By Robert Collier
San Francisco Chronicle, 21 August 2005
With violence continuing at a drumbeat pace in Iraq, the United States is pegging its hopes for victory against the insurgency largely on the Iraqi political process.
But the optimism over a new constitution, which has a deadline of Monday to emerge from negotiations among Iraqi politicians, may have little effect on the bloodshed and may even worsen it, say some leaders who maintain contacts with the insurgents.
In telephone interviews, leaders of the Arab Sunnis -- the 20 percent or so of the population that constitutes most of the insurgency -- and other opponents of the U.S. military presence pointed out that previous events portrayed by U.S. officials as turning points against the violence proved to be no such thing. The December 2003 capture of Saddam Hussein, the June 2004 transfer of sovereignty, and the Jan. 30 election this year all failed to prevent the gradual strengthening of the insurgency.
"A constitution will do nothing to stop the violence, because most people in government are not recognized by the Iraqi people," said Tariq al-Hashimi, secretary-general of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the largest legal Arab Sunni political group. "Although there have been elections, there is no credibility. The Iraqi people do not like them. They do not see them as nationalist."
What, then, is the solution?
For increasing numbers of Americans, Plan B is to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq. Although most Democratic Party leaders have opposed a troop pullout, saying it would leave Iraq in chaos, public support for a withdrawal has grown -- and has received a special boost from Cindy Sheehan's vigil outside President Bush's ranch in Texas.
In recent weeks, Sen. Russell Feingold, D-Wis., a possible candidate for the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination, has called for a pullout from Iraq within one year, and 52 members of the House supported a resolution co- sponsored by Democratic Reps. Barbara Lee of Oakland and Lynn Woolsey of Petaluma that calls for a withdrawal by Oct. 1, 2006.
Surprisingly, however, the Iraqis who might be expected to support such a pullout -- those close to the Sunni Arab militants themselves -- say the focus on a quick exit is misplaced.
"It's impossible for them or us to fix an exact schedule" for troop withdrawal, said Isam al-Rawi, a leader of the Muslim Scholars Association, a group of 3,000 Sunni clerics. "That is not the important thing right now. There are other steps that are much more necessary to calm the situation."
Largely unnoticed amid the U.S. political debate, al-Rawi and other Sunni leaders close to the insurgency have reached tacit consensus over the broad outline of an interim program to reduce the violence, stabilize the country and thus enable the U.S.-led coalition troops to begin a gradual withdrawal. While differences remain on some points, there is wide agreement on these steps:
-- A troop pullout from most urban areas and an end to military checkpoints and raids. "The Americans and British must leave all residential areas," said al-Rawi. "This is very sensitive for our feelings. When they retreat to military bases outside the major cities, the Iraqis will no longer be meeting military tanks and trucks in the streets and highways, and they will no longer be afraid their home will be invaded at night."
-- Overhaul of the Iraqi Army and National Guard. Although the White House and Democrats alike say they want to turn over security duties to the Iraqi Army and National Guard as soon as possible, Sunni Arabs point out that these two institutions are almost completely composed of members of their ethnic enemies -- the Kurdish peshmerga and the Shiite militias. "These people want to humiliate the Sunni," al-Hashimi said. "The Army and National Guard must be professionalized. They cannot be dominated by members of the party militias."
Over the past two years, U.S. officials have alternately recruited and purged Sunni Arab officers and troops. The problem with the Sunni Arabs, the Americans say, is that they are heavily infiltrated by the insurgency, while the Kurds and Shiites are dependably loyal to the U.S.-backed Baghdad government.
-- Release of prisoners. The number of Iraqi prisoners in American military custody has grown rapidly in recent months, with as many as 15,000 Iraqis behind bars, according to U.S. estimates.
Military officials have admitted that many of the prisoners have simply been swept up in neighborhood roundups. Because there is no formal trial process, the process of vetting prisoners and releasing those found innocent is very slow. Military officials have reportedly expressed worry that the sprawling prison camps are serving as recruiting camps for al Qaeda and the most extremist insurgent groups.
