By Charles A. Stevenson
Armed Forces & Society, Summer 96
The Clinton Administration has developed and applied a fairly detailed set of guidelines on the use of force. The Clinton criteria are derived in large measure from official military doctrine promulgated by Gen. Colin Powell, but they have been modified particularly in light of U.S. experience in Somalia. The current consensus doctrine calls for overwhelming force in defense of vital national interests in order to achieve a quick, decisive victory with low U.S. casualties. When important but not vital interests are involved, and costs and risks are commensurate with those interests, limited military means may be used for limited political objectives. In all cases, military operations should have clearly defined and achievable missions, with measurable milestones and an exit strategy to guard against mission creep. Public and congressional support is deemed advisable but not necessary. This article illustrates the application of this doctrine in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.
There is a set of principles on the use of force that has evolved during the Clinton Administration and now stands as the consensus guidelines for future military actions. It differs from past criteria in notable ways, but primarily in its elaboration and differentiation for various possible circumstances. This article seeks to explain this new doctrine, describe its evolution, and evaluate its applicability to those agonized decisions about sending U.S. military forces into harm's way.
For more than two decades American policymakers have wrestled with the problem of setting the terms and conditions for the use of force. Scarred by the U.S. experience in Vietnam, successive presidents have tried to reassure the American public that their chosen military actions would not repeat earlier errors. Military leaders have also worked to obtain conditions that would protect them from another failed, unpopular mission. And members of Congress have sought to force each president to give them a significant role in the decision process.
While none of these matters has been conclusively settled, there seems to be a broad consensus on how and when to use military force. Those principles are:
1. When vital interests are at stake, the nation should use whatever force may be necessary to achieve a quick, decisive victory with low U.S. casualties.
2. When important but not truly vital interests are at stake, and when the costs and risks of military action are commensurate with such interests and success is likely, limited military means may be used for limited political objectives.
3. In all cases, political leaders should provide military commanders with clear political objectives that can be translated into clear and attainable military missions.
4. Before forces are committed to action, they should be given milestones for measuring the accomplishment of their mission and an exit strategy.
5. There should be reasonable assurance of public and congressional support for the planned use of force.
This list represents a reformulation of official documents and public statements, which are often phrased as questions to be considered when deciding on the use of force. However, it is not always clear what should be done if some choices are unclear or run counter to those favored in the bulk of the replies.
Implications and Unresolved Questions
Three implications follow from these guidelines. The first is that there is still ample room for discretion, particularly in defining the magnitude of the interests at stake. No president need be forced to act if he is otherwise reluctant, nor are military operations precluded simply because some factors flash red or amber instead of green. It makes an enormous difference whether a given situation is declared to be a vital or an important interest. While that can always be a subject for extensive debate, the fact remains that the president has the initiative. In the Clinton Administration, as under its predecessor, containing Iraq was considered a vital interest, while the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia fell into a lesser category. And despite the long history of U.S. interventions in Latin America and its associated rhetorical justifications, Haiti has also remained in the merely important category.
A second implication is that rapid success is now an imperative. It cannot be wished; it has to be expected. And if there are any doubts, a face-saving exit strategy has to be in place. American military history until 1975 showed a preference for a strategy of attrition, hoping to win by steady application of force that eventually overwhelmed the enemy. The length of a conflict was not a barrier to involvement. If anything, losses raised the stakes and created an added incentive to persevere. No longer. Force should be used overwhelmingly and decisively, not gradually, with more attention to military results than to political signals.
A third implication is that U.S. casualties must remain low even when vital interests are at stake. It is strange but seemingly true--or at least accepted as gospel within the Washington Beltway--that public reluctance to tolerate military casualties among our all-volunteer force is much higher than when draftees bore the brunt of the fighting. Perhaps television has magnified the impact of warfare's inevitable death and suffering. Perhaps expectations of nearly bloodless victories have been raised unduly high by the stunning success of the Persian Gulf war. Perhaps America, unlike, say, France, is too soft and sentimental to act like a Great Power.
These guidelines do not resolve all questions that have been part of the post-Vietnam debate on the use of force. They do not settle the argument over whether force should be a last resort or can be an early response to prevent or deter a subsequent threat. Many earlier criteria routinely listed military action as permissible only when nonmilitary means had failed. Now many officials see the threat or use of force, with other instruments of national power, as valuable and acceptable from the start.
Nor do the new guidelines rule out the use of force primarily for sending policy signals. Many officers, especially angered by the heavy losses and repeated failure of Vietnam operations controlled by political leaders for deliberate political objectives, opposed sending troops or pilots as signals of intent or resolve. Nevertheless, official doctrine now acknowledges the potential value of military operations for such purposes. This approach is acceptable, however, because the costs and risks must be low and the military usually decides on the precise targets to be struck, which allows the planners to support the political objectives while also hitting the military ones.
Another matter still in dispute is whether there can be an arm's length war--a use of force that keeps all but a few pilots out of harm's way. Many civilian commentators have joined with air power advocates in endorsing air strikes as a highly effective but low-risk option even for ethnic conflicts and civil wars. Ground force experts, on the other hand, doubt the efficacy of airpower alone and worry about the possible slippery slope into ground combat.
Finally, there is the problem of dealing with admittedly unclear situations, in which it is difficult to specify concrete political or military objectives, or there are multiple objectives that might require quite different military actions. Despite his own key role in articulating criteria for the use of force, Gen. Colin Powell admitted in his final public address before retirement that murkiness did not preclude military action. "And if it isn't possible to come up with a clear purpose, if the situation, as is too often the case, is murky, then you should understand its murkiness and know that, as you go into this, you have to find the clarity that you will eventually need."(n1)
Curious Features
One should note several curious features about these principles. While most are phrased positively, the underlying thrust is often negative: don't embark on high risk operations that have a less than overwhelming chance of success; don't start something without a clear idea of how to end it; don't use force incrementally or gradually. A negative phrasing would highlight the true origin of many of these principles--avoiding mistakes of the past, especially in Vietnam and Lebanon.
