By Mark John
Reuters, 29 May 2007
BRUSSELS (Reuters) - European Union experts will from next month start training police forces across Afghanistan, including southern provinces which have borne the brunt of insurgent violence, EU officials said on Tuesday.
But they gave no forecast for how many fully trained Afghan police officers they expected their small, 160-strong operation to turn out during a three-year mission starting June 17, adding its activities would depend on security and other criteria.
"We can play a very honorable role together with the U.S. police mission," EU Special Representative for Afghanistan Francesc Vendrell told a news briefing of an existing U.S. police training mission of some 500 trainers.
"We are lagging behind in the training of police."
Vendrell said some of the EU training personnel would deploy to south Afghanistan despite concerns that a spate of civilian casualties from Western military operations was turning the local population against international forces.
"That should be no reason not to have our trainers and mentors in that region," he added.
U.S. officials including Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice have urged the EU to do more to help speed up training of police and other law officials needed to combat widespread corruption and the drugs trade in Afghanistan which analysts say is fuelling the insurgency.
EU capitals agreed last year to expand a 50-strong German police training operation into a full EU-led mission, but Vendrell conceded he would have liked many more than the 160 trainers which will be deployed this year.
"I would liked to have seen it at the same size as the mission in
Kosovo, but that was unrealistic," he said of the 1,500 staff the EU is gearing up to send on a similar rule of law mission if the breakaway Serb province wins independence.
Vendrell said international agencies in Afghanistan saw the need for some 82,000 Afghan police, including auxiliaries, up from the existing force tentatively estimated at 60,000.
The 23-nation mission will include personnel from non-EU nations such as Norway, Canada and Australia and will monitor police reform and offer advice at national and provincial level.
The EU officers will carry arms but will rely mainly on the
NATO-led ISAF peace force for protection. EU officials accept that could determine the range of activities the carry out.
"We must be aware that they (ISAF) can support us only within their means and capabilities," said Brigadier-General Friedrich Eichele, the German who will head the mission.
EU officials bristled at U.S. complaints last year that the bloc should do more to put the impoverished nation on its feet.
EU states make up roughly half the 30,000-plus ISAF force and since the U.S.-led invasion of 2001 have ploughed around 3.7 billion euros of aid into Afghanistan, roughly a third of all international aid.
---------------------------
Citation: Mark John. "EU sees Afghan police trainers covering hotspots," Reuters, 29 May 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070529/wl_nm/afghan_eu_dc
---------------------------
31 May 2007
30 May 2007
Iran wants to develop shared oil fields with Iraq
Reuters, 26 May 2007
TEHRAN - Iran wants to develop previously untapped oil fields shared with neighboring Iraq, a move that will benefit the two countries which fought a war in the 1980s, an Iranian oil official said on Saturday.
"We hope to start working together. Both countries stand to gain. We would strengthen investment and make the best use of our shared fields," Gholamhossein Nozari, managing director of state-owned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), told reporters.
Iran and Iraq have been strengthening ties since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, arousing concern among Iraq's once dominant Sunni minority and other Arab states as well as in the United States.
Washington accuses Iran of stirring up violence in Iraq. Tehran blames the presence of U.S. troops for the unrest.
"There is a general agreement between us (on the fields)," Nozari said, adding that the two countries had already held two rounds of discussion on developing the fields.
"We want to use 'green' fields," he said, referring to previously untapped fields.
"We have many joint fields like Naftshahr, Paidar-e Gharb, Azar, Azadegan and so many others," he said on the sidelines of a conference in Tehran organized by Iran's Ravand Institute for Economic and International Studies.
Iraq has already invited Iranian firms to bid for contracts to build at least four oil refineries in the country, Iraq's Oil Ministry said this month. Iraq needs to attract investment from foreign firms to develop fields and boost output.
Iran, OPEC's No. 2 oil producer which is under U.N. sanctions because a row about its nuclear program, is also keen to draw in new investors
------------------------
Citation: "Iran wants to develop shared oil fields with Iraq," Reuters, 26 May 2007.
Original URL: http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL2663403020070526
------------------------
TEHRAN - Iran wants to develop previously untapped oil fields shared with neighboring Iraq, a move that will benefit the two countries which fought a war in the 1980s, an Iranian oil official said on Saturday.
"We hope to start working together. Both countries stand to gain. We would strengthen investment and make the best use of our shared fields," Gholamhossein Nozari, managing director of state-owned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), told reporters.
Iran and Iraq have been strengthening ties since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, arousing concern among Iraq's once dominant Sunni minority and other Arab states as well as in the United States.
Washington accuses Iran of stirring up violence in Iraq. Tehran blames the presence of U.S. troops for the unrest.
"There is a general agreement between us (on the fields)," Nozari said, adding that the two countries had already held two rounds of discussion on developing the fields.
"We want to use 'green' fields," he said, referring to previously untapped fields.
"We have many joint fields like Naftshahr, Paidar-e Gharb, Azar, Azadegan and so many others," he said on the sidelines of a conference in Tehran organized by Iran's Ravand Institute for Economic and International Studies.
Iraq has already invited Iranian firms to bid for contracts to build at least four oil refineries in the country, Iraq's Oil Ministry said this month. Iraq needs to attract investment from foreign firms to develop fields and boost output.
Iran, OPEC's No. 2 oil producer which is under U.N. sanctions because a row about its nuclear program, is also keen to draw in new investors
------------------------
Citation: "Iran wants to develop shared oil fields with Iraq," Reuters, 26 May 2007.
Original URL: http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL2663403020070526
------------------------
25 May 2007
One year on, Iraq government tries new tack
By Sabah Jerges
Agence France Presse, 24 May 2007
BAGHDAD (AFP) - Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki nominated six new ministers on Thursday in a bid to end the sectarian infighting that paralysed his beleaguered government during its first year in office.
Maliki told parliament that his candidates to fill the posts vacated six weeks ago by followers of radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr were chosen for their knowledge and ability rather than party affiliations.
"If we are late in announcing the names it is because we reviewed many names and CVs," he told parliament, days after the first anniversary of his rule. "We believe these nominees are the best we can get."
The premier also thanked Sadr's faction for pulling out of the government and giving him a chance "to select more qualified people for the posts."
Sadr's 30-seat parliamentary bloc was key to Maliki being elected prime minister over other rival Shiite candidates a year ago, but it left government when the premier refused to back a timetable for the withdrawal of US forces.
"I would love to give any future ministry to people from outside the parliamentary blocs," Maliki told reporters after his speech, while the fractious chamber settled down to consider the credentials of his choices.
Just over a year ago, Maliki formed Iraq's first permanent post-invasion unity government that brought together all the major political forces but proved hamstrung by sectarian bickering.
Ministries were essentially handed out as political prizes to the various factions -- many of them sectarian or ethnic -- to buy their allegiance to the government, and ministers were rarely chosen for their expertise.
Omar Abdel Sattar Mahmud of the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party, which has repeatedly threatened to pull out of the government, noted how ministries from rival parties refused to cooperate.
"The responsibility of any failure lies on all parties, each according to his post and position in the government," he said, adding that Maliki was not entirely to blame for the flawed structure.
"The problem is that the political agreements on which the government was formed were not implemented," agreed Hamid Muala al-Saadi, a lawmaker from the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, a powerful Shiite party.
"This is one of the government's deadly sicknesses," he added.
Maliki has repeatedly, most recently in Thursday's address, called for greater unity in the country and insists he is serious about implementing a project of national reconciliation.
The United States, in particular, is pressuring Maliki's administration to take action and
President George W. Bush said Thursday as lawmakers were set to vote on
Iraq war funds that Baghdad "needs to show real progress."
The legislation "reflects a consensus that the Iraqi government needs to show real progress in return for America's continued support and sacrifice," he said at a press conference at the White House.
US ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker for his part congratulated Maliki on his first year in office, while emphasising the need to pass certain laws and push reconciliation.
"These are tasks that must be completed, and completed soon, to achieve the national reconciliation that the vast majority of Iraqis desire," he said.
Veteran Kurdish lawmaker Mahmud Othman, however, said that this US pressure was not helpful and reflected a double standard in US views towards Iraq which contributed to the failures of the last year.
"On one hand Bush emphasises his support to the government of Maliki but on the other hand he encourages the efforts against him by the other Arab countries... with the aim of putting pressure on him," he complained.
"They pressure him and scare him so that he will do what they tell him."
Maliki's nominees are Ali al-Bahadli for agriculture, Sabah Rasul Sadeq for health, Amer Abdel Jabbar Ismail for transport, Thamer Jaafar Mohammed al-Zubaidi for civil society, Kholud Sami Azar al-Maajun for provincial affairs and Zuhair Mohammed Ridha Sharba for tourism.
The parliament will vote on them Sunday.
--------------------------
Citation: Sabah Jerges. "One year on, Iraq government tries new tack," Agence France Presse, 24 May 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070524/wl_mideast_afp/iraqpolitics--------------------------
Agence France Presse, 24 May 2007
BAGHDAD (AFP) - Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki nominated six new ministers on Thursday in a bid to end the sectarian infighting that paralysed his beleaguered government during its first year in office.
Maliki told parliament that his candidates to fill the posts vacated six weeks ago by followers of radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr were chosen for their knowledge and ability rather than party affiliations.
"If we are late in announcing the names it is because we reviewed many names and CVs," he told parliament, days after the first anniversary of his rule. "We believe these nominees are the best we can get."
The premier also thanked Sadr's faction for pulling out of the government and giving him a chance "to select more qualified people for the posts."
Sadr's 30-seat parliamentary bloc was key to Maliki being elected prime minister over other rival Shiite candidates a year ago, but it left government when the premier refused to back a timetable for the withdrawal of US forces.
"I would love to give any future ministry to people from outside the parliamentary blocs," Maliki told reporters after his speech, while the fractious chamber settled down to consider the credentials of his choices.
Just over a year ago, Maliki formed Iraq's first permanent post-invasion unity government that brought together all the major political forces but proved hamstrung by sectarian bickering.
Ministries were essentially handed out as political prizes to the various factions -- many of them sectarian or ethnic -- to buy their allegiance to the government, and ministers were rarely chosen for their expertise.
Omar Abdel Sattar Mahmud of the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party, which has repeatedly threatened to pull out of the government, noted how ministries from rival parties refused to cooperate.
"The responsibility of any failure lies on all parties, each according to his post and position in the government," he said, adding that Maliki was not entirely to blame for the flawed structure.
"The problem is that the political agreements on which the government was formed were not implemented," agreed Hamid Muala al-Saadi, a lawmaker from the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, a powerful Shiite party.
"This is one of the government's deadly sicknesses," he added.
Maliki has repeatedly, most recently in Thursday's address, called for greater unity in the country and insists he is serious about implementing a project of national reconciliation.
The United States, in particular, is pressuring Maliki's administration to take action and
President George W. Bush said Thursday as lawmakers were set to vote on
Iraq war funds that Baghdad "needs to show real progress."
The legislation "reflects a consensus that the Iraqi government needs to show real progress in return for America's continued support and sacrifice," he said at a press conference at the White House.
US ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker for his part congratulated Maliki on his first year in office, while emphasising the need to pass certain laws and push reconciliation.
"These are tasks that must be completed, and completed soon, to achieve the national reconciliation that the vast majority of Iraqis desire," he said.
Veteran Kurdish lawmaker Mahmud Othman, however, said that this US pressure was not helpful and reflected a double standard in US views towards Iraq which contributed to the failures of the last year.
"On one hand Bush emphasises his support to the government of Maliki but on the other hand he encourages the efforts against him by the other Arab countries... with the aim of putting pressure on him," he complained.
"They pressure him and scare him so that he will do what they tell him."
Maliki's nominees are Ali al-Bahadli for agriculture, Sabah Rasul Sadeq for health, Amer Abdel Jabbar Ismail for transport, Thamer Jaafar Mohammed al-Zubaidi for civil society, Kholud Sami Azar al-Maajun for provincial affairs and Zuhair Mohammed Ridha Sharba for tourism.
The parliament will vote on them Sunday.
--------------------------
Citation: Sabah Jerges. "One year on, Iraq government tries new tack," Agence France Presse, 24 May 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070524/wl_mideast_afp/iraqpolitics--------------------------
24 May 2007
Tactics change, Iraq strategy the same
By Robert Burns
The Associated Press, 23 May 2007
WASHINGTON - Mindful of long-term U.S. interests, military and diplomatic strategists seeking to salvage President Bush's latest Iraq war plan are beginning to shift gears while buying time for Iraqis to resolve their differences.
Pressure to show results is growing in the U.S., even as more troops arrive.
Adding to the anxiety is the rising American death toll. The military announced Wednesday that gunbattles and roadside bombs killed seven soldiers and two Marines the day before, bringing the total U.S military death toll since the war began to at least 3,431.
The top U.S. commander in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, in collaboration with new U.S. ambassador Ryan Crocker, is putting the final touches on a document spelling out in new detail how they intend to implement Bush's strategy announced in January. Bush ordered an extra 21,500 combat troops to Iraq in hopes that more firepower in Baghdad would tamp down sectarian violence and enable rival factions to coalesce.
The Petraeus and Crocker plan, known in military parlance as a campaign plan, makes what one military officer in Baghdad called course corrections without changing the basic Bush strategy, which was built on the belief that political reconciliation in Baghdad could not happen until better security was established.
Under consideration is a large and rapid increase in the size of the Iraqi army to fill the security gaps that are anticipated once the extra U.S. troops begin to leave, perhaps early next year, according to an official knowledgeable of the planning. There are now about 144,000 in the Iraqi army; any increases would have to be worked out with the Iraqi government, in part because they would have to pay some of the cost.
National Public Radio reported Wednesday that Petraeus and Crocker want to nearly double the size of the Iraqi army.
During the rocky tenure of Petraeus's predecessor, Gen. George Casey, a greater emphasis was placed on hastening the transition of security, political and economic responsibilities to the Shiite-led Iraqi government, which has battled a Sunni-led and al-Qaida-fueled insurgency.
Petraeus has focused more on identifying hardened sectarians in the political system and security forces and persuading Iraqi leaders to remove them. His new plan also envisions more emphasis on negotiating with elements of the insurgency that are judged to be potentially willing to reconcile, one official said.
Petraeus has said he plans to report to Washington in September on how the Bush strategy is working. One key question then will be whether to reduce U.S. troop levels, which the
Pentagon says now stand at 147,000. About another 10,000 troops are scheduled to arrive over the coming month, mainly in the Baghdad area.
The implications of a U.S. failure are grim and extend beyond the politics of a war that, after more than four years of fighting, has drawn most Americans to the view that it was a mistake to begin. Senior civilian and military officials believe the United States has a long-term interest in assuring the stability of Iraq — not just to restore a society that collapsed after the U.S. invasion in 2003, but also to preserve wider U.S. interests.
Pressure on the administration to succeed in Iraq comes not only from the Democratic-led Congress — including some members of the president's own party — but also from the inescapable fact that the U.S. military — particularly the Army and the Marine Corps — are getting worn down by the unrelenting pace of fighting.
Deputy White House spokesman Tony Fratto said the Petraeus plan is not a new war strategy.
"These are the tactics designed to help make the (existing) strategy work," he said, adding that it "will be completed soon, in consultation with officials in Washington." The Washington Post, which was first to report on the plan in its Wednesday editions, said it is scheduled to be finished by the end of the month.
"The report is classified because we don't want to signal all of our intended plans to those trying to defeat the U.S., coalition and Iraqis who are trying to create a stable and secure Iraq, therefore, we're not going to discuss details.," Fratto said.
Frederick Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute think tank, who returned last week from a weeklong visit to Iraq, said in an interview that it was to be expected that Petraeus and Crocker would do a "soup-to-nuts reassessment" of the situation this spring, since they arrived after the strategy was already in place.
Kagan, who said he has not seen the campaign plan, said he sees little chance of — or reason to — switch strategies.
"I don't think there's another viable military option in Iraq at this point that differs dramatically from what we're doing," Kagan said.
Stephen Biddle, a military expert at the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of a group that spent weeks in Iraq assessing the situation for Petraeus and Crocker to help them develop their new plan, said in an interview that expanding the size of the Iraqi army will be difficult, mainly because of the sectarian tensions that have hardened over time.
"It's hard to get a non-sectarian military to begin with," let alone expand it quickly, he said, stressing that he was offering his personal view and was not authorized to discuss the work he did for Petreaus and Crocker.