"There are many thousands of prisoners and there is no transparency, there is no accusation list," said Wamidh Nadhmi, the leader of the Arab Nationalist Trend, a secularist group that boycotted the January elections.
"Several relatives of mine were imprisoned for months, and there was no evidence. And for people who are arrested by Iraqi police it is worse. They are tortured, all kinds of things are done to them. That makes Iraqis very, very angry."
In Beirut, Lebanon, on July 29, Nadhmi was one of 47 Iraqi leaders and intellectuals who co-signed a statement expressing support for "the valiant armed resistance to the occupation." But the statement indicated divisions in their ranks between former members of the ruling Baath Party and non-Baathists, stating the need for "resolving antagonisms between the patriotic forces through a bold process of criticism and self-criticism with respect to the mistakes of the past."
Nadhmi and other Iraqis interviewed for this article said they did not advocate release of Saddam Hussein or others accused of involvement in killings and torture. "No, it is not necessary to release them," al-Rawi said. "They are bad men. They have committed crimes. But you must release the others. "
-- Amnesty for pro-Baathist, radical Islamist and hard-line nationalist groups, while excluding al Qaeda. Former top officials of the Hussein government chafe under the law that has outlawed membership in -- or even verbal support for -- the Baath Party. "There must be a legal way for all those people opposed to the American presence to be organized legally," said Nadhmi. "Otherwise they will fight."Several top leaders of the Islamic Clerics Association have been arrested by U.S. troops, and several have been killed in mysterious circumstances by gunmen who the association says are Shiite death squads.
-- Negotiations with the "resistance." Sunni leaders have frequently met with U.S. officials in Baghdad to try to coax them to talk with the guerrillas. They draw a line between what they call the "resistance," by which they mean Iraqi fighters who attack only U.S. and Iraqi troops, and the Sunni extremists linked to al Qaeda who have spread terror with car bombs and suicide attacks against Shiite civilians.
A big problem, however, is figuring out which insurgent groups to approach. The Sunni Arab leaders consulted for this article estimated the number of insurgent organizations as ranging from 12 to 35 -- not including foreign groups.
Further complicating matters, not all groups may be willing to negotiate. In late June, a former Iraqi electricity minister, Ayham al-Sammarai, claimed that he had reached an agreement with insurgent groups to allow him to broker peace talks with the government. Immediately, however, three hard-line rebel groups -- the Ansar al-Sunna Army, the Mujahedeen Army and the Islamic Army in Iraq -- rejected talks and threatened al-Sammarai with death.
Al-Rawi said he is confident that if peace feelers were made as part of an overall peace package, the rebels would be willing to talk. He admits there are no guarantees. "We do not know, because our contacts are indirect. But we must try," he said.
All the Iraqis consulted admitted that their proposed measures constitute a big gamble. The possibility remains, they say, that Sunni extremist groups linked to al Qaeda could capitalize on a U.S. pullout to continue their terrorist fight against the nation's Shiite majority. More likely, they say, the terrorists would slip out of Iraq to continue their global jihad in other nations, as they did after previous fights in Afghanistan and Chechnya.
Al-Rawi indicated, however, that until Sunni Arabs see U.S. concessions, support for the resistance and the terrorists alike will remain strong.
"We realize that it will take a long time for the Americans to leave. We cannot say six months or 12 months, because we may have to change the plan when the situation changes. If the Americans start taking real steps, if the Iraqi people feel that they will no longer be occupied, they will say with one voice to the terrorists, 'Please leave us.' And they will go," he said.
"But in this situation now, when the troops are even in our universities, our mosques, our houses, it is impossible."
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Citation: Robert Collier. "Sunnis offer an exit plan," San Francisco Chronicle, 21 August 2005.
Original URL: http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/08/21/INGQEEA80E1.DTL
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