Note also how these guidelines differentiate between what civilians and the military must do. The civilians must provide clear objectives and criteria for success, along with an assurance of public support; the military, in contrast, must be the calculator of costs and risks as well as the judge of what forces and tactics to use. This is consistent with the development and elaboration in recent years of the notion of an "operational level" of warfare, overlapping both strategy and tactics, in which military planners take the policy objectives from national leaders and translate them into campaign plans.
Whatever political wisdom may be contained in these guidelines, and there is much, I would argue that the primary beneficiary is the uniformed military. They are given an insurance policy--against long, unpopular wars. The face to be saved by an in-place exit strategy is more that of military leaders than of the president. Similarly, the source for much of the detailed articulation of these ideas is the U.S. military, applying lessons bitterly learned in recent years.
Roots of the Doctrine
The new guidelines have many similarities to previous attempts to spell out the terms and conditions for possible use of U.S. military forces, but they also mark an intellectual advance toward a more differentiated set of principles. The Clinton doctrine contains most of the key conditions set by others as well as adding more specific rules for particular categories.
In fact, the Clinton doctrine on the use of force is essentially the Powell doctrine that was codified by the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) shortly before his retirement. What is different are the modifications that take account of the experiences in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. These are elaborations rather than alterations of Powell's formula, however, because the intellectual domination of military thinking in this area has been virtually total in recent years, overwhelming and supplanting the ideas advanced by former President George Bush and former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.
In 1984, Secretary Weinberger enunciated six criteria for the use of force that were essentially rules for avoiding another Vietnam. These constituted high hurdles against the use of force, so high, in fact, that Weinberger's cabinet colleague, Secretary of State George Schultz, later called them "a counsel of inaction bordering on paralysis." Colin Powell, in addition, observed that he viewed Weinberger's rules as "a practical guide" but perhaps too explicit, thus leading "potential enemies to look for loopholes."(n2)
The Weinberger tests were phrased to echo criticisms of the conduct of the Vietnam war, especially those from the U.S. military. The tests ruled out the use of force except for vital national interests, which in hindsight Vietnam did not appear to be, and which probably only the Soviet Union and China could threaten. They also demanded reasonable assurance of domestic support in advance of committing troops, something difficult to predict or guarantee. They did establish, however, a call for clear political and military objectives, as well as an intention to win when once engaged that remain an important part of the consensus guidelines.
The original Weinberger tests amounted to a codification of the Vietnam syndrome. They declared what not to do rather than when to take bold action. They reflected the lessons learned by the U.S. military and others supporting the Vietnam war who were angered by its outcome. Those lessons included no more incrementalism, only massive force; no more being left hanging by politicians; no more fighting without winning.
The U.S. experience in Lebanon taught the military the importance of having an exit strategy before entering, so that U.S. forces could be assured an honorable departure, even from a messy situation. The later Powell guidelines built upon these ideas and extended them to the emerging field of peacekeeping operations, the most likely and contentious type of probable, foreseeable military action.
In 1992, after two major military operations that were generally viewed as successful, President Bush reflected on the use of force in his valedictory address at West Point. The outgoing president argued against fixed rules or rigid criteria. Instead of relegating the use of force to a last resort possibility, as Weinberger had done, Bush viewed it as a backdrop, a complement, or a temporary alternative to diplomacy. He also endorsed military action for important but less than vital interests, when it was the most appropriate instrument. Interestingly, Bush made no mention of the need for domestic or congressional support.(n3)
The Bush criteria were enunciated in the context of policy choices over Bosnia and Somalia, when the president chose to avoid U.S. military involvement in the tangled Balkan conflict even while he decided to send troops on a short-term, humanitarian mission to Africa. He later said that his advisors (Cheney and Powell) warned that a Bosnian intervention could require 250,000 U.S. troops and still not be successful.(n4) Somalia seemed feasible, however, because the large U.S. force was set to hand matters over to UN contingents within 2-4 months.
The Powell Doctrine
The most important single influence on President Clinton's thinking on the use of force was Colin Powell. The JCS Chairman developed his own views during the Vietnam War, which taught him the importance of having clear political objectives before starting to fight as well as the need for public support for military operations. He was later part of a study group for the Army Chief of Staff that stressed the need for the Army to win battles and wars. And he regarded the 1989 invasion of Panama, the first major operation after he became chairman, as vindication of the lessons he had learned about clear objectives and large-scale, decisive force.(n5)
Powell put his ideas into practice when Kuwait was seized by Iraq. He spoke out against relying too much on airpower and resisted offensive operations until sufficient forces were promised and in place to guarantee victory. He also counseled the Bush Administration against trying to restore Aristide to power in Haiti because of the difficulty of getting out once troops were sent in.(n6)
Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor have summarized the Powell doctrine as follows:
"There should be no use of force.., unless success is all but guaranteed. Force should be used decisively and its application should preferably be short. As soon as the aims are achieved, American forces should be quickly extracted, lest the military fall into a quagmire. Above all, the image of the armed forces is to be protected."(n7)
This description is somewhat exaggerated, although it correctly notes Powell's emphasis on quick, decisive actions and prompt exits. It is also right in noting the general's concern with public attitudes toward the military, another lesson from Vietnam, in which many officers felt betrayed and stranded by political leaders in a no-win situation. I think it is misleading, however, to say that Powell believes in avoiding all use of force except for guaranteed successes. Instead, he seems to favor limiting missions so that they can be defined as achieved, although such missions can also include the limited use of force for political purposes.
The fullest elaboration of the Powell doctrine came in a formal publication closely supervised by the JCS Chairman and formally approved and disseminated by him just three weeks before his retirement. "Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations" goes far beyond the earlier guidelines by making significant distinctions among types of conflicts and alternative political goals.(n8)
Perhaps the publication's most important distinction is between war, defined as "large-scale, sustained combat operations," and what are called "military operations other than war involving the use or threat of force," some of which may entail combat. The latter covers the spectrum that includes strikes, raids, shows of force, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and noncombatant evacuation operations.