U.S. officials say security is improving as thousands more U.S. troops arrive in Baghdad neighborhoods, but they acknowledge that more gains are needed and that the Iraqi government must move faster to fulfill its obligation to pass key legislation and take other actions, including eliminating sectarian death squads.
Adm. William Fallon, the top U.S. commander in the Middle East, told a congressional panel May 3 that he has asked his staff to take a longer-term look at Iraq to consider what kind of relationship is possible.
"I envision that we will want to be — and we will be asked to be — in Iraq for some period of time," Fallon said. He referred to "an enduring presence" of U.S. forces in Iraq, not to fight insurgents but to train Iraqis and to support their developing ground, sea and air forces in ways that U.S. forces do elsewhere on the globe.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates spoke two weeks ago of U.S. forces remaining in Iraq "for a protracted period of time," with Iraqi government agreement, to provide logistical and other kinds of support.
But those kinds of long-term arrangements may not be possible unless the situation in Baghdad is fixed soon.
-----------------------------
Citation: Robert Burns. "Tactics change, Iraq strategy the same," The Associated Press, 23 May 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070524/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_military_iraq_8
-----------------------------
The Associated Press, 23 May 2007
WASHINGTON - Mindful of long-term U.S. interests, military and diplomatic strategists seeking to salvage President Bush's latest Iraq war plan are beginning to shift gears while buying time for Iraqis to resolve their differences.
Pressure to show results is growing in the U.S., even as more troops arrive.
Adding to the anxiety is the rising American death toll. The military announced Wednesday that gunbattles and roadside bombs killed seven soldiers and two Marines the day before, bringing the total U.S military death toll since the war began to at least 3,431.
The top U.S. commander in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, in collaboration with new U.S. ambassador Ryan Crocker, is putting the final touches on a document spelling out in new detail how they intend to implement Bush's strategy announced in January. Bush ordered an extra 21,500 combat troops to Iraq in hopes that more firepower in Baghdad would tamp down sectarian violence and enable rival factions to coalesce.
The Petraeus and Crocker plan, known in military parlance as a campaign plan, makes what one military officer in Baghdad called course corrections without changing the basic Bush strategy, which was built on the belief that political reconciliation in Baghdad could not happen until better security was established.
Under consideration is a large and rapid increase in the size of the Iraqi army to fill the security gaps that are anticipated once the extra U.S. troops begin to leave, perhaps early next year, according to an official knowledgeable of the planning. There are now about 144,000 in the Iraqi army; any increases would have to be worked out with the Iraqi government, in part because they would have to pay some of the cost.
National Public Radio reported Wednesday that Petraeus and Crocker want to nearly double the size of the Iraqi army.
During the rocky tenure of Petraeus's predecessor, Gen. George Casey, a greater emphasis was placed on hastening the transition of security, political and economic responsibilities to the Shiite-led Iraqi government, which has battled a Sunni-led and al-Qaida-fueled insurgency.
Petraeus has focused more on identifying hardened sectarians in the political system and security forces and persuading Iraqi leaders to remove them. His new plan also envisions more emphasis on negotiating with elements of the insurgency that are judged to be potentially willing to reconcile, one official said.
Petraeus has said he plans to report to Washington in September on how the Bush strategy is working. One key question then will be whether to reduce U.S. troop levels, which the
Pentagon says now stand at 147,000. About another 10,000 troops are scheduled to arrive over the coming month, mainly in the Baghdad area.
The implications of a U.S. failure are grim and extend beyond the politics of a war that, after more than four years of fighting, has drawn most Americans to the view that it was a mistake to begin. Senior civilian and military officials believe the United States has a long-term interest in assuring the stability of Iraq — not just to restore a society that collapsed after the U.S. invasion in 2003, but also to preserve wider U.S. interests.
Pressure on the administration to succeed in Iraq comes not only from the Democratic-led Congress — including some members of the president's own party — but also from the inescapable fact that the U.S. military — particularly the Army and the Marine Corps — are getting worn down by the unrelenting pace of fighting.
Deputy White House spokesman Tony Fratto said the Petraeus plan is not a new war strategy.
"These are the tactics designed to help make the (existing) strategy work," he said, adding that it "will be completed soon, in consultation with officials in Washington." The Washington Post, which was first to report on the plan in its Wednesday editions, said it is scheduled to be finished by the end of the month.
"The report is classified because we don't want to signal all of our intended plans to those trying to defeat the U.S., coalition and Iraqis who are trying to create a stable and secure Iraq, therefore, we're not going to discuss details.," Fratto said.
Frederick Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute think tank, who returned last week from a weeklong visit to Iraq, said in an interview that it was to be expected that Petraeus and Crocker would do a "soup-to-nuts reassessment" of the situation this spring, since they arrived after the strategy was already in place.
Kagan, who said he has not seen the campaign plan, said he sees little chance of — or reason to — switch strategies.
"I don't think there's another viable military option in Iraq at this point that differs dramatically from what we're doing," Kagan said.
Stephen Biddle, a military expert at the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of a group that spent weeks in Iraq assessing the situation for Petraeus and Crocker to help them develop their new plan, said in an interview that expanding the size of the Iraqi army will be difficult, mainly because of the sectarian tensions that have hardened over time.
"It's hard to get a non-sectarian military to begin with," let alone expand it quickly, he said, stressing that he was offering his personal view and was not authorized to discuss the work he did for Petreaus and Crocker.
U.S. officials say security is improving as thousands more U.S. troops arrive in Baghdad neighborhoods, but they acknowledge that more gains are needed and that the Iraqi government must move faster to fulfill its obligation to pass key legislation and take other actions, including eliminating sectarian death squads.
Adm. William Fallon, the top U.S. commander in the Middle East, told a congressional panel May 3 that he has asked his staff to take a longer-term look at Iraq to consider what kind of relationship is possible.
"I envision that we will want to be — and we will be asked to be — in Iraq for some period of time," Fallon said. He referred to "an enduring presence" of U.S. forces in Iraq, not to fight insurgents but to train Iraqis and to support their developing ground, sea and air forces in ways that U.S. forces do elsewhere on the globe.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates spoke two weeks ago of U.S. forces remaining in Iraq "for a protracted period of time," with Iraqi government agreement, to provide logistical and other kinds of support.
But those kinds of long-term arrangements may not be possible unless the situation in Baghdad is fixed soon.
-----------------------------
Citation: Robert Burns. "Tactics change, Iraq strategy the same," The Associated Press, 23 May 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070524/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_military_iraq_8
-----------------------------
Opium: Iraq's deadly new export
Amid the anarchy, farmers begin to grow opium poppies, raising fears that the country could become a major heroin supplier
By Patrick Cockburn
The Independent, 23 May 2007
Farmers in southern Iraq have started to grow opium poppies in their fields for the first time, sparking fears that Iraq might become a serious drugs producer along the lines of Afghanistan.
Rice farmers along the Euphrates, to the west of the city of Diwaniya, south of Baghdad, have stopped cultivating rice, for which the area is famous, and are instead planting poppies, Iraqi sources familiar with the area have told The Independent.
The shift to opium cultivation is still in its early stages but there is little the Iraqi government can do about it because rival Shia militias and their surrogates in the security forces control Diwaniya and its neighbourhood. There have been bloody clashes between militiamen, police, Iraqi army and US forces in the city over the past two months.
The shift to opium production is taking place in the well-irrigated land west and south of Diwaniya around the towns of Ash Shamiyah, al Ghammas and Ash Shinafiyah. The farmers are said to be having problems in growing the poppies because of the intense heat and high humidity. It is too dangerous for foreign journalists to visit Diwaniya but the start of opium poppy cultivation is attested by two students from there and a source in Basra familiar with the Iraqi drugs trade.
Drug smugglers have for long used Iraq as a transit point for heroin, produced from opium in laboratories in Afghanistan, being sent through Iran to rich markets in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Saddam Hussein's security apparatus in Basra was reportedly heavily involved in the illicit trade. Opium poppies have hitherto not been grown in Iraq and the fact that they are being planted is a measure of the violence in southern Iraq. It is unlikely that the farmers' decision was spontaneous and the gangs financing them are said to be "well-equipped with good vehicles and weapons and are well-organised".
There is no inherent reason why the opium poppy should not be grown in the hot and well-watered land in southern Iraq. It was cultivated in the area as early as 3,400BC and was known to the ancient Sumerians as Hul Gil, the "joy plant". Some of the earliest written references to the opium poppy come from clay tablets found in the ruins of the city of Nippur, just to the east of Diwaniya.
There has been an upsurge in violence not only in Diwaniya but in Basra, Nassariyah, Kut and other Shia cities of southern Iraq over the past 10 days. It receives limited attention outside Iraq because it has nothing to do with the fighting between the Sunni insurgents and US forces further north or the civil war between Shia and Sunni in Baghdad and central Iraq. The violence is also taking place in provinces that are too dangerous for journalists to visit. Aside from Basra, few foreign soldiers are killed.
The fighting is between rival Shia parties and militias, notably the Mehdi Army, who support the anti-US cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and the Badr Organisation - the military wing of the recently renamed Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). In many, though not all, areas of southern Iraq, the latter group controls the police.
The intra-militia violence in southern Iraq is essentially over control of profitable resources and the establishment of power bases. According to one report the violence in Diwaniya has been escalating for two months and was initially motivated by rivalry over control of opium production but soon widened into a general turf war.
The immediate cause of the fighting in Diwaniya that began on 16 May was the arrest of several members of the Mehdi Army. Other militiamen tried to rescue them and attacked the police (whom the Sadrists say are controlled by the SIIC). Troops from the Iraqi army and the US army were drawn into the fighting. The Sadrists sent 200 men as reinforcements into the city. Some 11 people, eight of them civilians, were killed on a single day. An American soldier was killed and two wounded in a Mehdi Army attack on Saturday. Diwaniya's Governor, Khaleel Jaleel Hamza, who has moved his family to Iran for safety, announced "a pact of honour" to end the fighting on Monday. The agreement provides for foreign forces to be kept out of the city.
As in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, these conditions of primal anarchy are ideal for criminal gangs and drug smugglers and producers. The difference is that Afghanistan had long been a major producer of opium and possessed numerous laboratories experienced in turning opium into heroin. The Taliban, on the orders of its leader, Mullah Omar, had stopped its cultivation by farmers in the parts of Afghanistan it controlled. Farmers near the southern city of Kandahar grubbed up cauliflowers and planted poppies instead as soon as the US started bombing.
The grip of the British Army around Basra and other southern provinces was always tenuous and is now coming to an end. Although the government in Baghdad speaks of gradually taking control of security in the provinces from US and Britain, the winners in the new Iraq are the militia, often criminalised, that have colonised the Iraqi security forces. Diwaniya is in Qaddasiyah province, which was never under British control but the pattern in all parts of Shia Iraq is very similar.
The one factor currently militating against criminal gangs organising poppy cultivation in Iraq on a wide scale is that they are already making large profits from smuggling drugs from Iran. This is easy to do because of Iraq's enormous and largely unguarded land borders with neighbouring states. Iraqis themselves are not significant consumers of heroin or other drugs.
But it is evident from the start of opium production around Diwaniya that some gangs think there is money to be made by following the example of Afghanistan. Given that they can guarantee much higher profits from growing opium poppies than can be made from rice, many impoverished Iraqi farmers are likely to cultivate the new crop.
---------------------------------
Citation: Patrick Cockburn. "Opium: Iraq's deadly new export," The Independent, 23 May 2007.
Original URL: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2573299.ece
---------------------------------
By Patrick Cockburn
The Independent, 23 May 2007
Farmers in southern Iraq have started to grow opium poppies in their fields for the first time, sparking fears that Iraq might become a serious drugs producer along the lines of Afghanistan.
Rice farmers along the Euphrates, to the west of the city of Diwaniya, south of Baghdad, have stopped cultivating rice, for which the area is famous, and are instead planting poppies, Iraqi sources familiar with the area have told The Independent.
The shift to opium cultivation is still in its early stages but there is little the Iraqi government can do about it because rival Shia militias and their surrogates in the security forces control Diwaniya and its neighbourhood. There have been bloody clashes between militiamen, police, Iraqi army and US forces in the city over the past two months.
The shift to opium production is taking place in the well-irrigated land west and south of Diwaniya around the towns of Ash Shamiyah, al Ghammas and Ash Shinafiyah. The farmers are said to be having problems in growing the poppies because of the intense heat and high humidity. It is too dangerous for foreign journalists to visit Diwaniya but the start of opium poppy cultivation is attested by two students from there and a source in Basra familiar with the Iraqi drugs trade.
Drug smugglers have for long used Iraq as a transit point for heroin, produced from opium in laboratories in Afghanistan, being sent through Iran to rich markets in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Saddam Hussein's security apparatus in Basra was reportedly heavily involved in the illicit trade. Opium poppies have hitherto not been grown in Iraq and the fact that they are being planted is a measure of the violence in southern Iraq. It is unlikely that the farmers' decision was spontaneous and the gangs financing them are said to be "well-equipped with good vehicles and weapons and are well-organised".
There is no inherent reason why the opium poppy should not be grown in the hot and well-watered land in southern Iraq. It was cultivated in the area as early as 3,400BC and was known to the ancient Sumerians as Hul Gil, the "joy plant". Some of the earliest written references to the opium poppy come from clay tablets found in the ruins of the city of Nippur, just to the east of Diwaniya.
There has been an upsurge in violence not only in Diwaniya but in Basra, Nassariyah, Kut and other Shia cities of southern Iraq over the past 10 days. It receives limited attention outside Iraq because it has nothing to do with the fighting between the Sunni insurgents and US forces further north or the civil war between Shia and Sunni in Baghdad and central Iraq. The violence is also taking place in provinces that are too dangerous for journalists to visit. Aside from Basra, few foreign soldiers are killed.
The fighting is between rival Shia parties and militias, notably the Mehdi Army, who support the anti-US cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and the Badr Organisation - the military wing of the recently renamed Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). In many, though not all, areas of southern Iraq, the latter group controls the police.
The intra-militia violence in southern Iraq is essentially over control of profitable resources and the establishment of power bases. According to one report the violence in Diwaniya has been escalating for two months and was initially motivated by rivalry over control of opium production but soon widened into a general turf war.
The immediate cause of the fighting in Diwaniya that began on 16 May was the arrest of several members of the Mehdi Army. Other militiamen tried to rescue them and attacked the police (whom the Sadrists say are controlled by the SIIC). Troops from the Iraqi army and the US army were drawn into the fighting. The Sadrists sent 200 men as reinforcements into the city. Some 11 people, eight of them civilians, were killed on a single day. An American soldier was killed and two wounded in a Mehdi Army attack on Saturday. Diwaniya's Governor, Khaleel Jaleel Hamza, who has moved his family to Iran for safety, announced "a pact of honour" to end the fighting on Monday. The agreement provides for foreign forces to be kept out of the city.
As in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, these conditions of primal anarchy are ideal for criminal gangs and drug smugglers and producers. The difference is that Afghanistan had long been a major producer of opium and possessed numerous laboratories experienced in turning opium into heroin. The Taliban, on the orders of its leader, Mullah Omar, had stopped its cultivation by farmers in the parts of Afghanistan it controlled. Farmers near the southern city of Kandahar grubbed up cauliflowers and planted poppies instead as soon as the US started bombing.
The grip of the British Army around Basra and other southern provinces was always tenuous and is now coming to an end. Although the government in Baghdad speaks of gradually taking control of security in the provinces from US and Britain, the winners in the new Iraq are the militia, often criminalised, that have colonised the Iraqi security forces. Diwaniya is in Qaddasiyah province, which was never under British control but the pattern in all parts of Shia Iraq is very similar.
The one factor currently militating against criminal gangs organising poppy cultivation in Iraq on a wide scale is that they are already making large profits from smuggling drugs from Iran. This is easy to do because of Iraq's enormous and largely unguarded land borders with neighbouring states. Iraqis themselves are not significant consumers of heroin or other drugs.
But it is evident from the start of opium production around Diwaniya that some gangs think there is money to be made by following the example of Afghanistan. Given that they can guarantee much higher profits from growing opium poppies than can be made from rice, many impoverished Iraqi farmers are likely to cultivate the new crop.
---------------------------------
Citation: Patrick Cockburn. "Opium: Iraq's deadly new export," The Independent, 23 May 2007.
