Inside Defense
The Marine Corps is continuing to work on and fund upgrades to its Light Armored Vehicles in an attempt to keep the fleet functional through 2025, two decades past its original retirement date.
Of the four existing Light Armored Reconnaissance battalions, at least one has been deployed to either Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom at all times in the last several years, Robert Lusardi, the deputy program manager said. That is putting a strain on the LAVs, just as the two wars have with the rest of the Marine Corps’ rolling stock.
“What we’re seeing is what everybody else is seeing in the world, and what the whole ground combat equipment fleet is seeing,” Lusardi said at an industry conference last week. “We’re getting older. We have to sustain them. At the same time we have to sustain them, we have to improve them.”
The Marines are currently in the process of updating their LAVs to the A2 variant, which Lusardi said took a rapid acquisition approach at the start of the Iraq war. The program management office procured the components necessary to carry out the upgrade, integrated the systems and began fielding them through depots.
The first A2 variants were fielded in 2007, and they include improved suspension and armor and an automatic fire-suppression system.
Lusardi said that the A2 upgrade is now in place through 65 percent of the vehicle fleet. The office has also carried out upgrades to the command and control LAV variant.
The next iteration will be an anti-tank variant, which was funded in the 2010 budget. Lusardi said that the development process has already begun, and he expects the variant to be fielded by fiscal year 2016 or FY-17.
Lusardi said that the program office will continue to look at ways to make the LAV more survivable, including adding further improved suspension systems and reconfiguring the fuel tank, although there is no funding for those initiatives yet. -- Cid Standifer
NAVY-23-7-15
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22 February 2010
General: Military Must Better Understand Non-Nuclear Deterrence
Inside Defense
Feb. 19, 2010 -- As the Defense Department moves away from nuclear weapons as the nation’s sole means of deterrence, it must strengthen its efforts to understand what other actions would keep would-be adversaries in check, according to the two-star officer leading U.S. Strategic Command's global strike directorate.
“We were very good at [understanding] the Soviet Union; we were very aware of their thinking,” Air Force Maj. Gen. Floyd Carpenter told InsideDefense.com. “We are not so good at other countries, I don't think. That intelligence piece is going to be critical and must grow,” he said in a brief interview following a Feb. 18 speech at the Nuclear Deterrence Summit, an industry conference in Alexandria, VA.
His comments come as defense officials wrestle with the question of how -- and if -- terrorist organizations can be deterred. Defense officials have said they need conventional kinetic deterrence capabilities that would allow the United States to respond more moderately to threats, without deploying atomic weapons. In addition, the Pentagon's emerging deterrence concept envisions a role for civilian agencies to “encourage restraint,” “deny benefits” or “impose cost,” Carpenter said, using terms from joint deterrence doctrine.
Without mentioning specific groups or countries, Carpenter said America's enemies today are more “risk-tolerant” than the Soviet Union and the United States were during the Cold War era, when the fear of mutual destruction through overwhelming force kept a fragile balance between the two superpowers.
Still, he argued, there are starting points for crafting a deterrence strategy against all adversaries -- they just need to be found. “All of us human beings have some risk aversion. It might not be the same aversion as you or I have, but that's the point. We need to understand what that point is and work that,” Carpenter told InsideDefense.com.
“They may not be afraid to die for their god, their religion or their country or whatever it might be. But they may have some other aversion” where adversaries cannot accept risk, he added. “I think that's the real point is find out what that is and work on that, as opposed to just say, 'We're going to come kill you if you continue to do that.”
During his speech, however, Carpenter delivered a passionate defense of traditional nuclear deterrence. “I don't know how you can survive in a nuclear world without a nuclear deterrent,” he said when asked by the moderator about the utility of strategic nuclear deterrence in the age of terrorism. “I would be very concerned as a taxpayer if other countries had a credible . . . [ability] to strike the United States, your home town, and we didn't have a response.
“If we’re just going to rely on missile defense or good will or a conventional capability, I would be very concerned,” he added. “And I think you should be very concerned, personally. I know we are friendlier today than we were 25 years ago. I guess I'm not that . . . trusting.” -- Sebastian Sprenger
21902010_feb19b
Feb. 19, 2010 -- As the Defense Department moves away from nuclear weapons as the nation’s sole means of deterrence, it must strengthen its efforts to understand what other actions would keep would-be adversaries in check, according to the two-star officer leading U.S. Strategic Command's global strike directorate.
“We were very good at [understanding] the Soviet Union; we were very aware of their thinking,” Air Force Maj. Gen. Floyd Carpenter told InsideDefense.com. “We are not so good at other countries, I don't think. That intelligence piece is going to be critical and must grow,” he said in a brief interview following a Feb. 18 speech at the Nuclear Deterrence Summit, an industry conference in Alexandria, VA.
His comments come as defense officials wrestle with the question of how -- and if -- terrorist organizations can be deterred. Defense officials have said they need conventional kinetic deterrence capabilities that would allow the United States to respond more moderately to threats, without deploying atomic weapons. In addition, the Pentagon's emerging deterrence concept envisions a role for civilian agencies to “encourage restraint,” “deny benefits” or “impose cost,” Carpenter said, using terms from joint deterrence doctrine.
Without mentioning specific groups or countries, Carpenter said America's enemies today are more “risk-tolerant” than the Soviet Union and the United States were during the Cold War era, when the fear of mutual destruction through overwhelming force kept a fragile balance between the two superpowers.
Still, he argued, there are starting points for crafting a deterrence strategy against all adversaries -- they just need to be found. “All of us human beings have some risk aversion. It might not be the same aversion as you or I have, but that's the point. We need to understand what that point is and work that,” Carpenter told InsideDefense.com.
“They may not be afraid to die for their god, their religion or their country or whatever it might be. But they may have some other aversion” where adversaries cannot accept risk, he added. “I think that's the real point is find out what that is and work on that, as opposed to just say, 'We're going to come kill you if you continue to do that.”
During his speech, however, Carpenter delivered a passionate defense of traditional nuclear deterrence. “I don't know how you can survive in a nuclear world without a nuclear deterrent,” he said when asked by the moderator about the utility of strategic nuclear deterrence in the age of terrorism. “I would be very concerned as a taxpayer if other countries had a credible . . . [ability] to strike the United States, your home town, and we didn't have a response.
“If we’re just going to rely on missile defense or good will or a conventional capability, I would be very concerned,” he added. “And I think you should be very concerned, personally. I know we are friendlier today than we were 25 years ago. I guess I'm not that . . . trusting.” -- Sebastian Sprenger
21902010_feb19b
Army Considering Adding V-Shaped Hulls To Stryker Vehicles
Inside Defense
Feb. 19, 2010 -- The Army is considering a new plan to add a v-shaped hull to its Stryker vehicle fleet to provide improved protection against blasts from roadside bombs, an initiative that is being weighed as part of a package of accelerated modifications that could be acted on quickly, according to service officials.
Specifically, the Army is weighing a proposal to modify the current flat underside of the eight-wheeled combat vehicle with a “double-v-shaped hull” to give the Stryker vehicle a level of protection against improvised explosive devices comparable to that of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, according to sources familiar with the concept.
“There is a study under way looking for what survivability increases can we do for the vehicle,” said an Army official who said the assessment includes a concept for “a double-v hull.”
While the Army is conducting a routine recalibration of its long-term plans to modify and upgrade the Stryker fleet, the service is simultaneously looking at options for expediting things that might immediately improve troop safety.
“This is an exceptionally accelerated approach and if it can be done, the Army is interested,” said a second service official. The aim of the assessment is to determine “what could be incorporated rapidly to affect current combat operations,” the official added.
Modifications being considered include those that reflect lessons learned not only during operations in Iraq but also by the Stryker brigade currently fighting in Afghanistan, sources said.
Army leaders are still being briefed on the concept, which has yet to be presented to the Pentagon's acquisition executive, who has oversight of Stryker acquisition decisions.
The double-v-shaped hull would require a number of modifications to the Stryker, including a new suspension capable of lowering the vehicle for improved stability during off-road operations, a more powerful engine to accommodate the increased weight and wider tires. Other modifications being considered include blast protection kits for the vehicle’s interior and a reinforced driver's capsule.
The Army has requested $445 million for Stryker modifications in the fiscal year 2011 war cost spending bill; additional funding would be required for modifications to the hull, a source familiar with the concept said.
Should Army leaders elect to push ahead with such Stryker modifications, a number of issues would have to be addressed, including when to cut into the current production line -- which is cranking out combat vehicles at the rate of roughly 35 a month -- and exactly when these vehicles might be shipped to Afghanistan. -- Jason Sherman
2192010_feb19c
Feb. 19, 2010 -- The Army is considering a new plan to add a v-shaped hull to its Stryker vehicle fleet to provide improved protection against blasts from roadside bombs, an initiative that is being weighed as part of a package of accelerated modifications that could be acted on quickly, according to service officials.
Specifically, the Army is weighing a proposal to modify the current flat underside of the eight-wheeled combat vehicle with a “double-v-shaped hull” to give the Stryker vehicle a level of protection against improvised explosive devices comparable to that of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, according to sources familiar with the concept.
“There is a study under way looking for what survivability increases can we do for the vehicle,” said an Army official who said the assessment includes a concept for “a double-v hull.”
While the Army is conducting a routine recalibration of its long-term plans to modify and upgrade the Stryker fleet, the service is simultaneously looking at options for expediting things that might immediately improve troop safety.
“This is an exceptionally accelerated approach and if it can be done, the Army is interested,” said a second service official. The aim of the assessment is to determine “what could be incorporated rapidly to affect current combat operations,” the official added.
Modifications being considered include those that reflect lessons learned not only during operations in Iraq but also by the Stryker brigade currently fighting in Afghanistan, sources said.
Army leaders are still being briefed on the concept, which has yet to be presented to the Pentagon's acquisition executive, who has oversight of Stryker acquisition decisions.
The double-v-shaped hull would require a number of modifications to the Stryker, including a new suspension capable of lowering the vehicle for improved stability during off-road operations, a more powerful engine to accommodate the increased weight and wider tires. Other modifications being considered include blast protection kits for the vehicle’s interior and a reinforced driver's capsule.
The Army has requested $445 million for Stryker modifications in the fiscal year 2011 war cost spending bill; additional funding would be required for modifications to the hull, a source familiar with the concept said.
Should Army leaders elect to push ahead with such Stryker modifications, a number of issues would have to be addressed, including when to cut into the current production line -- which is cranking out combat vehicles at the rate of roughly 35 a month -- and exactly when these vehicles might be shipped to Afghanistan. -- Jason Sherman
2192010_feb19c
17 February 2010
Pentagon Spends Nearly $1.1 Billion On More Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles
Inside Defense
Feb. 16, 2010 -- The Defense Department today announced new orders worth close to $1.1 billion for more original Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, fulfilling a directive from Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter.
According to the Pentagon's announcement, the military ordered category I MRAPs from Navistar, worth $751.5 million, though the award does not specify the quantity. The trucks are to include engineering change proposal upgrades for enhanced maneuverability.
"This order will also be used for the procurement of Category I MRAP vehicles which provide protection of U.S. military personnel supporting Operation Enduring Freedom," the announcement says, noting that work is expected to be completed by the end of August.
Additionally, the Pentagon ordered 250 MRAPs -- at a cost of $227.4 million -- from General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada. "The procurement is for 250 MRAP RG-31A2 vehicles and associated engineering change proposal upgrades to include an independent suspension system," the announcement says. Work is expected to be complete by the end of October.
DOD also announced it will buy 58 category I MRAPs from BAE Systems at a price of $90.6 million. The work should be complete by March 2011, the announcement adds. Inside the Army first reported on Feb. 2 that the Pentagon would be buying more than 2,800 MRAPs -- about half of which would be original versions of the blast-proof trucks.
In a Jan. 29 memo, Carter called for the quick purchase of the MRAPs and MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles to meet vehicle needs in Afghanistan. Carter wrote that U.S. Central Command issued a Dec. 24, 2009, request for additional MRAP vehicles in Afghanistan.
But, citing uncertainty about “how many vehicles will ultimately be required,” he added, “it is important to begin production and initial fielding since otherwise needed vehicles will be unnecessarily delayed.”
Consequently, Carter approved an increase in the MRAP low-rate initial production quantity to 25,700. He also allowed immediate orders of 1,460 M-ATVs from Oshkosh and 1,050 MRAP Dash vehicles with independent suspension systems from Navistar. He directed the program office buy 250 RG-31A3 vehicles with ISS from General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada and 58 RG-33s from BAE Systems.
Both Navistar and GDLS-C have already produced MRAPs for Afghanistan, but not in recent months. In late 2008, the Pentagon ordered more than 1,200 of Navistar’s category I MRAP trucks -- which the company calls the MaxxPro Dash -- to send to the country. The company has said the vehicle allows “for greater mobility in a smaller, lighter-weight vehicle optimized for Afghanistan operations.”
Like Navistar, GDLS-C has built many MRAPs sent to Afghanistan and last provided nearly 800 MRAPs under an award made in July 2008. -- Marjorie Censer
2162010_feb16c
Feb. 16, 2010 -- The Defense Department today announced new orders worth close to $1.1 billion for more original Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, fulfilling a directive from Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter.
According to the Pentagon's announcement, the military ordered category I MRAPs from Navistar, worth $751.5 million, though the award does not specify the quantity. The trucks are to include engineering change proposal upgrades for enhanced maneuverability.
"This order will also be used for the procurement of Category I MRAP vehicles which provide protection of U.S. military personnel supporting Operation Enduring Freedom," the announcement says, noting that work is expected to be completed by the end of August.
Additionally, the Pentagon ordered 250 MRAPs -- at a cost of $227.4 million -- from General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada. "The procurement is for 250 MRAP RG-31A2 vehicles and associated engineering change proposal upgrades to include an independent suspension system," the announcement says. Work is expected to be complete by the end of October.
DOD also announced it will buy 58 category I MRAPs from BAE Systems at a price of $90.6 million. The work should be complete by March 2011, the announcement adds. Inside the Army first reported on Feb. 2 that the Pentagon would be buying more than 2,800 MRAPs -- about half of which would be original versions of the blast-proof trucks.
In a Jan. 29 memo, Carter called for the quick purchase of the MRAPs and MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles to meet vehicle needs in Afghanistan. Carter wrote that U.S. Central Command issued a Dec. 24, 2009, request for additional MRAP vehicles in Afghanistan.
But, citing uncertainty about “how many vehicles will ultimately be required,” he added, “it is important to begin production and initial fielding since otherwise needed vehicles will be unnecessarily delayed.”
Consequently, Carter approved an increase in the MRAP low-rate initial production quantity to 25,700. He also allowed immediate orders of 1,460 M-ATVs from Oshkosh and 1,050 MRAP Dash vehicles with independent suspension systems from Navistar. He directed the program office buy 250 RG-31A3 vehicles with ISS from General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada and 58 RG-33s from BAE Systems.
Both Navistar and GDLS-C have already produced MRAPs for Afghanistan, but not in recent months. In late 2008, the Pentagon ordered more than 1,200 of Navistar’s category I MRAP trucks -- which the company calls the MaxxPro Dash -- to send to the country. The company has said the vehicle allows “for greater mobility in a smaller, lighter-weight vehicle optimized for Afghanistan operations.”
Like Navistar, GDLS-C has built many MRAPs sent to Afghanistan and last provided nearly 800 MRAPs under an award made in July 2008. -- Marjorie Censer
2162010_feb16c
DOD Study Documents Military's Reliance on Contractors
Inside Defense
Feb. 16, 2010 -- During the Iraq war, the Defense Department depended most heavily on contractors performing logistics services, followed by private interpreters and trainers and information technology specialists, according to an unreleased Joint Staff study.
The results, showing logistics contractors making up the vast majority of personnel deployed alongside U.S. forces in Iraq, are hardly surprising, officials said. But the study is the first-ever attempt to take an in-depth look at the contractor force accompanying U.S. forces in Iraq, and its results are expected to help answer questions about what kinds of capabilities the military should purchase as needed, and what capabilities should reside in the force.
The study is the result of a multi-phased effort initiated by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen, who asked his staff for a formal analysis that would allow him to gauge DOD's reliance on contractors during wartime. During phase two of the effort, which is slated to wrap up soon, officials waded through 36,000 lines of contract data, considered eight quarterly censuses of U.S. Central Command contractors and grouped all contracted services into nine so-called joint capability areas, according to a January 2010 Joint Staff briefing.
In total, there were 151,000 contractors providing logistics services in Iraq during the third quarter of fiscal year 2008, according to the briefing. In addition, 14,000 were providing services belonging in the “building partnerships” rubric (including interpreters); and 9,000 were performing work classified as force protection operations, the document states.
When comparing the contractor numbers to the amount of uniformed personnel dedicated to the same JCAs, the contractor-military discrepancy in the logistics field was greatest, at 4.8 to 1, followed by a ratio of 1:1 for net-centric services, 1.3:1 for building partnerships and 2.5:1 for the field “corporate management and support,” according to the briefing. The 0.3:1 ratio in the force protection JCA represents a “high reliance” on contractors, versus a “high dependence” in the other fields.
The traditional military disciplines of force application and command and control had only minute contractor involvement, the slides state.
“DOD is dependent on contract support for large-scale, long-term overseas contingency operations in key areas where executive force cap, troop rotations, dwell time, high-demand/low-density skill sets, and quality of life for military personnel are preserved,” the document reads.
The contractor study's upcoming phase III will focus on improving DOD planning processes so contractor use becomes predictable during future operations. Ad-hoc oversight by government officials and an unprecedented flow of private workers to Iraq was to blame for instances of waste, fraud and abuse there during the past years, officials have said.
Joint Staff officials are pushing for upcoming revisions of the senior-level Guidance for the Employment of the Force and the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance to include language that would require combatant commanders to “plan for contracted support to the same level of fidelity as forces,” according to the Joint Staff briefing. -- Sebastian Sprenger
2162010_feb16d
Feb. 16, 2010 -- During the Iraq war, the Defense Department depended most heavily on contractors performing logistics services, followed by private interpreters and trainers and information technology specialists, according to an unreleased Joint Staff study.
The results, showing logistics contractors making up the vast majority of personnel deployed alongside U.S. forces in Iraq, are hardly surprising, officials said. But the study is the first-ever attempt to take an in-depth look at the contractor force accompanying U.S. forces in Iraq, and its results are expected to help answer questions about what kinds of capabilities the military should purchase as needed, and what capabilities should reside in the force.
The study is the result of a multi-phased effort initiated by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen, who asked his staff for a formal analysis that would allow him to gauge DOD's reliance on contractors during wartime. During phase two of the effort, which is slated to wrap up soon, officials waded through 36,000 lines of contract data, considered eight quarterly censuses of U.S. Central Command contractors and grouped all contracted services into nine so-called joint capability areas, according to a January 2010 Joint Staff briefing.
In total, there were 151,000 contractors providing logistics services in Iraq during the third quarter of fiscal year 2008, according to the briefing. In addition, 14,000 were providing services belonging in the “building partnerships” rubric (including interpreters); and 9,000 were performing work classified as force protection operations, the document states.
When comparing the contractor numbers to the amount of uniformed personnel dedicated to the same JCAs, the contractor-military discrepancy in the logistics field was greatest, at 4.8 to 1, followed by a ratio of 1:1 for net-centric services, 1.3:1 for building partnerships and 2.5:1 for the field “corporate management and support,” according to the briefing. The 0.3:1 ratio in the force protection JCA represents a “high reliance” on contractors, versus a “high dependence” in the other fields.
