By Brian Krebs.
Newsbytes,26 December 2000.
Widespread media reports that Iraq has been importing the scarce and highly sought-after Playstation 2 video consoles for their military potential are unsubstantiated and groundless, a Sony spokesperson said today.
In the days leading up to December 25, several media outlets, including NBC, cited an unidentified US Customs officer as saying the popular PlayStation 2 units were being diverted from toy shops around Detroit to factions affiliated with the Iraqi military.
The stories note that the coveted video game units are being sought by the Iraqi government due to their hefty processing power, which when hooked together en masse could conceivably offer computing speeds similar to that of low-grade supercomputers, devices seen as necessary for the development and testing of weapons of mass destruction.
But Sony spokesperson Molly Smith said if Saddam Hussein wanted to get hold of a stash of Playstations, he'd have to get in line behind millions of other consumers.
"Right now, with our current inventory situation, it's likely that anyone - Saddam Hussein or otherwise - claiming to have a substantial number of Playstation 2 units is probably pulling your leg at this point," Smith said.
"This completely unsubstantiated story has been lingering for weeks and it's time to put it to rest."
The US government controls exports of processors based on their processing speed, measured in MTOPs (millions of theoretical operations per second.) Currently, exports of processors which measure 28,000 MTOPs or below have been decontrolled for export to nearly all countries of the world with the exception of nations labeled terrorist sponsors, including Iraq, Iran and Libya. For those nations, the processor speed limit is a mere 6 MTOPs.
Robert Majak, assistant secretary for export administration at the Commerce Departments Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) said while the Playstation
2 devices almost assuredly clock more than 6 MTOPs, there are more efficient and more commercially-available devices - desktop PCs that measure speeds of up to 6,500 MTOPs, for example - than this holiday's scarcest gift.
"I would assume that if Iran were determined to obtain such devices illegally, it would presumably go after something much more powerful than a chip in a toy of some sort," Majak said.
Citation: Brian Krebs. "Saddam Couldn't Get Playstations If He Tried - Sony," Newsbytes,26 December 2000.
Original URL: http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0NEW/is_2000_Dec_26/ai_68501911
This site is designed for use by researchers, educators, and students who seek access to its 2000+ military policy articles for research and/or educational purposes. Provided on a not-for-profit basis per 'fair use' rules.
06 April 2008
05 April 2008
Taiwan navy not ready for AEGIS
ARMS ACQUISITION: The US needs proof that Taiwan's navy is capable of operating the advanced warships and this, not China, is the main factor preventing the sale from going through, opines one defense analyst
By Brian Hsu.
The Taipei Times Online, 22 March 2001
"I know why the Americans insist on selling the decommissioned Kidds to us. These ships are to assist the Taiwan navy in getting used to operating much more sophisticated weapons platforms."
Erich Shih, a senior editor with 'Defense International' magazine
With or without pressure from China, the US government will not agree to sell AEGIS-equipped guided missile destroyers to Taiwan before the Taiwan navy proves itself to be competent to handle the advanced warships, a defense source told the Taipei Times yesterday.
The US government will use the Kidd-class destroyer, which it is to sell to Taiwan, to test whether the navy is qualified to operate a more advanced warship like the AEGIS-equipped Arleigh-Burke-class vessels, the defense source said.
"The US' hesitancy is understandable. It is also justifiable considering the past performance of the Taiwan navy in operating second-generation warships like the Knox-class, Cheng Kung-class, and Lafayette-class frigates over the past few years," the source said.
"The Kidd destroyer will be a testing ground for the navy. If they can prove themselves to be competent in every way to handle a state-of-the-art warship, the US will then seriously consider approving the sales of AEGIS ships to Taiwan."
Erich Shih (施孝瑋), a senior editor with Defense International magazine, said it is true that the AEGIS ships are quite different to any warship currently in service with Taiwan's navy.
Citing the air defense capabilities of the AEGIS warship as an example, Shih said: "The operation of Standard Missile II on the AEGIS [system] would be a new experience for the navy since it is quite different from any missile of a similar kind currently in use in the navy."
"We would not be able to get the Kidd warships until three years down the line. However, I know why the Americans insist on selling the decommissioned Kidds to us. These ships are to assist the Taiwan navy in getting used to operating much more sophisticated weapons platforms," Shih said.
Chung Chien (鍾堅), a National Tsing Hua University professor who has close contact with the military, offered a different view on the issue, saying the US will not sell the AEGIS ships to Taiwan but will offer something else.