Original URL: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2573299.ece
---------------------------------
22 May 2007
Iraq to spend 1.5 billion dollars on weapons
Agence France Presse, 21 May 2007
BAGHDAD (AFP) - Iraq's defence ministry will buy new weapons worth more than 1.5 billion dollars (1.11 billion euros), including helicopters and US rifles, the minister announced on Monday.
The purchases will be made possible by a 26 percent increase in the country's defence budget, to 4.1 billion dollars (three billion euros) for the current fiscal year.
"The Iraqi government has signed a contract with the American government to set up a foreign weapons sales office to buy weapons that Iraq needs," Defence Minister Abdel Qader Jassim Mohammed said at a Baghdad press conference.
"This programme will help Iraq to buy modern weapons and to ensure arrival of these weapons when the ministry asks for them," he added.
Iraq has started importing American-made M-16 and M-4 rifles, which are slowly replacing the ubiquitous Soviet-designed AK-47 Kalashnikov among the Iraqi forces struggling to bring order to the country.
Mohammed is also looking to beef up the country's air force and navy with the purchase of 29 Soviet-designed M-17 helicopters, six reconnaissance planes, 10 patrol boats from Italy and 26 from the United States.
The gradual switchover from the AK-47 to the M-16 began earlier this month, when a graduating class of Iraqi military recruits became the first of 1,600 rookie soldiers to start receiving the weapons.
The M-16 fires a 5.56mm round, standard among most modern armies and lighter than the 7.62mm used in the rugged Kalashnikov.
Iraq is awash with Kalashnikovs looted from ousted dictator
Saddam Hussein's defunct armed forces, smuggled from around the region by militants and imported by the United States to arm new Iraqi security units.
Many go missing from official stocks, but the new generation of US-made weapons will be issued to individual soldiers, whose photographs and biometric data will be recorded next to their guns' serial numbers to deter fraud.
--------------------------------
Citation: "Iraq to spend 1.5 billion dollars on weapons," Agence France Presse, 21 May 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070521/wl_mideast_afp/iraqusmilitary--------------------------------
BAGHDAD (AFP) - Iraq's defence ministry will buy new weapons worth more than 1.5 billion dollars (1.11 billion euros), including helicopters and US rifles, the minister announced on Monday.
The purchases will be made possible by a 26 percent increase in the country's defence budget, to 4.1 billion dollars (three billion euros) for the current fiscal year.
"The Iraqi government has signed a contract with the American government to set up a foreign weapons sales office to buy weapons that Iraq needs," Defence Minister Abdel Qader Jassim Mohammed said at a Baghdad press conference.
"This programme will help Iraq to buy modern weapons and to ensure arrival of these weapons when the ministry asks for them," he added.
Iraq has started importing American-made M-16 and M-4 rifles, which are slowly replacing the ubiquitous Soviet-designed AK-47 Kalashnikov among the Iraqi forces struggling to bring order to the country.
Mohammed is also looking to beef up the country's air force and navy with the purchase of 29 Soviet-designed M-17 helicopters, six reconnaissance planes, 10 patrol boats from Italy and 26 from the United States.
The gradual switchover from the AK-47 to the M-16 began earlier this month, when a graduating class of Iraqi military recruits became the first of 1,600 rookie soldiers to start receiving the weapons.
The M-16 fires a 5.56mm round, standard among most modern armies and lighter than the 7.62mm used in the rugged Kalashnikov.
Iraq is awash with Kalashnikovs looted from ousted dictator
Saddam Hussein's defunct armed forces, smuggled from around the region by militants and imported by the United States to arm new Iraqi security units.
Many go missing from official stocks, but the new generation of US-made weapons will be issued to individual soldiers, whose photographs and biometric data will be recorded next to their guns' serial numbers to deter fraud.
--------------------------------
Citation: "Iraq to spend 1.5 billion dollars on weapons," Agence France Presse, 21 May 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070521/wl_mideast_afp/iraqusmilitary--------------------------------
21 May 2007
Exclusive: Secret US plot to kill Al-Sadr
By Patrick Cockburn
The Independent, 21 May 2007
The US Army tried to kill or capture Muqtada al-Sadr, the widely revered Shia cleric, after luring him to peace negotiations at a house in the holy city of Najaf, which it then attacked, according to a senior Iraqi government official.
The revelation of this extraordinary plot, which would probably have provoked an uprising by outraged Shia if it had succeeded, has left a legacy of bitter distrust in the mind of Mr Sadr for which the US and its allies in Iraq may still be paying. "I believe that particular incident made Muqtada lose any confidence or trust in the [US-led] coalition and made him really wild," the Iraqi National Security Adviser Dr Mowaffaq Rubai'e told The Independent in an interview. It is not known who gave the orders for the attempt on Mr Sadr but it is one of a series of ill-considered and politically explosive US actions in Iraq since the invasion. In January this year a US helicopter assault team tried to kidnap two senior Iranian security officials on an official visit to the Iraqi President. Earlier examples of highly provocative actions carried out by the US with
little thought for the consequences include the dissolution of the Iraqi army and the Baath party.
The attempted assassination or abduction took place two-and-a-half years ago in August 2004 when Mr Sadr and his Mehdi Army militiamen were besieged by US Marines in Najaf, south of Baghdad.
Dr Rubai'e believes that his mediation efforts - about which he had given the US embassy, the American military command and the Iraqi government in Baghdad full details - were used as an elaborate set-up to entice the Shia leader to a place where he could be trapped.
Mr Sadr emerged as the leader of the Sadrist movement in Baghdad at the time of the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. It had been founded by his father, also a cleric, who had confronted Saddam's regime in the 1990s and had been murdered by his agents in 1999. Its blend of nationalism, religion and populism proved highly attractive to Iraqi Shia, particularly to the very poor.
Although Mr Sadr escaped with his life at the last moment, the incident helps explain why he disappeared from view in Iraq when President George Bush stepped up confrontation with him and his Mehdi Army militia in January.
Dr Rubai'e said: "I know him very well and I think his suspicion and distrust of the coalition and any foreigner is really deep-rooted," and dates from what happened in Najaf. He notes that after it had happened Mr Sadr occupied the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf as a place of refuge. Dr Rubai'e had gone to Najaf in August 2004 to try to mediate an end to the fighting. He met Mr Sadr who agreed to a set of conditions to end the crisis. "He actually signed the agreement with his own handwriting," said Dr Rubai'e. "He wanted the inner Najaf, the old city, around the shrine to be treated like the Vatican."
Having returned to Baghdad to show the draft document to Iyad Allawi, who was prime minister at the time, Dr Rubai'e went back to Najaf to make a final agreement with Mr Sadr.
It was agreed that the last meeting would take place in the house in Najaf of Muqtada's father Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr who had been murdered by Saddam's gunmen with two of his sons five years before. Dr Rubai'e and other mediators started for the house. As they did so they saw the US Marines open up an intense bombardment of the house and US Special Forces also heading for it. But the attack was a few minutes premature. Mr Sadr was not yet in the house and managed to escape.
Although Dr Rubai'e, as Iraqi National Security Adviser since 2004 and earlier a member of the Iraqi Governing Council, is closely associated with the American authorities in Baghdad, he has no doubt about what happened.
He sees the negotiations as part of a charade to lure Mr Sadr, who is normally very careful about his own security, to a house where he could be eliminated.
"When I came back to Baghdad I was really, really infuriated, I can tell you," Dr Rubai'e said. "I went berserk with both [the US commander General George] Casey and the ambassador [John Negroponte]." They denied that knew of a trap and said they would look into what happened but he never received any explanation from them.
The US always felt deeply threatened by Mr Sadr because, unlike the other Shia parties, he opposed the occupation and demanded that it end.
There were two attempts to crush his movement in 2004, neither of which was successful. The first, at the end of March, began with the closure of his newspaper and the arrest of one of his close advisers. A warrant for Mr Sadr's own arrest was issued. A US general said his only alternatives were to be killed or captured.
The US authorities appeared to have little understanding of the reverence with which the Sadr family was regarded by many Iraqi Shia.
The crackdown provoked a reaction for which the US was ill-prepared. The Mehdi Army, though poorly armed and untrained, took over part of Baghdad and many Shia cities and towns in southern Iraq. The US had to rush troops to embattled outposts.
A second crisis began in Najaf in August and this time the US and the recently appointed government of Iyad Allawi appear to have decided to smash Mr Sadr and his movement for ever. But they dared not assault the shrine of Imam Ali, one of the holiest Shia shrines.
Other Shia parties suspected that once Mr Sadr was dealt with they would be marginalised. The crisis was finally defused when Grand Ayatollah Ali al- Sistani, after undergoing medical treatment in London, returned to Najaf and negotiated an agreement with Mr Sadr under which he withdrew but did not disarm his forces.
The attempt to kill or imprison Mr Sadr was first revealed by Dr Rubai'e to Ali Allawi, the former Iraqi finance minister, who gives an account of what happened in his recent book The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the war, Losing the peace.
Dr Rubai'e said this weekend in Baghdad that he stands by his account given there. He does not think the Americans were planning to kill him along with Mr Sadr because he had a senior American officer with him almost all the time.
Muqtada al-Sadr is one of the most extraordinary figures to emerge during the war in Iraq,a pivotal figure leading a broad-based political movement with a powerful military wing.
The appeal of the 33-year-old Shia cleric is both religious and nationalist. He is regarded with devotion by millions. He is also a survivor and an astute politician who has often out-manoeuvred his opponents. The US and Britain have repeatedly underestimated the strength of his support.
The al-Sadrs are one of the great Shia religious families. His relative, Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, was the founder of a politically active Shia movement and was executed by Saddam Hussein in 1980. Muqtada's father Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr in effect founded the Sadrist movement in the 1990s. Finding he could not control him, Saddam Hussein had him murdered with two of his sons in Najaf in 1999, provoking widespread rioting.
To the surprise of all, the Sadrist movement re-emerged with Muqtada at its head during the fall of the old regime. In April 2003 it took over large parts of Shia Iraq. Its base was the vast Shia slum, renamed Sadr City, that contains a third of the population of Baghdad.
The US and its Iraqi allies regarded Muqtada as a highly threatening figure. Paul Bremer, the ill-fated US viceroy in Iraq after the invasion, detested and unwisely under-rated the Sadrists. When he moved against them in April 2004 he was astonished to see them take over much of southern Shia Iraq in a few days. Muqtada took refuge in Najaf.
There was a heavy fighting in August 2004 when the US made an all-out effort to eliminate Muqtada and his movement. Once again he survived, thanks to a compromise arranged by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.
His movement became less confrontational. It took part in the elections in 2005, winning 32 seats out of 275. The Mehdi Army was viewed by the Sunni as an organisation of sectarian death squads.
The US began increasingly to confront the Sadrists. But they were an essential support of the Iraqi government, making it difficult for the US to move against them. When the reinforced US forces in Baghdad did threaten the Mehdi Army, Muqtada simply sent his militiamen home, and disappeared from view.
---------------------------------
Citation: Patrick Cockburn. "Exclusive: Secret US plot to kill Al-Sadr," The Independent, 21 May 2007.
Original URL: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2565123.ece
----------------------------
The Independent, 21 May 2007
The US Army tried to kill or capture Muqtada al-Sadr, the widely revered Shia cleric, after luring him to peace negotiations at a house in the holy city of Najaf, which it then attacked, according to a senior Iraqi government official.
The revelation of this extraordinary plot, which would probably have provoked an uprising by outraged Shia if it had succeeded, has left a legacy of bitter distrust in the mind of Mr Sadr for which the US and its allies in Iraq may still be paying. "I believe that particular incident made Muqtada lose any confidence or trust in the [US-led] coalition and made him really wild," the Iraqi National Security Adviser Dr Mowaffaq Rubai'e told The Independent in an interview. It is not known who gave the orders for the attempt on Mr Sadr but it is one of a series of ill-considered and politically explosive US actions in Iraq since the invasion. In January this year a US helicopter assault team tried to kidnap two senior Iranian security officials on an official visit to the Iraqi President. Earlier examples of highly provocative actions carried out by the US with
little thought for the consequences include the dissolution of the Iraqi army and the Baath party.
The attempted assassination or abduction took place two-and-a-half years ago in August 2004 when Mr Sadr and his Mehdi Army militiamen were besieged by US Marines in Najaf, south of Baghdad.
Dr Rubai'e believes that his mediation efforts - about which he had given the US embassy, the American military command and the Iraqi government in Baghdad full details - were used as an elaborate set-up to entice the Shia leader to a place where he could be trapped.
Mr Sadr emerged as the leader of the Sadrist movement in Baghdad at the time of the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. It had been founded by his father, also a cleric, who had confronted Saddam's regime in the 1990s and had been murdered by his agents in 1999. Its blend of nationalism, religion and populism proved highly attractive to Iraqi Shia, particularly to the very poor.
Although Mr Sadr escaped with his life at the last moment, the incident helps explain why he disappeared from view in Iraq when President George Bush stepped up confrontation with him and his Mehdi Army militia in January.
Dr Rubai'e said: "I know him very well and I think his suspicion and distrust of the coalition and any foreigner is really deep-rooted," and dates from what happened in Najaf. He notes that after it had happened Mr Sadr occupied the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf as a place of refuge. Dr Rubai'e had gone to Najaf in August 2004 to try to mediate an end to the fighting. He met Mr Sadr who agreed to a set of conditions to end the crisis. "He actually signed the agreement with his own handwriting," said Dr Rubai'e. "He wanted the inner Najaf, the old city, around the shrine to be treated like the Vatican."
Having returned to Baghdad to show the draft document to Iyad Allawi, who was prime minister at the time, Dr Rubai'e went back to Najaf to make a final agreement with Mr Sadr.
It was agreed that the last meeting would take place in the house in Najaf of Muqtada's father Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr who had been murdered by Saddam's gunmen with two of his sons five years before. Dr Rubai'e and other mediators started for the house. As they did so they saw the US Marines open up an intense bombardment of the house and US Special Forces also heading for it. But the attack was a few minutes premature. Mr Sadr was not yet in the house and managed to escape.
Although Dr Rubai'e, as Iraqi National Security Adviser since 2004 and earlier a member of the Iraqi Governing Council, is closely associated with the American authorities in Baghdad, he has no doubt about what happened.
He sees the negotiations as part of a charade to lure Mr Sadr, who is normally very careful about his own security, to a house where he could be eliminated.
"When I came back to Baghdad I was really, really infuriated, I can tell you," Dr Rubai'e said. "I went berserk with both [the US commander General George] Casey and the ambassador [John Negroponte]." They denied that knew of a trap and said they would look into what happened but he never received any explanation from them.
The US always felt deeply threatened by Mr Sadr because, unlike the other Shia parties, he opposed the occupation and demanded that it end.
There were two attempts to crush his movement in 2004, neither of which was successful. The first, at the end of March, began with the closure of his newspaper and the arrest of one of his close advisers. A warrant for Mr Sadr's own arrest was issued. A US general said his only alternatives were to be killed or captured.
The US authorities appeared to have little understanding of the reverence with which the Sadr family was regarded by many Iraqi Shia.
The crackdown provoked a reaction for which the US was ill-prepared. The Mehdi Army, though poorly armed and untrained, took over part of Baghdad and many Shia cities and towns in southern Iraq. The US had to rush troops to embattled outposts.
A second crisis began in Najaf in August and this time the US and the recently appointed government of Iyad Allawi appear to have decided to smash Mr Sadr and his movement for ever. But they dared not assault the shrine of Imam Ali, one of the holiest Shia shrines.
Other Shia parties suspected that once Mr Sadr was dealt with they would be marginalised. The crisis was finally defused when Grand Ayatollah Ali al- Sistani, after undergoing medical treatment in London, returned to Najaf and negotiated an agreement with Mr Sadr under which he withdrew but did not disarm his forces.
The attempt to kill or imprison Mr Sadr was first revealed by Dr Rubai'e to Ali Allawi, the former Iraqi finance minister, who gives an account of what happened in his recent book The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the war, Losing the peace.
Dr Rubai'e said this weekend in Baghdad that he stands by his account given there. He does not think the Americans were planning to kill him along with Mr Sadr because he had a senior American officer with him almost all the time.
Muqtada al-Sadr is one of the most extraordinary figures to emerge during the war in Iraq,a pivotal figure leading a broad-based political movement with a powerful military wing.