The traditional military disciplines of force application and command and control had only minute contractor involvement, the slides state.
“DOD is dependent on contract support for large-scale, long-term overseas contingency operations in key areas where executive force cap, troop rotations, dwell time, high-demand/low-density skill sets, and quality of life for military personnel are preserved,” the document reads.
The contractor study's upcoming phase III will focus on improving DOD planning processes so contractor use becomes predictable during future operations. Ad-hoc oversight by government officials and an unprecedented flow of private workers to Iraq was to blame for instances of waste, fraud and abuse there during the past years, officials have said.
Joint Staff officials are pushing for upcoming revisions of the senior-level Guidance for the Employment of the Force and the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance to include language that would require combatant commanders to “plan for contracted support to the same level of fidelity as forces,” according to the Joint Staff briefing. -- Sebastian Sprenger
2162010_feb16d
16 February 2010
Army Drafting Options For Formation Of Additional Combat Aviation Brigade
Army Guard may provide AH-64Ds
Inside Army
As soon as next month, the Army will present the Office of the Secretary of Defense a set of options for how to resource an additional combat aviation brigade, a proposition that could cost billions of dollars and is expected to involve the purchase of new helicopters as well as new ways of using existing aircraft, according to Pentagon officials.
OSD, in a classified resource directive issued last year, asked the Army to deliver by Feb. 1 proposals for how to field a 13th combat aviation brigade in order to provide additional “enablers” that combatant commanders say are critical to operations like those in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Army officials are still preparing options and associated analysis for how to further expand the service’s aviation force by fiscal year 2015, in accordance with guidance from OSD.
“The Defense Department has asked the Army to look at courses of action on how we’d increase Army aviation capacity in the active component,” said a service official. “We’re looking at lots of different options; we’re admiring the problem right now.”
The assessment, according to Pentagon officials, is examining everything from where to base the aircraft, how quickly they might be stood up and associated pilot training issues.
A combat aviation brigade can be assembled from up to five types of aviation battalions or squadrons: general support aviation operate UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters and CH-47 Chinook cargo helicopters; assault battalions are equipped with UH-60s; light attack and reconnaissance squadrons fly OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters; and heavy attack and reconnaissance battalions are equipped with AH-64 Apache attack helicopters.
The Army’s FY-11 budget request sent to Congress earlier this month includes funds to begin forming a 12th combat aviation brigade, and the service’s new five-year investment plan includes funds to begin forming a 13th combat aviation brigade by FY-15, as Inside the Army has reported.
Resourcing the 13th aviation brigade will require purchases of new aircraft. Also, the Army staff is exploring where it might utilize existing equipment.
For example, Pentagon officials say that one proposal floated in recent weeks as part of the OSD-directed study was for AH-64D Apache helicopters assigned to the National Guard to be folded into the attack battalion of the 13th aviation brigade. Army sources say that proposal initially met with resistance from the Guard’s leadership.
However, a source close to the National Guard Bureau said that the Army Guard would be willing to offer 20 AH-64Ds for the new brigade.
“The Army Guard is going to give 20 helicopters to stand up the 13th CAB,” said a source. “They’re not happy about it, but they are being team players.”
Asked about this development, a spokesman for the National Guard Bureau said only that discussions on the matter are continuing.
“The Army National Guard is working with Department of the Army to develop courses of action, and determine the feasibility of various resource options, to form a 13th combat aviation brigade with existing aircraft and force structure,” said Lt. Col. Robert Ditchey. “No decision has been made how this will impact the Army National Guard.”
Army National Guard units operate nearly 100 AH-64D aircraft, combat helicopters with very limited utility in a homeland defense and state roles, Pentagon officials said.
Guard units in North Carolina, Utah and Arizona have 24 AH-64D models each, and South Carolina’s Guard has 16, according to a source knowledgeable about Army National Guard aviation capabilities. In addition, Army National Guard units in Pennsylvania, Idaho, Missouri and Texas all operate versions of the AH-64 that are slated to be upgraded to the D model over the next five years, the source said. -- Jason Sherman
ARMY-22-6-2
Inside Army
As soon as next month, the Army will present the Office of the Secretary of Defense a set of options for how to resource an additional combat aviation brigade, a proposition that could cost billions of dollars and is expected to involve the purchase of new helicopters as well as new ways of using existing aircraft, according to Pentagon officials.
OSD, in a classified resource directive issued last year, asked the Army to deliver by Feb. 1 proposals for how to field a 13th combat aviation brigade in order to provide additional “enablers” that combatant commanders say are critical to operations like those in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Army officials are still preparing options and associated analysis for how to further expand the service’s aviation force by fiscal year 2015, in accordance with guidance from OSD.
“The Defense Department has asked the Army to look at courses of action on how we’d increase Army aviation capacity in the active component,” said a service official. “We’re looking at lots of different options; we’re admiring the problem right now.”
The assessment, according to Pentagon officials, is examining everything from where to base the aircraft, how quickly they might be stood up and associated pilot training issues.
A combat aviation brigade can be assembled from up to five types of aviation battalions or squadrons: general support aviation operate UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters and CH-47 Chinook cargo helicopters; assault battalions are equipped with UH-60s; light attack and reconnaissance squadrons fly OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters; and heavy attack and reconnaissance battalions are equipped with AH-64 Apache attack helicopters.
The Army’s FY-11 budget request sent to Congress earlier this month includes funds to begin forming a 12th combat aviation brigade, and the service’s new five-year investment plan includes funds to begin forming a 13th combat aviation brigade by FY-15, as Inside the Army has reported.
Resourcing the 13th aviation brigade will require purchases of new aircraft. Also, the Army staff is exploring where it might utilize existing equipment.
For example, Pentagon officials say that one proposal floated in recent weeks as part of the OSD-directed study was for AH-64D Apache helicopters assigned to the National Guard to be folded into the attack battalion of the 13th aviation brigade. Army sources say that proposal initially met with resistance from the Guard’s leadership.
However, a source close to the National Guard Bureau said that the Army Guard would be willing to offer 20 AH-64Ds for the new brigade.
“The Army Guard is going to give 20 helicopters to stand up the 13th CAB,” said a source. “They’re not happy about it, but they are being team players.”
Asked about this development, a spokesman for the National Guard Bureau said only that discussions on the matter are continuing.
“The Army National Guard is working with Department of the Army to develop courses of action, and determine the feasibility of various resource options, to form a 13th combat aviation brigade with existing aircraft and force structure,” said Lt. Col. Robert Ditchey. “No decision has been made how this will impact the Army National Guard.”
Army National Guard units operate nearly 100 AH-64D aircraft, combat helicopters with very limited utility in a homeland defense and state roles, Pentagon officials said.
Guard units in North Carolina, Utah and Arizona have 24 AH-64D models each, and South Carolina’s Guard has 16, according to a source knowledgeable about Army National Guard aviation capabilities. In addition, Army National Guard units in Pennsylvania, Idaho, Missouri and Texas all operate versions of the AH-64 that are slated to be upgraded to the D model over the next five years, the source said. -- Jason Sherman
ARMY-22-6-2
AFRICOM Mulling West African Counterdrug Issues, Building Intel Center
Broader effort envisioned
Inside Pentagon
U.S. Africa Command aims to wrap up studies in May spelling out the unique counternarcotics needs of individual West African countries and has also begun assisting with intelligence-collection centers -- two undertakings that officials there hope will evolve into broader international efforts to tackle the continent’s growing drug problems.
AFRICOM is helping the State Department’s international narcotics and law enforcement affairs bureau to carry out the assessments, which began in late 2008, said Steve Johnston, the division chief of the command’s counternarcotics and law enforcement assistance division, in an interview from the command’s headquarters. The Justice Department and Department of Homeland Security are also involved.
In the last two weeks, the interagency government team completed two reviews for Cape Verde and Liberia, Johnston said, noting previously completed reviews looked at Senegal and Guinea Bissau.
“We’re coming down to the wire in finishing up our last ones in West Africa, and basically what’s coming out of that is that each country’s unique,” Johnston told Inside the Pentagon this week. “Each have different requirements and we’re trying to make sure that we shape our support to them to make sure we meet their needs, as opposed to try to impose what we think they need upon them.”
From the beginning, Congress asked for a vision of the command’s counternarcotics approach over the next five years and sought studies that conveyed what African governments needed to battle drug trafficking and use, he explained. The next phase would be to work individually with partner countries on the continent with an eye toward establishing the “connectivity between them,” so that government attempts to fight illicit substances could be addressed regionally, he said.
West Africa is a priority for the command, the State Department and Congress as well as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats William Wechsler, maintained Johnston.
Drug trafficking has emerged as a major threat to security, governance, development and public health in West Africa, with the annual sub-regional drug trade valued at nearly $2 billion, noted Andre Le Sage, the academic chair for terrorism and counterterrorism at the Defense Department’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies in Washington. He spoke at a regional workshop held by the center last fall.
A U.S. military official familiar with the region could not reveal study specifics for each West African country but told ITP that requirements vary. One nation may lack basic training to determine if a substance is truly a drug, including how to test for it, and may be without test kits and a laboratory, the military official said. Other countries, meanwhile, may have drug test kits and know how to search vehicles or individuals but seek more advanced equipment “at the airport in order to screen people coming through,” the official noted, adding that in some cases, a government may have laws against hashish usage but not ones governing trafficking cocaine through the country.
The assessments aim to create a comprehensive look of “what’s moving through, what we can do about that, who can address that, what do they need to address that, how can we assist,” as well as the next steps of ensuring whether individuals can be prosecuted and imprisoned, according to the military official.
The hope is to come up with a “systematic plan to go from the assessments, individual country assistance, to a regional plan” that is part of an interagency government approach in which AFRICOM plays a small part, Johnston said. The command can offer drug test kits, assist in providing basic law-enforcement training and help the Senegalese navy to project their naval power farther south to help protect their southern maritime domain, he added.
The Justice Department, moreover, needs to help bolster a prosecutorial service and a criminal justice program, Johnston said, explaining that a lack of asset-forfeiture laws in some African states makes it difficult for governments to strip people of illegally obtained assets.
“We’re just starting to move in that direction,” he noted. “We see that on the horizon but we’re just not there yet.”
Over the next few years, Johnston said, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) will probably assume a larger role in this endeavor.
Beyond these country-by-country studies, the command is also teaming up with African partners to build drug intelligence fusion centers, the first one being in Cape Verde. AFRICOM and the government in the West African nation are putting the finishing touches on a counternarcotics maritime information security center, aiming to forge a connection with the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre-Narcotics in Lisbon, he said.
The command is “looking at a couple of other potential areas” for fusion centers in West Africa but plans to discuss the idea with the United Nations and Western European partners to prevent repeating similar efforts, according to Johnston.
Sara Batmanglich, a senior program officer focusing on West Africa at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, believes AFRICOM has “a lot to offer West Africa in terms of technical training and capacity-building on this issue.” But she stressed that ECOWAS must take the lead.
“Right now there is plenty of goodwill to cooperate and tackle this problem, and I think that has to be built upon and reinforced, whereas duplication and parallel initiatives could erode this will,” said Batmanglich. “I’m not saying this is necessarily what’s happening, but I do think it’s a potential danger of too many cooks in the kitchen.”
As it stands, drug trafficking and criminal organizations are coordinating in Latin America, Africa and Europe, according to Batmanglich. As a result, the international community’s response must show a “commensurate” amount of cooperation and information-sharing, which has been “notoriously a sticking point” at all levels, she added.
While AFRICOM can do its part, particularly where narcotrafficking-organized crime “bleeds into terrorism,” tackling the challenge will require investment of personnel and resources from other U.S. government agencies, added Peter Pham, a senior fellow and Africa project director at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, and an associate professor of justice studies, political science and African studies at James Madison University in Virginia.
“First, we need to get information,” Pham said. “We don’t even have an embassy in Guinea Bissau, arguably ground zero of the West African narcotics traffic. Second, we need to get the law enforcement and other specialists in there to build relations with their counterparts, like AFRICOM does with military counterparts.”
The Drug Enforcement Agency has a presence in only four African countries (Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, and South Africa), he added.
Third, in collaboration with other partners, the United States needs to build training programs for law enforcement, Pham told ITP. -- Fawzia Sheikh
Inside Pentagon
U.S. Africa Command aims to wrap up studies in May spelling out the unique counternarcotics needs of individual West African countries and has also begun assisting with intelligence-collection centers -- two undertakings that officials there hope will evolve into broader international efforts to tackle the continent’s growing drug problems.
AFRICOM is helping the State Department’s international narcotics and law enforcement affairs bureau to carry out the assessments, which began in late 2008, said Steve Johnston, the division chief of the command’s counternarcotics and law enforcement assistance division, in an interview from the command’s headquarters. The Justice Department and Department of Homeland Security are also involved.
In the last two weeks, the interagency government team completed two reviews for Cape Verde and Liberia, Johnston said, noting previously completed reviews looked at Senegal and Guinea Bissau.
“We’re coming down to the wire in finishing up our last ones in West Africa, and basically what’s coming out of that is that each country’s unique,” Johnston told Inside the Pentagon this week. “Each have different requirements and we’re trying to make sure that we shape our support to them to make sure we meet their needs, as opposed to try to impose what we think they need upon them.”
From the beginning, Congress asked for a vision of the command’s counternarcotics approach over the next five years and sought studies that conveyed what African governments needed to battle drug trafficking and use, he explained. The next phase would be to work individually with partner countries on the continent with an eye toward establishing the “connectivity between them,” so that government attempts to fight illicit substances could be addressed regionally, he said.
West Africa is a priority for the command, the State Department and Congress as well as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats William Wechsler, maintained Johnston.
Drug trafficking has emerged as a major threat to security, governance, development and public health in West Africa, with the annual sub-regional drug trade valued at nearly $2 billion, noted Andre Le Sage, the academic chair for terrorism and counterterrorism at the Defense Department’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies in Washington. He spoke at a regional workshop held by the center last fall.
A U.S. military official familiar with the region could not reveal study specifics for each West African country but told ITP that requirements vary. One nation may lack basic training to determine if a substance is truly a drug, including how to test for it, and may be without test kits and a laboratory, the military official said. Other countries, meanwhile, may have drug test kits and know how to search vehicles or individuals but seek more advanced equipment “at the airport in order to screen people coming through,” the official noted, adding that in some cases, a government may have laws against hashish usage but not ones governing trafficking cocaine through the country.
The assessments aim to create a comprehensive look of “what’s moving through, what we can do about that, who can address that, what do they need to address that, how can we assist,” as well as the next steps of ensuring whether individuals can be prosecuted and imprisoned, according to the military official.
The hope is to come up with a “systematic plan to go from the assessments, individual country assistance, to a regional plan” that is part of an interagency government approach in which AFRICOM plays a small part, Johnston said. The command can offer drug test kits, assist in providing basic law-enforcement training and help the Senegalese navy to project their naval power farther south to help protect their southern maritime domain, he added.
The Justice Department, moreover, needs to help bolster a prosecutorial service and a criminal justice program, Johnston said, explaining that a lack of asset-forfeiture laws in some African states makes it difficult for governments to strip people of illegally obtained assets.
“We’re just starting to move in that direction,” he noted. “We see that on the horizon but we’re just not there yet.”
Over the next few years, Johnston said, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) will probably assume a larger role in this endeavor.
Beyond these country-by-country studies, the command is also teaming up with African partners to build drug intelligence fusion centers, the first one being in Cape Verde. AFRICOM and the government in the West African nation are putting the finishing touches on a counternarcotics maritime information security center, aiming to forge a connection with the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre-Narcotics in Lisbon, he said.
The command is “looking at a couple of other potential areas” for fusion centers in West Africa but plans to discuss the idea with the United Nations and Western European partners to prevent repeating similar efforts, according to Johnston.
Sara Batmanglich, a senior program officer focusing on West Africa at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, believes AFRICOM has “a lot to offer West Africa in terms of technical training and capacity-building on this issue.” But she stressed that ECOWAS must take the lead.
“Right now there is plenty of goodwill to cooperate and tackle this problem, and I think that has to be built upon and reinforced, whereas duplication and parallel initiatives could erode this will,” said Batmanglich. “I’m not saying this is necessarily what’s happening, but I do think it’s a potential danger of too many cooks in the kitchen.”
As it stands, drug trafficking and criminal organizations are coordinating in Latin America, Africa and Europe, according to Batmanglich. As a result, the international community’s response must show a “commensurate” amount of cooperation and information-sharing, which has been “notoriously a sticking point” at all levels, she added.
While AFRICOM can do its part, particularly where narcotrafficking-organized crime “bleeds into terrorism,” tackling the challenge will require investment of personnel and resources from other U.S. government agencies, added Peter Pham, a senior fellow and Africa project director at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, and an associate professor of justice studies, political science and African studies at James Madison University in Virginia.
“First, we need to get information,” Pham said. “We don’t even have an embassy in Guinea Bissau, arguably ground zero of the West African narcotics traffic. Second, we need to get the law enforcement and other specialists in there to build relations with their counterparts, like AFRICOM does with military counterparts.”
The Drug Enforcement Agency has a presence in only four African countries (Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, and South Africa), he added.
Third, in collaboration with other partners, the United States needs to build training programs for law enforcement, Pham told ITP. -- Fawzia Sheikh
Pentagon Seeks CERP Budget Boost Despite Past Congressional Cuts
Inside Pentagon
The Pentagon is seeking additional funding for a program giving commanders in the field flexibility to finance small-scale, urgent civil and humanitarian needs, but lawmakers have regarded the effort with skepticism and curtailed its use in the past.
Despite suspicions about the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), Congress has been “willing to fund this program fairly well on the assumption that it works,” Gordon Adams, a professor of U.S. foreign policy at American University in Washington, told Inside the Pentagon.
From lawmakers, to the Pentagon, to civilian agencies, it seems that “everybody loves” this program, Adams said, adding that his guess is “nobody is really going to complain this year” about the fiscal year 2011 budget request for the program.
The Defense Department is requesting a total of $1.3 billion for the initiative ($200 million for Iraq and $1.1 billion for Afghanistan), an 8.3 percent rise for CERP from FY-10’s $1.2 billion.
In last December’s FY-10 Defense Appropriations Act, lawmakers doubled funding compared to the prior year but also trimmed the overall program. The law provided $1.2 billion for CERP, including $1 billion in Afghanistan and $200 million in Iraq. This final amount fell $300 million below the administration’s request, which sought $1.2 billion for Afghanistan and $300 million for Iraq (ITP, Dec. 24, 2009, p7).
The legislation also withheld $500 million of the amount appropriated until the Pentagon provides lawmakers with further information about the program. Congress also demanded that $500 million of the $1.2 billion be withheld pending submission of a “thorough review” of CERP not later than 180 days after the bill becomes law.
Congress, in addition, asked for a separate assessment for Iraq and Afghanistan outlining goals and requirements for CERP money in the coming year, as well as other monthly data and reports.
Still, lawmakers largely view the program as “chump change in the context of the big defense budget and, frankly, the committees are all too willing to simply roll over and say if the COCOMs want it, we should give it to them,” Adams argued. “That becomes even more compelling when you’re dealing with Afghanistan and Iraq, where we’ve got troops deployed forward.”
