By Robert H. Reid
The Associated Press, 07 August 2006
BAGHDAD, Iraq - U.S. and Iraqi forces strike the Baghdad base of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr — but his gunmen hold their fire. U.S. soldiers kill 15 of al-Sadr's followers, drawing little more than a few perfunctory complaints.
That's a dramatic departure in style for the youthful firebrand, who launched two major uprisings against the American-led coalition two years ago when U.S. authorities closed his newspaper and pushed an Iraqi judge into issuing an arrest warrant against him.
If anything, al-Sadr is more powerful today than he was then. But that power is also a restraint: al-Sadr has more to lose by an intemperate move now than in 2004.
And that has held him back — so far — from sending thousands of armed followers into the streets to exact revenge.
Both al-Sadr and the U.S. military are locked in a high-risk struggle as the Americans seek to restore order to Baghdad and shore up the shaky government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, himself a Shiite.
The Americans know they must rein in al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army militia if they are to disband armed groups believed responsible for the sharp rise in sectarian violence that has brought the country to the brink of civil war.
But the Americans cannot afford an all-out move against al-Sadr. That would trigger a backlash among the Shiite majority — a nightmare scenario for the troubled U.S. mission in
Iraq.
A major push against al-Sadr would also undercut al-Maliki, who relies heavily on al-Sadr for political support.
Al-Sadr's movement holds 30 of the 275 seats in parliament and five Cabinet posts. Al-Sadr's backing helped al-Maliki win the top job during painstaking negotiations within the Shiite alliance that led to the ouster of Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari.
As a result, the Americans have been careful to avoid mentioning the Mahdi Army as the target of their attacks, including the raid early Monday in Sadr City or the July 22 attack on al-Sadr's office in Musayyib where 15 militiamen died.
Instead the Americans prefer to describe the targets as "thugs" or "criminals."
"We must be careful not to demonize the entire Sadrist movement," said one U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because the issue is so sensitive. "No doubt about it. He's a player."
But al-Sadr faces his own conundrum.
He owes much of his prestige within the Shiite community to his defiant stand against the Americans in 2004. His Mahdi militia is feared by Sunni Arabs but viewed by many Shiites as their most reliable protection against Sunni extremists.
An armed showdown with the Americans could cost al-Sadr his close ties to al-Maliki's government, destroy the last vestige of Shiite political unity and — in the end — result in the deaths of thousands of loyal followers.
At the very least, it could prompt the government and the Americans into a serious effort to disband the Shiite militias, which would mean locking up key leaders and combing Sadr City and other Sadrist strongholds in search of weapons.
To al-Sadr, the real battle is with the Sunni Arabs. The Shiite nightmare is that the Americans might somehow use political turmoil to impose an Iraqi government of their own, heavy with secular politicians instead of the religious parties that now control it.
That would spell the end of the political power the Shiites have long felt was their birthright as Iraq's largest community — an estimated 60 percent of the country's 27 million people.
Key al-Sadr lieutenants say privately that they have their "red lines" and that at some point, American pressure will become too great for restraint.
But they have not spelled out those "red lines" — if in fact they have determined them.
For the time being, al-Sadr prefers to look for ways to remind the Americans and the Iraqi government that he is a powerful figure who cannot be easily dismissed. That — more than admiration for Hezbollah — was behind Friday's mass rally in Sadr City in support of the Lebanese Shiite guerrillas fighting the Israelis.
Al-Sadr's aides had proposed a series of rallies across the Shiite heartland. Instead, the cleric decided to bring his followers to Baghdad to remind the authorities that he can muster tens of thousands into the streets.
Robert H. Reid is correspondent-at-large for The Associated Press and has reported frequently from Iraq since 2003.
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Citation: Robert H. Reid. "Analysis: Firebrand cleric more cautious," The Associated Press, 07 August 2006.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060807/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_sadr_s_dilemma
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