The appeal of the 33-year-old Shia cleric is both religious and nationalist. He is regarded with devotion by millions. He is also a survivor and an astute politician who has often out-manoeuvred his opponents. The US and Britain have repeatedly underestimated the strength of his support.
The al-Sadrs are one of the great Shia religious families. His relative, Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, was the founder of a politically active Shia movement and was executed by Saddam Hussein in 1980. Muqtada's father Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr in effect founded the Sadrist movement in the 1990s. Finding he could not control him, Saddam Hussein had him murdered with two of his sons in Najaf in 1999, provoking widespread rioting.
To the surprise of all, the Sadrist movement re-emerged with Muqtada at its head during the fall of the old regime. In April 2003 it took over large parts of Shia Iraq. Its base was the vast Shia slum, renamed Sadr City, that contains a third of the population of Baghdad.
The US and its Iraqi allies regarded Muqtada as a highly threatening figure. Paul Bremer, the ill-fated US viceroy in Iraq after the invasion, detested and unwisely under-rated the Sadrists. When he moved against them in April 2004 he was astonished to see them take over much of southern Shia Iraq in a few days. Muqtada took refuge in Najaf.
There was a heavy fighting in August 2004 when the US made an all-out effort to eliminate Muqtada and his movement. Once again he survived, thanks to a compromise arranged by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.
His movement became less confrontational. It took part in the elections in 2005, winning 32 seats out of 275. The Mehdi Army was viewed by the Sunni as an organisation of sectarian death squads.
The US began increasingly to confront the Sadrists. But they were an essential support of the Iraqi government, making it difficult for the US to move against them. When the reinforced US forces in Baghdad did threaten the Mehdi Army, Muqtada simply sent his militiamen home, and disappeared from view.
---------------------------------
Citation: Patrick Cockburn. "Exclusive: Secret US plot to kill Al-Sadr," The Independent, 21 May 2007.
Original URL: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2565123.ece
----------------------------
Influx of Al Qaeda, money into Pakistan is seen
U.S. officials say the terrorist network's command base is increasingly being funded by cash coming out of Iraq.
By Greg Miller
Los Angeles Times, 20 May 2007
WASHINGTON — A major CIA effort launched last year to hunt down Osama bin Laden has produced no significant leads on his whereabouts, but has helped track an alarming increase in the movement of Al Qaeda operatives and money into Pakistan's tribal territories, according to senior U.S. intelligence officials familiar with the operation.
In one of the most troubling trends, U.S. officials said that Al Qaeda's command base in Pakistan is increasingly being funded by cash coming out of Iraq, where the terrorist network's operatives are raising substantial sums from donations to the anti-American insurgency as well as kidnappings of wealthy Iraqis and other criminal activity.
The influx of money has bolstered Al Qaeda's leadership ranks at a time when the core command is regrouping and reasserting influence over its far-flung network. The trend also signals a reversal in the traditional flow of Al Qaeda funds, with the network's leadership surviving to a large extent on money coming in from its most profitable franchise, rather than distributing funds from headquarters to distant cells.
Al Qaeda's efforts were aided, intelligence officials said, by Pakistan's withdrawal in September of tens of thousands of troops from the tribal areas along the Afghanistan border where Bin Laden and his top deputy, Ayman Zawahiri, are believed to be hiding.
Little more than a year ago, Al Qaeda's core command was thought to be in a financial crunch. But U.S. officials said cash shipped from Iraq has eased those troubles.
"Iraq is a big moneymaker for them," said a senior U.S. counter-terrorism official.
The evolving picture of Al Qaeda's finances is based in part on intelligence from an aggressive effort launched last year to intensify the pressure on Bin Laden and his senior deputies.
As part of a so-called surge in personnel, the CIA deployed as many as 50 clandestine operatives to Pakistan and Afghanistan — a dramatic increase over the number of CIA case officers permanently stationed in those countries. All of the new arrivals were given the primary objective of finding what counter-terrorism officials call "HVT1" and "HVT2." Those "high value target" designations refer to Bin Laden and Zawahiri.
The surge was part of a broader shake-up at the CIA designed to refocus on the hunt for Bin Laden, officials said. One former high-ranking agency official said the CIA had formed a task force that involved officials from all four directorates at the agency, including analysts, scientists and technical experts, as well as covert operators.
The officials were charged with reinvigorating a search that had atrophied when some U.S. intelligence assets and special forces teams were pulled out of Afghanistan in 2002 to prepare for the war with Iraq.
Arduous search
Nevertheless, U.S. intelligence and military officials said, the surge has yet to produce a single lead on Bin Laden's or Zawahiri's location that could be substantiated.
"We're not any closer," said a senior U.S. military official who monitors the intelligence on the hunt for Bin Laden.
The lack of progress underscores the difficulty of the search more than five years after the Sept. 11 attacks. Despite a $25-million U.S. reward, current and former intelligence officials said, the United States has not had a lead on Bin Laden since he fled American and Afghan forces in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan in early 2002.
"We've had no significant report of him being anywhere," said a former senior CIA official who, like others interviewed for this article, spoke on condition of anonymity when discussing U.S. intelligence operations. U.S. spy agencies have not even had information that "you could validate historically," the official said, meaning a tip on a previous Bin Laden location that could subsequently be verified.
President Bush is given detailed presentations on the hunt's progress every two to four months, in addition to routine counter-terrorism briefings, intelligence officials said.
The presentations include "complex schematics, search patterns, what we're doing, where the Predator flies," said one participant, referring to flights by unmanned airplanes used in the search. The CIA has even used sand models to illustrate the topography of the mountainous terrain where Bin Laden is believed to be hiding.
Still, officials said, they have been unable to answer the basic question of whether they are getting closer to their target.
"Any prediction on when we're going to get him is just ridiculous," said the senior U.S. counter-terrorism official. "It could be a year from now or the Pakistanis could be in the process of getting him right now."
In a written response to questions from The Times, the CIA said it "does not as a rule discuss publicly the details of clandestine operations," but acknowledged it had stepped up operations against Bin Laden and defended their effectiveness.
"The surge has been modest in size, here and overseas, but has added new skills and fresh thinking to the fight against a resilient and adaptive foe," CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano said in the statement. "It has paid off, generating more information about Al Qaeda and helping take terrorists off the street."
The CIA spies are part of a broader espionage arsenal aimed at Bin Laden and Zawahiri that includes satellites, electronic eavesdropping stations and the unmanned airplanes.
Pakistan pullout
Current and former U.S. intelligence officials involved in the surge said it had been hobbled by a number of other developments. Chief among them, they said, was Pakistan's troop pullout last year from border regions where the hunt has been focused.
Just months after the CIA deployed dozens of additional operatives to its station in Islamabad — as well as bases in Peshawar and other locations — Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf announced "peace agreements" with tribal leaders in Waziristan.
Driven by domestic political pressures and rising anti-American sentiment, the agreements called for the tribes to rein in the activities of foreign fighters, and bar them from launching attacks in Afghanistan, in exchange for a Pakistani military pullback.
But U.S. officials said there was little evidence that the tribal groups had followed through.
"Everything was undermined by the so-called peace agreement in north Waziristan," said a senior U.S. intelligence official responsible for overseeing counter-terrorism operations. "Of all the things that work against us in the global war on terror, that's the most damaging development. The one thing Al Qaeda needs to plan an attack is a relatively safe place to operate."
Some in the administration initially expressed concern over the Pakistani move, but Bush later praised it, following a White House meeting with Musharraf.
The pullback took significant pressure off Al Qaeda leaders and the tribal groups protecting them. It also made travel easier for operatives migrating to Pakistan after taking part in the insurgency in Iraq.
Some of these veterans are leading training at newly established camps, and are positioned to become the "next generation of leadership" in the organization, said the former senior CIA official.
"Al Qaeda is dependent on a lot of leaders coming out of Iraq for its own viability," said the former official, who recently left the agency. "It's these sorts of guys who carry out operations."
The former official added that the resurgent Taliban forces in Afghanistan are "being schooled" by Al Qaeda operatives with experience fighting U.S. forces in Iraq.
The administration's concern was underscored when Vice President Dick Cheney and Deputy CIA Director Stephen Kappes visited Musharraf in Pakistan in February to prod him to crack down on Al Qaeda and its training camps.
The Pakistani pullback also has reopened financial channels that had been constricted by the military presence.
The senior U.S. counter-terrorism official said there were "lots of indications they can move people in and out easier," and that operatives from Iraq often bring cash.
"A year ago we were saying they were having serious money problems," the official said. "That seems to have eased up."
The cash is mainly U.S. currency in relatively modest sums — tens of thousands of dollars. The scale of the payments suggests the money is not meant for funding elaborate terrorist plots, but instead for covering the day-to-day costs of Al Qaeda's command: paying off tribal leaders, hiring security and buying provisions.
Contributors mobilized
Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, as the network's Iraq branch is known, has drawn increasingly large contributions from elsewhere in the Muslim world — largely because the fight against U.S. forces has mobilized donors across the Middle East, officials said.
"Success in Iraq and Afghanistan is the reason people are contributing again, with money and private contributions coming back in from the Gulf," said the senior U.S. counter-terrorism official. He added that Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia also has become an effective criminal enterprise.
"The insurgents have great businesses they run: stealing cars, kidnapping people, protection money," the counter-terrorism official said. The former CIA official said the activity is so extensive that the "ransom-for-profit business in Iraq reminds me of Colombia and Mexico in the 1980s and '90s."
U.S. officials got a glimpse of the Al Qaeda leadership's financial dependency when American forces intercepted a lengthy letter Zawahiri sent to now-deceased Iraq insurgent leader Abu Musab Zarqawi in 2005. In the letter, Zawahiri alluded to financial difficulties, saying "the lines have been cut off," and asked Zarqawi for fresh funds.
"We need a payment while new lines are being opened," Zawahiri wrote, according to a translation released publicly by the U.S. government. "So, if you're capable of sending a payment of approximately one hundred thousand, we'll be very grateful to you."
The payments appear to have given Al Qaeda leaders in Iraq new influence in the organization, officials said. In particular, officials noted that Zawahiri appears to have abandoned his effort to persuade Sunni Arab insurgents not to divide Muslims by striking Shiites, and has more recently moved closer to sanctioning such bloodshed.
U.S. officials believe they had Zawahiri in their sights on at least one occasion. Acting on reports that Zawahiri was to attend an Al Qaeda gathering in a remote village in northwest Pakistan in January 2006, the CIA launched a missile strike on the compound, missing Zawahiri but killing a senior Al Qaeda operations commander. U.S. officials believe Zawahiri changed plans at the last minute.
Within months of that strike, the CIA began sending dozens of additional case officers to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The impetus for the surge is unclear. Several former CIA officials said it was launched at the direction of former CIA Director Porter J. Goss, and that the White House had been pushing the agency to step up the effort to find Bin Laden.
But the CIA disputed those accounts, saying in its written statement that "this initiative was and is driven solely by operational considerations." The effort, according to CIA spokesman Gimigliano, grew out of an assessment in mid-2005 in which "the agency itself identified changes in the operational landscape against Al Qaeda."
Several months before the surge, the CIA disbanded a special unit known as "Alec Station" that had led the search for Bin Laden. At the time, the move was seen as a sign that the hunt was being downgraded, but officials said it was a prelude to a broader reorganization.
The surge included what one former CIA official described as a "new breed" of spy developed since the Sept. 11 attacks. These so-called "targeting officers" are given a blend of analytic and operational training to become specialists in sifting clues to the locations of high-value fugitives.
The CIA's ability to send spies into the tribal region is limited, officials said.
"We can't go into the tribal areas without protection," said the former CIA official who was involved in the planning of the surge. "For the most part they have to travel with [the Pakistan intelligence service] and their footprint is not small because they're worried about getting shot too."
Instead, the effort is designed to cultivate sources in the outer perimeters of the security networks that guard Bin Laden, and gradually work inward.
The aim, another former CIA official said, is "to find people who had access to people who had access to his movements. It's pretty basic stuff."
--------------------------
Citation: Greg Miller. "Influx of Al Qaeda, money into Pakistan is seen," Los Angeles Times, 20 May 2007.
Original URL: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-binladen20may20,1,6397543.story?track=crosspromo&coll=la-headlines-nation&ctrack=1&cset=true
--------------------------
By Greg Miller
Los Angeles Times, 20 May 2007
WASHINGTON — A major CIA effort launched last year to hunt down Osama bin Laden has produced no significant leads on his whereabouts, but has helped track an alarming increase in the movement of Al Qaeda operatives and money into Pakistan's tribal territories, according to senior U.S. intelligence officials familiar with the operation.
In one of the most troubling trends, U.S. officials said that Al Qaeda's command base in Pakistan is increasingly being funded by cash coming out of Iraq, where the terrorist network's operatives are raising substantial sums from donations to the anti-American insurgency as well as kidnappings of wealthy Iraqis and other criminal activity.
The influx of money has bolstered Al Qaeda's leadership ranks at a time when the core command is regrouping and reasserting influence over its far-flung network. The trend also signals a reversal in the traditional flow of Al Qaeda funds, with the network's leadership surviving to a large extent on money coming in from its most profitable franchise, rather than distributing funds from headquarters to distant cells.
Al Qaeda's efforts were aided, intelligence officials said, by Pakistan's withdrawal in September of tens of thousands of troops from the tribal areas along the Afghanistan border where Bin Laden and his top deputy, Ayman Zawahiri, are believed to be hiding.
Little more than a year ago, Al Qaeda's core command was thought to be in a financial crunch. But U.S. officials said cash shipped from Iraq has eased those troubles.
"Iraq is a big moneymaker for them," said a senior U.S. counter-terrorism official.
The evolving picture of Al Qaeda's finances is based in part on intelligence from an aggressive effort launched last year to intensify the pressure on Bin Laden and his senior deputies.
As part of a so-called surge in personnel, the CIA deployed as many as 50 clandestine operatives to Pakistan and Afghanistan — a dramatic increase over the number of CIA case officers permanently stationed in those countries. All of the new arrivals were given the primary objective of finding what counter-terrorism officials call "HVT1" and "HVT2." Those "high value target" designations refer to Bin Laden and Zawahiri.
The surge was part of a broader shake-up at the CIA designed to refocus on the hunt for Bin Laden, officials said. One former high-ranking agency official said the CIA had formed a task force that involved officials from all four directorates at the agency, including analysts, scientists and technical experts, as well as covert operators.
The officials were charged with reinvigorating a search that had atrophied when some U.S. intelligence assets and special forces teams were pulled out of Afghanistan in 2002 to prepare for the war with Iraq.
Arduous search
Nevertheless, U.S. intelligence and military officials said, the surge has yet to produce a single lead on Bin Laden's or Zawahiri's location that could be substantiated.
"We're not any closer," said a senior U.S. military official who monitors the intelligence on the hunt for Bin Laden.
The lack of progress underscores the difficulty of the search more than five years after the Sept. 11 attacks. Despite a $25-million U.S. reward, current and former intelligence officials said, the United States has not had a lead on Bin Laden since he fled American and Afghan forces in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan in early 2002.
"We've had no significant report of him being anywhere," said a former senior CIA official who, like others interviewed for this article, spoke on condition of anonymity when discussing U.S. intelligence operations. U.S. spy agencies have not even had information that "you could validate historically," the official said, meaning a tip on a previous Bin Laden location that could subsequently be verified.
President Bush is given detailed presentations on the hunt's progress every two to four months, in addition to routine counter-terrorism briefings, intelligence officials said.
The presentations include "complex schematics, search patterns, what we're doing, where the Predator flies," said one participant, referring to flights by unmanned airplanes used in the search. The CIA has even used sand models to illustrate the topography of the mountainous terrain where Bin Laden is believed to be hiding.
Still, officials said, they have been unable to answer the basic question of whether they are getting closer to their target.
"Any prediction on when we're going to get him is just ridiculous," said the senior U.S. counter-terrorism official. "It could be a year from now or the Pakistanis could be in the process of getting him right now."
In a written response to questions from The Times, the CIA said it "does not as a rule discuss publicly the details of clandestine operations," but acknowledged it had stepped up operations against Bin Laden and defended their effectiveness.
"The surge has been modest in size, here and overseas, but has added new skills and fresh thinking to the fight against a resilient and adaptive foe," CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano said in the statement. "It has paid off, generating more information about Al Qaeda and helping take terrorists off the street."