For commanders in theater, CERP is a “fantastic way not to have to deal with the bureaucracy and the civilian agencies who run assistance programs,” Adams noted.
The funds are “game-changers, inasmuch as they give our troops more flexibility to truly make things happen for the local populace, wherever we are,” said Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen during the Feb. 1 press conference on the budget. “As one junior officer noted, in a counterinsurgency fight, CERP dollars are faster, more precise and more impactful than bullets.”
Mullen told reporters he prefers “even more flexibility in the rules governing the use of these funds.” He said proper accountability is necessary, but added he has seen with his “own eyes the huge difference CERP can make when it is applied to the greatest need and with the greatest speed.”
Civilian agencies are also willing to “accept this flow of funding,” given that they lack their own flexible pool of money, Adams said. CERP is the principle funding source for provincial reconstruction teams, he said, referring to a joint military-civilian effort to improve security, support good governance and enhance provincial development.
The potential for the flexible-funding program to succeed in Afghanistan, where most of the money will be spent, is difficult to gauge, Adams told ITP. The “paper trail and the audit trail” for CERP, he explained, is “not what it should be.” As a result, uncertainty surrounds whether CERP has played a critical role in meeting U.S. military objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan, he said.
Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests some success, notably the creation of town councils and digging of wells, Adams noted.
Yet there are also indications that while program dollars can “buy hearts and minds in the short term,” the Iraqi and Afghan governments cannot sustain projects for a long period and U.S. Agency for International Development funding is “not in a place to back it up” either, he added. -- Fawzia Sheikh
PENTAGON-26-6-9
The Pentagon is seeking additional funding for a program giving commanders in the field flexibility to finance small-scale, urgent civil and humanitarian needs, but lawmakers have regarded the effort with skepticism and curtailed its use in the past.
Despite suspicions about the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), Congress has been “willing to fund this program fairly well on the assumption that it works,” Gordon Adams, a professor of U.S. foreign policy at American University in Washington, told Inside the Pentagon.
From lawmakers, to the Pentagon, to civilian agencies, it seems that “everybody loves” this program, Adams said, adding that his guess is “nobody is really going to complain this year” about the fiscal year 2011 budget request for the program.
The Defense Department is requesting a total of $1.3 billion for the initiative ($200 million for Iraq and $1.1 billion for Afghanistan), an 8.3 percent rise for CERP from FY-10’s $1.2 billion.
In last December’s FY-10 Defense Appropriations Act, lawmakers doubled funding compared to the prior year but also trimmed the overall program. The law provided $1.2 billion for CERP, including $1 billion in Afghanistan and $200 million in Iraq. This final amount fell $300 million below the administration’s request, which sought $1.2 billion for Afghanistan and $300 million for Iraq (ITP, Dec. 24, 2009, p7).
The legislation also withheld $500 million of the amount appropriated until the Pentagon provides lawmakers with further information about the program. Congress also demanded that $500 million of the $1.2 billion be withheld pending submission of a “thorough review” of CERP not later than 180 days after the bill becomes law.
Congress, in addition, asked for a separate assessment for Iraq and Afghanistan outlining goals and requirements for CERP money in the coming year, as well as other monthly data and reports.
Still, lawmakers largely view the program as “chump change in the context of the big defense budget and, frankly, the committees are all too willing to simply roll over and say if the COCOMs want it, we should give it to them,” Adams argued. “That becomes even more compelling when you’re dealing with Afghanistan and Iraq, where we’ve got troops deployed forward.”
For commanders in theater, CERP is a “fantastic way not to have to deal with the bureaucracy and the civilian agencies who run assistance programs,” Adams noted.
The funds are “game-changers, inasmuch as they give our troops more flexibility to truly make things happen for the local populace, wherever we are,” said Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen during the Feb. 1 press conference on the budget. “As one junior officer noted, in a counterinsurgency fight, CERP dollars are faster, more precise and more impactful than bullets.”
Mullen told reporters he prefers “even more flexibility in the rules governing the use of these funds.” He said proper accountability is necessary, but added he has seen with his “own eyes the huge difference CERP can make when it is applied to the greatest need and with the greatest speed.”
Civilian agencies are also willing to “accept this flow of funding,” given that they lack their own flexible pool of money, Adams said. CERP is the principle funding source for provincial reconstruction teams, he said, referring to a joint military-civilian effort to improve security, support good governance and enhance provincial development.
The potential for the flexible-funding program to succeed in Afghanistan, where most of the money will be spent, is difficult to gauge, Adams told ITP. The “paper trail and the audit trail” for CERP, he explained, is “not what it should be.” As a result, uncertainty surrounds whether CERP has played a critical role in meeting U.S. military objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan, he said.
Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests some success, notably the creation of town councils and digging of wells, Adams noted.
Yet there are also indications that while program dollars can “buy hearts and minds in the short term,” the Iraqi and Afghan governments cannot sustain projects for a long period and U.S. Agency for International Development funding is “not in a place to back it up” either, he added. -- Fawzia Sheikh
PENTAGON-26-6-9
10 February 2010
Cyber Warriors: China's Challenge
James Fallows. The Atlantic. March 2010
Early in my time in China, I learned a useful lesson for daily life. In the summer of 2006, I saw a contingent of light-green-shirted People’s Liberation Army soldiers marching in formation down a sidewalk on Fuxing Lu in Shanghai, near the U.S. and Iranian consulates. They looked so crisp under the leafy plane trees of the city’s old colonial district that I pulled out a camera to take a picture of them—and, after pushing the button, had to spend the next 60 seconds running at full tilt away from the group’s leader, who pursued me yelling in English “Stop! No photo! Must stop!” Fortunately he gave up after scaring me off.
The practical lesson was to not point a camera toward uniformed groups of soldiers or police. The broader hint I took was to be more careful when asking about or discussing military matters than when asking about most other aspects of modern China’s development. I did keep asking people in China—carefully—about the potential military and strategic implications of their country’s growing strength. Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union and consequent disappearance of the U.S. military’s one superpower rival, Western defense strategists have speculated about China’s emergence as the next great military threat. (In 2005, this magazine published Robert Kaplan’s cover story “How We Would Fight China,” about such a possibility. Many of the international-affairs experts I interviewed in China were familiar with that story. I often had to explain that “would” did not mean “will” in the article’s headline.)
The cynical view of warnings about a mounting Chinese threat is that they are largely Pentagon budget-building ploys: if the U.S. military is “only” going to fight insurgents and terrorists in the future, it doesn’t really need the next generation of expensive fighter planes or attack submarines. Powerful evidence for this view—apart from familiarity with Pentagon budget debates over the years—is that many of the neoconservative thinkers who since 9/11 have concentrated on threats from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran were before that time writing worriedly about China. The most powerful counterargument is that China’s rise is so consequential and unprecedented in scale that it would be naive not to expect military ramifications. My instincts lie with the skeptical camp: as I’ve often written through the past three years, China has many more problems than most Americans can imagine, and its power is much less impressive up close. But on my return to America, I asked a variety of military, governmental, business, and academic officials about how the situation looks from their perspective. In most ways, their judgment was reassuringly soothing; unfortunately, it left me with a new problem to worry about.
Without meaning to sound flip, I think the strictly military aspects of U.S.-China relations appear to be something Americans can rest easy about for a long time to come. Hypercautious warnings to the contrary keep cropping up, especially in the annual reports on China’s strategic power produced since 2000 by the Pentagon each spring and by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission each fall. Yet when examined in detail, even these show the limits of the Chinese threat. To summarize:
• In overall spending, the United States puts between five and 10 times as much money into the military per year as China does, depending on different estimates of China’s budget. Spending does not equal effectiveness, but it suggests the difference in scale.
• In sophistication of equipment, Chinese forces are only now beginning to be brought up to speed. For instance, just one-quarter of its naval surface fleet is considered “modern” in electronics, engines, and weaponry.
• In certain categories of weaponry, the Chinese don’t even compete. For instance, the U.S. Navy has 11 nuclear-powered aircraft-carrier battle groups. The Chinese navy is only now moving toward construction of its very first carrier.
• In the unglamorous but crucial components of military effectiveness—logistics, training, readiness, evolving doctrine—the difference between Chinese and American standards is not a gap but a chasm. After a natural disaster anywhere in the world, the American military’s vast airlift and sealift capacity often brings rescue supplies. The Chinese military took days to reach survivors after the devastating Sichuan earthquake in May of 2008, because it has so few helicopters and emergency vehicles.
• For better and worse, in modern times, American forces are continually in combat somewhere in the world. This has its drawbacks, but it means that U.S. leaders, tactics, and doctrine are constantly refined by the realities of warfare. In contrast, vanishingly few members of the People’s Liberation Army have any combat experience whatsoever. The PLA’s last major engagement was during its border war with Vietnam in February and March of 1979, when somewhere between 7,000 of its soldiers (Chinese estimate) and 25,000 (foreign estimates) were killed within four weeks.
Beyond all this is a difference of military culture rarely included in American discussions of the Chinese threat—and surprising to those unfamiliar with the way China’s Communist government chose to fund its army. The post-Vietnam American military has been fanatically devoted to creating a “warrior” culture of military professionalism. The great struggle of the modern PLA has been containing the crony-capitalist culture that comes from its unashamed history of involvement in business. Especially under Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese military owned and operated factories, hotels and office buildings, shipping and trucking companies, and other businesses both legitimate and shady. In the late 1990s President Jiang Zemin led a major effort to peel the PLA’s military functions away from its business dealings, but by all accounts, corruption remains a major challenge in the Chinese military, rather than the episodic problem it is for most Western forces. One example: at a small airport in the center of the country, an airport manager told me about his regular schedule of hong bao deliveries—“red envelopes,” or discreet cash payoffs—to local air-force officers, to ensure airline passage through the sector of airspace they controlled. (Most U.S. airspace is controlled by the Federal Aviation Administration; nearly all of China’s, by the military.) A larger example is the widespread assumption that military officials control the vast Chinese traffic in pirated movie DVDs.
The Chinese military’s main and unconcealed ambition is to someday be strong enough to take Taiwan by force if it had to. But the details of the balance of power between mainland and Taiwanese forces, across the Straits of Taiwan, have been minutely scrutinized by all parties for decades, and shifts will not happen by surprise. The annual reports from the Pentagon and the Security Review Commission lay out other possible scenarios for conflict, but in my experience it is rare to hear U.S. military or diplomatic officials talk about war with China as a plausible threat. “My view is that the political leadership is principally focused on creating new jobs inside the country,” I was told by retired Admiral Mike McConnell, a former head of the National Security Agency and the director of national intelligence under George W. Bush. Another former U.S. official put it this way: “We tend to think of everything about China as being multiplied by 1.3 billion. The Chinese leadership has to think of everything as being divided by 1.3 billion”—jobs, houses, land. Russell Leigh Moses, who has lived in China for years and lectures at programs to train Chinese officials, notes that the Chinese military, like its counterparts everywhere, is “determined not to be neglected.” But “so many problems occupy the military itself—including learning how to play the political game—that there is no consensus to take on the U.S.”
Yes, circumstances could change, and someday there could be a consensus to “take on the U.S.” But the more you hear about the details, the harder it is to worry seriously about that now. So why should we worry? After conducting this round of interviews, I now lose sleep over something I’d generally ignored: the possibility of a “cyberwar” that could involve attacks from China—but, alarmingly, could also be launched by any number of other states and organizations.
The cyber threat is the idea that organizations or individuals may be spying on, tampering with, or preparing to inflict damage on America’s electronic networks. Google’s recent announcement of widespread spying “originating from China” brought attention to a problem many experts say is sure to grow. China has hundreds of millions of Internet users, mostly young. In any culture, this would mean a large hacker population; in China, where tight control and near chaos often coexist, it means an Internet with plenty of potential outlaws and with carefully directed government efforts, too. In a report for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission late last year, Northrop Grumman prepared a time line of electronic intrusions and disruptions coming from sites inside China since 1999. In most cases it was impossible to tell whether the activity was amateur or government-planned, the report said. But whatever their source, the disruptions were a problem. And in some instances, the “depth of resources” and the “extremely focused targeting of defense engineering data, US military operational information, and China-related policy information” suggested an effort that would be “difficult at best without some type of state-sponsorship.”
The authorities I spoke with pooh-poohed as urban myth the idea that an electronic assault was behind the power failures that rippled from the Midwest to the East Coast in August of 2003. By all accounts, this was a cascading series of mechanical and human errors. But after asking corporate and government officials what worried them, I learned several unsettling things I hadn’t known before.
First, nearly everyone in the business believes that we are living in, yes, a pre-9/11 era when it comes to the security and resilience of electronic information systems. Something very big—bigger than the Google-China case—is likely to go wrong, they said, and once it does, everyone will ask how we could have been so complacent for so long. Electronic-commerce systems are already in a constant war against online fraud. “The real skill to running a successful restaurant has relatively little to do with producing delicious food and a lot to do with cost and revenue management,” an official of an Internet commerce company told me, asking not to be named. “Similarly, the real business behind PayPal, Google Checkout, and other such Internet payment systems is fraud and risk management,” since the surge of attempted electronic theft is comparable to the surge of spam through e-mail networks.
At a dinner in Washington late last year, I listened to two dozen cyber-security experts compare tales of near-miss disasters. The consensus was that only a large-scale public breakdown would attract political attention to the problem, and that such a breakdown would occur. “Cyber crime is not conducted by some 15-year-old kids experimenting with viruses,” Eugene Spafford, a computer scientist at Purdue, who is one of the world’s leading cyber-security figures (and was at the dinner), told me later via e-mail.
It is well-funded and pursued by mature individuals and groups of professionals with deep financial and technical resources, often with local government (or other countries’) toleration if not support. It is already responsible for billions of dollars a year in losses, and it is growing and becoming more capable. We have largely ignored it, and building our military capabilities is not responding to that threat.
With financial, medical, legal, intellectual, logistic, and every other sort of information increasingly living in “the cloud,” the consequences of collapse or disruption are unpleasant to contemplate. A forthcoming novel, Directive 51, by John Barnes, does indeed contemplate them, much as in the 1950s Nevil Shute imagined the world after nuclear war in On the Beach. Barnes’s view of the collapse of financial life (after all, our “assets” consist mostly of notations in banks’ computer systems), the halt of most manufacturing systems, the evaporation of the technical knowledge that now exists mainly in the cloud, and other consequences is so alarming that the book could draw attention in a way no official report can.
Next, the authorities stressed that Chinese organizations and individuals were a serious source of electronic threats—but far from the only one, or perhaps even the main one. You could take this as good news about U.S.-China relations, but it was usually meant as bad news about the problem as a whole. “The Chinese would be in the top three, maybe the top two, leading problems in cyberspace,” James Lewis, a former diplomat who worked on security and intelligence issues and is now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, told me. “They’re not close to being the primary problem, and there is debate about whether they’re even number two.” Number one in his analysis is Russia, through a combination of state, organized-criminal, and unorganized-individual activity. Number two is Israel—and there are more on the list. “The French are notorious for looking for economic advantage through their intelligence system,” I was told by Ed Giorgio, who has served as the chief code maker and chief code breaker for the National Security Agency. “The Israelis are notorious for looking for political advantage. We have seen Brazil emerge as a source of financial crime, to join Russia, which is guilty of all of the above.” Interestingly, no one suggested that international terrorist groups—as opposed to governments, corporations, or “normal” criminals—are making significant use of electronic networks to inflict damage on Western targets, although some groups rely on the Internet for recruitment, organization, and propagandizing.
This led to another, more surprising theme: that the main damage done to date through cyberwar has involved not theft of military secrets nor acts of electronic sabotage but rather business-versus-business spying. Some military secrets have indeed leaked out, the most consequential probably being those that would help the Chinese navy develop a modern submarine fleet. And many people said that if the United States someday ended up at war against China—or Russia, or some other country—then each side would certainly use electronic tools to attack the other’s military and perhaps its civilian infrastructure. But short of outright war, the main losses have come through economic espionage. “You could think of it as taking a shortcut on the ‘D’ of R&D,” research and development, one former government official said. “When you create a new product, a competitor can cherry-pick the good parts and introduce a competitive product much more rapidly than he could otherwise.” Another technology expert, who serves on government advisory boards, told me, when referring to the steady loss of technological advantage, “We should not forget that it was China where ‘death by a thousand cuts’ originated.” I heard of instances of Western corporate officials who arrived for negotiations in China and realized too late that their briefing books and internal numbers were already known by the other side. (In the same vein: I asked security officials whether the laptops and BlackBerry I had used while living in China would have been bugged in some way while I was there. The answers were variations on “Of course,” with the “you idiot” left unsaid.)
The final theme was that even though these cyber concerns are not confined to China, the Chinese aspects do deserve consideration on their own, because China’s scale, speed of growth, and complex relationship with the United States make it a unique case. Hackers in Russia or Israel might be more skillful one by one, but with its huge population China simply has more of them. The French might be more aggressive in searching for corporate secrets, but their military need not simultaneously consider how to stop the Seventh Fleet. According to Mike McConnell, everything about China’s military planning changed after its leaders saw the results of U.S. precision weapons in the first Gulf War. “They were shocked,” he told me. “They had no idea warfare had progressed to that point, and they went on a crash course to take away our advantage.” This meant both building their own information systems—thus China’s aspiration to create a Beidou (the Chinese name for the Big Dipper) system of satellites comparable to America’s GPS—and being prepared in time of war to “attack what they see as our soft underbelly, our military’s dependence on networking,” as McConnell put it, noting the vast emerging PLA literature on defending and attacking data networks.
Ed Giorgio, formerly of the NSA, has prepared charts showing the points of “asymmetric advantage” China might have over the long run in such competition. Point nine on his 12-point chart: “They know us much better than we know them (virtually every one of their combatants reads English and virtually none of ours read Mandarin. This, in itself, will surely precipitate a massive intelligence failure).” But James Lewis, of CSIS, pointed out an “asymmetric handicap”: “For all the effort the Chinese put into cyber competition, external efforts”—against a potential foe like the United States—“are second priority. The primary priority is domestic control and regime survival. The external part is a side benefit.” For many other reasons, the China-cyber question will, like the China-finance and China-environment and China-human-rights questions, demand special attention and work.
The implications of electronic insecurity will be with us in the long run, among the other enduring headaches of the modern age. The “solution” to them is like the solution to coping with China’s rise: something that will unfold over the years and require constant attention, adjustments, and innovations. “Cyber security is a process, not a patch,” Eugene Spafford said. “We must continue to invest in it—and for the long term as well as the ‘quick fix,’ because otherwise we will always be applying fixes too late.”
No doubt because I’ve been so preoccupied for so long with the implications of China’s growth, I thought I heard a familiar note in the recommendations that many of the cyber-security experts offered. The similarity lies in their emphasis on openness, transparency, and international contact as the basis of a successful policy.