Given his crucial distinction between "war" and "operations other than war," Powell's doctrine noted that the goal in war is to "fight and win," while in other operations the goal may be only to "support national objectives, deter war, and return to a state of peace." In other words, the military may have to settle for something short of victory, and there are likely to be political restraints on weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence. Decisive military action may not even be appropriate if such action could undermine long-term strategic objectives.
One of the most significant additions to military thinking about the use of force is the joint publication's careful distinction between imposed and negotiated settlements. The document notes that "defeating an enemy military force is rarely sufficient, in and of itself, to ensure a long-term solution to a crisis." It urges properly conceived conflict termination criteria and awareness of whether the political objective is an imposed settlement, requiring the domination or overthrow of the opponent, or a negotiated settlement, when both sides necessarily make concessions. The document notes that military force can be useful in providing leverage for favorable conflict termination, and it allows political leaders to impose restraints when they admit to a goal short of the overthrow of an adversary.(n9)
The U.S. military's willingness to make these distinctions, and to acknowledge gray areas in what had previously been a political debate of sharp contrasts, demonstrated an appreciation of the complexity of the issue. In his discussion of it, General Powell argued that he was a reluctant warrior who, when sent into battle, wanted decisive results, with forces carefully tailored to the political objectives. His criteria reflected and codified the lessons learned by the U.S. military in Vietnam, and reinforced by the experience in Lebanon.
By the time the Clinton Administration first enunciated its own guidelines for the use of force, it had been through the added, and quite painful, experience in Somalia. Thus it embraced the Powell distinctions and conditions, but also underscored the need for timelines, milestones, and a specific exit strategy whether the operation was going well or poorly.
Clinton Doctrine
The fullest, most recent articulation of the Clinton doctrine appears in the president's latest [February 1995] National Security Strategy Report. That document, in twelve straightforward paragraphs, discusses the administration's approach to "Deciding When and How to Employ U.S. Forces."(n10)
The report declares that "it is unwise to specify in advance all the limitations we will place on our use of force..." It then lists three categories of national interests--vital, important, and humanitarian--with differing guidelines for the possible use of force.
Vital interests, such as "defense of U.S. territory, citizens, allies and economic well-being," call for doing "whatever it takes to defend those interests, including--when necessary--the unilateral and decisive use of military power."
Important, but not vital, interests call for limited and conditional use of military force. The conditions include likely success, costs and risks commensurate with the interests at stake, and the failure of other means used to achieve the objectives.
In the case of humanitarian interests, the administration tends to rule out combat power and limits use of military forces to situations in which they can provide unique capabilities or respond to urgent, otherwise unattainable needs of those in distress. In these cases, the risks to U.S. troops are supposed to be "minimal."
The purpose of any use of force is "to support U.S. diplomacy in responding to key dangers." The Clinton report declares a predisposition to act, however, only in situations where "there is reason to believe our action will bring lasting improvement." It also defers to regional or multilateral actors who might be "better positioned to act than we are."
Prior to committing military force, the administration pledges to consider several critical questions:
"Have we considered non-military means that offer a reasonable chance of success? Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission? What is the environment of risk we are entering? What is needed to achieve our goals? What are the potential costs--both human and financial--of the engagement? Do we have reasonable assurance of support from the American people and their elected representatives? Do we have timelines and milestones that will reveal the extent of success or failure, and, in either case, do we have an exit strategy?"(n11)
Assuming satisfactory answers, the administration then promises to send troops abroad "with a clear mission and, for those operations that are likely to involve combat, the means to achieve their objectives decisively," through having carefully matched military force to U.S. political objectives.
The Clinton report adds some points that respond to some of the controversies stirred by its foreign policy actions. It reiterates a willingness to act unilaterally, but notes the desirability of sharing the costs and burdens with others. And it laments the images that sway American public opinion first to intervene and then to favor withdrawal when U.S. casualties occur. Finally, it acknowledges the need for public support to sustain any military operation, but urges "unwavering commitment to our objective" once forces are deployed, and resistance to "reflexive calls for early withdrawal," because these would encourage adversaries to inflict U.S. casualties in order to drive U.S. forces home.(n12)
The report modifies somewhat the original Clinton formulation, which was not released until July 1994, although it had been largely agreed upon at the staff level months earlier. Most of the language in that first presidential strategy report was repeated, although reorganized, in the 1995 document. There were, however, some notable additions between 1994 and 1995. The revised document, as noted, spelled out the key distinctions among vital, important, and humanitarian interests. It also included additional questions to be considered, such as the risk environment, the potential costs, and a clear, achievable mission. It promised, for the first time, that troops would be sent abroad only with a clear mission and the means to achieve it. And, with Somalia obviously in mind, it noted the problems of maintaining public support when pictures of American casualties appear on television.
One example of the widespread acceptance of the Clinton doctrine's guidelines can be found in Richard Haass' excellent book, Intervention.(n13) The book grew out of a study group as well as conferences and meetings with academics and officials, many of whom held prominent positions in the Clinton Administration. As an important National Security Council staffer in the Bush Administration who helped write the outgoing president's West Point speech on the use of force, Haass endorses many of the ideas advanced by others, particularly those emphasizing the importance of clear, consistent relationships between political purposes and military means and the need to calculate desirability in conjunction with feasibility.
Haass deviates from the usual public declarations, however, by dismissing lists of national interests as "of little use" in deciding whether to intervene abroad. He considers the term too elastic, better suited to justify decisions afterward than to help make decisions on what to do now. But Haass rejects Weinberger's insistence on "victory," and sides with the Powell and Clinton formulations favoring limited force for limited purposes. And while he supports the notion of an exit strategy, he echoes the Clinton Administration's argument against firm preannounced dates for withdrawal.
At the end, Haass puts the decision on military action just where most presidents want it--as an act of judgment, depending on circumstances, comparing use of force to other instruments, and the benefits of action or inaction.
Evaluation of the Doctrine
If one demands clarity and predictability rather than vagueness and discretion, then all of these efforts to spell out criteria for military action are inadequate. In fact, the current doctrine is probably the best that is possible.