The CIA spies are part of a broader espionage arsenal aimed at Bin Laden and Zawahiri that includes satellites, electronic eavesdropping stations and the unmanned airplanes.
Pakistan pullout
Current and former U.S. intelligence officials involved in the surge said it had been hobbled by a number of other developments. Chief among them, they said, was Pakistan's troop pullout last year from border regions where the hunt has been focused.
Just months after the CIA deployed dozens of additional operatives to its station in Islamabad — as well as bases in Peshawar and other locations — Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf announced "peace agreements" with tribal leaders in Waziristan.
Driven by domestic political pressures and rising anti-American sentiment, the agreements called for the tribes to rein in the activities of foreign fighters, and bar them from launching attacks in Afghanistan, in exchange for a Pakistani military pullback.
But U.S. officials said there was little evidence that the tribal groups had followed through.
"Everything was undermined by the so-called peace agreement in north Waziristan," said a senior U.S. intelligence official responsible for overseeing counter-terrorism operations. "Of all the things that work against us in the global war on terror, that's the most damaging development. The one thing Al Qaeda needs to plan an attack is a relatively safe place to operate."
Some in the administration initially expressed concern over the Pakistani move, but Bush later praised it, following a White House meeting with Musharraf.
The pullback took significant pressure off Al Qaeda leaders and the tribal groups protecting them. It also made travel easier for operatives migrating to Pakistan after taking part in the insurgency in Iraq.
Some of these veterans are leading training at newly established camps, and are positioned to become the "next generation of leadership" in the organization, said the former senior CIA official.
"Al Qaeda is dependent on a lot of leaders coming out of Iraq for its own viability," said the former official, who recently left the agency. "It's these sorts of guys who carry out operations."
The former official added that the resurgent Taliban forces in Afghanistan are "being schooled" by Al Qaeda operatives with experience fighting U.S. forces in Iraq.
The administration's concern was underscored when Vice President Dick Cheney and Deputy CIA Director Stephen Kappes visited Musharraf in Pakistan in February to prod him to crack down on Al Qaeda and its training camps.
The Pakistani pullback also has reopened financial channels that had been constricted by the military presence.
The senior U.S. counter-terrorism official said there were "lots of indications they can move people in and out easier," and that operatives from Iraq often bring cash.
"A year ago we were saying they were having serious money problems," the official said. "That seems to have eased up."
The cash is mainly U.S. currency in relatively modest sums — tens of thousands of dollars. The scale of the payments suggests the money is not meant for funding elaborate terrorist plots, but instead for covering the day-to-day costs of Al Qaeda's command: paying off tribal leaders, hiring security and buying provisions.
Contributors mobilized
Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, as the network's Iraq branch is known, has drawn increasingly large contributions from elsewhere in the Muslim world — largely because the fight against U.S. forces has mobilized donors across the Middle East, officials said.
"Success in Iraq and Afghanistan is the reason people are contributing again, with money and private contributions coming back in from the Gulf," said the senior U.S. counter-terrorism official. He added that Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia also has become an effective criminal enterprise.
"The insurgents have great businesses they run: stealing cars, kidnapping people, protection money," the counter-terrorism official said. The former CIA official said the activity is so extensive that the "ransom-for-profit business in Iraq reminds me of Colombia and Mexico in the 1980s and '90s."
U.S. officials got a glimpse of the Al Qaeda leadership's financial dependency when American forces intercepted a lengthy letter Zawahiri sent to now-deceased Iraq insurgent leader Abu Musab Zarqawi in 2005. In the letter, Zawahiri alluded to financial difficulties, saying "the lines have been cut off," and asked Zarqawi for fresh funds.
"We need a payment while new lines are being opened," Zawahiri wrote, according to a translation released publicly by the U.S. government. "So, if you're capable of sending a payment of approximately one hundred thousand, we'll be very grateful to you."
The payments appear to have given Al Qaeda leaders in Iraq new influence in the organization, officials said. In particular, officials noted that Zawahiri appears to have abandoned his effort to persuade Sunni Arab insurgents not to divide Muslims by striking Shiites, and has more recently moved closer to sanctioning such bloodshed.
U.S. officials believe they had Zawahiri in their sights on at least one occasion. Acting on reports that Zawahiri was to attend an Al Qaeda gathering in a remote village in northwest Pakistan in January 2006, the CIA launched a missile strike on the compound, missing Zawahiri but killing a senior Al Qaeda operations commander. U.S. officials believe Zawahiri changed plans at the last minute.
Within months of that strike, the CIA began sending dozens of additional case officers to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The impetus for the surge is unclear. Several former CIA officials said it was launched at the direction of former CIA Director Porter J. Goss, and that the White House had been pushing the agency to step up the effort to find Bin Laden.
But the CIA disputed those accounts, saying in its written statement that "this initiative was and is driven solely by operational considerations." The effort, according to CIA spokesman Gimigliano, grew out of an assessment in mid-2005 in which "the agency itself identified changes in the operational landscape against Al Qaeda."
Several months before the surge, the CIA disbanded a special unit known as "Alec Station" that had led the search for Bin Laden. At the time, the move was seen as a sign that the hunt was being downgraded, but officials said it was a prelude to a broader reorganization.
The surge included what one former CIA official described as a "new breed" of spy developed since the Sept. 11 attacks. These so-called "targeting officers" are given a blend of analytic and operational training to become specialists in sifting clues to the locations of high-value fugitives.
The CIA's ability to send spies into the tribal region is limited, officials said.
"We can't go into the tribal areas without protection," said the former CIA official who was involved in the planning of the surge. "For the most part they have to travel with [the Pakistan intelligence service] and their footprint is not small because they're worried about getting shot too."
Instead, the effort is designed to cultivate sources in the outer perimeters of the security networks that guard Bin Laden, and gradually work inward.
The aim, another former CIA official said, is "to find people who had access to people who had access to his movements. It's pretty basic stuff."
--------------------------
Citation: Greg Miller. "Influx of Al Qaeda, money into Pakistan is seen," Los Angeles Times, 20 May 2007.
Original URL: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-binladen20may20,1,6397543.story?track=crosspromo&coll=la-headlines-nation&ctrack=1&cset=true
--------------------------
18 May 2007
NATO reviews Afghan tactics to cut civilian deaths
By Andrew Gray
Reuters, 18 May 2007
WASHINGTON - NATO is looking at its tactics in Afghanistan to reduce civilian casualties, which have prompted protests from President Hamid Karzai, the alliance's top commander said on Friday.
U.S. Army Gen. John Craddock said NATO understood that civilian casualties cost the alliance credibility among local people whose support was vital to defeating Islamist insurgents from the Taliban movement.
"Every time that happens, someone walks away, an Afghan citizen, with a bad feeling towards either NATO or the United States," said Craddock, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander.
"That's what we don't want to happen."
Dozens of civilians have been killed in recent weeks in operations by NATO forces or a separate U.S.-led task force fighting the Taliban, according to Afghan officials.
The rising civilian death toll has triggered protests by Afghans demanding the resignation of the pro-U.S. Karzai and the expulsion of American troops from Afghanistan.
The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force has some 37,000 troops in Afghanistan, around 15,000 of them from the United States, according to the Pentagon.
Karzai said this month that Afghanistan could no longer accept civilian casualties and a U.S. military commander apologized for the killing of 19 civilians during an attack in March.
Craddock said NATO was looking at all the incidents where civilian casualties had been reported.
He said a preliminary review by the top NATO commander in Afghanistan indicated the military had in most cases followed its rules of engagement, which specify when force can be used.
The rules of engagement would not change, Craddock said, but commanders may decide to change the way they operate.
"It may change tactics, techniques and procedures," he said at a breakfast meeting with reporters in Washington.
Craddock said NATO forces faced difficult choices, particularly if they came under attack. Insurgents could take refuge in buildings and NATO commanders had to decide whether to launch air strikes which would kill enemy forces but also risked civilian casualties.
"This is imperfect. If you haven't ever done it, you don't understand the fog and the friction," he said.
-----------------------------
Citation: Andrew Gray. "NATO reviews Afghan tactics to cut civilian deaths," Reuters, 18 May 2007.
Original URL: http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N18208357.htm
-----------------------------
Reuters, 18 May 2007
WASHINGTON - NATO is looking at its tactics in Afghanistan to reduce civilian casualties, which have prompted protests from President Hamid Karzai, the alliance's top commander said on Friday.
U.S. Army Gen. John Craddock said NATO understood that civilian casualties cost the alliance credibility among local people whose support was vital to defeating Islamist insurgents from the Taliban movement.
"Every time that happens, someone walks away, an Afghan citizen, with a bad feeling towards either NATO or the United States," said Craddock, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander.
"That's what we don't want to happen."
Dozens of civilians have been killed in recent weeks in operations by NATO forces or a separate U.S.-led task force fighting the Taliban, according to Afghan officials.
The rising civilian death toll has triggered protests by Afghans demanding the resignation of the pro-U.S. Karzai and the expulsion of American troops from Afghanistan.
The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force has some 37,000 troops in Afghanistan, around 15,000 of them from the United States, according to the Pentagon.
Karzai said this month that Afghanistan could no longer accept civilian casualties and a U.S. military commander apologized for the killing of 19 civilians during an attack in March.
Craddock said NATO was looking at all the incidents where civilian casualties had been reported.
He said a preliminary review by the top NATO commander in Afghanistan indicated the military had in most cases followed its rules of engagement, which specify when force can be used.
The rules of engagement would not change, Craddock said, but commanders may decide to change the way they operate.
"It may change tactics, techniques and procedures," he said at a breakfast meeting with reporters in Washington.
Craddock said NATO forces faced difficult choices, particularly if they came under attack. Insurgents could take refuge in buildings and NATO commanders had to decide whether to launch air strikes which would kill enemy forces but also risked civilian casualties.
"This is imperfect. If you haven't ever done it, you don't understand the fog and the friction," he said.
-----------------------------
Citation: Andrew Gray. "NATO reviews Afghan tactics to cut civilian deaths," Reuters, 18 May 2007.
Original URL: http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N18208357.htm
-----------------------------
Saboteurs have upper hand in an endless war, says Iraq's Oil Minister
By Patrick Cockburn
The Independent, 18 May 2007
Iraq's Oil Minister has unequalled experience of adversity. As a leading Iraqi nuclear scientist, Dr Hussain al-Shahristani was summoned to see Saddam Hussein in 1979 and asked to assist in a project to make a nuclear weapon.
He flatly refused to help and was immediately thrown into jail and savagely tortured by being beaten for 22 days as he was hung in the air by his wrists that were tied behind his back. Adamant in his determination not to assist Saddam in developing a nuclear device Dr Shahristani spent 10 years in solitary confinement in a small windowless cell in Abu Ghraib prison.
During the chaos of the Gulf War he succeeded in escaping with the help of a "trusty" who delivered his meals. The man, a Palestinian jailed by Saddam as a favour to Yasser Arafat, agreed to help him get out of the dreaded Abu Ghraib.
Stealing a Mukhabarat (secret police) car, the scientist made his way to Kurdistan and then to Iran.
Sitting in his office in the Oil Ministry on a surprisingly rainy day in Baghdad, Dr Shahristani carries few outward signs of a life beset by danger and suffering. Following the overthrow of Saddam in 2003 he returned to Iraq and became the leader of the independent members of parliament who belonged to the Shia alliance. He became Oil Minister a year ago.
It is not an easy job. Iraq's only revenue is from the 1.6 million barrels a day of crude oil that the country exports out of the 2.2 million barrels a day it produces. Every day saboteurs blow up Iraqi oil pipelines and Oil Ministry teams try to repair them in an endless war to strangle Iraq's oil exports to the Mediterranean. Right now the saboteurs have, perhaps temporarily, the upper hand.
"It is as bad as it has ever been," says Dr Shahristani in an interview with The Independent. "If we can protect the pipeline we can add half a million barrels to our exports immediately."
The main problem is that the pipeline that takes crude oil from the oilfields in northern Iraq runs through notoriously dangerous territory between Kirkuk and Baiji to the west. "As soon as we finish a repair they plant another IED [improvised explosive device]. The pipe is hundreds of miles long and runs through a hostile area where insurgents are very active," he says. As a result all exports have to pass through Basra.
Iraq is trying to reorganise its oil industry. The US is pressing for a draft oil bill that has been in dispute for more than a year to be finally passed by parliament. It has become one of the famous "benchmarks" by which Washington says it is measuring progress in Iraq.
There is some hypocrisy here because the year in which the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority ran the Iraqi oil industry in 2003-04 was famous for managerial incompetence and corruption.
The control of oil and oil revenue is also at the centre of the fraught relationship between the central government in Baghdad and the Kurds. The need to share oil money is one of the few things holding Iraq together. The Kurds want to maximise their autonomy and, critically, to make sure that they get their present 17 per cent share of oil revenues. With some reason they are suspicious that money on which they wholly depend will be held up or sequestered by some delaying tactic in Baghdad.
Dr Shahristani says negotiations over the coming week will be crucial in deciding if agreement can be reached with the Kurds on oil and gas. He himself had just returned from Kurdistan. The Kurdish Prime Minister is expected in Baghdad this week. The Kurds are demanding that their share of Iraq's oil revenues be released to them automatically.
"We have had endless problems on getting our share," says Dilshad Miran, a Kurdish official in Baghdad. "They give us figures but we don't know if they are right."
Distrust is deep. The Kurds believe they have been deliberately short-changed by Arab-run ministries. The Baghdad government suspects what it sees as efforts by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to set up an independent oil industry. Four contracts for oil exploration signed in Kurdistan before the fall of Saddam will be honoured though they may be amended. Dr Shahristani says he told Kurdish leaders that any other contracts "are illegal and I will be writing to any company that signs a contract with the KRG... that Iraq will not deal with them in future."
---------------------------
Citation: Patrick Cockburn. "Saboteurs have upper hand in an endless war, says Iraq's Oil Minister," The Independent, 18 May 2007.
Original URL: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2556485.ece
---------------------------
The Independent, 18 May 2007
Iraq's Oil Minister has unequalled experience of adversity. As a leading Iraqi nuclear scientist, Dr Hussain al-Shahristani was summoned to see Saddam Hussein in 1979 and asked to assist in a project to make a nuclear weapon.
He flatly refused to help and was immediately thrown into jail and savagely tortured by being beaten for 22 days as he was hung in the air by his wrists that were tied behind his back. Adamant in his determination not to assist Saddam in developing a nuclear device Dr Shahristani spent 10 years in solitary confinement in a small windowless cell in Abu Ghraib prison.
During the chaos of the Gulf War he succeeded in escaping with the help of a "trusty" who delivered his meals. The man, a Palestinian jailed by Saddam as a favour to Yasser Arafat, agreed to help him get out of the dreaded Abu Ghraib.
Stealing a Mukhabarat (secret police) car, the scientist made his way to Kurdistan and then to Iran.
Sitting in his office in the Oil Ministry on a surprisingly rainy day in Baghdad, Dr Shahristani carries few outward signs of a life beset by danger and suffering. Following the overthrow of Saddam in 2003 he returned to Iraq and became the leader of the independent members of parliament who belonged to the Shia alliance. He became Oil Minister a year ago.
It is not an easy job. Iraq's only revenue is from the 1.6 million barrels a day of crude oil that the country exports out of the 2.2 million barrels a day it produces. Every day saboteurs blow up Iraqi oil pipelines and Oil Ministry teams try to repair them in an endless war to strangle Iraq's oil exports to the Mediterranean. Right now the saboteurs have, perhaps temporarily, the upper hand.
"It is as bad as it has ever been," says Dr Shahristani in an interview with The Independent. "If we can protect the pipeline we can add half a million barrels to our exports immediately."
The main problem is that the pipeline that takes crude oil from the oilfields in northern Iraq runs through notoriously dangerous territory between Kirkuk and Baiji to the west. "As soon as we finish a repair they plant another IED [improvised explosive device]. The pipe is hundreds of miles long and runs through a hostile area where insurgents are very active," he says. As a result all exports have to pass through Basra.
Iraq is trying to reorganise its oil industry. The US is pressing for a draft oil bill that has been in dispute for more than a year to be finally passed by parliament. It has become one of the famous "benchmarks" by which Washington says it is measuring progress in Iraq.