"The US wants one AEGIS-like ship built in Taiwan," Chung said.
The ship will be built under full technical assistance from the US. It is to become the Taiwanese version of the AEGIS warship," Chung added.
"I do not think the US will transfer to us the technology for the construction of their AEGIS warships."
A defense official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the military has been prepared to accept the fact that the US will not agree to sell to Taiwan the AEGIS-equipped ships any time soon.
"We have an alternative plan under the circumstances. We will try to persuade the US to sell us the air defense phased-array radar used within the AEGIS system. The radar system is the best part of the warship. If we have the radar, we can build an anti-ballistic missile shield on our own," the official said.
"In other words, we will seek to build a land-based missile defense system. It is to be the second-best choice to the acquisition of AEGIS-equipped ships," he said.
"But there are yet many problems to be dealt with before the plan can become practicable," he added.
Citation: Brian Hsu. "Taiwan navy not ready for AEGIS," The Taipei Times Online, 22 March 2001.
Original URL: http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2001/03/22/story/0000078556
By Brian Hsu.
The Taipei Times Online, 22 March 2001
"I know why the Americans insist on selling the decommissioned Kidds to us. These ships are to assist the Taiwan navy in getting used to operating much more sophisticated weapons platforms."
Erich Shih, a senior editor with 'Defense International' magazine
With or without pressure from China, the US government will not agree to sell AEGIS-equipped guided missile destroyers to Taiwan before the Taiwan navy proves itself to be competent to handle the advanced warships, a defense source told the Taipei Times yesterday.
The US government will use the Kidd-class destroyer, which it is to sell to Taiwan, to test whether the navy is qualified to operate a more advanced warship like the AEGIS-equipped Arleigh-Burke-class vessels, the defense source said.
"The US' hesitancy is understandable. It is also justifiable considering the past performance of the Taiwan navy in operating second-generation warships like the Knox-class, Cheng Kung-class, and Lafayette-class frigates over the past few years," the source said.
"The Kidd destroyer will be a testing ground for the navy. If they can prove themselves to be competent in every way to handle a state-of-the-art warship, the US will then seriously consider approving the sales of AEGIS ships to Taiwan."
Erich Shih (施孝瑋), a senior editor with Defense International magazine, said it is true that the AEGIS ships are quite different to any warship currently in service with Taiwan's navy.
Citing the air defense capabilities of the AEGIS warship as an example, Shih said: "The operation of Standard Missile II on the AEGIS [system] would be a new experience for the navy since it is quite different from any missile of a similar kind currently in use in the navy."
"We would not be able to get the Kidd warships until three years down the line. However, I know why the Americans insist on selling the decommissioned Kidds to us. These ships are to assist the Taiwan navy in getting used to operating much more sophisticated weapons platforms," Shih said.
Chung Chien (鍾堅), a National Tsing Hua University professor who has close contact with the military, offered a different view on the issue, saying the US will not sell the AEGIS ships to Taiwan but will offer something else.
"The US wants one AEGIS-like ship built in Taiwan," Chung said.
The ship will be built under full technical assistance from the US. It is to become the Taiwanese version of the AEGIS warship," Chung added.
"I do not think the US will transfer to us the technology for the construction of their AEGIS warships."
A defense official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the military has been prepared to accept the fact that the US will not agree to sell to Taiwan the AEGIS-equipped ships any time soon.
"We have an alternative plan under the circumstances. We will try to persuade the US to sell us the air defense phased-array radar used within the AEGIS system. The radar system is the best part of the warship. If we have the radar, we can build an anti-ballistic missile shield on our own," the official said.
"In other words, we will seek to build a land-based missile defense system. It is to be the second-best choice to the acquisition of AEGIS-equipped ships," he said.
"But there are yet many problems to be dealt with before the plan can become practicable," he added.
Citation: Brian Hsu. "Taiwan navy not ready for AEGIS," The Taipei Times Online, 22 March 2001.
Original URL: http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2001/03/22/story/0000078556
US airplane was probing new warship
MID-AIR COLLISION: An intelligence source says the US Navy plane was attempting to collect data on China's most advanced warship when it collided with a Chinese jet fighter
By Brian Hsu.
The Taipei Times Online, 3 April 2001.
A US Navy surveillance aircraft that was forced to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island on Sunday was collecting information on a Russian-made Sovremenny-class destroyer, an intelligence source told the Taipei Times yesterday.
The propeller-driven EP-3 plane had attempted to fly away after colliding with one of two Chinese jet fighters, the intelligence source said. The collision caused the fighter to crash into the sea.