In overall U.S. dealings with China, it matters tremendously that so many Chinese organizations are led or influenced by people who have spent time in America or with Americans. Today’s financial, academic, and business elite in China is deeply familiar with the United States, many of its members having studied or worked here. They may disagree on points of policy—for instance, about trade legislation—but they operate within a similar set of concepts and facts. This is less true of China’s political leaders, and much less true of its military—with a consequently much greater risk of serious misunderstanding and error. The tensest moment in modern China’s security relationship with the outside world came in January of 2007, when its missile command shot one of its own weather satellites out of the sky, presumably to show the world that it had developed anti-satellite weaponry. The detonation filled satellite orbits with dangerous debris; worse, it seemed to signal an unprovoked new step in militarizing space. By all accounts, President Hu Jintao okayed this before it occurred; but no one in China’s foreign ministry appeared to have advance word, and for days diplomats sat silent in the face of worldwide protests. The PLA had not foreseen the international uproar it would provoke—or just didn’t care.
Precisely in hopes of building familiarity like that in the business world, the U.S. Navy has since the 1980s taken the lead in military-to-military exchanges with the PLA. “I think both sides are trying to figure out what kind of a military-to-military relationship is feasible and proper,” David Finkelstein, of the Center for Naval Analyses, in suburban Washington, D.C., told me. “We have two militaries that, in some circumstances, see each other as possible adversaries. At the same time, at the level of grand strategy, the two nations are trying to accommodate each other. There is a major chasm, but both sides are working hard to bridge it.” Such exposure obviously doesn’t eliminate the real differences of national interest between the two countries, but I believe it makes outright conflict less likely.
A similar high-road logic seems to lie behind recommendations for cyber security in general, and for dealing with the Chinese cyber threat in particular. The NSA, which McConnell directed and where Giorgio worked, is renowned for its secrecy. But both men, along with others, now argue that to defend information networks, the U.S. should talk openly about risks and insecurities—and engage the Chinese government and military in an effort to contain the problem.
As a matter of domestic U.S. politics, McConnell argues that we now suffer from a conspiracy of secrecy about the scale of cyber risks. No credit-card company wants to admit how often or how easily it is cheated. No bank or investment house wants to admit how close it has come to being electronically robbed. As a result, the changes in law, regulation, concept, or habit that could make online life safer don’t get discussed. Sooner or later, the cyber equivalent of 9/11 will occur—and, if the real 9/11 is a model, we will understandably, but destructively, overreact.
While trying to build bridges to the military, McConnell and others recommend that the U.S. work with China on international efforts to secure data networks, comparable to the Chinese role in dealing with the world financial crisis. “You could have the model of the International Civil Aviation Organization,” James Lewis said, “a body that can reduce risks for everyone by imposing common standards. It’s moving from the Wild West to the rule of law.” Why would the Chinese government want to join such an effort? McConnell’s answer was that an ever-richer China will soon have as clear a stake in secure data networks as it did in safe air travel.
We’re naturally skeptical of abstractions like “cooperation” or “greater openness” as the solutions to tough-guy, real-world problems. But in making the best of a world that will inevitably be changed by increasing Chinese power and increasing electronic threats from many directions, those principles may offer the right, realistic place to start.
Early in my time in China, I learned a useful lesson for daily life. In the summer of 2006, I saw a contingent of light-green-shirted People’s Liberation Army soldiers marching in formation down a sidewalk on Fuxing Lu in Shanghai, near the U.S. and Iranian consulates. They looked so crisp under the leafy plane trees of the city’s old colonial district that I pulled out a camera to take a picture of them—and, after pushing the button, had to spend the next 60 seconds running at full tilt away from the group’s leader, who pursued me yelling in English “Stop! No photo! Must stop!” Fortunately he gave up after scaring me off.
The practical lesson was to not point a camera toward uniformed groups of soldiers or police. The broader hint I took was to be more careful when asking about or discussing military matters than when asking about most other aspects of modern China’s development. I did keep asking people in China—carefully—about the potential military and strategic implications of their country’s growing strength. Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union and consequent disappearance of the U.S. military’s one superpower rival, Western defense strategists have speculated about China’s emergence as the next great military threat. (In 2005, this magazine published Robert Kaplan’s cover story “How We Would Fight China,” about such a possibility. Many of the international-affairs experts I interviewed in China were familiar with that story. I often had to explain that “would” did not mean “will” in the article’s headline.)
The cynical view of warnings about a mounting Chinese threat is that they are largely Pentagon budget-building ploys: if the U.S. military is “only” going to fight insurgents and terrorists in the future, it doesn’t really need the next generation of expensive fighter planes or attack submarines. Powerful evidence for this view—apart from familiarity with Pentagon budget debates over the years—is that many of the neoconservative thinkers who since 9/11 have concentrated on threats from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran were before that time writing worriedly about China. The most powerful counterargument is that China’s rise is so consequential and unprecedented in scale that it would be naive not to expect military ramifications. My instincts lie with the skeptical camp: as I’ve often written through the past three years, China has many more problems than most Americans can imagine, and its power is much less impressive up close. But on my return to America, I asked a variety of military, governmental, business, and academic officials about how the situation looks from their perspective. In most ways, their judgment was reassuringly soothing; unfortunately, it left me with a new problem to worry about.
Without meaning to sound flip, I think the strictly military aspects of U.S.-China relations appear to be something Americans can rest easy about for a long time to come. Hypercautious warnings to the contrary keep cropping up, especially in the annual reports on China’s strategic power produced since 2000 by the Pentagon each spring and by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission each fall. Yet when examined in detail, even these show the limits of the Chinese threat. To summarize:
• In overall spending, the United States puts between five and 10 times as much money into the military per year as China does, depending on different estimates of China’s budget. Spending does not equal effectiveness, but it suggests the difference in scale.
• In sophistication of equipment, Chinese forces are only now beginning to be brought up to speed. For instance, just one-quarter of its naval surface fleet is considered “modern” in electronics, engines, and weaponry.
• In certain categories of weaponry, the Chinese don’t even compete. For instance, the U.S. Navy has 11 nuclear-powered aircraft-carrier battle groups. The Chinese navy is only now moving toward construction of its very first carrier.
• In the unglamorous but crucial components of military effectiveness—logistics, training, readiness, evolving doctrine—the difference between Chinese and American standards is not a gap but a chasm. After a natural disaster anywhere in the world, the American military’s vast airlift and sealift capacity often brings rescue supplies. The Chinese military took days to reach survivors after the devastating Sichuan earthquake in May of 2008, because it has so few helicopters and emergency vehicles.
• For better and worse, in modern times, American forces are continually in combat somewhere in the world. This has its drawbacks, but it means that U.S. leaders, tactics, and doctrine are constantly refined by the realities of warfare. In contrast, vanishingly few members of the People’s Liberation Army have any combat experience whatsoever. The PLA’s last major engagement was during its border war with Vietnam in February and March of 1979, when somewhere between 7,000 of its soldiers (Chinese estimate) and 25,000 (foreign estimates) were killed within four weeks.
Beyond all this is a difference of military culture rarely included in American discussions of the Chinese threat—and surprising to those unfamiliar with the way China’s Communist government chose to fund its army. The post-Vietnam American military has been fanatically devoted to creating a “warrior” culture of military professionalism. The great struggle of the modern PLA has been containing the crony-capitalist culture that comes from its unashamed history of involvement in business. Especially under Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese military owned and operated factories, hotels and office buildings, shipping and trucking companies, and other businesses both legitimate and shady. In the late 1990s President Jiang Zemin led a major effort to peel the PLA’s military functions away from its business dealings, but by all accounts, corruption remains a major challenge in the Chinese military, rather than the episodic problem it is for most Western forces. One example: at a small airport in the center of the country, an airport manager told me about his regular schedule of hong bao deliveries—“red envelopes,” or discreet cash payoffs—to local air-force officers, to ensure airline passage through the sector of airspace they controlled. (Most U.S. airspace is controlled by the Federal Aviation Administration; nearly all of China’s, by the military.) A larger example is the widespread assumption that military officials control the vast Chinese traffic in pirated movie DVDs.
The Chinese military’s main and unconcealed ambition is to someday be strong enough to take Taiwan by force if it had to. But the details of the balance of power between mainland and Taiwanese forces, across the Straits of Taiwan, have been minutely scrutinized by all parties for decades, and shifts will not happen by surprise. The annual reports from the Pentagon and the Security Review Commission lay out other possible scenarios for conflict, but in my experience it is rare to hear U.S. military or diplomatic officials talk about war with China as a plausible threat. “My view is that the political leadership is principally focused on creating new jobs inside the country,” I was told by retired Admiral Mike McConnell, a former head of the National Security Agency and the director of national intelligence under George W. Bush. Another former U.S. official put it this way: “We tend to think of everything about China as being multiplied by 1.3 billion. The Chinese leadership has to think of everything as being divided by 1.3 billion”—jobs, houses, land. Russell Leigh Moses, who has lived in China for years and lectures at programs to train Chinese officials, notes that the Chinese military, like its counterparts everywhere, is “determined not to be neglected.” But “so many problems occupy the military itself—including learning how to play the political game—that there is no consensus to take on the U.S.”
Yes, circumstances could change, and someday there could be a consensus to “take on the U.S.” But the more you hear about the details, the harder it is to worry seriously about that now. So why should we worry? After conducting this round of interviews, I now lose sleep over something I’d generally ignored: the possibility of a “cyberwar” that could involve attacks from China—but, alarmingly, could also be launched by any number of other states and organizations.
The cyber threat is the idea that organizations or individuals may be spying on, tampering with, or preparing to inflict damage on America’s electronic networks. Google’s recent announcement of widespread spying “originating from China” brought attention to a problem many experts say is sure to grow. China has hundreds of millions of Internet users, mostly young. In any culture, this would mean a large hacker population; in China, where tight control and near chaos often coexist, it means an Internet with plenty of potential outlaws and with carefully directed government efforts, too. In a report for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission late last year, Northrop Grumman prepared a time line of electronic intrusions and disruptions coming from sites inside China since 1999. In most cases it was impossible to tell whether the activity was amateur or government-planned, the report said. But whatever their source, the disruptions were a problem. And in some instances, the “depth of resources” and the “extremely focused targeting of defense engineering data, US military operational information, and China-related policy information” suggested an effort that would be “difficult at best without some type of state-sponsorship.”
The authorities I spoke with pooh-poohed as urban myth the idea that an electronic assault was behind the power failures that rippled from the Midwest to the East Coast in August of 2003. By all accounts, this was a cascading series of mechanical and human errors. But after asking corporate and government officials what worried them, I learned several unsettling things I hadn’t known before.
First, nearly everyone in the business believes that we are living in, yes, a pre-9/11 era when it comes to the security and resilience of electronic information systems. Something very big—bigger than the Google-China case—is likely to go wrong, they said, and once it does, everyone will ask how we could have been so complacent for so long. Electronic-commerce systems are already in a constant war against online fraud. “The real skill to running a successful restaurant has relatively little to do with producing delicious food and a lot to do with cost and revenue management,” an official of an Internet commerce company told me, asking not to be named. “Similarly, the real business behind PayPal, Google Checkout, and other such Internet payment systems is fraud and risk management,” since the surge of attempted electronic theft is comparable to the surge of spam through e-mail networks.
At a dinner in Washington late last year, I listened to two dozen cyber-security experts compare tales of near-miss disasters. The consensus was that only a large-scale public breakdown would attract political attention to the problem, and that such a breakdown would occur. “Cyber crime is not conducted by some 15-year-old kids experimenting with viruses,” Eugene Spafford, a computer scientist at Purdue, who is one of the world’s leading cyber-security figures (and was at the dinner), told me later via e-mail.
It is well-funded and pursued by mature individuals and groups of professionals with deep financial and technical resources, often with local government (or other countries’) toleration if not support. It is already responsible for billions of dollars a year in losses, and it is growing and becoming more capable. We have largely ignored it, and building our military capabilities is not responding to that threat.
With financial, medical, legal, intellectual, logistic, and every other sort of information increasingly living in “the cloud,” the consequences of collapse or disruption are unpleasant to contemplate. A forthcoming novel, Directive 51, by John Barnes, does indeed contemplate them, much as in the 1950s Nevil Shute imagined the world after nuclear war in On the Beach. Barnes’s view of the collapse of financial life (after all, our “assets” consist mostly of notations in banks’ computer systems), the halt of most manufacturing systems, the evaporation of the technical knowledge that now exists mainly in the cloud, and other consequences is so alarming that the book could draw attention in a way no official report can.
Next, the authorities stressed that Chinese organizations and individuals were a serious source of electronic threats—but far from the only one, or perhaps even the main one. You could take this as good news about U.S.-China relations, but it was usually meant as bad news about the problem as a whole. “The Chinese would be in the top three, maybe the top two, leading problems in cyberspace,” James Lewis, a former diplomat who worked on security and intelligence issues and is now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, told me. “They’re not close to being the primary problem, and there is debate about whether they’re even number two.” Number one in his analysis is Russia, through a combination of state, organized-criminal, and unorganized-individual activity. Number two is Israel—and there are more on the list. “The French are notorious for looking for economic advantage through their intelligence system,” I was told by Ed Giorgio, who has served as the chief code maker and chief code breaker for the National Security Agency. “The Israelis are notorious for looking for political advantage. We have seen Brazil emerge as a source of financial crime, to join Russia, which is guilty of all of the above.” Interestingly, no one suggested that international terrorist groups—as opposed to governments, corporations, or “normal” criminals—are making significant use of electronic networks to inflict damage on Western targets, although some groups rely on the Internet for recruitment, organization, and propagandizing.
This led to another, more surprising theme: that the main damage done to date through cyberwar has involved not theft of military secrets nor acts of electronic sabotage but rather business-versus-business spying. Some military secrets have indeed leaked out, the most consequential probably being those that would help the Chinese navy develop a modern submarine fleet. And many people said that if the United States someday ended up at war against China—or Russia, or some other country—then each side would certainly use electronic tools to attack the other’s military and perhaps its civilian infrastructure. But short of outright war, the main losses have come through economic espionage. “You could think of it as taking a shortcut on the ‘D’ of R&D,” research and development, one former government official said. “When you create a new product, a competitor can cherry-pick the good parts and introduce a competitive product much more rapidly than he could otherwise.” Another technology expert, who serves on government advisory boards, told me, when referring to the steady loss of technological advantage, “We should not forget that it was China where ‘death by a thousand cuts’ originated.” I heard of instances of Western corporate officials who arrived for negotiations in China and realized too late that their briefing books and internal numbers were already known by the other side. (In the same vein: I asked security officials whether the laptops and BlackBerry I had used while living in China would have been bugged in some way while I was there. The answers were variations on “Of course,” with the “you idiot” left unsaid.)
The final theme was that even though these cyber concerns are not confined to China, the Chinese aspects do deserve consideration on their own, because China’s scale, speed of growth, and complex relationship with the United States make it a unique case. Hackers in Russia or Israel might be more skillful one by one, but with its huge population China simply has more of them. The French might be more aggressive in searching for corporate secrets, but their military need not simultaneously consider how to stop the Seventh Fleet. According to Mike McConnell, everything about China’s military planning changed after its leaders saw the results of U.S. precision weapons in the first Gulf War. “They were shocked,” he told me. “They had no idea warfare had progressed to that point, and they went on a crash course to take away our advantage.” This meant both building their own information systems—thus China’s aspiration to create a Beidou (the Chinese name for the Big Dipper) system of satellites comparable to America’s GPS—and being prepared in time of war to “attack what they see as our soft underbelly, our military’s dependence on networking,” as McConnell put it, noting the vast emerging PLA literature on defending and attacking data networks.
Ed Giorgio, formerly of the NSA, has prepared charts showing the points of “asymmetric advantage” China might have over the long run in such competition. Point nine on his 12-point chart: “They know us much better than we know them (virtually every one of their combatants reads English and virtually none of ours read Mandarin. This, in itself, will surely precipitate a massive intelligence failure).” But James Lewis, of CSIS, pointed out an “asymmetric handicap”: “For all the effort the Chinese put into cyber competition, external efforts”—against a potential foe like the United States—“are second priority. The primary priority is domestic control and regime survival. The external part is a side benefit.” For many other reasons, the China-cyber question will, like the China-finance and China-environment and China-human-rights questions, demand special attention and work.
The implications of electronic insecurity will be with us in the long run, among the other enduring headaches of the modern age. The “solution” to them is like the solution to coping with China’s rise: something that will unfold over the years and require constant attention, adjustments, and innovations. “Cyber security is a process, not a patch,” Eugene Spafford said. “We must continue to invest in it—and for the long term as well as the ‘quick fix,’ because otherwise we will always be applying fixes too late.”
No doubt because I’ve been so preoccupied for so long with the implications of China’s growth, I thought I heard a familiar note in the recommendations that many of the cyber-security experts offered. The similarity lies in their emphasis on openness, transparency, and international contact as the basis of a successful policy.
In overall U.S. dealings with China, it matters tremendously that so many Chinese organizations are led or influenced by people who have spent time in America or with Americans. Today’s financial, academic, and business elite in China is deeply familiar with the United States, many of its members having studied or worked here. They may disagree on points of policy—for instance, about trade legislation—but they operate within a similar set of concepts and facts. This is less true of China’s political leaders, and much less true of its military—with a consequently much greater risk of serious misunderstanding and error. The tensest moment in modern China’s security relationship with the outside world came in January of 2007, when its missile command shot one of its own weather satellites out of the sky, presumably to show the world that it had developed anti-satellite weaponry. The detonation filled satellite orbits with dangerous debris; worse, it seemed to signal an unprovoked new step in militarizing space. By all accounts, President Hu Jintao okayed this before it occurred; but no one in China’s foreign ministry appeared to have advance word, and for days diplomats sat silent in the face of worldwide protests. The PLA had not foreseen the international uproar it would provoke—or just didn’t care.
Precisely in hopes of building familiarity like that in the business world, the U.S. Navy has since the 1980s taken the lead in military-to-military exchanges with the PLA. “I think both sides are trying to figure out what kind of a military-to-military relationship is feasible and proper,” David Finkelstein, of the Center for Naval Analyses, in suburban Washington, D.C., told me. “We have two militaries that, in some circumstances, see each other as possible adversaries. At the same time, at the level of grand strategy, the two nations are trying to accommodate each other. There is a major chasm, but both sides are working hard to bridge it.” Such exposure obviously doesn’t eliminate the real differences of national interest between the two countries, but I believe it makes outright conflict less likely.
A similar high-road logic seems to lie behind recommendations for cyber security in general, and for dealing with the Chinese cyber threat in particular. The NSA, which McConnell directed and where Giorgio worked, is renowned for its secrecy. But both men, along with others, now argue that to defend information networks, the U.S. should talk openly about risks and insecurities—and engage the Chinese government and military in an effort to contain the problem.
As a matter of domestic U.S. politics, McConnell argues that we now suffer from a conspiracy of secrecy about the scale of cyber risks. No credit-card company wants to admit how often or how easily it is cheated. No bank or investment house wants to admit how close it has come to being electronically robbed. As a result, the changes in law, regulation, concept, or habit that could make online life safer don’t get discussed. Sooner or later, the cyber equivalent of 9/11 will occur—and, if the real 9/11 is a model, we will understandably, but destructively, overreact.
While trying to build bridges to the military, McConnell and others recommend that the U.S. work with China on international efforts to secure data networks, comparable to the Chinese role in dealing with the world financial crisis. “You could have the model of the International Civil Aviation Organization,” James Lewis said, “a body that can reduce risks for everyone by imposing common standards. It’s moving from the Wild West to the rule of law.” Why would the Chinese government want to join such an effort? McConnell’s answer was that an ever-richer China will soon have as clear a stake in secure data networks as it did in safe air travel.