There is some hypocrisy here because the year in which the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority ran the Iraqi oil industry in 2003-04 was famous for managerial incompetence and corruption.
The control of oil and oil revenue is also at the centre of the fraught relationship between the central government in Baghdad and the Kurds. The need to share oil money is one of the few things holding Iraq together. The Kurds want to maximise their autonomy and, critically, to make sure that they get their present 17 per cent share of oil revenues. With some reason they are suspicious that money on which they wholly depend will be held up or sequestered by some delaying tactic in Baghdad.
Dr Shahristani says negotiations over the coming week will be crucial in deciding if agreement can be reached with the Kurds on oil and gas. He himself had just returned from Kurdistan. The Kurdish Prime Minister is expected in Baghdad this week. The Kurds are demanding that their share of Iraq's oil revenues be released to them automatically.
"We have had endless problems on getting our share," says Dilshad Miran, a Kurdish official in Baghdad. "They give us figures but we don't know if they are right."
Distrust is deep. The Kurds believe they have been deliberately short-changed by Arab-run ministries. The Baghdad government suspects what it sees as efforts by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to set up an independent oil industry. Four contracts for oil exploration signed in Kurdistan before the fall of Saddam will be honoured though they may be amended. Dr Shahristani says he told Kurdish leaders that any other contracts "are illegal and I will be writing to any company that signs a contract with the KRG... that Iraq will not deal with them in future."
---------------------------
Citation: Patrick Cockburn. "Saboteurs have upper hand in an endless war, says Iraq's Oil Minister," The Independent, 18 May 2007.
Original URL: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2556485.ece
---------------------------
10 May 2007
Iran 'seeking conflict by proxy in Afghanistan': Britain
Agence France-Presse, 09 May 2007
LONDON (AFP) - British Defence Secretary Des Browne said there were signs that
Iran was helping the Taliban fight coalition forces in Afghanistan.
Indications were that it was seeking to attack international troops "by proxy," he told the defence committee of parliament's lower House of Commons, which scrutinises Ministry of Defence administration and policy.
"Demonstrably they have sought confrontation by proxy with us and the United States and other NATO members elsewhere in the region and there is some indication that they are doing the same in Afghanistan," he said on Tuesday.
Last month British Prime Minister
Tony Blair accused elements in Tehran of "backing, financing, arming, supporting terrorism in
Iraq."
Browne said that Iran was otherwise playing a positive role in Afghanistan, sealing its border and cutting off the flow of illegal drugs and providing investment.
He said that as with other regional powers, such as India and Pakistan, it was in Iran's interest to see a strong, stable Afghanistan.
"This is a complex environment," Browne said.
"Regionally, an Afghanistan which is not a failed state and has a reduced drugs economy is in the strategic interest of all these countries.
"Iran do make a very positive contribution on the border in relation to drugs. They make significant investment inside Afghanistan as well."
Browne praised Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf for his efforts in tackling support for Taliban insurgents emanating from his country.
"I believe that President Musharraf is committed to taking on this problem and in recent months they have stepped up their action against the Taliban to a level that we haven't previously seen," he said.
He warned, however, that there "is no doubt that historically there were relations between elements of the Pakistan government structure and the Taliban, and it is highly improbable that those have gone away."
Browne said Britain was encouraging Pakistan to clamp down on the madrassas -- Islamic religious schools blamed for radicalising youths.
"It is a strategic issue for us because it is a strategic issue in relation to the security of the streets of this city (London), never mind Afghanistan," he said.
Britain has pledged an extra 1,400 troops for Afghanistan, who are due to arrive within weeks, taking the country's contingent in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to 7,700.
-----------------------------
Citation: "Iran 'seeking conflict by proxy in Afghanistan': Britain," Agence France-Presse, 09 May 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070509/wl_sthasia_afp/britainiranmilitaryafghanistanpakistan_070509084422
-----------------------------
LONDON (AFP) - British Defence Secretary Des Browne said there were signs that
Iran was helping the Taliban fight coalition forces in Afghanistan.
Indications were that it was seeking to attack international troops "by proxy," he told the defence committee of parliament's lower House of Commons, which scrutinises Ministry of Defence administration and policy.
"Demonstrably they have sought confrontation by proxy with us and the United States and other NATO members elsewhere in the region and there is some indication that they are doing the same in Afghanistan," he said on Tuesday.
Last month British Prime Minister
Tony Blair accused elements in Tehran of "backing, financing, arming, supporting terrorism in
Iraq."
Browne said that Iran was otherwise playing a positive role in Afghanistan, sealing its border and cutting off the flow of illegal drugs and providing investment.
He said that as with other regional powers, such as India and Pakistan, it was in Iran's interest to see a strong, stable Afghanistan.
"This is a complex environment," Browne said.
"Regionally, an Afghanistan which is not a failed state and has a reduced drugs economy is in the strategic interest of all these countries.
"Iran do make a very positive contribution on the border in relation to drugs. They make significant investment inside Afghanistan as well."
Browne praised Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf for his efforts in tackling support for Taliban insurgents emanating from his country.
"I believe that President Musharraf is committed to taking on this problem and in recent months they have stepped up their action against the Taliban to a level that we haven't previously seen," he said.
He warned, however, that there "is no doubt that historically there were relations between elements of the Pakistan government structure and the Taliban, and it is highly improbable that those have gone away."
Browne said Britain was encouraging Pakistan to clamp down on the madrassas -- Islamic religious schools blamed for radicalising youths.
"It is a strategic issue for us because it is a strategic issue in relation to the security of the streets of this city (London), never mind Afghanistan," he said.
Britain has pledged an extra 1,400 troops for Afghanistan, who are due to arrive within weeks, taking the country's contingent in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to 7,700.
-----------------------------
Citation: "Iran 'seeking conflict by proxy in Afghanistan': Britain," Agence France-Presse, 09 May 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070509/wl_sthasia_afp/britainiranmilitaryafghanistanpakistan_070509084422
-----------------------------
Pentagon to keep beefed-up force in Afghanistan through 2008
Agence France-Presse, 09 May 2007
WASHINGTON (AFP) - The Pentagon Wednesday announced plans to keep about 25,000 troops in Afghanistan through next year amid a resurgence of the Taliban.
The Pentagon said the 101st Airborne Division will send its headquarters and a combat brigade to Afghanistan early next year to replace units returning to the United States.
The deployment plans "are a reflection of the continued US commitment to maintain two brigades in Afghanistan and to provide the level of forces sufficient military capability to support NATO-ISAF," said Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman.
Despite strains on US forces because of the war in
Iraq, Defense Secretary Robert Gates decided in January to beef up the US military presence in Afghanistan from one combat brigade to two to help counter a revival of the Taliban.
Currently there are about 25,000 US troops in Afghanistan, about 14,000 of them assigned to a 36,000-strong NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
The remaining US forces are focused on counter-terrorism and training missions.
----------------------
Citation: "Pentagon to keep beefed-up force in Afghanistan through 2008," Agence France-Presse, 09 May 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070509/pl_afp/usafghanistanmilitary_070509151531
----------------------
WASHINGTON (AFP) - The Pentagon Wednesday announced plans to keep about 25,000 troops in Afghanistan through next year amid a resurgence of the Taliban.
The Pentagon said the 101st Airborne Division will send its headquarters and a combat brigade to Afghanistan early next year to replace units returning to the United States.
The deployment plans "are a reflection of the continued US commitment to maintain two brigades in Afghanistan and to provide the level of forces sufficient military capability to support NATO-ISAF," said Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman.
Despite strains on US forces because of the war in
Iraq, Defense Secretary Robert Gates decided in January to beef up the US military presence in Afghanistan from one combat brigade to two to help counter a revival of the Taliban.
Currently there are about 25,000 US troops in Afghanistan, about 14,000 of them assigned to a 36,000-strong NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
The remaining US forces are focused on counter-terrorism and training missions.
----------------------
Citation: "Pentagon to keep beefed-up force in Afghanistan through 2008," Agence France-Presse, 09 May 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070509/pl_afp/usafghanistanmilitary_070509151531
----------------------
09 May 2007
River Tigris becoming a graveyard of bodies
IRIN, 08 May 2007
BAGHDAD - The River Tigris has long been a symbol of prosperity in Iraq but since the US-led invasion in 2003, this amazing watercourse has turned into a graveyard of bodies. In addition, the water level is decreasing as pollution increases, say environmentalists.
Pollution in the river is caused by oil derivatives and industrial waste as well as Iraqi and US military waste, they say.
The river was one of the main sources of water, food, transport and recreation for the local population but after four years of war and pollution, it has been transformed into a stagnant sewer, according to environmentalists.
"The situation is critical. The river is gradually being destroyed and there are no projects to prevent its destruction," said Professor Ratib Mufid, an environment expert at Baghdad University.
"A large part of the river has been turned into a military area, forcing families to leave their homes around the riverbanks and close restaurants. Fishermen are prohibited from fishing where the river passes through the capital and all vessels are banned in the area," Mufid said.
The river is contaminated with war waste and toxins, and residents of the impoverished Sadr City suburb are often left with no alternative but to drink contaminated water from the Tigris. This is why, specialists say, many Sadr City residents are plagued by diarrhoea and suffer from recurring kidney stones.
In the hot dry summer months, when the water level drops, mud islands can be seen, and water levels appear to be decreasing every year.
"The problem of decreasing water flow starts in Turkey's Taurus mountains. Between there and Kurdistan, many dams have been built which help to decrease the water flow. The idea [of dam-building] was to prevent floods which over the years affected northern communities, but the consequence can now be seen with nearly half the previous water flow," Seif Barakah, media officer for the Ministry of Environment, said.
Ban on shipping, fishing
Military forces have banned shipping and fishing in the river, and many families who depend for their income on fishing have been deprived of their means of survival.
"Many fishermen have been killed trying to fish at night because they encountered insurgents looking to plant bombs on the riverbanks. It is still possible to find some men trying to fish, but it is rare," Barakah said.
During the day, military boats can be seen making their daily patrols, and in more secure areas, such as those near the fortified Green Zone, snipers are on guard 24 hours a day preventing insurgents from entering the zone.
Dead bodies
Every day local police haul bodies from the Tigris bearing signs of torture. Locals who live near the river constantly see floating bodies.
The situation is even worse in Suwayrah, a southern area of the capital, where the government has built barriers with huge iron nets to trap plants and garbage dropped in the river but now this is also a barrier for bodies.
"Since January 2006 at least 800 bodies have been dragged from those iron nets, and this figure does not include those collected from the central section of the river. Most of the bodies are unidentified and buried without family claims," said Col Abdel-Waheed Azzam, a senior officer in the investigation department of the Ministry of Interior.
According to Azzam, 90 percent of the bodies found in the river show signs of serious torture. "Because of the state of the bodies, it is not useful to try to have an autopsy done, and if the bodies are not claimed within 24 hours they are automatically buried," he said.
Highly polluted
During Saddam Hussein's regime people caught dumping garbage in the river were punished, but today mountains of rubbish can be seen on the riverbanks; and these affect the normal watercourse and pollute the area.
"With dams decreasing the water flow, the salt level rises and in conjunction with the high level of pollutants dumped in the river by northern cities, this reduces oxygen levels, making an unpropitious environment for any living being," Barakah said.
Fishermen said that years ago it was easy to catch a fish in the river but today even if you use nets it is practically impossible to catch a fish and many can be found floating, having died of pollution and lack of oxygen.
"Today, the only fish you can catch are those floating and which died from pollution after ingesting toxic waste and eating rubbish," said Ateif Fahi, 56, a fisherman in the capital, Baghdad.
-------------------------
Citation: "River Tigris becoming a graveyard of bodies," IRIN, 08 May 2007.
Original URL: http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/bbc635469a6b3073f9b596fc7cf9fdae.htm
-------------------------
BAGHDAD - The River Tigris has long been a symbol of prosperity in Iraq but since the US-led invasion in 2003, this amazing watercourse has turned into a graveyard of bodies. In addition, the water level is decreasing as pollution increases, say environmentalists.
Pollution in the river is caused by oil derivatives and industrial waste as well as Iraqi and US military waste, they say.
The river was one of the main sources of water, food, transport and recreation for the local population but after four years of war and pollution, it has been transformed into a stagnant sewer, according to environmentalists.
"The situation is critical. The river is gradually being destroyed and there are no projects to prevent its destruction," said Professor Ratib Mufid, an environment expert at Baghdad University.
"A large part of the river has been turned into a military area, forcing families to leave their homes around the riverbanks and close restaurants. Fishermen are prohibited from fishing where the river passes through the capital and all vessels are banned in the area," Mufid said.
The river is contaminated with war waste and toxins, and residents of the impoverished Sadr City suburb are often left with no alternative but to drink contaminated water from the Tigris. This is why, specialists say, many Sadr City residents are plagued by diarrhoea and suffer from recurring kidney stones.
In the hot dry summer months, when the water level drops, mud islands can be seen, and water levels appear to be decreasing every year.
"The problem of decreasing water flow starts in Turkey's Taurus mountains. Between there and Kurdistan, many dams have been built which help to decrease the water flow. The idea [of dam-building] was to prevent floods which over the years affected northern communities, but the consequence can now be seen with nearly half the previous water flow," Seif Barakah, media officer for the Ministry of Environment, said.
Ban on shipping, fishing
Military forces have banned shipping and fishing in the river, and many families who depend for their income on fishing have been deprived of their means of survival.
"Many fishermen have been killed trying to fish at night because they encountered insurgents looking to plant bombs on the riverbanks. It is still possible to find some men trying to fish, but it is rare," Barakah said.
During the day, military boats can be seen making their daily patrols, and in more secure areas, such as those near the fortified Green Zone, snipers are on guard 24 hours a day preventing insurgents from entering the zone.
Dead bodies
Every day local police haul bodies from the Tigris bearing signs of torture. Locals who live near the river constantly see floating bodies.
The situation is even worse in Suwayrah, a southern area of the capital, where the government has built barriers with huge iron nets to trap plants and garbage dropped in the river but now this is also a barrier for bodies.
"Since January 2006 at least 800 bodies have been dragged from those iron nets, and this figure does not include those collected from the central section of the river. Most of the bodies are unidentified and buried without family claims," said Col Abdel-Waheed Azzam, a senior officer in the investigation department of the Ministry of Interior.
According to Azzam, 90 percent of the bodies found in the river show signs of serious torture. "Because of the state of the bodies, it is not useful to try to have an autopsy done, and if the bodies are not claimed within 24 hours they are automatically buried," he said.
Highly polluted
During Saddam Hussein's regime people caught dumping garbage in the river were punished, but today mountains of rubbish can be seen on the riverbanks; and these affect the normal watercourse and pollute the area.
"With dams decreasing the water flow, the salt level rises and in conjunction with the high level of pollutants dumped in the river by northern cities, this reduces oxygen levels, making an unpropitious environment for any living being," Barakah said.
Fishermen said that years ago it was easy to catch a fish in the river but today even if you use nets it is practically impossible to catch a fish and many can be found floating, having died of pollution and lack of oxygen.
"Today, the only fish you can catch are those floating and which died from pollution after ingesting toxic waste and eating rubbish," said Ateif Fahi, 56, a fisherman in the capital, Baghdad.
-------------------------
Citation: "River Tigris becoming a graveyard of bodies," IRIN, 08 May 2007.
Original URL: http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/bbc635469a6b3073f9b596fc7cf9fdae.htm
-------------------------
US army posting to YouTube
Agence France Presse, 09 May 2007
WASHINGTON: The US military is now posting video clips on YouTube showing US troops in combat and insurgents being bombed in a "boots on the ground" perspective of the Iraq war, officials said yesterday.
Multi-National Forces Iraq created a channel on the popular video-sharing website in March to show the clips, which capture the intensity of combat while generally showing US troops in a positive light.
Pentagon spokesmen were unable to explain what the military hopes to accomplish with the "MNFIRAQ" channel, but it appeared to be part of a push to find new ways to gain support for the deeply unpopular war.
"This is a specific effort to get information out about Iraq," said Colonel Gary Keck, a spokesman for the Pentagon.
White House spokesman Tony Snow said he thought that airing the video clips of the Iraq fighting on the YouTube channel was "a good idea ... because it's important sometimes to be able to get ... images out that ... portray a fuller picture of what's going on on the battlefield".