The source said the EP-3's attempt to fly away was aborted after the second jet fighter opened fire with its machine gun as a warning.
The source -- who had monitored the incident by radar and also listened to cockpit exchanges -- said he believed the EP-3 was forced to land by the Chinese fighter plane at an airport on Hainan.
US officials, on the other hand, have said the collision with the Chinese fighter had caused sufficient damage to the US plane for it to issue a "Mayday" signal and make an emergency landing.
Sunday was not the first time that a US surveillance plane such as the EP-3 has tried to collect information on the most advanced fighting ship in the Chinese navy, which poses a major threat to US aircraft carriers with its lethal Sunburn anti-ship missiles.
The EP-3 is packed with supersensitive electronic equipment capable of intercepting and analyzing radio and other electronic communications, and is used to track and collect information on enemy ships.
According to the intelligence source, Taiwan's military radar detected the EP-3 flying in circles in the vicinity of the Sovremenny at a low altitude and at a speed of around 250km per hour.
Two Chinese jet fighters taking off from their base in Guangdong Province arrived to intercept and drive away the visitor -- but the US Navy plane did not at first show any intention of leaving.
The two jets flew in formation side by side with the EP-3 for some time before one of the planes found it could not fly as slow as the US plane, which is powered by four turboprop engines
The Chinese jet tried to slow down by making a turn, the source said. Its attempt to do so caused the fighter to bump into the US aircraft and then crash into the sea.
The pilot, as well as the Chinese aircraft, remains missing.
Meanwhile, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense said Sunday's incident may affect arms sales talks between Taiwan and US.
"If the US takes a hard line on the matter, it will have a favorable effect upon the arms talks between Taiwan and the US," said Vice Admiral Kao Yang (高揚), deputy administrative defense minister. "But if the matter is solved within a short time, it is hard to say whether it will be good for us or not."
Citation: Brian Hsu. "US airplane was probing new warship," The Taipei Times Online, 3 April 2001.
Original URL: http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2001/04/03/story/0000080165
By Brian Hsu.
The Taipei Times Online, 3 April 2001.
A US Navy surveillance aircraft that was forced to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island on Sunday was collecting information on a Russian-made Sovremenny-class destroyer, an intelligence source told the Taipei Times yesterday.
The propeller-driven EP-3 plane had attempted to fly away after colliding with one of two Chinese jet fighters, the intelligence source said. The collision caused the fighter to crash into the sea.
The source said the EP-3's attempt to fly away was aborted after the second jet fighter opened fire with its machine gun as a warning.
The source -- who had monitored the incident by radar and also listened to cockpit exchanges -- said he believed the EP-3 was forced to land by the Chinese fighter plane at an airport on Hainan.
US officials, on the other hand, have said the collision with the Chinese fighter had caused sufficient damage to the US plane for it to issue a "Mayday" signal and make an emergency landing.
Sunday was not the first time that a US surveillance plane such as the EP-3 has tried to collect information on the most advanced fighting ship in the Chinese navy, which poses a major threat to US aircraft carriers with its lethal Sunburn anti-ship missiles.
The EP-3 is packed with supersensitive electronic equipment capable of intercepting and analyzing radio and other electronic communications, and is used to track and collect information on enemy ships.
According to the intelligence source, Taiwan's military radar detected the EP-3 flying in circles in the vicinity of the Sovremenny at a low altitude and at a speed of around 250km per hour.
Two Chinese jet fighters taking off from their base in Guangdong Province arrived to intercept and drive away the visitor -- but the US Navy plane did not at first show any intention of leaving.
The two jets flew in formation side by side with the EP-3 for some time before one of the planes found it could not fly as slow as the US plane, which is powered by four turboprop engines
The Chinese jet tried to slow down by making a turn, the source said. Its attempt to do so caused the fighter to bump into the US aircraft and then crash into the sea.
The pilot, as well as the Chinese aircraft, remains missing.
Meanwhile, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense said Sunday's incident may affect arms sales talks between Taiwan and US.
"If the US takes a hard line on the matter, it will have a favorable effect upon the arms talks between Taiwan and the US," said Vice Admiral Kao Yang (高揚), deputy administrative defense minister. "But if the matter is solved within a short time, it is hard to say whether it will be good for us or not."
Citation: Brian Hsu. "US airplane was probing new warship," The Taipei Times Online, 3 April 2001.