It now covers the full spectrum of military actions, with careful distinctions if not rigid applicability. The key issues, however, remain as questions to be considered rather than answers assuring action. Thus it is unclear what effect an unfavorable answer might have on a decision to employ force. What if the risks and military requirements are high? What if there is no reasonable assurance of domestic support? What if murky or multiple objectives make it hard to specify milestones for success and a safe exit strategy?
Unlike the "just war" criteria, which many of these guidelines track very closely, the American guidelines are only factors to be weighed, not absolute requirements. In the just war tradition, by contrast, force is permitted only when all conditions are satisfied. Policymakers prefer situational ethics.
Another potential gap in the Clinton formulation is in its applicability to the military actions of his administration. In the national strategy report, the president cites actions against Iraq as an example of the decisive use of force in a situation in which a vital national interest was at stake. He also mentions Haiti as a case of the limited use of force for limited objectives and Rwanda as a good example of humanitarian intervention.
The Doctrine Applied
1. The Early Months
In his campaign for the presidency, Bill Clinton criticized George Bush for not being forceful enough in his foreign policy--for appeasing Saddam Hussein before Iraq seized Kuwait and then for abandoning those urged to revolt against the Iraqi leader; for "coddling dictators," especially in China; and for not using force to guarantee the delivery of relief supplies in Bosnia. Clinton said the United States should join in a multinational coalition to "shoot its way" into Sarajevo. He was a "different Democrat," willing to use force decisively and unwilling to make major additional cuts in defense.(n14)
His first action as commander-in-chief was a calculatedly routine approval of air attacks to enforce the "no fly zone" over northern Iraq. This was a continuation of Bush Administration policy, to be sure, but the new team downplayed rather than trumpeted this thoroughly civilian president's first use of military combat force. Even a few months later, when Clinton ordered cruise missile attacks on an intelligence facility in Baghdad in retaliation for Iraqi involvement in an assassination plot against former President Bush, officials did not seem to promote the image of a warrior president but rather tried to return attention to the domestic agenda.
Bosnia was the first issue over which Clinton wrestled with the conditions for using military force. He began by suggesting air strike options in his first post-election meeting with Colin Powell, but soon came to recognize the risks in that approach.(n15) Indeed, it is evident that he was well coached by his senior military advisor and that he had absorbed the principles of the general's doctrine. In public statements the president repeatedly cited the general's views as similar to his own. For example, in a 23 April news conference, Clinton cited Powell's views on air strikes and said, "If you take action [in Bosnia], if the United States takes action, you must have a clearly defined objective that can be met. We must be able to understand it, and its limitations must be clear." Two weeks later, when the administration was seeking European support for its "lift and strike" plan (to lift the UN-imposed arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims and strike Serb positions from the air), Clinton said that if he decided to use air power, "I would have a very specific, clearly defined strategy to pursue and very clear tactical objectives for the use of that air power, which would have a beginning, a middle and an end, and which not only I but our military advisers had advised me could be achieved."(n16)
He also reportedly held a series of lengthy meetings with his top national security officials at which he asked the very sorts of questions Powell had earlier prescribed and that Clinton himself later enunciated as his criteria for using force: What are the objectives? How do we extricate ourselves? What are the risks?(n17) Eventually, of course, he decided that unilateral military action was unwise and that U.S. participation in multilateral efforts would stop short of using ground combat troops.
Why did Clinton reach that decision? Why did he back off from the urgency and fervor he displayed in the campaign? It could be that logical consideration of the intervention criteria led inexorably to it. It could be that the large military force proposed involved unacceptably high risks, at home and in the Balkans. It could also be that the White House, ever sensitive to even the slightest blips in public opinion polls, sensed a significant change in the popular mood. Majority opinion had supported U.S. intervention during the second half of 1992, peaking in January 1993, with 63% of the respondents to a Gallup survey in favor of air strikes and 57% willing to send group troops to restore peace and deliver humanitarian aid to Bosnia. By early May, however, as the administration tried to win European support for "lift and strike," only 36% of the respondents still favored air strikes, and 55% were opposed.(n18)
But the deck was also stacked by important political considerations. The president, who had never served in uniform, was under strong pressure to heed military advice. Indeed, recent presidents have usually acted as if the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a veto on decisions to use force. Instead of exercising that veto directly, however, the chiefs have used their influence to impose key conditions on military operations, such as exit strategies and the freedom to make operational decisions.
U.S. military leaders thought that even massive force would not guarantee victory. At the height of the presidential campaign in September 1992, Powell had publicly opposed even such limited military action as enforcing the no-fly zone or conducting air strikes on Serb artillery as ineffective and likely to lead to unacceptably deeper U.S. involvement. President Bush later reported that General Powell and Defense Secretary Cheney had said, "We can go in, but we can't tell you how we're going to win this." The military argued that it would take 250,000 American troops to open supply lines and stop the killing and that the operation might still not be successful because of the mountainous terrain. As the Clinton Administration reconsidered policy in April 1993, Powell repeated his misgivings in congressional testimony, saying that driving the Serbs out and restoring Bosnia would require several hundred thousand people for a number of years.(n19)
Powell was in another open dispute with the new president because he opposed the Clinton proposal to end discrimination against homosexuals in uniform. Because the president's position was politically unpopular and a major distraction to the administration, it also seemed wise to cooperate with Powell on use of force issues. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin also opposed major involvement in Bosnia and publicly admitted the absence of good options.(n20)
Although Congress later rallied to the lift and strike option, there was little enthusiasm for it in 1993. Thus the initial Clinton decisions on Bosnia primarily reflected military thinking, both in terms of the issues to be considered and the outcome recommended.