We’re naturally skeptical of abstractions like “cooperation” or “greater openness” as the solutions to tough-guy, real-world problems. But in making the best of a world that will inevitably be changed by increasing Chinese power and increasing electronic threats from many directions, those principles may offer the right, realistic place to start.
06 February 2010
House panel: Defense review lacks priorities
By Otto Kreisher CongressDaily February 5, 2010
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review received a chilly reception Thursday from the House Armed Services Committee, with members from both parties complaining that it lacks clear priorities and calls for too few forces to meet the future threats and missions envisioned.
House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton, D-Mo., called the QDR "superior" to previous documents updating national defense strategy, military force structure and modernization plans and praised its focus on a force able to counter more than one threat at a time.
But Skelton complained that it seemed to require a force "capable of being all things in all contingencies," which makes it hard for the committee to determine what the priorities are and which of the many possible risks are the most important.
"This makes our task much more difficult, because although the QDR should not be budget-constrained, the plain fact is that resources are not unlimited" and the QDR "comes up short" on giving Congress any guidance on how to make the essential tradeoffs, he said.
Armed Services Committee ranking member Howard (Buck) McKeon, R-Calif., echoed those concerns, repeating his protest that the QDR's focus on winning the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan short-changed the forces needed for the future.
Michele Flournoy, undersecretary of defense for policy, and Vice Adm. Stephen Stanley, director for force structure and resources for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, insisted that the QDR did set priorities. But they acknowledged that the forces had to be flexible and adaptable to respond to the wide range of possible threats.
Skelton said the scope of missions described appeared to require a larger Army and Marine Corps, and McKeon asked how the current force would handle a major contingency, such as North Korea, while involved in those conflicts.
Flournoy said that because Iraq and Afghanistan involved mainly the Army and Marines, the Navy and Air Force would be able to respond to a threat from North Korea.
But McKeon replied that the QDR and the fiscal 2011 budget cut the size of the Air Force and did not enlarge the Navy.
Seapower Subcommittee Chairman Gene Taylor, D-Miss., also complained that the QDR did not allow the Navy to reach the 313-ship fleet it wanted, and asked why it called for retiring the Perry-class frigates when they could fill missions such as the antipiracy patrols off Somalia.
Taylor warned the defense officials to expect "a shot across the bow" from his panel in legislation that would require them to propose building two new ships for every ship they planned to retire.
Virginia lawmakers demanded to know if the officials regarded anticipated funding shortfalls for ships and aircraft as less important than spending as much as $1 billion to move an aircraft carrier from its home port in Norfolk, Va., to Mayport, Fla. Flournoy could not provide an immediate answer.
In response to a question about the Marine leaders' concerns over their fading amphibious capabilities, Stanley said the QDR supported amphibious operations to ensure that U.S. forces can enter hostile areas to neutralize a threat. And he said the expeditionary fighting vehicle, which has been repeatedly delayed, will be a part of that capability.
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review received a chilly reception Thursday from the House Armed Services Committee, with members from both parties complaining that it lacks clear priorities and calls for too few forces to meet the future threats and missions envisioned.
House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton, D-Mo., called the QDR "superior" to previous documents updating national defense strategy, military force structure and modernization plans and praised its focus on a force able to counter more than one threat at a time.
But Skelton complained that it seemed to require a force "capable of being all things in all contingencies," which makes it hard for the committee to determine what the priorities are and which of the many possible risks are the most important.
"This makes our task much more difficult, because although the QDR should not be budget-constrained, the plain fact is that resources are not unlimited" and the QDR "comes up short" on giving Congress any guidance on how to make the essential tradeoffs, he said.
Armed Services Committee ranking member Howard (Buck) McKeon, R-Calif., echoed those concerns, repeating his protest that the QDR's focus on winning the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan short-changed the forces needed for the future.
Michele Flournoy, undersecretary of defense for policy, and Vice Adm. Stephen Stanley, director for force structure and resources for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, insisted that the QDR did set priorities. But they acknowledged that the forces had to be flexible and adaptable to respond to the wide range of possible threats.
Skelton said the scope of missions described appeared to require a larger Army and Marine Corps, and McKeon asked how the current force would handle a major contingency, such as North Korea, while involved in those conflicts.
Flournoy said that because Iraq and Afghanistan involved mainly the Army and Marines, the Navy and Air Force would be able to respond to a threat from North Korea.
But McKeon replied that the QDR and the fiscal 2011 budget cut the size of the Air Force and did not enlarge the Navy.
Seapower Subcommittee Chairman Gene Taylor, D-Miss., also complained that the QDR did not allow the Navy to reach the 313-ship fleet it wanted, and asked why it called for retiring the Perry-class frigates when they could fill missions such as the antipiracy patrols off Somalia.
Taylor warned the defense officials to expect "a shot across the bow" from his panel in legislation that would require them to propose building two new ships for every ship they planned to retire.
Virginia lawmakers demanded to know if the officials regarded anticipated funding shortfalls for ships and aircraft as less important than spending as much as $1 billion to move an aircraft carrier from its home port in Norfolk, Va., to Mayport, Fla. Flournoy could not provide an immediate answer.
In response to a question about the Marine leaders' concerns over their fading amphibious capabilities, Stanley said the QDR supported amphibious operations to ensure that U.S. forces can enter hostile areas to neutralize a threat. And he said the expeditionary fighting vehicle, which has been repeatedly delayed, will be a part of that capability.
At $7 Billion Per Boat, New Strategic Submarine Threatens Conventional Fleet Funding
Inside Defense
Feb. 5, 2010 -- The Navy's new shipbuilding plan affixes a price tag of as much as $7 billion for each new submarine purchased to modernize the undersea leg of the nation's nuclear triad, the first publicly disclosed estimate and one large enough to significantly encroach on funding for conventional shipbuilding within a decade.
The Navy's new five-year investment plan -- from fiscal years 2011 to 2015 -- includes a down payment to begin work on an Ohio-class submarine (SSBN) replacement, a 12-boat buy that must begin in earnest by FY-19 and could cost between $72 billion and $84 billion, according to the Navy's new 30-year shipbuilding plan delivered to Congress along with the FY-11 budget request.
The “need to fund SSBN recapitalization will result in some risk to the Navy's shipbuilding plan” beyond the Pentagon's current five-year spending plan, the report states. Still, Navy officials drafting an FY-12 to FY-17 investment plan this spring must grapple what ships the service can afford to buy while modernizing its strategic deterrent capability.
“Assuming a unit cost of about $6-$7 billion per ship (consistent with the cost of the Ohio-class SSBN), it is critical to understand the impact of these ships on the remaining recapitalization plan,” states the Navy's “Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY-11,” dated February 2010.
The Navy plans to continue using a $6 billion to $7 billion range for a new SSBN(X) “until a definitive cost estimate is complete,” the report states. “The estimated cost should be refined and reported in a subsequent report to Congress.”
The Navy's FY-11 budget request includes $609 million in research and development funding for SSGN(X).
The shipbuilding report outlines for the first time how the Ohio-class replacement procurement threatens to compete with resourcing for other ships the Navy wants to buy at the same time.
The SSBN(X) subs “require significant resource commitments during the period when they are being procured,” the report states. “The timing of the replacements for these important strategic assets is inextricably linked to legacy retirements. The latest start for the lead SSBN(X) is FY-19 and the replacements must start reaching the operational force by FY-29. There is no leeway in their plan to allow a later start or any delay in the procurement plan.”
Part of the challenge for the Navy is this: at the same time new SSBN(X) subs are being purchased, the service will be facing “wholesale end-of-service-life retirements” of its Los Angeles-class attack submarine fleet; its CG-47 Ticonderoga class guided missile cruisers; DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers; and LSD 41- and LSD 49-class dock landing ships.
“While the SSBN(X) is being procured, the Navy will be limited in its ability to procure other ship classes,” states the report. “This slowdown in procurement will occur when the Navy needs to be procuring at least 10 ships per year to maintain its force level against the anticipated ship retirements from the 1980s and 1990s.”
The 30-year shipbuilding plan estimates the Navy would require on average $15.9 billion annually. However, in the near term -- between FY-11 and FY-15 -- the Navy needs $14.5 billion per year.
The Pentagon, according to the report, recognizes that spending on new ships during the period between FY-21 and FY-30 “will exceed this limit, averaging about $17.9 billion per year over that period. Executing the procurement of the SSBN program and sustaining minimum levels of acquisition in our remaining critical programs precludes funding this period at a level below that currently projected.”
In a draft version of the Navy shipbuilding plan, first reported by Inside the Pentagon on Dec. 7, the Navy presented an alternative, long-range inventory that would squeeze dozens of conventional warships from its force if the service were required to pay for the SSBN(X) modernization from its own budget, including: 19 DDG-51 destroyers, 15 Littoral Combat Ships, four attack subs, two LPD-17 amphibious ships, one LH(X) amphibious ship, seven T-AO oilers, two sub tenders and six Joint High Speed Vessels.
The final version of the report to Congress does not indicate that the Navy has received any new authority to plan on higher annual allocations. However, the number of conventional ships procured while the SSBN(X) subs are purchased does not plummet as suggested in the draft report. -- Jason Sherman
252010_feb5a
Feb. 5, 2010 -- The Navy's new shipbuilding plan affixes a price tag of as much as $7 billion for each new submarine purchased to modernize the undersea leg of the nation's nuclear triad, the first publicly disclosed estimate and one large enough to significantly encroach on funding for conventional shipbuilding within a decade.
The Navy's new five-year investment plan -- from fiscal years 2011 to 2015 -- includes a down payment to begin work on an Ohio-class submarine (SSBN) replacement, a 12-boat buy that must begin in earnest by FY-19 and could cost between $72 billion and $84 billion, according to the Navy's new 30-year shipbuilding plan delivered to Congress along with the FY-11 budget request.
The “need to fund SSBN recapitalization will result in some risk to the Navy's shipbuilding plan” beyond the Pentagon's current five-year spending plan, the report states. Still, Navy officials drafting an FY-12 to FY-17 investment plan this spring must grapple what ships the service can afford to buy while modernizing its strategic deterrent capability.
“Assuming a unit cost of about $6-$7 billion per ship (consistent with the cost of the Ohio-class SSBN), it is critical to understand the impact of these ships on the remaining recapitalization plan,” states the Navy's “Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY-11,” dated February 2010.
The Navy plans to continue using a $6 billion to $7 billion range for a new SSBN(X) “until a definitive cost estimate is complete,” the report states. “The estimated cost should be refined and reported in a subsequent report to Congress.”
The Navy's FY-11 budget request includes $609 million in research and development funding for SSGN(X).
The shipbuilding report outlines for the first time how the Ohio-class replacement procurement threatens to compete with resourcing for other ships the Navy wants to buy at the same time.
The SSBN(X) subs “require significant resource commitments during the period when they are being procured,” the report states. “The timing of the replacements for these important strategic assets is inextricably linked to legacy retirements. The latest start for the lead SSBN(X) is FY-19 and the replacements must start reaching the operational force by FY-29. There is no leeway in their plan to allow a later start or any delay in the procurement plan.”
Part of the challenge for the Navy is this: at the same time new SSBN(X) subs are being purchased, the service will be facing “wholesale end-of-service-life retirements” of its Los Angeles-class attack submarine fleet; its CG-47 Ticonderoga class guided missile cruisers; DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers; and LSD 41- and LSD 49-class dock landing ships.
“While the SSBN(X) is being procured, the Navy will be limited in its ability to procure other ship classes,” states the report. “This slowdown in procurement will occur when the Navy needs to be procuring at least 10 ships per year to maintain its force level against the anticipated ship retirements from the 1980s and 1990s.”
The 30-year shipbuilding plan estimates the Navy would require on average $15.9 billion annually. However, in the near term -- between FY-11 and FY-15 -- the Navy needs $14.5 billion per year.
The Pentagon, according to the report, recognizes that spending on new ships during the period between FY-21 and FY-30 “will exceed this limit, averaging about $17.9 billion per year over that period. Executing the procurement of the SSBN program and sustaining minimum levels of acquisition in our remaining critical programs precludes funding this period at a level below that currently projected.”
In a draft version of the Navy shipbuilding plan, first reported by Inside the Pentagon on Dec. 7, the Navy presented an alternative, long-range inventory that would squeeze dozens of conventional warships from its force if the service were required to pay for the SSBN(X) modernization from its own budget, including: 19 DDG-51 destroyers, 15 Littoral Combat Ships, four attack subs, two LPD-17 amphibious ships, one LH(X) amphibious ship, seven T-AO oilers, two sub tenders and six Joint High Speed Vessels.
The final version of the report to Congress does not indicate that the Navy has received any new authority to plan on higher annual allocations. However, the number of conventional ships procured while the SSBN(X) subs are purchased does not plummet as suggested in the draft report. -- Jason Sherman
252010_feb5a
04 February 2010
Pentagon Leaders Defend Quadrennial Defense Review Against Criticism
Inside Pentagon
Pentagon leaders are defending the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, punching back at critics who assert the department’s report downplays the requirements for deterring and defeating other countries in high-end war.
Rep. Howard McKeon (R-CA), the top Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, confronted Defense Secretary Robert Gates with such criticism in a hearing yesterday.
“In my view the QDR understates the requirements to deter and defeat challenges from state actors and it overestimates the capabilities of the force the department would build,” he said. “This QDR does an excellent job of delineating the threat posed by those with anti-access capabilities -- notably China -- but does little to address the risk resulting from the gaps in funding, capability and force structure.”
Gates pushed back hard against the criticism.
“I would take the strongest possible issue with those who say we are neglecting the potential future fight or the capabilities needed to take on high end adversaries,” Gates said. “The reality is in this budget, half the procurement budget is going for systems that are purely associated with modernization of conventional capabilities, about 7 percent for, if you will, the fights we’re in, and about 43 percent for dual-purpose capabilities -- C-17s, and other capabilities that will be used no matter what kind of fight we’re in.”
The Pentagon budget is modernizing conventional capabilities, he said, ticking off examples such as long-range strike, prompt-global strike, a new bomber, new nuclear ballistic missile submarines, attack submarines, Army vehicles and cyber systems. Even with the restructured Joint Strike Fighter program, the Pentagon will be way ahead of the Chinese and Russian militaries in terms of acquiring fifth-generation fighter aircraft, Gates said.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen agreed. While the QDR stresses winning today’s wars it also advocates a significant investment in the future, he said, citing capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; rotary-wing aircraft and special forces. While the Pentagon is rebalancing its capabilities, by no means has the pendulum swung too far away from preparing for conventional war, he said.
At the Council on Foreign Relations on Tuesday, Pentagon policy chief Michèle Flournoy noted the QDR puts particular emphasis on high-end asymmetric threats.
“How could very powerful state adversaries, often rising regional powers, use their sophisticated technologies and forces to actually counter U.S. interests?” she said. “And so, along with investments in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism capabilities, for example, you’ll see targeted investments in capabilities that are related to deterring and defeating aggression in anti-access environments -- so, for example, modernizing long-range strike capabilities.”
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks defended the QDR yesterday in a teleconference with bloggers. The QDR explicitly spends a lot of time and energy on long-term threats, including the high-end threat area, which DOD generally talks about in terms of anti-access, area denial and the limitations it may present to U.S. power projection capabilities, she said.
Gates told the Senate Armed Services Committee Tuesday morning that the Air Force might not field its Next-Generation Bomber until the 2020s. At yesterday’s House hearing, Gates stressed the QDR and the budget provide for a family of long range strike initiatives. He noted DOD must grapple with substantial questions.
“Should it be standoff or attack?” he said. “Should it be manned or remotely piloted? So there are some fairly fundamental issues. We have money in the budget, as we mentioned earlier, for both B-2 and B-52 modernization, and so, we’re looking at something that will be in our inventory until 2060 or 2070 and so, and based on the life of the B- 52, it may be there until 2100. But all kidding aside, I think that the key is trying to figure out what the right technologies are for the future. We have put money, we worked with this committee in particular to put money in the budget, to sustain the technology base in industry, in terms of materials and so on, so that we will still have those choices.”
At yesterday’s hearing, Rep. Mike Coffman (R-CO) asked the witnesses about the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program. The system, made by General Dynamics, came under heavy scrutiny during the QDR. Ultimately, though, the department opted not to kill the program but rather to delay the low-rate production decision by a year (Inside the Pentagon, Jan. 7, p1). The fate of the program depends on how prototypes perform in upcoming tests.
Mullen endorsed the need for some kind of forcible entry capability to carry Marines ashore. But he noted the EFV program’s costs have “exploded” over the years, signaling a waning appetite to invest further in the troubled effort.
“What’s the vehicle? EFV is it right now, and it’s in the program,” he said. “But I also think there are limits about how much money we can spend there. [Marine Commandant] Gen. [James] Conway wants to get to a point, post- Afghanistan, if you will, where the Marine Corps is a lot lighter. It has gotten a lot heavier. So there’s a lot of work to do about what the future of the Marine Corps looks like, specifically not just tied to one vehicle or one shipyard.”
The final version of the long-anticipated QDR shakes up budget plans to fix military capability gaps, outlines a new force-planning construct and downplays an earlier draft’s language on China as a potential enemy.
The QDR, the culmination of a year’s work, is an important step toward “fully institutionalizing the ongoing reform” at the Pentagon and reshaping the military to meet the “urgent demands of today and the most likely and lethal threats of the future,” Gates writes in a letter introducing the report. InsideDefense.com obtained an advance copy of the final QDR report prior to its official release Feb. 1.
“To meet the potential threats to our military’s ability to project power, deter aggression, and come to the aid of allies and partners, this QDR directs more focus and investment in a new air-sea battle concept, long-range strike, space and cyberspace, among other conventional and strategic modernization programs,” Gates writes in the cover letter, which was not included in an earlier, much-publicized draft.
The assessment leading up to the report uncovered “a significant number of possible shortfalls in the capabilities and capacity of programmed U.S. forces,” the document states. “In some cases, opportunities exist to remedy these shortfalls by investing in new systems or additional force structure. In other cases, no readily available solutions are at hand but greater investments in research and development or concept exploration are warranted.”
Many of these enhancements will be costly, according to the QDR, which describes some of the tradeoffs that Defense Department leaders identified to rebalance the military’s capabilities. These include the previously reported decisions to halt production of the Air Force’s C-17 aircraft, delay development of new Navy command ships and terminate the Navy’s CG(X) cruiser program as well as the Pentagon’s Net Enabled Command and Control program.
“More such tradeoffs could be necessary in the future,” the report adds.
“The QDR concluded that the U.S. military must balance resources and risk among four major objectives,” Gates told reporters Feb. 1. “The first is to prevail in today’s wars -- the first time this objective has appeared in a QDR. Achieving our objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq has moved to the top of the institutional military’s budgeting, policy and program priorities. We now recognize that America’s ability to deal with threats for years to come will depend importantly on our success in the current conflicts.”
The second major objective, he said, is to prevent and deter conflict by better employing and integrating all elements of national power and international cooperation, and should those fail, by possessing superior military capabilities and the means and will to use them.
In addition, DOD must prepare for a wide range of contingencies, including the disruptive, high-tech capabilities being developed by other nations, he said.
The fourth major objective is to preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force, he added.
The final report differs in key ways from the Dec. 3, 2009, draft prepared before Gates and other senior officials provided their input. In the section on a new force-planning construct aimed at addressing a wider range of potential challenges, an added phrase -- “including two capable nation-state aggressors” -- underscores the force must still be able to fight two wars at once.
