Summary of PDA 18 January 2007 Iraq proposal
Extracted from Resolving Iraq: Progress depends on a short timeline for US troop withdrawal, Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #40, 18 January 2007; http://www.comw.org/pda/0701bm40.html
The memo argues that the large-scale US military presence in Iraq has become part of the problem and an impediment to integrating "rejectionists" in the political process. It advances an alternative approach to stabilizing Iraq that hinges on a short timeline for US troop withdrawal.
Key elements of the proposal:
■ Withdrawal of almost all US military forces from the country by mid-March 2008 – a necessary precondition of drawing Iraqi rejectionists into the political process;
■ Creation of a new multinational effort under the auspices of the UN Security Council and involving all of Iraq's neighbors (among others). The new mission would have separate sections addressing governance, development, and security;
■ Creation of a new International Security Assistance Force (ISAF-Iraq) under UN auspices and mostly comprising troops from Arab and Muslim nations not bordering Iraq. Additionally, Iraq would exchange substantial "military observer" missions with all of its neighbors;
■ Other initiatives aiming to draw Iraqi "rejectionist" elements into the political process would include an end to the de-Baathification campaign, a return to local Sunni authority in Sunni locales, full amnesty for all indigenous insurgents and militia personnel not charged with intentionally doing grave harm to noncombatant civilians;
■ The new mission will involve Iraq's neighbors in cooperative efforts to control Iraq's borders, reduce intercommunal tensions, and win the assent of Iraq's leaders to a new national compact. Winning the cooperation of Iraq's neighbors will require that some of their key security concerns be addressed. In the case of Syria and Iran, a de-escalation of other contentious issues is essential;
■ Between now and March 2008, the emphasis of US military activity in Iraq would shift to training Iraqi forces, redefining the security mission, and handing it off to the new international coalition. A few thousand US troops might remain in Iraq after March 2008 as part of ISAF- Iraq, but serving only in training, support, and observer capacities. The United States might also maintain a deterrent force in the region (but outside Iraq) comprising a ground force component of no more than 15,000 soldiers and marines (including those afloat).
Overcoming resistance and moving all Iraqi parties toward a "new beginning" for Iraq will depend on the political momentum gained from the prospect of US troop withdrawal, a reassertion of Iraqi sovereignty, and the combined influence of Iraq's neighbors.
Should Iraq's political leadership reject the path outlined above, they will have foreclosed the possibility of stabilizing the country any time soon. In this eventuality, the United States should withdraw its current mission and assume a regional posture that aims to contain and manage the situation from a distance. Also, regional diplomacy should take this eventuality into account now. Concerned nations should coordinate their responses to minimize the possibility of a broader war and ensure humanitarian relief.