2. The Somalia Syndrome
Resistance from the U.S.military kept tight limits on Bush Administration actions in Somalia--an application of the Powell doctrine. Many in the Pentagon reportedly viewed the African nation as a "bottomless pit." There is also substantial evidence that the U.S. military resisted any deployment of ground forces during repeated interagency meetings until mid-November 1992, and General Powell reportedly stressed the "downsides" of intervention up to the moment that President Bush made his decision on 25 November. Eventually Vice Chairman of the JCS, Adm. David Jeremiah, endorsed ground troops for a relief operation, provided that several conditions of concern to the military were met: that the force would be under American command; that it would be backed by a UN Security Counsel resolution authorizing all necessary means to accomplish its mission; and that it would be large, up to 35,000 troops. The plan also called for operations to be handed over to the United Nations after 24 months, with only a 2,000-man contingent of Marines remaining offshore for emergencies. U.S. commanders also insisted on dropping disarmament of the clans from the original mission statement. As one official commented at the time, "This is the Desert Storm way of handling Somalia."(n21)
The Clinton Administration accepted the Bush policy and treated the hand-over to UN control as the end of the problem. "Mission accomplished," the president told returning troops in a White House ceremony on May 5. "Your successful return reminds us that other missions lie ahead for our nation."(n22) In fact, the new administration favored a broader mandate for the UN operation, as working toward a long-term political solution.
While officials in Washington turned their attention to other matters, there were significant changes on the ground in Somalia. Incrementally and without adequate foresight, U.S. forces found themselves on the defensive, then taking sides against one of the factions, and finally being pinned down, literally and figuratively, in the streets of Mogadishu. The blame can be widely shared. There was high-level inattentiveness in Washington, on-scene bureaucratic infighting, a puzzling command structure, and ad hoc responses to particular incidents that changed the substance of policy without reevaluating accompanying assumptions and plans. The humanitarian relief mission turned into one of nation-building, supplemented by a manhunt for the leader of one of the major factions, which had to be included in any lasting settlement. The result was inconsistency, confusion, and then disaster.
Shortly after the United Nations assumed responsibility for Somalia, Pakistani peacekeepers were ambushed by forces believed to be controlled by Mohamed Farah Aideed. That set off a manhunt by U.S. forces that the military reportedly favored at first. Colin Powell says he supported the request for helicopter gunships and AC-130 strike plans but resisted sending Delta Force until requests from the field became too insistent. Over time and without success, military planners came to question the manhunt, but meanwhile the political and military situation had been polarized and UN forces were attacked in repeated incidents. After four U.S. soldiers were killed on 8 August by a remotely detonated mine, Washington finally acceded to requests from the field for specialized troops, eventually sending a battalion of rangers and some commandos. September witnessed the odd spectacle of the U.S. regional commander, Gen. Joseph P. Hoar, opposing a State Department call for more U.S. troops while the local American commander, Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Montgomery, was pleading in vain for extra tanks and armored vehicles to protect his forces. The disagreement was over the mission. The State department official favored an offensive against Aideed, while General Hoar urged a reassessment of a continued U.S. presence. He reportedly argued that there was still no coherent plan for Somalia and opined that substantial additional U.S. support might be "politically unacceptable and unwise."(n23)
There was no thoroughgoing review of the basic policy or of the principles of the Clinton doctrine until after the October firefight, when the president complained that he had not been given adequate information before the tragedy. "How could this happen?" he demanded of his advisers.(n24) What had occurred, of course, was what the military call "mission creep," the gradual change in what the troops are doing or supposed to do without due regard to the consequences. Actually, once the UN was a party to the conflict and U.S. troops were sent as a sheriff's posse, they should have expected to be shot at.
Meanwhile, congressional support was eroding. Initial support for the relief mission disintegrated into partisan bickering over war powers by spring, as Washington debated what to do about Bosnia. No effort was made to reconcile minor differences between House and Senate measures authorizing troops in Somalia because of fears of debates and votes over collateral issues. Then, when U.S. casualties began to occur in August, doubts and opposition grew.
Even before the deadly firefight in Mogadishu, both houses had passed nonbinding amendments calling on the president to obtain legislative authorization to keep troops in Somalia beyond 15 November. After 3 October, the rush to the exits became a stampede. Even conservative Republicans, who had ritually denounced similar proposals during GOP administrations, offered amendments to force the president to withdraw troops from Somalia and to deny him the authority to send them to Haiti. President Clinton avoided a major political defeat only by promising to meet the critics' demands and bring U.S. forces home by the end of March 1994.
Arguably, the administration applied the Clinton doctrine to Somalia in October, even though it had not paid sufficient attention to the matter earlier. With costs rapidly exceeding the U.S. interest involved, and with public support collapsing, the president developed an emergency exit strategy that ended the immediate crisis. He also launched a new diplomatic effort that did not require strong military backing.
The Somalia experience prompted two significant modifications in the Powell approach to the use of force: a sharper realization that U.S. casualties must be kept very low, and a closer link between public support and continued operations. Neither Powell nor Bush had previously emphasized the need for public support, but Mogadishu taught the downside corollary: even if support is not necessary to begin an operation, strong public and congressional opposition can force an early end to it.
General Shalikashvili later referred to the "bitter lesson" of Somalia. Indeed, the new chairman of the JCS speculated that there was now a "Somalia syndrome" at work, making it extremely difficult for U.S. peacekeepers to suffer any casualties without jeopardizing public support for the operation. This underscored the need for few casualties as a condition of any future use of force.
The Somali experience also served to strengthen military and other opponents of a more active U.S. peacekeeping role, especially if that might entail subordination to non-American commanders or dependence on foreign units for key support or defense functions. The resulting policy set conditions for U.S. participation very much like the guidelines for other uses of troops.(n25) This was a more hesitant and limited approach than the president had promised in his campaign.
3. Haiti
Events in Mogadishu had a chilling effect on plans for Haiti. Even before the 3 October deaths, Pentagon officials were insisting on clearer advance answers to questions surrounding the planned deployment of U.S. troops to police the political settlement between the military rulers and ousted President Aristide that was reached in July.
If Somalia was a problem that the new administration had failed to recognize, Haiti was one of their own creation. After having chided the Bush Administration for its refugee policy and for failing to support democracy in Haiti by pressing for the reinstatement of Jean-Bertrand Aristide as president, the new U.S. president found himself unable to deliver on his pledges. Diplomacy supplemented by a UN embargo did produce an agreement in July for Aristide's return on 30 October. But that return was not to take place.
