Sunni Marginalization Risks Worsening Iraq Turmoil

Khaled Yacoub Oweis
Reuters
2 January 2005

BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Only four weeks before crucial elections, sectarian divisions threaten to worsen Iraq's unrest, with majority Shi'ite Muslims poised for political dominance and many Sunni Arabs boycotting the polls or too afraid to vote. Engaging the minority Sunnis, who have dominated Iraqi politics for eight decades but now fear a Shi'ite clerical resurgence, is vital for future national stability.

Several politicians have warned that if the Sunnis are sidelined, a Lebanese-style sectarian quota system for government posts could push Iraq toward civil war. The 2003 U.S.-led invasion ended a quarter-century of rule by Saddam Hussein, a Sunni -- and decades of Shi'ite marginalization dating back to the 1920s, when Iraq's British rulers excluded the Shi'ites from government after a failed revolt and Shi'ite clerics told their people to stay away from politics.

In a historic turnaround, the Jan. 30 elections are almost certain to produce a Shi'ite-dominated parliament that will choose a government and draft a new constitution. A low Sunni turnout would increase fears of future sectarian strife. The insurgency raging north and west of Baghdad is dominated by Sunni Arabs. Even Sunnis who support the elections fear they will be prevented from voting by attacks and intimidation.

Shi'ite parties, such as the Islamist Dawa, say the elections will help stabilize Iraq. But some Sunnis fear they will strengthen Islamists leading a Shi'ite list, who they say are eroding secularism and packing government with their supporters. They say Iraq could follow the worrying example of Lebanon, where quotas that allocated key government posts along sectarian lines helped spark civil war. "One third of Iraq will not take part in the polls. We are talking about major cities such as Mosul," said Umma Party leader Saad Jabr, whose father was prime minister under the British-installed monarchy. "There has been no census. A deadly quota system is plaguing the government. The election is treated as an end in itself, not a means to achieve democracy," he added.

SISTANI FACTOR

Shi'ites, led by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, their most influential cleric, have insisted the polls go ahead, as have the United States and Shi'ite neighbor Iran. The reclusive Sistani does not favor the involvement of clergy in politics, but even his enemies say he is a lynchpin preventing civil war by preaching against violence and intervening directly to prevent followers taking revenge on Sunnis who have killed Shi'ites. Sunni religious leaders -- including militant Wahabists who regrouped during the last years of Saddam's rule, to some extent with his backing -- have urged their followers not to vote but have offered no alternative other than backing the resistance. "Let the Americans leave and we'll talk then. The only word now is resistance," said a businessman from the Sunni city of Falluja, where the insurgency started shortly after the war. The former Baathist, who is in Jordan, says he funds the insurgents. Jail probably awaits him if he returns to Iraq.

The government has arrested Sunni clerics who declared support for the rebels and 160 active members of the anti-U.S. Sadr movement, a Shi'ite group that has warned of civil war if elections go ahead without Sunni participation. The movement, led by nationalist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, has bowed to the will of the more senior Sistani and agreed not to disrupt the polls. A mixed-religion movement led by Sheikh Jawad al-Khalisi has adopted a similar line.

The violence in Iraq has prompted Planning Minister Mehdi al-Hafedh, a prominent Shi'ite, to call for a national reconciliation conference ahead of elections. Reconstruction has all but stopped and hopes of economic recovery have been dashed. Sabotage has helped create a fuel and electricity crisis and disrupted oil exports. Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, eager to crack down on the insurgency, has tried to recruit the help of tribal leaders, as well as former agents of Saddam familiar with the Sunni heartland. Saddam used a mix of force and cash handouts to tribes to stay in power, but that formula may no longer work. The rise of militant Islamists has eroded the authority of tribal leaders. "Iraq's social order has changed," said a former officer from Falluja. "It took Saddam years to change the system. It became unrecognizable barely months after him."

c Reuters 2005

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Citation: Khaled Yacoub Oweis, "Sunni Marginalization Risks Worsening Iraq Turmoil," Reuters, 2 January 2005.