The brief slice-of-life-and-death videos carry titles such as More Fighting in Baqubah, Battle on Haifa Street, "Soft Knock" Search in Baghdad, and Counter Mortar Operation. One shows US troops helping the victim of a car bombing, another returning a freed hostage to his family.
Soldiers fire their weapons at unseen combatants in some shots, and run through smoke-filled streets in others. But in most, death remains somewhere beyond the frame.
"MNF-I established this YouTube channel to give viewers around the world a 'boots on the ground' perspective of Operation Iraqi Freedom from those who are fighting it," a statement posted on the channel says.
"Video clips document action as it appeared to personnel on the ground and in the air as it was shot," it says.
"We will only edit video clips for time, security reasons and for over-disturbing or offensive images."
In Counter Mortar Operation, viewers are presented with an aerial view of six Iraqi insurgents who are said to be firing a mortar, then breaking it down and piling into their car to make their escape.
They speed down a country road, seemingly unaware they are being watched. A missile then enters the frame, followed by a fiery explosion.
"Coalition air power destroys vehicle, mortar and insurgents," the caption reads.
Typical of the emailed reactions to the clip, which the website says has been viewed more than 39,000 times, was one signed dboy4ever:
"Die terrorists and people who sympathize with them. You messed with the wrong country," he wrote.
Sometimes viewers take away a different message.
"I am sure the Iraqi freedom fighters don't like that the American terrorists are on their turf. I guess that's why u'll never win this war," wrote Lleuwelynn in response to one of the videos.
----------------------
Citation: "US army posting to YouTube," Agence France Presse, 09 May 2007.
Original URL: http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/printpage/0,5942,21695956,00.html
----------------------
WASHINGTON: The US military is now posting video clips on YouTube showing US troops in combat and insurgents being bombed in a "boots on the ground" perspective of the Iraq war, officials said yesterday.
Multi-National Forces Iraq created a channel on the popular video-sharing website in March to show the clips, which capture the intensity of combat while generally showing US troops in a positive light.
Pentagon spokesmen were unable to explain what the military hopes to accomplish with the "MNFIRAQ" channel, but it appeared to be part of a push to find new ways to gain support for the deeply unpopular war.
"This is a specific effort to get information out about Iraq," said Colonel Gary Keck, a spokesman for the Pentagon.
White House spokesman Tony Snow said he thought that airing the video clips of the Iraq fighting on the YouTube channel was "a good idea ... because it's important sometimes to be able to get ... images out that ... portray a fuller picture of what's going on on the battlefield".
The brief slice-of-life-and-death videos carry titles such as More Fighting in Baqubah, Battle on Haifa Street, "Soft Knock" Search in Baghdad, and Counter Mortar Operation. One shows US troops helping the victim of a car bombing, another returning a freed hostage to his family.
Soldiers fire their weapons at unseen combatants in some shots, and run through smoke-filled streets in others. But in most, death remains somewhere beyond the frame.
"MNF-I established this YouTube channel to give viewers around the world a 'boots on the ground' perspective of Operation Iraqi Freedom from those who are fighting it," a statement posted on the channel says.
"Video clips document action as it appeared to personnel on the ground and in the air as it was shot," it says.
"We will only edit video clips for time, security reasons and for over-disturbing or offensive images."
In Counter Mortar Operation, viewers are presented with an aerial view of six Iraqi insurgents who are said to be firing a mortar, then breaking it down and piling into their car to make their escape.
They speed down a country road, seemingly unaware they are being watched. A missile then enters the frame, followed by a fiery explosion.
"Coalition air power destroys vehicle, mortar and insurgents," the caption reads.
Typical of the emailed reactions to the clip, which the website says has been viewed more than 39,000 times, was one signed dboy4ever:
"Die terrorists and people who sympathize with them. You messed with the wrong country," he wrote.
Sometimes viewers take away a different message.
"I am sure the Iraqi freedom fighters don't like that the American terrorists are on their turf. I guess that's why u'll never win this war," wrote Lleuwelynn in response to one of the videos.
----------------------
Citation: "US army posting to YouTube," Agence France Presse, 09 May 2007.
Original URL: http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/printpage/0,5942,21695956,00.html
----------------------
04 May 2007
Beleaguered Iraqis now fear their own security forces more than the insurgents
By Patrick Cockburn
The Independent, 04 May 2007
"Be careful," warned a senior Iraqi government official living in the Green Zone in Baghdad, "be very careful and above all do not trust the police or the army."
He added that the level of insecurity in the Iraqi capital is as bad now as it was before the US drive to make the city safe came into operation in February.
The so-called "surge", the dispatch of 20,000 extra American troops to Iraq with the prime mission of getting control of Baghdad, is visibly failing.
There are army and police checkpoints everywhere but Iraqis are terrified because they do not know if the men in uniform they see there are, in reality, death squad members.
Omar, the 15-year-old brother-in-law of a friend, was driving with two other boys through al-Mansur in west Baghdad a fortnight ago. Their car was stopped at a police checkpoint. Most of the police in Baghdad are Shia. They took him away saying they suspected that his ID card was a fake. The real reason was probably that only Sunnis use the name Omar. Three days later he was found dead.
I was driving through central Baghdad yesterday. Our car was pulled over at an army checkpoint. I had hung my jacket from a hook above the window so nobody could easily see I was a foreigner. A soldier leaned in the window and asked who I was. We were lucky. He merely looked surprised when told I was a foreign journalist and said softly: "Keep well hidden."
The problem about the US security plan is that it does not provide security. It had some impact to begin with and the number of bodies found in the street went down. This was mainly because the Shia Mehdi Army was stood down by its leader, Muqtada al-Sadr.
But the Sunni insurgent groups increased the number of sectarian suicide bombings against Shia markets. The US was unable to stop this and now the sectarian body count is on the rise again. Some 30 bodies, each shot in the head, were found on Wednesday alone.
The main new American tactic is proving counter-productive. This is the sealing-off of entire neighbourhoods, either by concrete walls or barriers of rubbish, so there is only a single entrance and exit.
Speaking of Sunni districts such as al-Adhamiyah, a government official said: "We are creating mini-Islamic republics."
This is born out by anecdotal evidence. The uncle of a friend called Mohammed (nobody wants their full name published) died of natural causes. The family, all Sunni, wanted to bury him but were unable to reach the nearest cemetery in Abu Ghraib. Instead they went to one in Adhamiyah. As they entered the cemetery an armed civilian group, whom they took to be al-Qa'ida from their way of speaking, asked directly: "Are any of you Shia?" Only when reassured that they were all Sunni were they allowed to bury their relative.
The failure of the "surge" comes because it is not accompanied by any political reconciliation. On the contrary the government is factionalised. The two vice-presidents, Tariq al- Hashimi, a Sunni, and Adel Abdel Mehdi, a Shia, may make conciliatory statements, but one Iraqi observer noted: "Tariq only employs Sunni and Adel only Shia."
The Sunni feel they are fighting for their lives. Their last redoubts in east Baghdad (aside from Adhamiyah) are being overrun by the Mehdi Army. The Sunni insurgent groups, notably al-Qa'ida, are on the offensive in west Baghdad, where they are strongest. When the Americans succeed in driving away Shia militia their place is taken, not by government forces, but by Sunni militia.
People in Baghdad are terrified of being killed by a bomb or bundled into the boot of a car and murdered. Less dramatic, but equally significant in forcing people to flee Iraq for Jordan or Syria is the sheer difficulty of maintaining a normal life. Much of the trade in the city used to take place in open-air markets. But because of repeated bombs attacks only one is now open. This is in Karada, but many people no longer go there because it has come under repeated attack.
So many areas are now sealed off in Baghdad that there are continuous traffic jams. This presents a problem for drivers. If they to avoid the traffic jams by driving off the main road they may enter an area where militiamen rule whomay kill them.
One friend who had just returned from a trip to Syria found that, because of an attack on a government patrol, his neighbourhood had been closed to traffic. "I had to walk for 40 minutes with my heavy suitcase," he lamented.
Even in dangerous neighbourhoods such as Beitawin, off Saadoun Street in central Baghdad, notorious for its criminal gangs even in Saddam Hussein's time, people were queuing for petrol for hours yesterday evening because they have no choiceif they want to fill their tanks.
A bizarre flavour has been given to Saadoun Street because the government has encouraged artists to paint the giant concrete blast barriers with uplifting, if unlikely, scenes of mountain torrents, meadows in spring and lakeside scenes. Many of the pictures, all in garish greens, blues and yellows, look more like Switzerland than Iraq.
Muqtada al-Sadr, for his part, is encouraging artists to paint the blast barriers with scenes illustrating the anguish that has been inflicted on the Iraqi people by the US occupation.
The only "gated community" that functions successfully in Baghdad is the Green Zone itself, the four square miles on the right bank of the Tigris that is home to the government and the US embassy. It is sealed off from the rest of Iraq by multiple security barriers and fortifications.
Entering the zone recently I was questioned and searched, at different stages, by Kurds, Georgians, Peruvians and Nepalese.
No country in the world has such rigorous frontier procedures as what one American called "this little chunk of Texas". Living cut off in the zone it is impossible for the ruling elite of Iraq to understand the terrible suffering and terror beyond the compound's gates.
-------------------------------
Citation: Patrick Cockburn. "Beleaguered Iraqis now fear their own security forces more than the insurgents," The Independent, 04 May 2007.
Original URL: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2510910.ece
-------------------------------
The Independent, 04 May 2007
"Be careful," warned a senior Iraqi government official living in the Green Zone in Baghdad, "be very careful and above all do not trust the police or the army."
He added that the level of insecurity in the Iraqi capital is as bad now as it was before the US drive to make the city safe came into operation in February.
The so-called "surge", the dispatch of 20,000 extra American troops to Iraq with the prime mission of getting control of Baghdad, is visibly failing.
There are army and police checkpoints everywhere but Iraqis are terrified because they do not know if the men in uniform they see there are, in reality, death squad members.
Omar, the 15-year-old brother-in-law of a friend, was driving with two other boys through al-Mansur in west Baghdad a fortnight ago. Their car was stopped at a police checkpoint. Most of the police in Baghdad are Shia. They took him away saying they suspected that his ID card was a fake. The real reason was probably that only Sunnis use the name Omar. Three days later he was found dead.
I was driving through central Baghdad yesterday. Our car was pulled over at an army checkpoint. I had hung my jacket from a hook above the window so nobody could easily see I was a foreigner. A soldier leaned in the window and asked who I was. We were lucky. He merely looked surprised when told I was a foreign journalist and said softly: "Keep well hidden."
The problem about the US security plan is that it does not provide security. It had some impact to begin with and the number of bodies found in the street went down. This was mainly because the Shia Mehdi Army was stood down by its leader, Muqtada al-Sadr.
But the Sunni insurgent groups increased the number of sectarian suicide bombings against Shia markets. The US was unable to stop this and now the sectarian body count is on the rise again. Some 30 bodies, each shot in the head, were found on Wednesday alone.
The main new American tactic is proving counter-productive. This is the sealing-off of entire neighbourhoods, either by concrete walls or barriers of rubbish, so there is only a single entrance and exit.
Speaking of Sunni districts such as al-Adhamiyah, a government official said: "We are creating mini-Islamic republics."
This is born out by anecdotal evidence. The uncle of a friend called Mohammed (nobody wants their full name published) died of natural causes. The family, all Sunni, wanted to bury him but were unable to reach the nearest cemetery in Abu Ghraib. Instead they went to one in Adhamiyah. As they entered the cemetery an armed civilian group, whom they took to be al-Qa'ida from their way of speaking, asked directly: "Are any of you Shia?" Only when reassured that they were all Sunni were they allowed to bury their relative.
The failure of the "surge" comes because it is not accompanied by any political reconciliation. On the contrary the government is factionalised. The two vice-presidents, Tariq al- Hashimi, a Sunni, and Adel Abdel Mehdi, a Shia, may make conciliatory statements, but one Iraqi observer noted: "Tariq only employs Sunni and Adel only Shia."
The Sunni feel they are fighting for their lives. Their last redoubts in east Baghdad (aside from Adhamiyah) are being overrun by the Mehdi Army. The Sunni insurgent groups, notably al-Qa'ida, are on the offensive in west Baghdad, where they are strongest. When the Americans succeed in driving away Shia militia their place is taken, not by government forces, but by Sunni militia.
People in Baghdad are terrified of being killed by a bomb or bundled into the boot of a car and murdered. Less dramatic, but equally significant in forcing people to flee Iraq for Jordan or Syria is the sheer difficulty of maintaining a normal life. Much of the trade in the city used to take place in open-air markets. But because of repeated bombs attacks only one is now open. This is in Karada, but many people no longer go there because it has come under repeated attack.
So many areas are now sealed off in Baghdad that there are continuous traffic jams. This presents a problem for drivers. If they to avoid the traffic jams by driving off the main road they may enter an area where militiamen rule whomay kill them.
One friend who had just returned from a trip to Syria found that, because of an attack on a government patrol, his neighbourhood had been closed to traffic. "I had to walk for 40 minutes with my heavy suitcase," he lamented.
Even in dangerous neighbourhoods such as Beitawin, off Saadoun Street in central Baghdad, notorious for its criminal gangs even in Saddam Hussein's time, people were queuing for petrol for hours yesterday evening because they have no choiceif they want to fill their tanks.
A bizarre flavour has been given to Saadoun Street because the government has encouraged artists to paint the giant concrete blast barriers with uplifting, if unlikely, scenes of mountain torrents, meadows in spring and lakeside scenes. Many of the pictures, all in garish greens, blues and yellows, look more like Switzerland than Iraq.
Muqtada al-Sadr, for his part, is encouraging artists to paint the blast barriers with scenes illustrating the anguish that has been inflicted on the Iraqi people by the US occupation.
The only "gated community" that functions successfully in Baghdad is the Green Zone itself, the four square miles on the right bank of the Tigris that is home to the government and the US embassy. It is sealed off from the rest of Iraq by multiple security barriers and fortifications.
Entering the zone recently I was questioned and searched, at different stages, by Kurds, Georgians, Peruvians and Nepalese.
No country in the world has such rigorous frontier procedures as what one American called "this little chunk of Texas". Living cut off in the zone it is impossible for the ruling elite of Iraq to understand the terrible suffering and terror beyond the compound's gates.
-------------------------------
Citation: Patrick Cockburn. "Beleaguered Iraqis now fear their own security forces more than the insurgents," The Independent, 04 May 2007.
Original URL: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2510910.ece
-------------------------------
Iraq Sunni bloc says weighing leaving government
Reuters, 03 May 2007
BAGHDAD, May 3 (Reuters) - Iraq's main Sunni bloc said on Thursday it was considering pulling out of Shi'ite Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's coalition government, saying sectarian violence and corruption was worsening under his administration.
Some members of the Sunni Accordance Front, the largest parliamentary bloc of the Sunni Arab minority, have been urging the group for several months to quit Maliki's government because they believe Sunni concerns are not being addressed.
It has six cabinet ministers and a pullout would not be enough to topple the government, which would still have a majority in the 275-seat parliament.
But it would be a blow to Maliki and raise questions about how representative his administration would remain at a time when he is struggling to push U.S.-backed efforts to reconcile Iraq's warring sects and communities.
"After a year (in government) it's regretful to say that the benefit of this participation has been sour," Saleem al-Jubouri, Front spokesman told a news conference.
"The Iraqi Accordance Front extends its hand to the relevant political blocs and asks them to review a number of controversial issues...Otherwise the Iraqi Accordance Front is studying its options and will not hesitate to take a political stance in the appropriate time," Jubouri said.
Another official, Omar al-Jubouri, said leaving Maliki's coalition of Shi'ites, Sunni Arabs and ethnic Kurds was among the options the group was reviewing.
Dominant under Saddam Hussein until majority Shi'ites swept to power in the first post-war elections, Sunnis have long demanded reforms as a condition to remain in government.
Such measures include reforming the constitution, easing a ban on former members of Saddam's Baath party holding office and purging Iraq's security forces of Shi'ite death squads.
Sunni Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi, a member of the bloc, said he had discussed Iraq's "stumbling political process" with U.S. President George W. Bush in a telephone call on Sunday.
Six ministers from Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's movement quit the government last month in protest over Maliki's refusal to set a timetable for withdrawing U.S. troops.
(Reporting by Waleed Ibrahim and Mussab Al-Khairalla)
----------------------------
Citation: "Iraq Sunni bloc says weighing leaving government," Reuters, 03 May 2007.