In the summer of 1993, the Pentagon and State Department reportedly split over the plan to send U.S. troops to participate in the UN peacekeeping force. Military planners were wary of a risky, open-ended commitment and doubted that the political agreement would be implemented by the Haitian military. Many officials also doubted the ability and temperament of the exiled president. Shortly before a troopship was scheduled to sail to Port-au-Prince, Secretary Aspin and Admiral Jeremiah reportedly presented Secretary Christopher with a long list of conditions that had to be met before troops could be deployed. These included airfield and port access, final rules of engagement, Haitian military agreement to the mission, and other details. This was two days before the Ranger firefight in Mogadishu and eight days before the USS Harlan County anchored offshore after being blocked from landing in Port-au-Prince by angry mobs on the dock. Although the ship had sailed, the speed of the retreat reflected continuing Pentagon doubts about the mission.(n26) The outcome might have been different had the timing been different, but nothing more was possible in the wake of the Mogadishu disaster.
During 1994 the administration combined diplomatic pressure with military planning. Pentagon opposition to aspects of the expected invasion reached such a point that Deputy Secretary John Deutch arranged for lengthy discussions between senior military leaders and Haiti hawk Strobe Talbott, Undersecretary of State. The military concerns were less about the initial intervention, in which planners expected a lopsided operation, than about the subsequent efforts to turn Haiti into a functioning democracy, with a professional army and police force, in an atmosphere of civil order. That task was viewed as lengthy, costly, and potentially dangerous in terms of possible U.S. casualties and pressures for the "mission creep" that led to disaster in Somalia.(n27)
Eventually Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili reportedly accepted the inevitability of a decision for intervention. Pentagon planners by then had succeeded, however, in crafting a plan reflecting their concerns and consistent with the Clinton guidelines on the use of force except with regard to public and congressional support. A substantial initial military force of 20,000 would provide overwhelming force. The mission was limited and specific, calling for the removal of the military leaders, the restoration of the Aristide government, the training of a civilian-controlled police force, and a transition within a few months to an international peacekeeping force with a majority of non-U.S, troops. Administration officials stressed that the goal was simply to restore a secure environment, not to begin "nation-building."(n28)
In a background briefing after the president's ultimatum but before dispatch of the Carter-Powell-Nunn delegation, senior military officials said they were "very comfortable with this plan." They did not expect organized resistance and they expected to remove forces rapidly after accomplishing the precise mission. The U.S. military were not expected to perform police functions, as developed in Somalia, but were to "patrol and deter violence by their presence and by their demeanor." Deputy Secretary Deutch later acknowledged that the biggest single issue was how to handle the policing function in Haiti and to avoid having U.S. troops drawn into it.(n29)
With the last-minute agreement engineered by a team headed by former president Jimmy Carter, the operation turned into a peaceful intervention, with no American combat casualties. At the end of March 1995, the United States turned things over to a UN force that was scheduled to remain in place through the Haitian presidential election in February 1996. Only 2,400 of the 6,000 peacekeepers were U.S. personnel.
The only deviation from the Clinton guidelines was the absence of the reasonable assurance of public and congressional support that the president had pledged to consider along with other "critical questions" before committing troops.(n30) There were numerous congressional votes in the several months before the invasion, most expressing a sense of Congress that there should not be an invasion or that Congress should vote before any military action. No legislation passed that specifically limited the president's freedom of action. Even after the invasion, the resolution that passed Congress required periodic reports but neither authorized nor limited the troop deployments. While administration officials later claimed they consulted widely with Congress about the planned action, they obviously did not heed the warnings against unilateral executive action.
Public opinion was, in fact, more supportive of action. Between mid-May and late June of 1994, support for sending troops to restore democracy in Haiti climbed from 36% to 45%, although 50% still opposed. When given the option of sending troops along with other nations, those in favor of military action soared to 54% in July. Perhaps more significantly, the figure was 60% among both Clinton and Perot voters. The president's pre-invasion address to the nation prompted a further 16% increase in public support for sending troops.(n31)
Why did President Clinton disregard the opposition? Probably, as was the case with some of his predecessors, because he thought he could get away with it. He was successful in turning public opinion around, and he also proved quite lucky with regard to casualties, which was the most important factor to Congress and the public. Since he was indelibly committed to restoring the Aristide regime, he may have feared that he would have suffered among one of his key constituencies--black Americans--if he abandoned that goal. Indeed, public pressure in early summer revealed the acute sensitivity to that constituency that Clinton felt about Haiti. It is also curious that Haiti was viewed by nearly 3/4 of the U.S. public as a "vital interest" primarily because of the threat of immigrants and refugees. Only 31% of public leaders shared that view, and even the Clinton strategy report placed Haiti as important but not vital.(n32)
4. Rwanda
When massive ethnic bloodshed spread through Rwanda in 1994, the United States deferred to African nations and France to respond to the problem. Rwanda illustrated the post-Somalia restraint imposed on U.S. humanitarian operations: as little as possible, as late as possible, along with--but after--as many others as possible, and for as short a time as possible. The costs and risks of trying to feed people caught up in brutal ethnic conflict were seen as so high that the use of American troops was limited--by official doctrine as well as political decision--to providing only unique and urgent support capabilities.
American military officials were concerned both about the cost and about the Somalia problem of sliding into a situation where U.S. forces might be caught up in the conflict. Delays in securing additional funds to cover peacekeeping expenses caused widely publicized readiness problems just at the end of the fiscal year and made Pentagon planners particularly sensitive to the dollar impact of overseas operations. When President Clinton ordered U.S. participation in the Rwandan relief effort at the end of July, the mission was limited strictly to logistical help and U.S. forces were kept out of the area of recent fighting. This experience led the administration to carve out a new and distinct category under which troops might be used--when only the military has the capabilities to jump-start a relief effort.(n33)
5. Bosnia 1995
Administration policy toward Bosnia during 1995 was mostly consistent with the Clinton guidelines. The NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serbs were large in scope but limited in time and purpose. The president continued to draw the big black line against U.S. ground troop involvement except to monitor an agreed settlement or to extract European peacekeepers. While Congress voted for nonbinding measures opposing troop deployments, it also pushed legislation requiring a unilateral end to the UN arms embargo and military help to the Bosnian Muslims.