Original URL: http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2001/04/03/story/0000080165
American Hegemony in the Asia-Pacific
Australian Institute of International Affairs, 2001
As the Bush Administration attempts to shape America's Asia policy, it should keep in mind that American hegemony or leadership is not necessarily incompatible with a posture that provides incentives for security cooperation. Indeed, all means to provide stability in a potentially volatile region deserve a full airing. Perhaps, though, a distinction needs to be drawn between the more formalised versions of security cooperation such as a Concert of Asia that imply, over the course of an unspecified time-frame, a diminution of American dominance in the Asia-Pacific, and the very loose forms of security cooperation that are compatible with United States leadership in the Asia-Pacific. In this regard, recent calls by Zbigniew Brzezinski for greater security cooperation between the United States and the various players (including China) in the Asia-Pacific (Brzezinski 2000a: 6), that are implicitly premised on the existing reality of American dominance (Brzezinski 2000b), are far more viable than a Concert of Powers. They have the added merit of representing a practical attempt to think about ways to spread responsibility for the region's security affairs, thus avoiding the issue of 'imperial overstretch' that has tripped up previous global hegemons (Kennedy 1989). After all, why should the United States seek to deal unilaterally on every single issue that crops up (Huntington 1999)? A process of regional consultation among America's allies and willing partners to coordinate joint action towards specific problems may go some way to preserving American resources and capability to project power at a global level. The Australian-led intervention in East Timor in September 1999, which was backed up by American logistical support, is one example of such an approach.
Relying on existing American bilateral alliances and loose diplomatic formations is quite different from the notion of an explicit regional management system encapsulated in the idea of a Concert of Asia. On closer reading, the proposal for a formalised Concert of Asia along the lines of the Concert of Europe that some scholars endorse appears to have little to do with the intrinsic condition of the region's international relations. Rather, it seems to have more to with an attempt by some advocates to rehabilitate their notions of cooperative security. According to one commentator, 'A modern Asian concert is likely to be based on the same set of norms that underpin the ARF, and it may prove more effective in crisis-management and preventive diplomacy' (Acharya 1999b: 98). Thus, a Concert can be viewed as a middle way between the realist balance of power assumptions they oppose, and the multilateral security efforts they once extolled, but which were revealed as ineffective during the recent Asian economic crisis. If multilateralists are suggesting that an informal framework of bilateral meetings between the region's major powers constitute a putative Concert of Asia (Shirk 1997: 269-70), then one might inquire how this differs from routine diplomatic activity the world over? To label such activity with ostentatious terms like 'Concert' misunderstands the reality of international relations in the Asia-Pacific.
In conclusion, a Concert of Asia has little to recommend it in practice. The example of the Concert of Europe on which the idea draws its sustenance was a regressive construct that inhibited change and arguably contributed to the later convulsions in the European order (see Langhorne 1981). Whatever the merits of the Concert idea as a debating point, ultimately, the flaws of a short-lived system, the chief premise of which was to crush internal dissent, is neither an appropriate model for Asia in the twenty-first century, nor an inspiring advertisement of foreign policy enlightenment. As has been argued, an American grand strategy that seeks to preserve the United States' position in the global hierarchy is both plausible and desirable. Provided American leadership is exercised wisely, there is every reason to expect that rather than balancing against the United States, the majority of the region's major powers will bandwagon with, or otherwise defer to, the United States (see Walt 1987b; Schweller 1994). If anything, the war against terrorism has only accentuated this phenomenon, with all but the most rejectionist elements in the international system lining up behind US leadership. Moreover, the relative speed and effectiveness with which US military action dispatched the Taliban regime in Afghanistan merely underscores the dominance of American power rather than signalling a precursor to new forms of multilateral diplomacy. In so far as the security of the Asia-Pacific is concerned, one Southeast Asian diplomat encapsulated the prevailing viewpoint among the region's capitals when he observed that: 'even with all its problems we still need the United States. Basically our choice is between a hegemony in Washington or a hegemony in Beijing. We are still choosing the United States' (quoted in Pomfret 2001b). The foregoing quote highlights the relevance of Geoffrey Blainey's crucial theoretical insight, that it is a clear preponderance of power that is most likely to produce peace (Blainey 1973: 113). Despite claims to the contrary and the temporary alliances forged in the wake of the 11 September crisis, as it turns out, what is needed to manage the security in the Asia-Pacific is not a Concert of powers but a clear pecking order, with a benevolent hegemon-the United States-at the top.
