Australian Institute of International Affairs, 2001
As the Bush Administration attempts to shape America's Asia policy, it should keep in mind that American hegemony or leadership is not necessarily incompatible with a posture that provides incentives for security cooperation. Indeed, all means to provide stability in a potentially volatile region deserve a full airing. Perhaps, though, a distinction needs to be drawn between the more formalised versions of security cooperation such as a Concert of Asia that imply, over the course of an unspecified time-frame, a diminution of American dominance in the Asia-Pacific, and the very loose forms of security cooperation that are compatible with United States leadership in the Asia-Pacific. In this regard, recent calls by Zbigniew Brzezinski for greater security cooperation between the United States and the various players (including China) in the Asia-Pacific (Brzezinski 2000a: 6), that are implicitly premised on the existing reality of American dominance (Brzezinski 2000b), are far more viable than a Concert of Powers. They have the added merit of representing a practical attempt to think about ways to spread responsibility for the region's security affairs, thus avoiding the issue of 'imperial overstretch' that has tripped up previous global hegemons (Kennedy 1989). After all, why should the United States seek to deal unilaterally on every single issue that crops up (Huntington 1999)? A process of regional consultation among America's allies and willing partners to coordinate joint action towards specific problems may go some way to preserving American resources and capability to project power at a global level. The Australian-led intervention in East Timor in September 1999, which was backed up by American logistical support, is one example of such an approach.
Relying on existing American bilateral alliances and loose diplomatic formations is quite different from the notion of an explicit regional management system encapsulated in the idea of a Concert of Asia. On closer reading, the proposal for a formalised Concert of Asia along the lines of the Concert of Europe that some scholars endorse appears to have little to do with the intrinsic condition of the region's international relations. Rather, it seems to have more to with an attempt by some advocates to rehabilitate their notions of cooperative security. According to one commentator, 'A modern Asian concert is likely to be based on the same set of norms that underpin the ARF, and it may prove more effective in crisis-management and preventive diplomacy' (Acharya 1999b: 98). Thus, a Concert can be viewed as a middle way between the realist balance of power assumptions they oppose, and the multilateral security efforts they once extolled, but which were revealed as ineffective during the recent Asian economic crisis. If multilateralists are suggesting that an informal framework of bilateral meetings between the region's major powers constitute a putative Concert of Asia (Shirk 1997: 269-70), then one might inquire how this differs from routine diplomatic activity the world over? To label such activity with ostentatious terms like 'Concert' misunderstands the reality of international relations in the Asia-Pacific.
In conclusion, a Concert of Asia has little to recommend it in practice. The example of the Concert of Europe on which the idea draws its sustenance was a regressive construct that inhibited change and arguably contributed to the later convulsions in the European order (see Langhorne 1981). Whatever the merits of the Concert idea as a debating point, ultimately, the flaws of a short-lived system, the chief premise of which was to crush internal dissent, is neither an appropriate model for Asia in the twenty-first century, nor an inspiring advertisement of foreign policy enlightenment. As has been argued, an American grand strategy that seeks to preserve the United States' position in the global hierarchy is both plausible and desirable. Provided American leadership is exercised wisely, there is every reason to expect that rather than balancing against the United States, the majority of the region's major powers will bandwagon with, or otherwise defer to, the United States (see Walt 1987b; Schweller 1994). If anything, the war against terrorism has only accentuated this phenomenon, with all but the most rejectionist elements in the international system lining up behind US leadership. Moreover, the relative speed and effectiveness with which US military action dispatched the Taliban regime in Afghanistan merely underscores the dominance of American power rather than signalling a precursor to new forms of multilateral diplomacy. In so far as the security of the Asia-Pacific is concerned, one Southeast Asian diplomat encapsulated the prevailing viewpoint among the region's capitals when he observed that: 'even with all its problems we still need the United States. Basically our choice is between a hegemony in Washington or a hegemony in Beijing. We are still choosing the United States' (quoted in Pomfret 2001b). The foregoing quote highlights the relevance of Geoffrey Blainey's crucial theoretical insight, that it is a clear preponderance of power that is most likely to produce peace (Blainey 1973: 113). Despite claims to the contrary and the temporary alliances forged in the wake of the 11 September crisis, as it turns out, what is needed to manage the security in the Asia-Pacific is not a Concert of powers but a clear pecking order, with a benevolent hegemon-the United States-at the top.
Citation: "American Hegemony in the Asia-Pacific," Australian Institute of International Affairs, 2001
Original URL: http://www.aiia.asn.au/news/hegemony.html