Once a peace settlement was reached at Dayton in November, the president and other administration officials depicted their mission in phrases drawn from the military doctrine on the use of force. In his address to the nation on 27 November 1995, President Clinton said the mission would be "precisely defined, with clear, realistic goals that can be achieved in a definite period of time." The troops would have the authority and training and equipment to respond to threats or violations of the agreement with "overwhelming force." He linked the Bosnian operation to American values and interests, including a vital interest in bringing stability to Central Europe.(n34)
Press reports suggested that U.S. military leaders were satisfied with the terms and conditions established for the Bosnia mission. Despite previous opposition, the New York Times reported, "even the most skeptical commanders now express confidence" in the mission "largely because the agreement meets virtually every condition the American military insisted on for success: Clear goals, a powerful force, NATO command and control, robust rules of engagement, a one-year time limit and the expressed cooperation of the rival factions." The mission statement reportedly was circumscribed to exclude election security, conducting humanitarian missions, or clearing mines, while still preserving the right to strike first against a perceived threat.(n35)
As in the case of Haiti, the administration disregarded evidence of public and congressional opposition to the Bosnia operation. Opinion polls found mixed results, depending on the wording of the question, but the president won a modest increase in support in response to the administration's publicity campaign. Congress had passed legislation prior to the Dayton agreement that would have forbidden the president to send troops without advance congressional authorization. An attempt to override the presidential veto of that measure was set aside pending the ongoing negotiations. The House of Representatives later went on record criticizing the operation, while the Senate gave grudging support once the troops were about to be deployed. Although many in Congress felt backed into a comer by the president in which they were unable to express their true feelings without jeopardizing NATO and seeming to undermine support for U.S. forces, the president could argue that he had kept his pledge to seek some measure of congressional support prior to the final commitment of troops.(n36)
6. Other Military Operations
Administration responses to other military threats showed a fairly direct application of the Clinton doctrine. Fearing North Korean development of a nuclear capability contrary to earlier pledges, the administration halted the further withdrawal of ground troops from South Korea, reinforced remaining units, and made a major diplomatic effort to bring North Korea back into compliance. Longstanding military plans for the defense of South Korea were updated, and the threat from the North was regularly listed as a vital interest, thereby justifying preparations for the kind of all-out response favored by the U.S. military.
When Iraq conducted threatening military maneuvers in September 1994 and August 1995, the administration responded with rapid troop deployments to the Persian Gulf area, both as a signal of the continuing U.S. commitment to that region and as an example of what are called flexible deterrent options for U.S. forces. These actions were based on existing, widely reviewed military plans. Because defense against Iraq, like North Korea, is viewed as a vital interest, and both have strong domestic support, the administration could do no less in the circumstances. But what it has chosen to do is to accept the military plans and conditions for possible use of force.
Is the Doctrine under Challenge?
There are some indications that senior U.S. military leaders are beginning to question the use of force guidelines set down by General Powell and President Clinton.(n37) Instead of overwhelming force, many officers reportedly now argue for a "minimum footprint," that is, small contingents that risk fewer casualties or potentially deeper involvements. Each service is stressing its particular war-fighting capabilities in ways that strengthen its budget claims and portray a willingness to fight in the more limited and more frequent operations that are most probable in the next several years. There is also growing criticism of the Chairman's Joint Staff, which grew quite powerful under General Powell and remains the locus of strategic planning and doctrinal development.
In my judgment, these indicators are part of an ongoing competition for power among military factions, but not a serious challenge to the basic Powell and Clinton doctrines. The more fundamental disagreement is not over the use of force but rather over the use of the forces. Many commentators, in uniform and out, have criticized the military for accepting extra missions such as humanitarian relief, drug interdiction, and international peacekeeping. Critics fear that these activities undermine military capability and readiness to perform its inescapable mission of national defense against major threats and also tend to politicize the military in unhealthy ways. It is no accident, and probably very significant, that General Shalikashvili makes a point of rejecting the notion that the Pentagon should "only do the big ones."(n38)
The current doctrine is durable, in my view, because it makes good sense. It combines careful logic with political wisdom and utility. It creates hurdles to the potential use of force that make it far more likely that any such use is both effective and controlled within acceptable limits. It makes distinctions that policymakers should be sensitive to. It forewarns them of the risks--criticism, failure, excessive costs--if they fail to heed its strictures.
The Clinton administration has learned much from its experience in using or trying to use military force, lessons that have reinforced its basic policy and led to modest revisions in the guidelines previously set forth by General Powell. My conclusion that the doctrine is still strong and viable rests on its utility to most policymakers. It protects the president against hasty, ill-considered actions that force him to choose between admitting a mistake or making a worse one. It protects the military against being sent into operations against their will or contrary to solid planning. It protects the public against the costs and consequences of major military misadventures. Yet it allows a full spectrum of military actions in support of well-articulated national goals. These protections are not absolute, but they should be reassuring as we continue our journey through the post-Cold War era.
Notes
AUTHOR'S NOTE: The views expressed in this article are those of the author.
(n1.) Colin Powell, Remarks at the National Press Club, 28 September, 1993, reprinted in Stephen Dagget and Nina Serafino, "The Use of Force: Key Contemporary Documents," Report 94-805F (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1994), 34.
(n2.) See Daggett and Serafino, "The Use of Force," 9-15, for Weinbetger criteria; George P. Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribner's, 1993), 650; Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 303.
(n3.) George Bush, Remarks at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York, 5 January, 1993, reprinted in Daggett and Sarafino, "The Use of Force," 30-33.
(n4.) Victor Gold, "George Bush Speaks Out on Washington, the Press, and Bill Clinton's First Year," Washingtonian Magazine (Feb. 1994), 124, 125.
