06 November 2006

Shock and Anger in Baghdad Greet the Abu Ghraib News

Iraqis on the street and in the halls of power view the possible return of a man convicted for his role in the prisoner abuse scandal as another example of U.S. arrogance and insensitivity

By Aparisim Ghosh
TIME, 03 November 2006

Even for a people used to waking up to the sound of explosions, Iraqis were jolted by a Friday morning bombshell: the news, first reported on time.com, that Sgt. Santos Cardona, viewed here as one of the villains of Abu Ghraib, has been ordered back to the country. Although Iraqi and Arab media have been slow to pick up on the story (the news cycle here tends to be a day or two behind the U.S.) many in Baghdad read about it online, and word quickly spread. The reaction was predictable: total outrage.

"This is America spitting in our face," said Imad al-Hashimi, a Baghdad paediatrician. "The sheer arrogance of it is unbelievable."

It wasn't until midday that the news began to circulate in the Green Zone, the Baghdad enclave that includes many key government offices, including that of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. There, it was greeted with incredulity—and warnings of a backlash. "The reaction in the street will be very bad," warns Maryam al-Rais, a member of the Iraqi parliament. "This is just the latest in a long list of insults to Iraqi dignity by the Americans."

Officials said that the Iraqi government was not consulted on Sgt. Cardona's new posting. "He was sent without the knowledge of the Iraqi government," says Said Fadil al-Shara'a, internal affairs advisor to Nuri al-Maliki. "Nobody who has abused Iraqis should be allowed into this country, whether or not he has been convicted."

One Western official in the Green Zone told TIME he had received several angry calls from political figures, expressing "a cold fury" at what they interpreted as American arrogance and insensitivity. "To them, the fact that [U.S. Ambassador Zalmay] Khalilzad didn't pick up the phone and tell [Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri] al-Maliki shows the Americans simply don't care about Iraqi opinion," says the diplomat. "If Abu Ghraib was a p.r. calamity, then this is Part II—another disaster."

The U.S. Embassy declined TIME's request for a comment, saying questions about Sgt. Cardona were "military matters and issues." The U.S. military in Baghdad has yet to respond to TIME's questions. But Friday morning, in an apparent response to the publication of TIME's story, the Pentagon issued a statement saying that Cardona's transfer is being "evaluated" and that his movement with his unit into Iraq from a staging area in Kuwait has been "stopped."

Iraqis contacted by TIME said it was especially galling that Sgt. Cardona should be involved in training police. To political analyst Tahseen al-Sheekli, it suggests "that America wants to build a police force that doesn't believe in human rights."

Even those who say they are willing to give Sgt. Cardona the benefit of the doubt, quickly add that his presence in Iraq would be a bad idea. "He was convicted and punished for his acts, and even the Islamic Sharia'a says he should be forgiven," says Hussain al-Musawi, who heads the Shi'ite Political Council, an influential group within the Shi'ite coalition that dominates the Iraqi parliament. "But I don't think that the Iraqi government should allow him to enter the country—I think it will do whatever necessary to prevent that."

It is hard to overstate just how much the Abu Ghraib scandal still resonates with Iraqis. As a journalist, I am constantly reminded of it by Iraqis I meet—whether in the high offices of the Green Zone or in the streets of Baghdad. Those who resent the U.S. presence in Iraq never tire of using it as a flogging horse; even today, statements and videos issued by insurgent groups and jihadi organizations routinely cite Abu Ghraib, along with Haditha and Mahmoudiya, as proof of America's malign intentions in Iraq. Sgt Cardona's return "will give the insurgents another pretext for their insurgency," predicts Sadiq al-Mussawi, a political analyst. "And in this instance, many Iraqis will agree with them."

Even America's allies here bring up Abu Ghraib all the time, as proof of how little the U.S. understands Iraq. Last year, a European diplomat told me the infamous Abu Ghraib photos—some of them featuring Sgt Cardona—"did more damage to U.S. credibility in Iraq than a Cruise missile smashing into a kindergarden."

For many Iraqis, the punishment meted out to those found guilty of atrocities in the prison was too lenient; and Sgt Cardona's return will only confirm suspicions that the U.S. military never took the case seriously. A top Iraqi military commander, trained and appointed to his high position by the U.S., once told me that the Americans should have made an example of all those found guilty by "cutting of their heads and displaying them at the entrance of the Green Zone." This, from a man who proudly labeled himself as a "friend of America."

The timing of Sgt Cardona's return could not have been worse. Anti-American sentiment in Iraq is at an all-time high, and opinion polls show that most Iraqis—regardless of sect or ethnicity—want the U.S. forces out of their country. Hatred for the U.S. military runs deep among the minority Sunnis, whose centuries-old grip on power ended with the fall of Saddam Hussein; Sunni resentment fuels the insurgency that has raged ever since.

But in recent weeks, even the majority Shi'ites—who most benefited from the fall of Saddam and from the democratic process the U.S. helped set in motion—have come to distrust the U.S. Many Shi'ites complain U.S. forces aren't doing enough to stamp out the insurgency, but are instead targeting Shi'ite militias who—in their view—are merely protecting the community from Sunni attacks.

Shi'ite anger has been stoked by rumors, currently rife in Baghdad's political circles, that the U.S. is seeking to replace the Shi'ite-led government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki with a more secular leadership, perhaps including some elements of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath party. Unsurprisngly, relations between al-Maliki and the U.S. have turned distinctly prickly. Sources tell TIME that the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the supreme religious figure in Iraqi Shi'ism, has been alarmed by these rumors and asked al-Maliki about them when the Prime Minister visited the cleric in Najaf last month.

What Sistani—and other religious figures—will make of Sgt. Cardona's return can only be guessed. The news broke too late to be brought up at the Friday prayers, traditionally the pulpit from which the Muslim clergy (Sunni and Shi'ite alike) comment on the important political developments of the week.

One final note: Many observers here are perplexed that the U.S. military would risk another p.r. debacle over a low-ranking soldier. "It is not as if this guy is some great commander, whose presence will make a big difference to the American military effort," says the diplomat, who asked not to be named because he is not authorized to speak with the media. "He's not a strategic asset, but he's become a tremendous strategic liability for the [U.S.] military."

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Citation: Aparisim Ghosh. "Shock and Anger in Baghdad Greet the Abu Ghraib News," TIME, 03 November 2006.
Original URL: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1554399,00.html
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