“This QDR likewise assumes the need for a robust force capable of protecting U.S. interests against a multiplicity of threats, including two capable nation-state aggressors,” the report states. “It breaks from the past, however, in its insistence that the U.S. Armed Forces must be capable of conducting a wide range of operations, from homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities, to deterrence and preparedness missions, to the conflicts we are in and the wars we may someday face.”
The world is “very much more complex” than in the early 1990s when the construct focused on two major wars came together, Gates told reporters.
“And what I wanted to convey was a much more complex environment, in which you may have to do not just two major conflicts, but a broad range of other things, as well, or, perhaps in the future, one of those conflicts and then a number of other contingencies,” he said. “So I just felt that construct was too confining and did not represent the real world that our country and our military forces are going to face in the future.”
Mullen, in his assessment of the QDR included in the back of the final report, says this construct is “properly focused on balancing capabilities to fight today’s wars with those needed to counter future potential adversaries. It enables us to build a ready and agile force with sufficient capacity and capability to defeat adversaries across the range of military operations. And finally, it places priority on our ability to defend the homeland and support civil authorities.”
Managing risk under the new QDR force-planning construct requires further analysis, including new scenarios to test joint concepts of operation and force mixes as well as the development of associated operational and strategic assumptions, Mullen writes. Planning and assessment efforts will vary the size, duration and simultaneity of operations and account for associated policies and goals for force rotation, disengagement and access to the reserve component, he adds.
Unlike the draft report, the final version of the QDR states explicitly that DOD will homeport a carrier in Mayport, FL. The subject is controversial with lawmakers from Virginia, the only state that now hosts a home port for carriers on the East Coast. Virginia lawmakers peppered Gates with questions on the topic at yesterday’s House Armed Services Committee hearing.
The QDR’s section on force structure describes the force levels required for each of the armed services. Much of this is similar to the draft, which was reported at length this past week by InsideDefense.com and others. But the final report notably calls for maintaining only eight Stryker brigade combat teams in the Army, though the draft proposed nine to 13. The total number of brigade combat teams listed is 73, as in the draft. This includes 40 infantry brigade combat teams and 25 heavy brigade combat teams.
The final report adds language stressing the importance of strengthening “key supporting capabilities” for strategic communication, which is considered “particularly essential” in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and stability operations, “where population and stakeholder beliefs and perceptions are crucial to our success, and where adversaries often enjoy the advantage of greater local knowledge and calibrate their activities to achieve sophisticated information objectives.”
Relative to the draft, the final report tones down discussion of China as a potential threat. The draft warned Russia has sold many modern surface-to-air missiles to China, but the final version of this section does not mention China. Also gone is a section from the draft that warned Chinese military doctrine calls for pre-emptive strikes.
The final report calls for institutionalizing a rapid-acquisition capability, noting DOD must not only prepare better for threats that can be anticipated but must also build agile, adaptive structures capable of quickly identifying emerging gaps and adjusting program and budgetary priorities to rapidly field capabilities that will mitigate those gaps. In addition to acquisition improvements, DOD needs a way to quickly prioritize and quantify needs as well as to ensure the resources are available to quickly field the systems, the report states.
The QDR notes the Pentagon recognizes the value of not only the U.S. industrial base but also the industrial capacities of allies. “We will continue to value our allies’ capabilities, ensure that when they bid on U.S. contracts that they are treated fairly, just as we expect our firms to be treated fairly in international competitions, and deepen our collaborative effort to innovate against 21st century threats,” the report states.
In order for the defense industry to remain a source of strategic advantage well into the future, DOD and the nation require a consistent, realistic, long-term strategy for shaping the structure and capabilities of the defense industrial base, according to the QDR. Toward this end, the Pentagon is “committed to being more forward leaning in its ongoing assessments of the industrial base -- refocusing our efforts on our future needs, not just our past performance; working much more closely with the services to foster an integrated approach to the overall industrial base; and placing transparency and dialogue with industry at the forefront of our agenda.”
The QDR also strongly advocates reform in export control, noting the current system poses a potential national security risk.
Further, the final report adds language stressing the importance of addressing national security issues in the Arctic. -- Christopher J. Castelli
PENTAGON-26-5-3
Pentagon leaders are defending the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, punching back at critics who assert the department’s report downplays the requirements for deterring and defeating other countries in high-end war.
Rep. Howard McKeon (R-CA), the top Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, confronted Defense Secretary Robert Gates with such criticism in a hearing yesterday.
“In my view the QDR understates the requirements to deter and defeat challenges from state actors and it overestimates the capabilities of the force the department would build,” he said. “This QDR does an excellent job of delineating the threat posed by those with anti-access capabilities -- notably China -- but does little to address the risk resulting from the gaps in funding, capability and force structure.”
Gates pushed back hard against the criticism.
“I would take the strongest possible issue with those who say we are neglecting the potential future fight or the capabilities needed to take on high end adversaries,” Gates said. “The reality is in this budget, half the procurement budget is going for systems that are purely associated with modernization of conventional capabilities, about 7 percent for, if you will, the fights we’re in, and about 43 percent for dual-purpose capabilities -- C-17s, and other capabilities that will be used no matter what kind of fight we’re in.”
The Pentagon budget is modernizing conventional capabilities, he said, ticking off examples such as long-range strike, prompt-global strike, a new bomber, new nuclear ballistic missile submarines, attack submarines, Army vehicles and cyber systems. Even with the restructured Joint Strike Fighter program, the Pentagon will be way ahead of the Chinese and Russian militaries in terms of acquiring fifth-generation fighter aircraft, Gates said.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen agreed. While the QDR stresses winning today’s wars it also advocates a significant investment in the future, he said, citing capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; rotary-wing aircraft and special forces. While the Pentagon is rebalancing its capabilities, by no means has the pendulum swung too far away from preparing for conventional war, he said.
At the Council on Foreign Relations on Tuesday, Pentagon policy chief Michèle Flournoy noted the QDR puts particular emphasis on high-end asymmetric threats.
“How could very powerful state adversaries, often rising regional powers, use their sophisticated technologies and forces to actually counter U.S. interests?” she said. “And so, along with investments in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism capabilities, for example, you’ll see targeted investments in capabilities that are related to deterring and defeating aggression in anti-access environments -- so, for example, modernizing long-range strike capabilities.”
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks defended the QDR yesterday in a teleconference with bloggers. The QDR explicitly spends a lot of time and energy on long-term threats, including the high-end threat area, which DOD generally talks about in terms of anti-access, area denial and the limitations it may present to U.S. power projection capabilities, she said.
Gates told the Senate Armed Services Committee Tuesday morning that the Air Force might not field its Next-Generation Bomber until the 2020s. At yesterday’s House hearing, Gates stressed the QDR and the budget provide for a family of long range strike initiatives. He noted DOD must grapple with substantial questions.
“Should it be standoff or attack?” he said. “Should it be manned or remotely piloted? So there are some fairly fundamental issues. We have money in the budget, as we mentioned earlier, for both B-2 and B-52 modernization, and so, we’re looking at something that will be in our inventory until 2060 or 2070 and so, and based on the life of the B- 52, it may be there until 2100. But all kidding aside, I think that the key is trying to figure out what the right technologies are for the future. We have put money, we worked with this committee in particular to put money in the budget, to sustain the technology base in industry, in terms of materials and so on, so that we will still have those choices.”
At yesterday’s hearing, Rep. Mike Coffman (R-CO) asked the witnesses about the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program. The system, made by General Dynamics, came under heavy scrutiny during the QDR. Ultimately, though, the department opted not to kill the program but rather to delay the low-rate production decision by a year (Inside the Pentagon, Jan. 7, p1). The fate of the program depends on how prototypes perform in upcoming tests.
Mullen endorsed the need for some kind of forcible entry capability to carry Marines ashore. But he noted the EFV program’s costs have “exploded” over the years, signaling a waning appetite to invest further in the troubled effort.
“What’s the vehicle? EFV is it right now, and it’s in the program,” he said. “But I also think there are limits about how much money we can spend there. [Marine Commandant] Gen. [James] Conway wants to get to a point, post- Afghanistan, if you will, where the Marine Corps is a lot lighter. It has gotten a lot heavier. So there’s a lot of work to do about what the future of the Marine Corps looks like, specifically not just tied to one vehicle or one shipyard.”
The final version of the long-anticipated QDR shakes up budget plans to fix military capability gaps, outlines a new force-planning construct and downplays an earlier draft’s language on China as a potential enemy.
The QDR, the culmination of a year’s work, is an important step toward “fully institutionalizing the ongoing reform” at the Pentagon and reshaping the military to meet the “urgent demands of today and the most likely and lethal threats of the future,” Gates writes in a letter introducing the report. InsideDefense.com obtained an advance copy of the final QDR report prior to its official release Feb. 1.
“To meet the potential threats to our military’s ability to project power, deter aggression, and come to the aid of allies and partners, this QDR directs more focus and investment in a new air-sea battle concept, long-range strike, space and cyberspace, among other conventional and strategic modernization programs,” Gates writes in the cover letter, which was not included in an earlier, much-publicized draft.
The assessment leading up to the report uncovered “a significant number of possible shortfalls in the capabilities and capacity of programmed U.S. forces,” the document states. “In some cases, opportunities exist to remedy these shortfalls by investing in new systems or additional force structure. In other cases, no readily available solutions are at hand but greater investments in research and development or concept exploration are warranted.”
Many of these enhancements will be costly, according to the QDR, which describes some of the tradeoffs that Defense Department leaders identified to rebalance the military’s capabilities. These include the previously reported decisions to halt production of the Air Force’s C-17 aircraft, delay development of new Navy command ships and terminate the Navy’s CG(X) cruiser program as well as the Pentagon’s Net Enabled Command and Control program.
“More such tradeoffs could be necessary in the future,” the report adds.
“The QDR concluded that the U.S. military must balance resources and risk among four major objectives,” Gates told reporters Feb. 1. “The first is to prevail in today’s wars -- the first time this objective has appeared in a QDR. Achieving our objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq has moved to the top of the institutional military’s budgeting, policy and program priorities. We now recognize that America’s ability to deal with threats for years to come will depend importantly on our success in the current conflicts.”
The second major objective, he said, is to prevent and deter conflict by better employing and integrating all elements of national power and international cooperation, and should those fail, by possessing superior military capabilities and the means and will to use them.
In addition, DOD must prepare for a wide range of contingencies, including the disruptive, high-tech capabilities being developed by other nations, he said.
The fourth major objective is to preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force, he added.
The final report differs in key ways from the Dec. 3, 2009, draft prepared before Gates and other senior officials provided their input. In the section on a new force-planning construct aimed at addressing a wider range of potential challenges, an added phrase -- “including two capable nation-state aggressors” -- underscores the force must still be able to fight two wars at once.
“This QDR likewise assumes the need for a robust force capable of protecting U.S. interests against a multiplicity of threats, including two capable nation-state aggressors,” the report states. “It breaks from the past, however, in its insistence that the U.S. Armed Forces must be capable of conducting a wide range of operations, from homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities, to deterrence and preparedness missions, to the conflicts we are in and the wars we may someday face.”
The world is “very much more complex” than in the early 1990s when the construct focused on two major wars came together, Gates told reporters.
“And what I wanted to convey was a much more complex environment, in which you may have to do not just two major conflicts, but a broad range of other things, as well, or, perhaps in the future, one of those conflicts and then a number of other contingencies,” he said. “So I just felt that construct was too confining and did not represent the real world that our country and our military forces are going to face in the future.”
Mullen, in his assessment of the QDR included in the back of the final report, says this construct is “properly focused on balancing capabilities to fight today’s wars with those needed to counter future potential adversaries. It enables us to build a ready and agile force with sufficient capacity and capability to defeat adversaries across the range of military operations. And finally, it places priority on our ability to defend the homeland and support civil authorities.”
Managing risk under the new QDR force-planning construct requires further analysis, including new scenarios to test joint concepts of operation and force mixes as well as the development of associated operational and strategic assumptions, Mullen writes. Planning and assessment efforts will vary the size, duration and simultaneity of operations and account for associated policies and goals for force rotation, disengagement and access to the reserve component, he adds.
Unlike the draft report, the final version of the QDR states explicitly that DOD will homeport a carrier in Mayport, FL. The subject is controversial with lawmakers from Virginia, the only state that now hosts a home port for carriers on the East Coast. Virginia lawmakers peppered Gates with questions on the topic at yesterday’s House Armed Services Committee hearing.
The QDR’s section on force structure describes the force levels required for each of the armed services. Much of this is similar to the draft, which was reported at length this past week by InsideDefense.com and others. But the final report notably calls for maintaining only eight Stryker brigade combat teams in the Army, though the draft proposed nine to 13. The total number of brigade combat teams listed is 73, as in the draft. This includes 40 infantry brigade combat teams and 25 heavy brigade combat teams.
The final report adds language stressing the importance of strengthening “key supporting capabilities” for strategic communication, which is considered “particularly essential” in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and stability operations, “where population and stakeholder beliefs and perceptions are crucial to our success, and where adversaries often enjoy the advantage of greater local knowledge and calibrate their activities to achieve sophisticated information objectives.”
Relative to the draft, the final report tones down discussion of China as a potential threat. The draft warned Russia has sold many modern surface-to-air missiles to China, but the final version of this section does not mention China. Also gone is a section from the draft that warned Chinese military doctrine calls for pre-emptive strikes.
The final report calls for institutionalizing a rapid-acquisition capability, noting DOD must not only prepare better for threats that can be anticipated but must also build agile, adaptive structures capable of quickly identifying emerging gaps and adjusting program and budgetary priorities to rapidly field capabilities that will mitigate those gaps. In addition to acquisition improvements, DOD needs a way to quickly prioritize and quantify needs as well as to ensure the resources are available to quickly field the systems, the report states.
The QDR notes the Pentagon recognizes the value of not only the U.S. industrial base but also the industrial capacities of allies. “We will continue to value our allies’ capabilities, ensure that when they bid on U.S. contracts that they are treated fairly, just as we expect our firms to be treated fairly in international competitions, and deepen our collaborative effort to innovate against 21st century threats,” the report states.
In order for the defense industry to remain a source of strategic advantage well into the future, DOD and the nation require a consistent, realistic, long-term strategy for shaping the structure and capabilities of the defense industrial base, according to the QDR. Toward this end, the Pentagon is “committed to being more forward leaning in its ongoing assessments of the industrial base -- refocusing our efforts on our future needs, not just our past performance; working much more closely with the services to foster an integrated approach to the overall industrial base; and placing transparency and dialogue with industry at the forefront of our agenda.”
The QDR also strongly advocates reform in export control, noting the current system poses a potential national security risk.
Further, the final report adds language stressing the importance of addressing national security issues in the Arctic. -- Christopher J. Castelli
PENTAGON-26-5-3
Pentagon Aviation Plan Urges Integrating Drones With Fighter Planes
Inside Pentagon
The Pentagon has outlined its first-ever, 30-year plan for modernizing its tactical air forces, a document that points to aggressive goals to integrate unmanned aircraft with a growing fleet of fifth-generation fighters.
The 26-page plan, obtained by sister publication Inside the Navy, assumes annual spending of $29 billion per year beginning in fiscal year 2016 for tactical aircraft in the Navy and Air Force. It projects a 177 percent increase -- about 500 aircraft -- in the unmanned aircraft inventory as well as a 350 percent increase -- an additional 1,000 aircraft -- in fifth-generation fighters over the next decade.
The plan also reveals that the Air Force’s F-22A Raptor will conclude its service life around 2025, and notes that the Navy’s investment in strike-fighter aircraft will be slashed after FY-13 when the service stops buying F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and prepares to ramp up production of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Inventories for the Navy and Air Force will decline by about 10 percent over the next 10 years.
The plan also notes that a “sizable investment” will be made toward the development of a multirole, unmanned sea-based platform, ramping up to $7 billion in fiscal year 2020.
“The Navy is conducting analysis to determine key capabilities for this future, sea-based unmanned aerial system (CVN UAS),” the report states. “Options cover a wide range, to include a high-endurance ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance]/strike platform for irregular warfare and a stealthy aircraft to defeat advanced air defenses.”
The aviation plan is the product of multiple high-level reviews and reflects work done in the just-released Quadrennial Defense Review, FY-11 budget and the newly restructured JSF program.
The Pentagon plans to more than double its medium-class unmanned drones from 300 in FY-11 to more than 800 in FY-20, a 177-percent increase. As part of that, the Air Force plans to buy 48 MQ-9 Reapers per year between FY-11 and FY-18 and 39 RQ-4 Global Hawks during that same period.
The Air Force is modernizing its command-and-control fleet and is reviewing what a future platform might look like since those aircraft are expected to reach the end of their service lives before 2040. The report leaves the door open for the service to replace a portion of its C2 and ISR fleet -- including the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System, RC-135 Rivet Joint and E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System -- with unmanned aircraft.
“It is possible that advances in UAS designs will allow unmanned systems to replace those aircraft,” the report notes.
The report also backs up claims by Defense Secretary Robert Gates over the last year that the Pentagon will field hundreds of fifth-generation aircraft by FY-20. The Air Force alone is expected to buy slightly more than 600 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters by that time and, coupled with the Navy and Marine Corps, more than 1,000 are expected to be on the books. The numbers come in addition to the Air Force’s fleet of 187 F-22A Raptors.
But the Air Force will begin exploring a follow-on for the F-22A toward the middle of the decade, in anticipation of the original fifth-generation fighter reaching the end of its combat life around 2025. Over the next 10 years, the Air Force plans to spend $1.9 billion to modernize the F-22A with advanced sensors and stealth features, according to the report.
By FY-40, almost all of today’s legacy force will have retired and the department will have begun recapitalization of the fifth-generation force. However, the report does not detail what a follow-on to the F-22A or F-35 might look like.
“These far-term recapitalization plans cannot be defined with any understood procurement plans for the JSF,” the report states. “It is anticipated that a family of systems -- mixes of manned and unmanned aircraft -- will shape the future fighter/attack inventory.”
As noted in the recently released Quadrennial Defense Review, the Pentagon is reviewing its long-range strike options, including the Air Force’s Next-Generation Bomber. “Range and payload requirements for a successor system are still under investigation,” the report states.
The Air Force is expected to spend about $1 billion on the bomber effort in FY-15 and could be spending as much as $4 billion on the effort in its FY-20 budget, depending on the results of the current studies.
As for intratheater airlift, the Air Force will continue buying Lockheed Martin C-130J cargo haulers in the near term. Down the road, however, the Pentagon is exploring a “family of airlift systems that would provide complementary capabilities with respect to maneuverability and sustainability.”
In the strategic airlift realm, the Air Force plans to continue flying C-5s and C-17s well into the 2030s. Down the road, the Pentagon would likely program funds to develop a C-5 replacement aircraft. -- Dan Taylor and Marcus Weisgerber
PENTAGON-26-5-1
The Pentagon has outlined its first-ever, 30-year plan for modernizing its tactical air forces, a document that points to aggressive goals to integrate unmanned aircraft with a growing fleet of fifth-generation fighters.