(n5.) Powell, My American Journey, 207-208, 279, and 434.
(n6.) Powell, My American Journey, 476-479, 544.
(n7.) "Beltway Warrior," The New York Times Magazine, (27 August 1995), 40ft.
(n8.) U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993), I-3, I-4.
(n9.) U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Pub 3-0, 1-11-12.
(n10.) William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: The White House, February 1995), 12-13. (Henceforth cited as NSSEE 1995)
(n11.) NSSEE 1995, 13.
(n12.) NSSEE 1995, 13.
(n13.) Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 69, 76.
(n14.) Thomas L. Friedman, "Clinton's Foreign-Policy Agenda Reaches Across Broad Spectrum," The New York Times, 4 October, 1992, A1.
(n15.) Powell, My American Journey, 576-78.
(n16.) William J. Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1993 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 487, 594.
(n17.) Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 150.
(n18.) See Gallup Poll Monthly, February, 1993, 12 and May 1993, 11.
(n19.) New York Times, 28 September, 1992, p. A1; Gold, "'George Bush Speaks Out," 125; Colin Powell, Testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1994 103d Cong., 1st sess. S. Hrg. 103-153, Pt. 1 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 95.
(n20.) Drew, On the Edge, 142; Senate Appropriations Committee, DoD Appropriations FY 1994, 47.
(n21.) Eric Schmitt, "A Tough Sell: Sending GIs to Bosnia," New York Times, 10 March 1994), A1: Don Oberdorfer, "The Path to Intervention," Washington Post, 6 December, 1992, A1; Michael Gordon, "Somali Aid Plan is Called the Most Ambitious Option," New York Times, 29 November 1992), 6; Clifford Krauss, "Washington Seeks Conditions on Plan for Somalia Force," New York Times, 27 November 1992), A1+; "Former U.N. Commander Thinks U.S. Should Pull Back from Peacekeeping," Inside the Navy, 23 January 1995, 20.
(n22.) Clinton, Public Papers, 1993, 565.
(n23.) Powell, My American Journey, 584; Barton Gellman, "The Words Behind a Deadly Decision," Washington Post, 31 October 1993, A1+; Michael R. Gordon, with John H. Cushman, Jr., "U.S. Supported Hunt for Aidid; Now Calls U.N. Policy Skewed," New York Times, 18 October 1993, A1+; Senator John Warner and Senator Carl Levin, "Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the Ranger Raid on October 3-4, 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia," Released by Senate Armed Services Committee, 29 September 1995, 24-27.
(n24.) Drew, On the Edge, 317, 319.
(n25.) Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Set to Limit Role of Military In Peacekeeping," New York Times, 29 January 1994, 1+; Daniel Williams, "Clinton Peacekeeping Policy to Set Limits on Use of U.S. Troops," Washington Post, 6 February 1994, A24.
(n26.) Michael R. Gordon, "Failure of Haiti Operation Backs Initial Pentagon Skepticism," New York Times, 15 October 1993, 18; Elaine Sciolino, "Pentagon and State Dept. at Odds Over Sending Soldiers to Haiti," New York Times, 8 October 1993, A1+.
(n27.) Ann Devroy and Bradley Graham, "U.S. Units Ready to Invade but Clinton Is Said to Be Weeks From Decision," Washington Post, 17 July 1994, 21; Ann Devroy and R. Jeffrey Smith, "A Split Administration Debated Invasion Risks," Washington Post, 25 September 1994, A1+; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Troops Stage Military Exercise with Eye on Haiti," New York Times, 7 July 1994, A1+; Elaine Sciolino, "Large Haiti Force is Weighed by U.S.," New York Times, 25 June 1994, A1+.
(n28.) Elaine Sciolino, "Top U.S. Officials Divided in Debate on Invading Haiti," New York Times, 4 August 1994, A1+; President Clinton's Television Address to the Nation, September 15, 1995; Testimony by Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch, Situation in Haiti, Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 28 September 1994, 103d Cong., 2d sess., S.Hrg. 103-863, 44.
(n29.) "Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials," 16 September 1994, released by Office of the Press Secretary, The White House; Deutch testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, 7, 40.
(n30.) William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: The White House, July 1994), 12.
(n31.) Richard Morin, "Support for Sending GIs to Haiti May Be Increasing, Poll Shows, Washington Post, 29 June 1994, All; Gallup Poll Monthly, July, 1994, 30-31, and September 1994, 16.
(n32.) Steven A. Holmes, "With Persuasion and Muscle, Black Caucus Reshapes Haiti Policy," New York Times, 13 July 1994, A10; John E. Rielly, ed., American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995) 27; NSSEE 1995, 12.
(n33.) R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Mission to Rwanda Criticized," Washington Post, 5 September 1994, A1+; Bradley Graham, "Aid Missions May Force Defense Cuts, Petty Says," Washington Post, 5 August, 1994, 27; NSSEE 1995, 12.
(n34.) William J. Clinton, "Presidential Address to the Nation," Washington Post, 28 November 1995, A8.
(n35.) Eric Schmitt, "Commanders Say U.S. Plan for Bosnia Will Work," New York Times, 27 November 1995, A1+; Dana Priest, "1,400 U.S. Troops Part of Advance Group," Washington Post, 28 November 1995, A9.
(n36.) Pat Towell and Donna Cassata, "Congress Takes Symbolic Stand on Troop Deployment," Congressional Quarterly, 16 December 1995, 3817; ;John F. Harris and Helen Dewar, "Clinton Bargains Defense Funds for Support on Bosnia," Washington Post, 29 November 1995, A30.
(n37.) See especially Thomas E. Ricks, "Colin Powell's Doctrine on Use of Military Force is Now Being Questioned by Senior U.S. Officers," Wall Street Journal, 30 August 1995, 12.
(n38.) Gen. John Shalikashvili, "Employing Forces Short of War," Defense 95, Issue 3, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995), 4.
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Citation: Charles A. Stevenson. "The Evolving Clinton Doctrine on the Use of Force," Armed Forces & Society, Summer 96.
Original URL: http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/22/4/511
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