Original URL: http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IBO334488.htm
----------------------------
BAGHDAD, May 3 (Reuters) - Iraq's main Sunni bloc said on Thursday it was considering pulling out of Shi'ite Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's coalition government, saying sectarian violence and corruption was worsening under his administration.
Some members of the Sunni Accordance Front, the largest parliamentary bloc of the Sunni Arab minority, have been urging the group for several months to quit Maliki's government because they believe Sunni concerns are not being addressed.
It has six cabinet ministers and a pullout would not be enough to topple the government, which would still have a majority in the 275-seat parliament.
But it would be a blow to Maliki and raise questions about how representative his administration would remain at a time when he is struggling to push U.S.-backed efforts to reconcile Iraq's warring sects and communities.
"After a year (in government) it's regretful to say that the benefit of this participation has been sour," Saleem al-Jubouri, Front spokesman told a news conference.
"The Iraqi Accordance Front extends its hand to the relevant political blocs and asks them to review a number of controversial issues...Otherwise the Iraqi Accordance Front is studying its options and will not hesitate to take a political stance in the appropriate time," Jubouri said.
Another official, Omar al-Jubouri, said leaving Maliki's coalition of Shi'ites, Sunni Arabs and ethnic Kurds was among the options the group was reviewing.
Dominant under Saddam Hussein until majority Shi'ites swept to power in the first post-war elections, Sunnis have long demanded reforms as a condition to remain in government.
Such measures include reforming the constitution, easing a ban on former members of Saddam's Baath party holding office and purging Iraq's security forces of Shi'ite death squads.
Sunni Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi, a member of the bloc, said he had discussed Iraq's "stumbling political process" with U.S. President George W. Bush in a telephone call on Sunday.
Six ministers from Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's movement quit the government last month in protest over Maliki's refusal to set a timetable for withdrawing U.S. troops.
(Reporting by Waleed Ibrahim and Mussab Al-Khairalla)
----------------------------
Citation: "Iraq Sunni bloc says weighing leaving government," Reuters, 03 May 2007.
Original URL: http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IBO334488.htm
----------------------------
03 May 2007
Trainers say Iraqi forces would collapse without U.S. support
Military advisors see years of work to build a strong, stable army.
By Tina Susman
Los Angeles Times, 03 May 2007
BESMAYA RANGE, IRAQ — Teams of Iraqi soldiers huddled outside the doors of two small homes across a narrow road from each other. Their AK-47s were ready, and so were they.
They kicked in the doors of each house, burst in, and began searching the rooms for insurgents, aiming their weapons as they moved crab-like through the maze-like structures.
"Stop! Stop! Stop!" someone hollered in English from a catwalk above them.
It was U.S. Army 1st Lt. Andrew Fuller, trying to break the soldiers of a potentially lethal habit. Simultaneous, side-by-side searches such as these often can end up with soldiers pointing their guns at each other.
"You always want to have your clearing operations going in the same direction," Fuller explained through a translator as the Iraqi teams regrouped in the dusty alley to try another approach.
For almost three years, training the Iraqi army has been among the top priorities for the U.S. military. And for nearly that long, U.S. officials have considered it among their chief frustrations.
Now, with President Bush under steady pressure to begin pulling U.S. troops from Iraq, the administration once again is emphasizing the need to train Iraqi forces to take over the country's security.
But despite some signs of progress, both Iraqis and their American advisors at this training range are blunt about how much work remains: If a U.S. pullout comes anytime soon, most say, the Iraqi army will collapse.
"Honestly put, I think Iraq would be challenged to remain a unified country," said Marine Lt. Col. William Redman, the senior advisor at the range.
"I've seen anarchy, and we're right on the brink of it right now. If we go in a year or two years, it's going to be a complete mess," said retired Army 1st Sgt. Jerry Massey, a 21-year veteran who trains Iraqis in how to spot and respond to threats. "We can't leave here for another five years, minimum."
Leaving too soon means different things to different people at Besmaya, a former Iraqi army base sprawling across a wind-ravaged stretch of khaki-colored desert in southwestern Diyala province. The base now is dedicated to training Iraqi troops, who come here for three weeks of intensive training before being deployed to the capital to enforce the U.S.-Iraqi security crackdown launched in mid-February.
Most, though, agree that for a variety of reasons it will be years before the Iraqis are ready to stand on their own.
Chief among them is the disintegration of Iraq's security, which has created a nation plagued by sectarian violence as well as an insurgency that includes groups loyal to Al Qaeda in Iraq. The insurgency has drawn in foreign fighters with a level of sophistication outweighing that of most Iraqi forces.
Troops in the all-volunteer Iraqi army have proved unpredictable. Many signed up with the idea that they would remain close to home, explained Gen. Ali Ghidan Majeed, the commander of ground troops in Iraq's army. Instead, because of the widening violence, they are being deployed to Baghdad, Al Anbar province and other far-flung places. That is driving some to desert, Majeed said.
In addition, pay is low and sometimes doesn't come at all because of administrative delays, which Majeed said leads many troops to take their monthly home leave and not return to duty.
"We're moving forward step by step," he said during a visit to Besmaya. "But my message is we need the coalition forces here in Iraq. We need them a lot: to manage our training, to manage our supplies, to manage our army."
That's not the message that President Bush and other backers of the war want to send. Though they oppose legislation demanding a timetable for U.S. troop withdrawal, they also face growing public opposition to the war, in which at least 3,355 U.S. troops have been killed since March 2003, according to the website icasualties.org, which tracks American casualties in the war.
Nobody denies that progress has been made in improving the Iraqi military. The army has 10 divisions, and trainers say new recruits show a commitment to learn and to serve that far outshines most older officers' attitudes.
Many continue to train and serve, even without pay, and the Besmaya range offers state-of-the-art facilities to make them better soldiers. While here, they are away from the distractions of home. Even their cellular phones are taken away.
Majeed acknowledged that sectarian divisions exist in the army, but he said this branch of Iraq's security forces was far more cohesive than others.
"You've got to take this in context," said U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, who oversees teams of U.S. troops who are working and living alongside Iraqi forces to boost their battlefield performance.
"In early 2005, there were two struggling Iraqi army divisions. Now we have 10 very capable divisions, and we're working on 11 and 12. So over the past two years there has been a huge amount of progress, but we're not there yet," he said.
Whether it was the off-key bugle tones that greeted the Iraqi and U.S. generals at Besmaya, or the assessment of field training exercises, the obstacles facing the Iraqis and their U.S. advisors were evident.
One of the biggest challenges, Fuller explained, is giving directions to Iraqis without violating cultural traditions that frown upon yelling orders. The in-your-face attitude that is effective at making U.S. trainees learn quickly is unacceptable here, particularly coming from someone as young as Fuller, who is 25.
If a soldier is struggling to catch on, advisors must take him aside and, through a translator, explain quietly what needs to change. This takes time, and there is little time to get these troops in shape for the dangers of Baghdad.
On an obstacle course designed to give soldiers an idea of what they will face in the field, Massey conducts drills to break bad habits. Chief among them is the tendency of Iraqi soldiers not to take cover when they come under fire. Dolls painted to resemble armed insurgents pop up from the sand via a remote control device in Massey's vehicle. "They like to hang out and shoot at the targets," Massey said.
The Iraqis also have not developed the close-knit teamwork that is drilled into U.S. forces, he said, citing their behavior during drills to simulate a roadside bomb exploding near a convoy.
U.S. troops are trained to provide cover to the stricken vehicle.
"The Iraqis do something totally different," Massey said. "They just haul butt out of there." That leaves the stranded vehicle alone to face the barrage of gunfire that generally follows a roadside bombing, and virtually guarantees casualties.
Fuller said another problem he sees is the corruption and laziness of older officers who served under former dictator Saddam Hussein.
"But now we're starting to see a lot of younger officers step up, and they're making a big impact," he said.
One such newcomer is Sgt. Mohammed Khamis, part of the Iraqi battalion from Kirkuk that was in its final days of training for Baghdad. Other than pay issues, Khamis said, the men with him were ready to do anything and go anywhere. Still, he said they were not ready to go it alone.
He said Iraqis still needed the Americans on the streets of Baghdad.
Even the biggest optimists, such as Pittard, say it is the duty of the U.S. to ensure that the mess arising since Hussein's ouster does not destroy Iraq.
"We came here in 2003. We cannot leave … this nation as a failed state in disarray. I think it would go in that direction," Pittard said. He said it would be January before one could judge progress of the Baghdad security plan alone, much less Iraqi troops' readiness to take charge of the entire country.
The Iraqi commander at Besmaya, Col. Abbas Fadhil, agreed. Fadhil was the first soldier to sign up in the new Iraqi army, on July 21, 2003, and echoes White House accusations that much of the violence plaguing Iraq now is being fueled by Iran. If the United States were to leave, Iran would move in and devour Iraq, he said.
"Without America? Fighting alone? Just Iraqi army fighting? That's not good," Fadhil said, his eyes widening at the thought. "We need time for training, for supplies. We need at least seven years." Even better, he said, 50 years.
-----------------------------------
Citation: Tina Susman. "Trainers say Iraqi forces would collapse without U.S. support," Los Angeles Times, 03 May 2007.
Original URL: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/iraq/complete/la-fg-iraqarmy3may03,1,3116254.story?coll=la-iraq-complete
-----------------------------------
By Tina Susman
Los Angeles Times, 03 May 2007
BESMAYA RANGE, IRAQ — Teams of Iraqi soldiers huddled outside the doors of two small homes across a narrow road from each other. Their AK-47s were ready, and so were they.
They kicked in the doors of each house, burst in, and began searching the rooms for insurgents, aiming their weapons as they moved crab-like through the maze-like structures.
"Stop! Stop! Stop!" someone hollered in English from a catwalk above them.
It was U.S. Army 1st Lt. Andrew Fuller, trying to break the soldiers of a potentially lethal habit. Simultaneous, side-by-side searches such as these often can end up with soldiers pointing their guns at each other.
"You always want to have your clearing operations going in the same direction," Fuller explained through a translator as the Iraqi teams regrouped in the dusty alley to try another approach.
For almost three years, training the Iraqi army has been among the top priorities for the U.S. military. And for nearly that long, U.S. officials have considered it among their chief frustrations.
Now, with President Bush under steady pressure to begin pulling U.S. troops from Iraq, the administration once again is emphasizing the need to train Iraqi forces to take over the country's security.
But despite some signs of progress, both Iraqis and their American advisors at this training range are blunt about how much work remains: If a U.S. pullout comes anytime soon, most say, the Iraqi army will collapse.
"Honestly put, I think Iraq would be challenged to remain a unified country," said Marine Lt. Col. William Redman, the senior advisor at the range.
"I've seen anarchy, and we're right on the brink of it right now. If we go in a year or two years, it's going to be a complete mess," said retired Army 1st Sgt. Jerry Massey, a 21-year veteran who trains Iraqis in how to spot and respond to threats. "We can't leave here for another five years, minimum."
Leaving too soon means different things to different people at Besmaya, a former Iraqi army base sprawling across a wind-ravaged stretch of khaki-colored desert in southwestern Diyala province. The base now is dedicated to training Iraqi troops, who come here for three weeks of intensive training before being deployed to the capital to enforce the U.S.-Iraqi security crackdown launched in mid-February.
Most, though, agree that for a variety of reasons it will be years before the Iraqis are ready to stand on their own.
Chief among them is the disintegration of Iraq's security, which has created a nation plagued by sectarian violence as well as an insurgency that includes groups loyal to Al Qaeda in Iraq. The insurgency has drawn in foreign fighters with a level of sophistication outweighing that of most Iraqi forces.
Troops in the all-volunteer Iraqi army have proved unpredictable. Many signed up with the idea that they would remain close to home, explained Gen. Ali Ghidan Majeed, the commander of ground troops in Iraq's army. Instead, because of the widening violence, they are being deployed to Baghdad, Al Anbar province and other far-flung places. That is driving some to desert, Majeed said.
In addition, pay is low and sometimes doesn't come at all because of administrative delays, which Majeed said leads many troops to take their monthly home leave and not return to duty.
"We're moving forward step by step," he said during a visit to Besmaya. "But my message is we need the coalition forces here in Iraq. We need them a lot: to manage our training, to manage our supplies, to manage our army."
That's not the message that President Bush and other backers of the war want to send. Though they oppose legislation demanding a timetable for U.S. troop withdrawal, they also face growing public opposition to the war, in which at least 3,355 U.S. troops have been killed since March 2003, according to the website icasualties.org, which tracks American casualties in the war.
Nobody denies that progress has been made in improving the Iraqi military. The army has 10 divisions, and trainers say new recruits show a commitment to learn and to serve that far outshines most older officers' attitudes.
Many continue to train and serve, even without pay, and the Besmaya range offers state-of-the-art facilities to make them better soldiers. While here, they are away from the distractions of home. Even their cellular phones are taken away.
Majeed acknowledged that sectarian divisions exist in the army, but he said this branch of Iraq's security forces was far more cohesive than others.
"You've got to take this in context," said U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, who oversees teams of U.S. troops who are working and living alongside Iraqi forces to boost their battlefield performance.
"In early 2005, there were two struggling Iraqi army divisions. Now we have 10 very capable divisions, and we're working on 11 and 12. So over the past two years there has been a huge amount of progress, but we're not there yet," he said.
Whether it was the off-key bugle tones that greeted the Iraqi and U.S. generals at Besmaya, or the assessment of field training exercises, the obstacles facing the Iraqis and their U.S. advisors were evident.
One of the biggest challenges, Fuller explained, is giving directions to Iraqis without violating cultural traditions that frown upon yelling orders. The in-your-face attitude that is effective at making U.S. trainees learn quickly is unacceptable here, particularly coming from someone as young as Fuller, who is 25.
If a soldier is struggling to catch on, advisors must take him aside and, through a translator, explain quietly what needs to change. This takes time, and there is little time to get these troops in shape for the dangers of Baghdad.
On an obstacle course designed to give soldiers an idea of what they will face in the field, Massey conducts drills to break bad habits. Chief among them is the tendency of Iraqi soldiers not to take cover when they come under fire. Dolls painted to resemble armed insurgents pop up from the sand via a remote control device in Massey's vehicle. "They like to hang out and shoot at the targets," Massey said.
The Iraqis also have not developed the close-knit teamwork that is drilled into U.S. forces, he said, citing their behavior during drills to simulate a roadside bomb exploding near a convoy.
U.S. troops are trained to provide cover to the stricken vehicle.
"The Iraqis do something totally different," Massey said. "They just haul butt out of there." That leaves the stranded vehicle alone to face the barrage of gunfire that generally follows a roadside bombing, and virtually guarantees casualties.
Fuller said another problem he sees is the corruption and laziness of older officers who served under former dictator Saddam Hussein.
"But now we're starting to see a lot of younger officers step up, and they're making a big impact," he said.
One such newcomer is Sgt. Mohammed Khamis, part of the Iraqi battalion from Kirkuk that was in its final days of training for Baghdad. Other than pay issues, Khamis said, the men with him were ready to do anything and go anywhere. Still, he said they were not ready to go it alone.
He said Iraqis still needed the Americans on the streets of Baghdad.
Even the biggest optimists, such as Pittard, say it is the duty of the U.S. to ensure that the mess arising since Hussein's ouster does not destroy Iraq.
"We came here in 2003. We cannot leave … this nation as a failed state in disarray. I think it would go in that direction," Pittard said. He said it would be January before one could judge progress of the Baghdad security plan alone, much less Iraqi troops' readiness to take charge of the entire country.
The Iraqi commander at Besmaya, Col. Abbas Fadhil, agreed. Fadhil was the first soldier to sign up in the new Iraqi army, on July 21, 2003, and echoes White House accusations that much of the violence plaguing Iraq now is being fueled by Iran. If the United States were to leave, Iran would move in and devour Iraq, he said.
"Without America? Fighting alone? Just Iraqi army fighting? That's not good," Fadhil said, his eyes widening at the thought. "We need time for training, for supplies. We need at least seven years." Even better, he said, 50 years.
-----------------------------------
Citation: Tina Susman. "Trainers say Iraqi forces would collapse without U.S. support," Los Angeles Times, 03 May 2007.
Original URL: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/iraq/complete/la-fg-iraqarmy3may03,1,3116254.story?coll=la-iraq-complete
-----------------------------------