A `strategic reserve' became a front-line force in Iraq. As units return home, the Army assesses their future training and mission.
By Julian E. Barnes
Los Angeles Times, 08 May 2006
WASHINGTON — National Guard troops in Iraq, which once constituted half the Army's fighting force, have been dramatically reduced and could be largely phased out of major combat responsibilities next year as military officials debate their performance and what role they should play in future conflicts.
Iraq was an important test of whether the Army could use the Guard more aggressively — and not just as a last resort. During the Cold War, the Guard was recast as the "strategic reserve" that would be used in the big fight against the Soviet Union that never came.
After the initial invasion of Iraq, the Army began the largest reserve mobilization since World War II. Guard units were assigned front-line responsibilities, roughly equivalent to active-duty units. Leaders of the Guard say their Iraq service has made their force the most capable and experienced it has ever been.
But the experience also has exposed weaknesses. Some active-duty soldiers argue the Guard was less prepared for the complexities of Iraq, while guardsmen complain they were subjected to longer separations from their families than active duty counterparts and had to train on out-of-date equipment.
The debate over the Guard is occurring partly inside a larger process as the Army pursues a plan to reorganize how it trains and deploys active duty and reserve forces overseas. Some officers are suggesting the Guard's combat role be reassessed.
The Guard reached a high of 50,285 troops deployed to Iraq in March 2005, a force that included eight combat brigades and a division headquarters. Today there are 23,000 Guard members and just two combat brigades. The Guard combat force will shrink to one brigade later this year as the Pennsylvania National Guard returns home. And if the overall drawdown continues, the National Guard brigade will be the first combat unit pulled next year, according to one senior defense official.
"The Guard will be the first on the off-ramp," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because the list of units to be deployed is classified.
The military has deployed both National Guard and Army Reserve units to Iraq. Reserve soldiers are exclusively assigned to support units, such as transportation companies or civil affairs teams. The National Guard, which reports to each state's governor unless mobilized by the federal government, provides both support and combat units.
Senior leaders say the Guard will continue to have a combat presence, albeit smaller, in Iraq. Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum, the chief of the National Guard Bureau, said combat and combat service brigades would continue to serve next year in Iraq.
"The National Guard is not coming out of the war," said Blum. "We will be proportionally represented in combat, combat support and combat service support."
Still, there is a little doubt that the Guard is about to cross an important milestone at a time when the Army is examining its organization and future missions. Some active-duty soldiers argue the most capable guardsmen have served in combat support units — military police companies or engineering battalions. In these units, Guard members often had civilian skills that complemented their military training and made them more adept, knowledgeable and flexible than active duty counterparts.
With 351 Guard soldiers killed in Iraq and another 2,867 wounded, many active-duty officers avoid criticizing the force. But some regular Army officers have suggested that many of the Guard units were too cautious, overly concerned with casualties and simply did not have the intensity of training to match the active-duty force. Guard units were not able to as quickly master the difficulties of the counter-insurgency fight, say some Iraq veterans.
"Iraq showed what we have really always known, that the more complex combined arms operations that take extensive training and considerable experience are more difficult for units that get two weeks of training a year," said one Army general, who spoke on condition of anonymity because publicly criticizing the Guard is frowned on in the military. "We need to be honest with ourselves. Six months of preparation does not provide the same foundation as five, 10, 15 years of full-time experience."
Some of those who want to revamp the role of the National Guard blame commanders for not intensifying its combat training.
"The National Guard needs to get serious about national security," said another Army official. "It was not a surprise they were not trained to do the job we wanted."
Such critiques anger Blum, the National Guard chief, who said such comments are "old think" that would offend the 19 Guard brigades that have fought in Iraq.
"When they operate the same equipment and when they are given the same resources, the same opportunity to train, they should perform identically to their active duty counterparts and they do," Blum says. "Except for the fact that they come in with civilian-acquired skills that bring extra capabilities that their unit would not normally have."
Maj. Gen. Joseph Taluto, who led the Guard's 42nd Infantry Division in Iraq, acknowledges that active duty forces may have gone into Iraq with more training. But once his soldiers were "in the soup," they acquired as much expertise as their counterparts.