The 26-page plan, obtained by sister publication Inside the Navy, assumes annual spending of $29 billion per year beginning in fiscal year 2016 for tactical aircraft in the Navy and Air Force. It projects a 177 percent increase -- about 500 aircraft -- in the unmanned aircraft inventory as well as a 350 percent increase -- an additional 1,000 aircraft -- in fifth-generation fighters over the next decade.
The plan also reveals that the Air Force’s F-22A Raptor will conclude its service life around 2025, and notes that the Navy’s investment in strike-fighter aircraft will be slashed after FY-13 when the service stops buying F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and prepares to ramp up production of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Inventories for the Navy and Air Force will decline by about 10 percent over the next 10 years.
The plan also notes that a “sizable investment” will be made toward the development of a multirole, unmanned sea-based platform, ramping up to $7 billion in fiscal year 2020.
“The Navy is conducting analysis to determine key capabilities for this future, sea-based unmanned aerial system (CVN UAS),” the report states. “Options cover a wide range, to include a high-endurance ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance]/strike platform for irregular warfare and a stealthy aircraft to defeat advanced air defenses.”
The aviation plan is the product of multiple high-level reviews and reflects work done in the just-released Quadrennial Defense Review, FY-11 budget and the newly restructured JSF program.
The Pentagon plans to more than double its medium-class unmanned drones from 300 in FY-11 to more than 800 in FY-20, a 177-percent increase. As part of that, the Air Force plans to buy 48 MQ-9 Reapers per year between FY-11 and FY-18 and 39 RQ-4 Global Hawks during that same period.
The Air Force is modernizing its command-and-control fleet and is reviewing what a future platform might look like since those aircraft are expected to reach the end of their service lives before 2040. The report leaves the door open for the service to replace a portion of its C2 and ISR fleet -- including the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System, RC-135 Rivet Joint and E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System -- with unmanned aircraft.
“It is possible that advances in UAS designs will allow unmanned systems to replace those aircraft,” the report notes.
The report also backs up claims by Defense Secretary Robert Gates over the last year that the Pentagon will field hundreds of fifth-generation aircraft by FY-20. The Air Force alone is expected to buy slightly more than 600 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters by that time and, coupled with the Navy and Marine Corps, more than 1,000 are expected to be on the books. The numbers come in addition to the Air Force’s fleet of 187 F-22A Raptors.
But the Air Force will begin exploring a follow-on for the F-22A toward the middle of the decade, in anticipation of the original fifth-generation fighter reaching the end of its combat life around 2025. Over the next 10 years, the Air Force plans to spend $1.9 billion to modernize the F-22A with advanced sensors and stealth features, according to the report.
By FY-40, almost all of today’s legacy force will have retired and the department will have begun recapitalization of the fifth-generation force. However, the report does not detail what a follow-on to the F-22A or F-35 might look like.
“These far-term recapitalization plans cannot be defined with any understood procurement plans for the JSF,” the report states. “It is anticipated that a family of systems -- mixes of manned and unmanned aircraft -- will shape the future fighter/attack inventory.”
As noted in the recently released Quadrennial Defense Review, the Pentagon is reviewing its long-range strike options, including the Air Force’s Next-Generation Bomber. “Range and payload requirements for a successor system are still under investigation,” the report states.
The Air Force is expected to spend about $1 billion on the bomber effort in FY-15 and could be spending as much as $4 billion on the effort in its FY-20 budget, depending on the results of the current studies.
As for intratheater airlift, the Air Force will continue buying Lockheed Martin C-130J cargo haulers in the near term. Down the road, however, the Pentagon is exploring a “family of airlift systems that would provide complementary capabilities with respect to maneuverability and sustainability.”
In the strategic airlift realm, the Air Force plans to continue flying C-5s and C-17s well into the 2030s. Down the road, the Pentagon would likely program funds to develop a C-5 replacement aircraft. -- Dan Taylor and Marcus Weisgerber
PENTAGON-26-5-1
Quadrennial Defense Review Spawns Relook at U.S. Global Defense Posture
Inside Defense
Feb. 4, 2010 -- Pentagon officials plan to conduct a study examining America's defense posture abroad in light of a new "architecture of cooperation" with key allies outlined in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy mentioned the follow-on review Feb. 2 during a talk at the Washington office of the Council on Foreign Relations. She said the study could lead officials to “tweak” some moves resulting from the last global posture review, done in 2004, while validating others from the Rumsfeld-era drill. Results of the new study would influence the fiscal year 2012 defense budget request, Flournoy said. That request will go to Congress one year from now.
The 2004 Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy, as it is known in Pentagon jargon, spurred plans to redeploy or bring back to the United States up to 70,000 troops stationed across Europe and Asia. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, defense officials believed the American troops were no longer needed overseas to contain Moscow.
Flournoy this week said the decision to take a “fresh look” at the U.S. defense posture comes partly in light of the “events in the last couple of years in Georgia” -- an apparent allusion to the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. The Georgian government strives for full membership in NATO, a goal Russian leaders oppose vehemently.
Pentagon officials want to ensure any new U.S. posture strategy for Europe fits into NATO's upcoming “strategic concept,” which alliance leaders will craft throughout the year, Flournoy said. Operations in Afghanistan, where the Europeans contribute personnel and equipment, also will factor into the debate, she added.
The QDR divides the U.S. defense posture into three components: forward-stationed and rotationally deployed forces, capabilities and equipment; an overseas network of infrastructure and facilities; and a “series of treaty, access, transit and status-protection agreements and arrangements” with partner countries.
Flournoy noted several decisions already made at the outset of the new basing review. “For the moment,” she said, four Army brigade combat teams will remain stationed in Europe. In addition, U.S. base realignment plans in Japan would remain in place, she added.
In the Western Pacific region, officials will begin looking at training facilities where indigenous armies and U.S. forces can exercise together, according to Flournoy. Identifying such facilities is “one of the things we can do better at,” she said.
“It is too soon to highlight specific locations for training or other changes as any potential change to our posture will be made in consultation with our interagency counterparts as well as our allies in our 'go slow and consult' policy,” Janine Davidson, who leads the new posture study, told InsideDefense.com in an e-mail today. Davidson is the deputy assistant secretary of defense for plans.
The review aims to “operationalize” the idea of a “cooperate and tailored approach” formulated in the QDR, Davidson told reporters today at the National Press Club in Washington. The approach entails crafting posture strategies based on the individual security situation in each region around the world. “We don't want to make major movements . . . without consulting the allies that we're there to support and work with,” she said.
Under the auspices of U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. forces routinely conduct joint exercises with the armies of numerous Asia-Pacific countries, including Cambodia, Bangladesh, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia, India, Malaysia and Mongolia.
At the time of the IGPBS, several lawmakers and experts rejected key assumptions of the study, fearing the removal of forces from Europe could hamper U.S. efforts to engage in successful diplomacy on the continent. A Dec. 3, 2009, draft version of the 2010 QDR, obtained by InsideDefense.com, explicitly notes shortcomings of the 2004 strategy. The final document, released this week, omits these sections.
The Pentagon's new tack on global basing issues -- casting defense posture as an instrument of cooperative security policy -- is reminiscent of a viewpoint articulated by the congressionally mandated Overseas Basing Commission in 2005. The now-defunct panel warned against the hasty implementation of IGPBS decisions, arguing a large-scale recall of DOD forces to the continental United States should be better coordinated with the rest of the government.
At the time, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's policy staff -- which included Kathleen Hicks, now Flournoy's deputy under secretary of defense for strategy, plans and forces -- vigorously rejected the panel's views. -- Sebastian Sprenger
Feb. 4, 2010 -- Pentagon officials plan to conduct a study examining America's defense posture abroad in light of a new "architecture of cooperation" with key allies outlined in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy mentioned the follow-on review Feb. 2 during a talk at the Washington office of the Council on Foreign Relations. She said the study could lead officials to “tweak” some moves resulting from the last global posture review, done in 2004, while validating others from the Rumsfeld-era drill. Results of the new study would influence the fiscal year 2012 defense budget request, Flournoy said. That request will go to Congress one year from now.
The 2004 Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy, as it is known in Pentagon jargon, spurred plans to redeploy or bring back to the United States up to 70,000 troops stationed across Europe and Asia. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, defense officials believed the American troops were no longer needed overseas to contain Moscow.
Flournoy this week said the decision to take a “fresh look” at the U.S. defense posture comes partly in light of the “events in the last couple of years in Georgia” -- an apparent allusion to the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. The Georgian government strives for full membership in NATO, a goal Russian leaders oppose vehemently.
Pentagon officials want to ensure any new U.S. posture strategy for Europe fits into NATO's upcoming “strategic concept,” which alliance leaders will craft throughout the year, Flournoy said. Operations in Afghanistan, where the Europeans contribute personnel and equipment, also will factor into the debate, she added.
The QDR divides the U.S. defense posture into three components: forward-stationed and rotationally deployed forces, capabilities and equipment; an overseas network of infrastructure and facilities; and a “series of treaty, access, transit and status-protection agreements and arrangements” with partner countries.
Flournoy noted several decisions already made at the outset of the new basing review. “For the moment,” she said, four Army brigade combat teams will remain stationed in Europe. In addition, U.S. base realignment plans in Japan would remain in place, she added.
In the Western Pacific region, officials will begin looking at training facilities where indigenous armies and U.S. forces can exercise together, according to Flournoy. Identifying such facilities is “one of the things we can do better at,” she said.
“It is too soon to highlight specific locations for training or other changes as any potential change to our posture will be made in consultation with our interagency counterparts as well as our allies in our 'go slow and consult' policy,” Janine Davidson, who leads the new posture study, told InsideDefense.com in an e-mail today. Davidson is the deputy assistant secretary of defense for plans.
The review aims to “operationalize” the idea of a “cooperate and tailored approach” formulated in the QDR, Davidson told reporters today at the National Press Club in Washington. The approach entails crafting posture strategies based on the individual security situation in each region around the world. “We don't want to make major movements . . . without consulting the allies that we're there to support and work with,” she said.
Under the auspices of U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. forces routinely conduct joint exercises with the armies of numerous Asia-Pacific countries, including Cambodia, Bangladesh, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia, India, Malaysia and Mongolia.
At the time of the IGPBS, several lawmakers and experts rejected key assumptions of the study, fearing the removal of forces from Europe could hamper U.S. efforts to engage in successful diplomacy on the continent. A Dec. 3, 2009, draft version of the 2010 QDR, obtained by InsideDefense.com, explicitly notes shortcomings of the 2004 strategy. The final document, released this week, omits these sections.
The Pentagon's new tack on global basing issues -- casting defense posture as an instrument of cooperative security policy -- is reminiscent of a viewpoint articulated by the congressionally mandated Overseas Basing Commission in 2005. The now-defunct panel warned against the hasty implementation of IGPBS decisions, arguing a large-scale recall of DOD forces to the continental United States should be better coordinated with the rest of the government.
At the time, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's policy staff -- which included Kathleen Hicks, now Flournoy's deputy under secretary of defense for strategy, plans and forces -- vigorously rejected the panel's views. -- Sebastian Sprenger
Up in the Air: Unmanned aircraft and vehicles are revolutionizing warfare.
By Katherine McIntire Peters kpeters@govexec.com Government Executive February 1, 2010
Unmanned aircraft and vehicles are revolutionizing warfare. But the military is just beginning to confront the institutional consequences.
In late 2008, Army Sgt. Michael Arons was flying a reconnaissance mission over a main supply route in Afghanistan when he saw three men concealing a bomb along the roadway. Arons called for an Air Force F-15 to bomb the site, most likely saving the lives of soldiers who later traveled that road. But it's what took place after the strike that was most impressive. After the fighter jet left the scene, Arons loitered in the sky, waiting to see what would happen next. Soon, two of the men who had placed the bomb emerged from hiding and ran off. Arons followed them, hovering overhead out of sight and hearing. When they ran to a nearby house, Arons alerted ground troops. What soldiers found there stunned them: The house was filled, wall-to-wall, with explosives and weapons - the raw material for countless roadside bombs and ambushes against U.S. and coalition troops.
"Had we not been there, who would have known?" Arons says. But his role in the confiscation of a major weapons cache was something unthinkable just a few years ago in the Army. Because the aircraft he piloted was a Predator drone, he was able to watch the situation develop undetected, from miles away. The information he provided ground troops undoubtedly thwarted casualties. Soon after that incident, Arons' unit started using armed Predators, giving the Army even greater control over how it shapes the battlefield. It would have eliminated the need, in that instance, to call on the Air Force to take out the roadside bomb.
"This has revolutionized the way we fight on a tactical level," says Col. Christopher Carlile, director of the Army's Unmanned Aerial Systems Center of Excellence at Fort Rucker, Ala. "There's not an infantryman out there who can call up and have the National Security Agency turn a satellite so he can see what's on the back side of a building. That doesn't happen. Up until now, the way that infantryman found out what was on the back side of that building was when he had fire coming from it."
The revolution in robotics technology has had a huge impact on the military.
A decade ago, the services had a handful of unmanned aircraft. Today, they have nearly 20,000 unmanned air and ground vehicles. The machines are going places on the battlefield commanders would never send troops, either because the risks are too great or because humans simply are incapable. They can loiter in the sky for hours without eye strain or fatigue or the need for a cigarette break. They even can explore tunnels and caves too narrow or dangerous for soldiers. They've neutralized countless roadside bombs, uncovered invaluable information about terrorist plans, and killed or led to the arrest of hundreds of enemy operatives.
But the machines are raising difficult organizational, legal and ethical questions for government leaders. For military officials, the technologies portend major organizational and cultural changes. "Something is revolutionary not because of the incredible capabilities it offers you, but because of the tough questions it forces you to ask. Questions about not only what's possible, but about what's proper," says P.W. Singer, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution and author of Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century (Penguin Books, 2009).
Demographics of War
Among other things, unmanned systems are changing long-held notions of who can do what on the battlefield. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Army and the Air Force, where service leaders have taken wholly different approaches to the use of unmanned aircraft.
Air Force Col. Dale Fridley flew F-16 Fighting Falcons for 15 years, before herniated disks forced him out of the cockpit on his 40th birthday. "It's a young man's game pulling 9 Gs," he says. He transferred to the Air Force Reserve in 1998, and soon after began flying for American Airlines. But after the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon, Fridley wanted to return to the Air Force, which had begun recalling rated pilots to service. He applied, but was rejected for medical reasons. Eventually, he heard from a friend that the service was hiring pilots for a new program that didn't involve climbing into a cockpit. "He told me, 'This is the coolest thing. We're killing bad guys from 6,000 miles away.' I thought that sounded like something I could do. There were no Gs involved and they were hurting for guys with tactical experience."
In summer 2004, Fridley sold all his belongings in Texas and moved to Las Vegas to become a Predator pilot and director of operations in the 17th Reconnaissance Squadron at nearby Creech Air Force Base. There he found himself in the vanguard of a new role few in the Air Force were ready to embrace. "
There were very few volunteers for the program," he says, noting that most of them did so only because they were no longer medically able to fly. Soon after, Air Force officials decided to create a squadron of armed Predators, and Fridley became its director of operations. "It was an opportunity to build a squadron from scratch," he says. The squadron's commander also was a former F-16 pilot. "We built it around the F-16 model. We knew we were going to be dropping bombs and shooting missiles."
Contrast that with the experience of Army Sgt. 1st Class Brian Miller, who also found career motivation in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, when he was an infantryman in the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, N.Y. Miller was coming up on re-enlistment and decided to stay in the Army, but he wanted to develop more marketable skills than those of an infantryman. When he sought the advice of an Army personnel specialist, none of the jobs available sounded very interesting. "Then he found something called a UAV operator. I said, 'What's a UAV operator?' There were probably 10 people in the room and nobody knew what that was. So [the personnel specialist] looked it up and starts reading the description. I said, 'Man, that sounds pretty good.' "
Today, Miller works for the director of evaluation and standardization in the unmanned systems program at Fort Rucker. He spends much of his time overseas evaluating the performance of drone operators on the battlefield. While he's shaping the use of emerging battlefield technology, he remains a grunt at heart: "I really push operators to think like infantrymen in terms of the information they should be looking for," he says. As for Fridley, last fall he moved to Washington where he works on the Air Force's unmanned aerial systems task force, which is charting the service's future path for using the technology.
While Fridley and Miller are shaping their services' use of unmanned aerial technology, their backgrounds couldn't be more different. If officers are the ruling class in military organizations, fighter pilots are the aristocracy in the Air Force. The service spent years and upwards of $10 million to turn Fridley into a fighter pilot. Only officers have what is called weapons employment authority, the decision-making power to shoot down targets on the battlefield. The service's use of unmanned aircraft is mostly pitched to the strategic level. "They're not tied to one specific battalion or one [brigade combat team]. They are theater assets, so they need to be able to maneuver around in the airspace, they need to be able to raise communications with different elements and be able to [fire weapons] on very short notice with very little information and to do it safely with no friendly fire incidents," Fridley says. "We really hammer home the weapons employment part of it."
The Army has taken a vastly different approach. "In the Army, [noncommissioned officers] are the backbone of our [unmanned] operations," says Carlile. Most drone operators are NCOs, while their platoon leaders are warrant officers, highly trained technical experts who occupy a category between the sergeants who make up the NCO corps and commissioned officers. Not only is it a less elitist structure, but weapons employment authority is not an issue in the Army, he adds: "If you've ever seen a soldier carrying an M-4 carbine, he has weapons release authority. If you've ever seen a sergeant in command of a tank with a 120 mm smooth-bore, high-explosive round, he is carrying a heck of a lot of firepower and he has weapons release authority." Officers still run the Army, but they typically do so with reverence for the young enlisted men and women who operate on the front lines, making life-or-death decisions.
The debate over who operates UAVs is more than academic, says Singer. "It's really not a question of can, it's a question of should. That 18- or 19-year-old soldier can fly the plane. The data shows that the Army has a lower crash rate than the Air Force does, and oddly enough the [soldiers] are less highly trained," he says, noting that the Army tends to rely more on automated takeoff and landing technology than on manual operation.
"It's a use-of-force question, understanding the battlefield," Singer says. As systems evolve and become more capable technologically, the answer to who should operate these systems is likely to evolve, he says.
"Another [demographic] change here is the civilian role," he adds. "We're carrying out the equivalent of a war in Pakistan right now. We've carried out more air strikes in Pakistan using drones than we did using manned bombers in the opening rounds of the Kosovo war. But it's not one that was authorized by Congress. More important, it's not one the military is conducting. It's mainly a civilian air war, and mainly a CIA air war. Are we at war in Pakistan, or is it not a war because we are using drones? By the old standard, this would be a war."
Institutional Changes
In many ways, the Army has embraced unmanned technologies much more readily and rapidly than the Air Force. Any day now, the service will have racked up nearly 1 million combat flying hours using unmanned systems from small hand-launched aircraft to the much larger Predator - far more than any other service.
The Army will train more than 2,000 unmanned aerial system operators this year, while the Air Force will develop about 360. The differences are deeper than numbers, however. The Air Force takes pilots and trains them to operate Predators and Reapers (which are essentially advanced Predators), whereas the Army takes enlisted personnel with no pilot training and turns them into drone operators. The Army also trains its unmanned pilots to operate the sensors on the aircraft that collect information from the battlefield. Typically, Army teams of operators alternate between piloting the aircraft and running the sensors to avoid fatigue and eye strain because the aircraft operate for much longer periods than any pilot or sensor operator can handle in a single shift.