Citation: "American Hegemony in the Asia-Pacific," Australian Institute of International Affairs, 2001
Original URL: http://www.aiia.asn.au/news/hegemony.html
As the Bush Administration attempts to shape America's Asia policy, it should keep in mind that American hegemony or leadership is not necessarily incompatible with a posture that provides incentives for security cooperation. Indeed, all means to provide stability in a potentially volatile region deserve a full airing. Perhaps, though, a distinction needs to be drawn between the more formalised versions of security cooperation such as a Concert of Asia that imply, over the course of an unspecified time-frame, a diminution of American dominance in the Asia-Pacific, and the very loose forms of security cooperation that are compatible with United States leadership in the Asia-Pacific. In this regard, recent calls by Zbigniew Brzezinski for greater security cooperation between the United States and the various players (including China) in the Asia-Pacific (Brzezinski 2000a: 6), that are implicitly premised on the existing reality of American dominance (Brzezinski 2000b), are far more viable than a Concert of Powers. They have the added merit of representing a practical attempt to think about ways to spread responsibility for the region's security affairs, thus avoiding the issue of 'imperial overstretch' that has tripped up previous global hegemons (Kennedy 1989). After all, why should the United States seek to deal unilaterally on every single issue that crops up (Huntington 1999)? A process of regional consultation among America's allies and willing partners to coordinate joint action towards specific problems may go some way to preserving American resources and capability to project power at a global level. The Australian-led intervention in East Timor in September 1999, which was backed up by American logistical support, is one example of such an approach.
Relying on existing American bilateral alliances and loose diplomatic formations is quite different from the notion of an explicit regional management system encapsulated in the idea of a Concert of Asia. On closer reading, the proposal for a formalised Concert of Asia along the lines of the Concert of Europe that some scholars endorse appears to have little to do with the intrinsic condition of the region's international relations. Rather, it seems to have more to with an attempt by some advocates to rehabilitate their notions of cooperative security. According to one commentator, 'A modern Asian concert is likely to be based on the same set of norms that underpin the ARF, and it may prove more effective in crisis-management and preventive diplomacy' (Acharya 1999b: 98). Thus, a Concert can be viewed as a middle way between the realist balance of power assumptions they oppose, and the multilateral security efforts they once extolled, but which were revealed as ineffective during the recent Asian economic crisis. If multilateralists are suggesting that an informal framework of bilateral meetings between the region's major powers constitute a putative Concert of Asia (Shirk 1997: 269-70), then one might inquire how this differs from routine diplomatic activity the world over? To label such activity with ostentatious terms like 'Concert' misunderstands the reality of international relations in the Asia-Pacific.
In conclusion, a Concert of Asia has little to recommend it in practice. The example of the Concert of Europe on which the idea draws its sustenance was a regressive construct that inhibited change and arguably contributed to the later convulsions in the European order (see Langhorne 1981). Whatever the merits of the Concert idea as a debating point, ultimately, the flaws of a short-lived system, the chief premise of which was to crush internal dissent, is neither an appropriate model for Asia in the twenty-first century, nor an inspiring advertisement of foreign policy enlightenment. As has been argued, an American grand strategy that seeks to preserve the United States' position in the global hierarchy is both plausible and desirable. Provided American leadership is exercised wisely, there is every reason to expect that rather than balancing against the United States, the majority of the region's major powers will bandwagon with, or otherwise defer to, the United States (see Walt 1987b; Schweller 1994). If anything, the war against terrorism has only accentuated this phenomenon, with all but the most rejectionist elements in the international system lining up behind US leadership. Moreover, the relative speed and effectiveness with which US military action dispatched the Taliban regime in Afghanistan merely underscores the dominance of American power rather than signalling a precursor to new forms of multilateral diplomacy. In so far as the security of the Asia-Pacific is concerned, one Southeast Asian diplomat encapsulated the prevailing viewpoint among the region's capitals when he observed that: 'even with all its problems we still need the United States. Basically our choice is between a hegemony in Washington or a hegemony in Beijing. We are still choosing the United States' (quoted in Pomfret 2001b). The foregoing quote highlights the relevance of Geoffrey Blainey's crucial theoretical insight, that it is a clear preponderance of power that is most likely to produce peace (Blainey 1973: 113). Despite claims to the contrary and the temporary alliances forged in the wake of the 11 September crisis, as it turns out, what is needed to manage the security in the Asia-Pacific is not a Concert of powers but a clear pecking order, with a benevolent hegemon-the United States-at the top.
Citation: "American Hegemony in the Asia-Pacific," Australian Institute of International Affairs, 2001
Original URL: http://www.aiia.asn.au/news/hegemony.html