"It does not take much time for a citizen soldier who has a good understanding of soldiering to start doing something on a very high level when he gets in country," Taluto said. "I have some company commanders who have some hard experience…. They measure up at the same level."
Guard officials argue that Iraq showed that their units were not given enough resources and said the Army must ensure they have sufficient training, soldiers and equipment if it intends to deploy them regularly. Although the Guard has 34 combat brigades on the books, only about 15 were considered capable of overseas service. Iraq showed that even those required significant upgrades of equipment and training before they could be sent to war.
The Guard also faced problems with some of its soldiers. Many guardsmen are older than the average active-duty soldier. That may mean they have more experience, but it also means they tend to be less physically fit and have a harder time keeping up in 125-degree heat, according to active-duty officers who have served in Iraq.
Guard brigades have also turned out to be understaffed, laden with soldiers who could not be deployed for medical reasons. That has meant that infantry brigades have had to turn to outside units to augment their ranks. The Pennsylvania Guard, for example, was augmented by forces from Michigan and Utah.
Blum said the Guard has been growing younger and replacing about 20% of its force every year. The Guard, he said, also has developed a system that allows units that are getting ready to deploy to carry extra soldiers, so they do not get caught short-handed in Iraq. But he also contended that augmenting brigades with units from other states actually strengthened the force.
Top Guard officials also say they can intensify the training once they get more resources and equipment. Both regular and Guard leaders acknowledge that at the beginning of the war, Guard units were sent to Iraq with inferior equipment. Although military leaders say that problem has been fixed, much of the new equipment arrives as the units are preparing to ship off. Taluto said that means Guard units have to learn how to use the new gear at the same time they are training to avoid roadside bombs and fight an insurgency.
Training and equipment deficiencies extended the preparation time needed by Guard units. So in addition to yearlong deployments in Iraq, Guard units would often train for six months far from home. Guard officials say they are trying to shrink those extended mobilization times that keep soldiers away from their families, fueling complaints and drawing ire from Congress.
The Army is working on what it calls a "force generation" model, its blueprint for deploying and rotating its various brigades worldwide. The plan would reorganize the Guard into what it calls an "operational reserve." Guard brigades would enter a regular rotation, so that if they are called into overseas service, it would be within a set window of time once every six years. Units that are approaching their deployment window would get more resources and better training.
Some Army officials are using the force generation discussion to push for a broader review of the Guard after Iraq. They argue that the war in Iraq and natural disasters at home have shown that the Guard is not the best place for combat brigades, particularly heavy mechanized forces. Others say the Army should consider not deploying larger Guard units, and instead mixing smaller companies in with active duty organizations.
Although such voices remain a minority, the Army is trying to force the Guard to shed artillery and air defense units and convert them into military police or other combat support units. Other heavy units are to be remade into light infantry.
"A governor can't use a tank battalion," an Army official said. "The power of the National Guard in a state is boots on the ground and trucks. It is not tanks or attack helicopters."
Michele A. Flournoy, a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said it was unlikely that the Army would use the Guard for major combat operations in the future because training simply takes too long. Instead, they would be most likely used for stability and peacekeeping operations — like the Guard's current deployments in Bosnia, Kosovo and the Sinai peninsula.
"I think this is well understood in the Pentagon," said Flournoy, who will publish a new report on the future of the National Guard next month. "But there is some concern within the National Guard — they don't want to be pushed out of the war fight."
Blum noted that stability operations in Iraq turned out to be complex combat operations. That reality, he argued, shows that as the Guard is transformed in the years to come, it has to be ready for any kind of fight.
"The Guard is a full-spectrum force that can do the full range of military operations on the ground and in the air. And we expect that there won't be any military operations this country engages in that we're not involved in, in significant ways," Blum said. "If you are getting shot at, it is high-intensity conflict."
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Citation: Julian E. Barnes. "Guard Faces Phase-Out of Combat Role," Los Angeles Times, 08 May 2006.
Original URL: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/iraq/complete/la-na-guard8may08,1,3328921.story?coll=la-iraq-complete
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