Air Force leaders are conducting a beta test to train unrated pilots to become drone operators, but there is deep reluctance to open the positions to enlisted personnel. While enlisted personnel operate sensors, officer pilots operate the craft.
Perhaps most telling of how UAVs have challenged Air Force values and the centrality of pilots to the service's identity, top officials are trying to get away from using the term unmanned system altogether, preferring instead remotely piloted aircraft, or RPAs.
Air Force leaders were slow to embrace unmanned aircraft a few years ago, but they have undoubtedly done so in the last two years, observers say. "A couple of years ago I think we were all a little bit worried about that," says Art Fritzson, a senior vice president at defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton in McLean, Va. "For the Air Force in particular, it was an identity crisis almost. Control of Air Force policy derived from senior [officials] in the Air Force who at one time or another had been fighter pilots or at least active-duty fliers of manned systems. To see the culture evolve away from that of [manned aircraft] to more unmanned systems, that was hard to take. But surprisingly, it's taken [hold] very quickly. I've seen lots of policy indications in the Air Force that that culture shift . . . maybe it's not being enthusiastically embraced, but it is being embraced."
In July 2009, the Air Force released a UAS flight plan outlining the service's thinking on the future of unmanned systems, from acquisition programs to training and doctrine. The Army expects to release its institutional plan for unmanned systems in April.
Unmanned systems operations "is rapidly becoming a respected career path in the Air Force - more rapidly than many of us thought was possible, so I think that's a good news story," Fritzson says.
Still, service officials would like to drop the term "unmanned" from the lexicon. "There's nothing unmanned about the systems today other than the vehicle itself," said Lt. Gen. David Deptula, Air Force deputy chief of staff for information, surveillance and reconnaissance, in a meeting with defense writers in December.
Data Dumps
The truth of that assertion will become even more evident in April, when the Air Force expects to deploy new sensors aboard three of the Predators conducting continual surveillance over Afghanistan. The wide-area airborne surveillance systems, more commonly known as the Gorgon Stare pod, will allow the service to transmit up to 10 video streams to 10 users on the ground across a broad area. That means three combat air patrols will suddenly find their data collection increase tenfold. In another year, that level of collection will increase by a factor of 65, Deptula said.
All that imagery begs the question of who will evaluate it and analyze it and scrub it for vital intelligence. Already during the last 13 months, the Air Force has collected 250,000 hours of video. If you sat down to watch it all it would take you 28 years, Fridley says.
There's no question technology will have to play a role in sifting through all that data. Tod Hagan, director of ISR software solutions for Florida-based defense contractor Modus Operandi, says the data handling issues will continue to mount. "For every drone out there, there's also probably a hundred ground sensors also collecting data," he says.
"All types of sensors are getting cheaper and easier to deploy. The challenge we face is how to help analysts make sense of this overwhelming volume of data. To compound matters it's not just one type of data - human intelligence, imagery, signals intelligence, all of which come in different formats," he says. Besides the various types of data being collected, there are often no standardized rules for how information is presented. For example, the Defense Department and military services use electronic systems that represent locations in more than 50 different ways. "Normalizing a measure like location to a common data type is very challenging and really the initial step for data fusion," Hagan says.
The Defense Department has begun to develop standards for unmanned systems, but that process remains nascent. "The way this should evolve is that the government starts to articulate the specifications and standards for interoperability," Fritzson says. "We haven't really gotten all of the government behind that in a unified way. Individual services and buying communities are starting to articulate that, but it takes a while to get the industry to respond."
The need for standards became clear late last year when insurgents were discovered to have hacked into Predator video feeds using cheap, commercial off-the-shelf software. It was a security weakness that some military officials had been aware of for years, but with no single organization in charge of setting standards and acquiring these mostly proprietary systems, it went unaddressed. Military officials say they are working to encrypt the video downlinks to prevent future breaches.
Almost all recent developments in unmanned technologies have been funded through supplemental budgets, as wartime necessities, not through the normal acquisition process. "The acquisitions process is literally not producing anything of value," Singer says. The Defense Department and the military services will have to figure out how to change that if they are to really harness the potential of robotics technologies, he says.
Human Factors
The first time Fridley flew a Predator in combat he understood immediately how it could have far-reaching consequences for the Air Force. "It wasn't until my plane was flying in Afghanistan and I was sitting in the [ground control station outside Las Vegas] that I realized I didn't even think about the fact that I wasn't there physically," he says. "In fact, to me it felt like I was flying there the whole time. I was a part of my aircraft just like I was part of my aircraft in an F-16. It made it sink home that this is the wave of the future."
That feeling of immediacy was a revelation to Fridley, and perhaps a harbinger of some of the personnel issues the service will grapple with in the future. "It shocked me how much I felt like I was there. But more than that, because I'm able to stare at targets much longer and get better pictures of targets, it feels more personal than it ever did when I was flying an F-16," he says. "In an F-16, you never see the civilians come out and cart away the dead bodies like you do in an RPA. It brings home to you that you really are dealing death and destruction."
Flying Predators and Reapers isn't nearly as much fun as flying F-16s, Fridley says, but it's vastly more rewarding than anything he's ever done in the Air Force.
"You really are doing a lot of great work for those folks who are humping the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq," he says. "You watch them going up the mountain passes and enter a village, follow them out, and give them directions in the middle of the night when they get lost. Or you sit over top of them in the middle of the desert and let them know there's nobody around for 20 miles and they can rest. Every day you're going back to support those guys. "The job satisfaction is leaps and bounds above what you get flying an F-16," Fridley says. "A lot of guys come kicking and screaming to Creech, but once they get there and they're doing the mission, there's nothing else they'd rather be doing."
Unmanned aircraft and vehicles are revolutionizing warfare. But the military is just beginning to confront the institutional consequences.
In late 2008, Army Sgt. Michael Arons was flying a reconnaissance mission over a main supply route in Afghanistan when he saw three men concealing a bomb along the roadway. Arons called for an Air Force F-15 to bomb the site, most likely saving the lives of soldiers who later traveled that road. But it's what took place after the strike that was most impressive. After the fighter jet left the scene, Arons loitered in the sky, waiting to see what would happen next. Soon, two of the men who had placed the bomb emerged from hiding and ran off. Arons followed them, hovering overhead out of sight and hearing. When they ran to a nearby house, Arons alerted ground troops. What soldiers found there stunned them: The house was filled, wall-to-wall, with explosives and weapons - the raw material for countless roadside bombs and ambushes against U.S. and coalition troops.
"Had we not been there, who would have known?" Arons says. But his role in the confiscation of a major weapons cache was something unthinkable just a few years ago in the Army. Because the aircraft he piloted was a Predator drone, he was able to watch the situation develop undetected, from miles away. The information he provided ground troops undoubtedly thwarted casualties. Soon after that incident, Arons' unit started using armed Predators, giving the Army even greater control over how it shapes the battlefield. It would have eliminated the need, in that instance, to call on the Air Force to take out the roadside bomb.
"This has revolutionized the way we fight on a tactical level," says Col. Christopher Carlile, director of the Army's Unmanned Aerial Systems Center of Excellence at Fort Rucker, Ala. "There's not an infantryman out there who can call up and have the National Security Agency turn a satellite so he can see what's on the back side of a building. That doesn't happen. Up until now, the way that infantryman found out what was on the back side of that building was when he had fire coming from it."
The revolution in robotics technology has had a huge impact on the military.
A decade ago, the services had a handful of unmanned aircraft. Today, they have nearly 20,000 unmanned air and ground vehicles. The machines are going places on the battlefield commanders would never send troops, either because the risks are too great or because humans simply are incapable. They can loiter in the sky for hours without eye strain or fatigue or the need for a cigarette break. They even can explore tunnels and caves too narrow or dangerous for soldiers. They've neutralized countless roadside bombs, uncovered invaluable information about terrorist plans, and killed or led to the arrest of hundreds of enemy operatives.
But the machines are raising difficult organizational, legal and ethical questions for government leaders. For military officials, the technologies portend major organizational and cultural changes. "Something is revolutionary not because of the incredible capabilities it offers you, but because of the tough questions it forces you to ask. Questions about not only what's possible, but about what's proper," says P.W. Singer, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution and author of Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century (Penguin Books, 2009).
Demographics of War
Among other things, unmanned systems are changing long-held notions of who can do what on the battlefield. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Army and the Air Force, where service leaders have taken wholly different approaches to the use of unmanned aircraft.
Air Force Col. Dale Fridley flew F-16 Fighting Falcons for 15 years, before herniated disks forced him out of the cockpit on his 40th birthday. "It's a young man's game pulling 9 Gs," he says. He transferred to the Air Force Reserve in 1998, and soon after began flying for American Airlines. But after the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon, Fridley wanted to return to the Air Force, which had begun recalling rated pilots to service. He applied, but was rejected for medical reasons. Eventually, he heard from a friend that the service was hiring pilots for a new program that didn't involve climbing into a cockpit. "He told me, 'This is the coolest thing. We're killing bad guys from 6,000 miles away.' I thought that sounded like something I could do. There were no Gs involved and they were hurting for guys with tactical experience."
In summer 2004, Fridley sold all his belongings in Texas and moved to Las Vegas to become a Predator pilot and director of operations in the 17th Reconnaissance Squadron at nearby Creech Air Force Base. There he found himself in the vanguard of a new role few in the Air Force were ready to embrace. "
There were very few volunteers for the program," he says, noting that most of them did so only because they were no longer medically able to fly. Soon after, Air Force officials decided to create a squadron of armed Predators, and Fridley became its director of operations. "It was an opportunity to build a squadron from scratch," he says. The squadron's commander also was a former F-16 pilot. "We built it around the F-16 model. We knew we were going to be dropping bombs and shooting missiles."
Contrast that with the experience of Army Sgt. 1st Class Brian Miller, who also found career motivation in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, when he was an infantryman in the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, N.Y. Miller was coming up on re-enlistment and decided to stay in the Army, but he wanted to develop more marketable skills than those of an infantryman. When he sought the advice of an Army personnel specialist, none of the jobs available sounded very interesting. "Then he found something called a UAV operator. I said, 'What's a UAV operator?' There were probably 10 people in the room and nobody knew what that was. So [the personnel specialist] looked it up and starts reading the description. I said, 'Man, that sounds pretty good.' "
Today, Miller works for the director of evaluation and standardization in the unmanned systems program at Fort Rucker. He spends much of his time overseas evaluating the performance of drone operators on the battlefield. While he's shaping the use of emerging battlefield technology, he remains a grunt at heart: "I really push operators to think like infantrymen in terms of the information they should be looking for," he says. As for Fridley, last fall he moved to Washington where he works on the Air Force's unmanned aerial systems task force, which is charting the service's future path for using the technology.
While Fridley and Miller are shaping their services' use of unmanned aerial technology, their backgrounds couldn't be more different. If officers are the ruling class in military organizations, fighter pilots are the aristocracy in the Air Force. The service spent years and upwards of $10 million to turn Fridley into a fighter pilot. Only officers have what is called weapons employment authority, the decision-making power to shoot down targets on the battlefield. The service's use of unmanned aircraft is mostly pitched to the strategic level. "They're not tied to one specific battalion or one [brigade combat team]. They are theater assets, so they need to be able to maneuver around in the airspace, they need to be able to raise communications with different elements and be able to [fire weapons] on very short notice with very little information and to do it safely with no friendly fire incidents," Fridley says. "We really hammer home the weapons employment part of it."
The Army has taken a vastly different approach. "In the Army, [noncommissioned officers] are the backbone of our [unmanned] operations," says Carlile. Most drone operators are NCOs, while their platoon leaders are warrant officers, highly trained technical experts who occupy a category between the sergeants who make up the NCO corps and commissioned officers. Not only is it a less elitist structure, but weapons employment authority is not an issue in the Army, he adds: "If you've ever seen a soldier carrying an M-4 carbine, he has weapons release authority. If you've ever seen a sergeant in command of a tank with a 120 mm smooth-bore, high-explosive round, he is carrying a heck of a lot of firepower and he has weapons release authority." Officers still run the Army, but they typically do so with reverence for the young enlisted men and women who operate on the front lines, making life-or-death decisions.
The debate over who operates UAVs is more than academic, says Singer. "It's really not a question of can, it's a question of should. That 18- or 19-year-old soldier can fly the plane. The data shows that the Army has a lower crash rate than the Air Force does, and oddly enough the [soldiers] are less highly trained," he says, noting that the Army tends to rely more on automated takeoff and landing technology than on manual operation.
"It's a use-of-force question, understanding the battlefield," Singer says. As systems evolve and become more capable technologically, the answer to who should operate these systems is likely to evolve, he says.
"Another [demographic] change here is the civilian role," he adds. "We're carrying out the equivalent of a war in Pakistan right now. We've carried out more air strikes in Pakistan using drones than we did using manned bombers in the opening rounds of the Kosovo war. But it's not one that was authorized by Congress. More important, it's not one the military is conducting. It's mainly a civilian air war, and mainly a CIA air war. Are we at war in Pakistan, or is it not a war because we are using drones? By the old standard, this would be a war."
Institutional Changes
In many ways, the Army has embraced unmanned technologies much more readily and rapidly than the Air Force. Any day now, the service will have racked up nearly 1 million combat flying hours using unmanned systems from small hand-launched aircraft to the much larger Predator - far more than any other service.
The Army will train more than 2,000 unmanned aerial system operators this year, while the Air Force will develop about 360. The differences are deeper than numbers, however. The Air Force takes pilots and trains them to operate Predators and Reapers (which are essentially advanced Predators), whereas the Army takes enlisted personnel with no pilot training and turns them into drone operators. The Army also trains its unmanned pilots to operate the sensors on the aircraft that collect information from the battlefield. Typically, Army teams of operators alternate between piloting the aircraft and running the sensors to avoid fatigue and eye strain because the aircraft operate for much longer periods than any pilot or sensor operator can handle in a single shift.
Air Force leaders are conducting a beta test to train unrated pilots to become drone operators, but there is deep reluctance to open the positions to enlisted personnel. While enlisted personnel operate sensors, officer pilots operate the craft.
Perhaps most telling of how UAVs have challenged Air Force values and the centrality of pilots to the service's identity, top officials are trying to get away from using the term unmanned system altogether, preferring instead remotely piloted aircraft, or RPAs.
Air Force leaders were slow to embrace unmanned aircraft a few years ago, but they have undoubtedly done so in the last two years, observers say. "A couple of years ago I think we were all a little bit worried about that," says Art Fritzson, a senior vice president at defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton in McLean, Va. "For the Air Force in particular, it was an identity crisis almost. Control of Air Force policy derived from senior [officials] in the Air Force who at one time or another had been fighter pilots or at least active-duty fliers of manned systems. To see the culture evolve away from that of [manned aircraft] to more unmanned systems, that was hard to take. But surprisingly, it's taken [hold] very quickly. I've seen lots of policy indications in the Air Force that that culture shift . . . maybe it's not being enthusiastically embraced, but it is being embraced."
In July 2009, the Air Force released a UAS flight plan outlining the service's thinking on the future of unmanned systems, from acquisition programs to training and doctrine. The Army expects to release its institutional plan for unmanned systems in April.
Unmanned systems operations "is rapidly becoming a respected career path in the Air Force - more rapidly than many of us thought was possible, so I think that's a good news story," Fritzson says.
Still, service officials would like to drop the term "unmanned" from the lexicon. "There's nothing unmanned about the systems today other than the vehicle itself," said Lt. Gen. David Deptula, Air Force deputy chief of staff for information, surveillance and reconnaissance, in a meeting with defense writers in December.
Data Dumps
The truth of that assertion will become even more evident in April, when the Air Force expects to deploy new sensors aboard three of the Predators conducting continual surveillance over Afghanistan. The wide-area airborne surveillance systems, more commonly known as the Gorgon Stare pod, will allow the service to transmit up to 10 video streams to 10 users on the ground across a broad area. That means three combat air patrols will suddenly find their data collection increase tenfold. In another year, that level of collection will increase by a factor of 65, Deptula said.
All that imagery begs the question of who will evaluate it and analyze it and scrub it for vital intelligence. Already during the last 13 months, the Air Force has collected 250,000 hours of video. If you sat down to watch it all it would take you 28 years, Fridley says.
There's no question technology will have to play a role in sifting through all that data. Tod Hagan, director of ISR software solutions for Florida-based defense contractor Modus Operandi, says the data handling issues will continue to mount. "For every drone out there, there's also probably a hundred ground sensors also collecting data," he says.
"All types of sensors are getting cheaper and easier to deploy. The challenge we face is how to help analysts make sense of this overwhelming volume of data. To compound matters it's not just one type of data - human intelligence, imagery, signals intelligence, all of which come in different formats," he says. Besides the various types of data being collected, there are often no standardized rules for how information is presented. For example, the Defense Department and military services use electronic systems that represent locations in more than 50 different ways. "Normalizing a measure like location to a common data type is very challenging and really the initial step for data fusion," Hagan says.
The Defense Department has begun to develop standards for unmanned systems, but that process remains nascent. "The way this should evolve is that the government starts to articulate the specifications and standards for interoperability," Fritzson says. "We haven't really gotten all of the government behind that in a unified way. Individual services and buying communities are starting to articulate that, but it takes a while to get the industry to respond."
The need for standards became clear late last year when insurgents were discovered to have hacked into Predator video feeds using cheap, commercial off-the-shelf software. It was a security weakness that some military officials had been aware of for years, but with no single organization in charge of setting standards and acquiring these mostly proprietary systems, it went unaddressed. Military officials say they are working to encrypt the video downlinks to prevent future breaches.
Almost all recent developments in unmanned technologies have been funded through supplemental budgets, as wartime necessities, not through the normal acquisition process. "The acquisitions process is literally not producing anything of value," Singer says. The Defense Department and the military services will have to figure out how to change that if they are to really harness the potential of robotics technologies, he says.
Human Factors
The first time Fridley flew a Predator in combat he understood immediately how it could have far-reaching consequences for the Air Force. "It wasn't until my plane was flying in Afghanistan and I was sitting in the [ground control station outside Las Vegas] that I realized I didn't even think about the fact that I wasn't there physically," he says. "In fact, to me it felt like I was flying there the whole time. I was a part of my aircraft just like I was part of my aircraft in an F-16. It made it sink home that this is the wave of the future."
That feeling of immediacy was a revelation to Fridley, and perhaps a harbinger of some of the personnel issues the service will grapple with in the future. "It shocked me how much I felt like I was there. But more than that, because I'm able to stare at targets much longer and get better pictures of targets, it feels more personal than it ever did when I was flying an F-16," he says. "In an F-16, you never see the civilians come out and cart away the dead bodies like you do in an RPA. It brings home to you that you really are dealing death and destruction."
Flying Predators and Reapers isn't nearly as much fun as flying F-16s, Fridley says, but it's vastly more rewarding than anything he's ever done in the Air Force.
"You really are doing a lot of great work for those folks who are humping the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq," he says. "You watch them going up the mountain passes and enter a village, follow them out, and give them directions in the middle of the night when they get lost. Or you sit over top of them in the middle of the desert and let them know there's nobody around for 20 miles and they can rest. Every day you're going back to support those guys. "The job satisfaction is leaps and bounds above what you get flying an F-16," Fridley says. "A lot of guys come kicking and screaming to Creech, but once they get there and they're doing the mission, there's nothing else they'd rather be doing."