By Barnett R. Rubin
Wall Street Journal, 29 December 2007
The assassination of Benazir Bhutto was probably a strategic attack by al Qaeda and its local allies—the Pakistani Taliban—aimed at achieving Osama bin Laden’s and Ayman al-Zawahiri’s most pressing political objective: destabilizing the government of Pakistan, the nuclear-armed country where al Qaeda has re-established the safe haven it lost in Afghanistan.
Many in Pakistan nevertheless will blame their own military, which has failed to stop the suicide bombings over the past five years, including that of Bhutto’s motorcade in Karachi in October. Pakistani intelligence now claims to have intercepted a phone call from Baitullah Mahsud, leader of the Pakistani Taliban, offering congratulations for the operation. It may be true. But the skepticism with which this announcement was greeted in Pakistan shows that the Bush administration’s strategy of trying to shore up the power of President (former general) Pervez Musharraf cannot work. Even if it is innocent of involvement in this assassination, the Pakistan military under Mr. Musharraf has no intention of ceding power to civilians.
Pakistani newspapers have already published what they claim are the planned results of the rigged elections. Nothing short of a genuine transition to democracy that replaces rather than complements military rule has a chance of establishing a government with the capacity to regain control of the country’s territory and marginalize the militants.
The murder of Bhutto was not just an attempt to derail Pakistani democracy, or prevent an enlightened Muslim woman from taking power. It was a counterattack, apparently by the Pakistani Taliban and al Qaeda, against a U.S.-backed transition from direct to indirect military rule in Pakistan by brokering a forced marriage of “moderates.”
According to last July’s National Intelligence Estimate on the al Qaeda threat, bin Laden has re-established his sanctuary in the Pakistani tribal agencies. According to a report by the United Nations mission in Afghanistan, the suicide bombers for Pakistan and Afghanistan are trained in these agencies.
Most global terrorist plots since 9/11 can be traced back to these areas. And Pakistan’s military regime, not Iran, has been the main source of rogue nuclear proliferation. It is therefore the U.S. partnership with military rulers in Pakistan that has been and is the problem, not the solution.
Last September, bin Laden released a video declaring jihad on the Pakistani government. When Bhutto returned to Pakistan from exile on Oct. 18—as part of a U.S.-backed strategy to shore up Musharraf’s power through elections—her motorcade was bombed as it passed by several military bases in Karachi, killing over 100.
In October and November, groups allied with the Pakistani Taliban captured several districts in Swat, in the Northwest Frontier Province, not in the tribal agencies. When I was in Pakistan in early November, I was told that this offensive was part of a larger effort by the Pakistani Taliban to surround Peshawar, capital of NWFP, and put increasing pressure on nearby Islamabad, the capital. The next key step, I was told on Nov. 5, would be an attack on Charsadda, northeast of Peshawar, on the Muslim feast of ‘Id al-Adha.
Sure enough, on Dec. 21 a suicide bomber killed 56 people during ‘Id worship in Charsadda. This suicide attack followed by a week the announcement that leaders of various Taliban groups had agreed to establish a common organization—the Taliban Movement of Pakistan—under the command of Baitullah Mahsud, the Taliban commander in the South Waziristan Tribal Agency, where the meeting took place. But if bin Laden declared jihad against Mr. Musharraf, Pakistan’s leader saw greater threats elsewhere. When he declared an emergency on Nov. 3, he was responding mainly to the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was about to rule that his standing for president while a serving general violated the constitution. Mr. Musharraf continued the longstanding policy of the Pakistani military of putting its own power, justified by the Indian threat, ahead of all other concerns.
Mr. Musharraf dissolved the Supreme Court and arrested thousands of democratic opponents before sending the army to recapture portions of Swat. His priorities—seeing unarmed civilian opponents as the main threat to the country—helps explain why many Pakistanis believe that the military is behind Bhutto’s assassination.
These priorities are consistent with the message that Mr. Musharraf has been sending for years. On Sept. 19, 2001, he told the Pakistani public that he would support U.S. efforts in Afghanistan in order to “save Afghanistan and Taliban, ensure that they suffer minimum losses.” He presented Pakistan’s support for U.S. efforts against the Taliban as reluctant compliance, required to assure the security of Pakistan from India.
Bhutto, however, had started to present a different message: that the people of Pakistan want a government and a state that serves them, not a state that serves the military’s pursuit of a failed strategic mission. She spoke of the Pakistani Taliban and their al Qaeda backers as the greatest threat to the country. She and other parties proposed to extend civil authority over the tribal agencies, ending their role as a platform for covert actions.
An interim of emergency rule and the postponement of national elections may now be inevitable. But if the military re-imposes martial law, further guts Pakistan’s judiciary and legal system, and blocks democratization, Pakistan’s people will resist.
For the first time in the history of Pakistan, respect for the military as an institution has plummeted. The vacuum of authority and legitimacy created by military rule will provide the Taliban and al Qaeda the opportunity they seek.
The Bush administration’s nightmare scenario—the convergence of terrorism and nuclear weapons—is happening right now, and in Pakistan, not in Iraq or Iran. Yet as recently as Dec. 11, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen, speaking to the House Armed Services Committee with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, hardly mentioned Pakistan, and characterized Afghanistan as second in priority to Iraq.
It is critical that the Bush administration put Pakistan and Afghanistan where they should have been for the past six years: at the top of this country’s security agenda. The most fitting memorial to Bhutto would be to recognize that the battle for a democratic Pakistan is the centerpiece of the global fight against terrorism.
Mr. Rubin is the director of studies at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation, and the author of “The Fragmentation of Afghanistan” (2nd edition, Yale University Press, 2002).
Citation: Barnett R. Rubin. "The Musharraf Problem," Wall Street Journal, 29 December 2007.
Original URL: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119888858644856743.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries
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31 December 2007
22 December 2007
Humiliation a Factor in Suicide Attacks
By Steven Gutkin
Associated Press, 29 September 2005.
BEERSHEBA, Israel - A bomb strapped to his abdomen, Rafat Moqadi walked into a Tel Aviv restaurant and saw a woman dining with her two little girls. "Seeing that, I decided not to carry out the operation. I couldn't do it," he said.
Yet, Moqadi said he longed for what he believes awaits a suicide bomber in the hereafter ? God's reward and a special place in heaven for martyrs. "He has a life in paradise," he told The Associated Press on Thursday. "He doesn't die."
A rare jailhouse interview with the would-be suicide bomber revealed a common thread running through the rising worldwide phenomenon: Most attackers are driven not by poverty or ignorance, but by a lethal mix of nationalism, zealotry and humiliation.
As the pace of attacks increases in the Middle East and beyond, a surprising profile is emerging of those willing to take their own lives: many are young, middle class and educated.
Nearly four-fifths of all suicide attacks over the past 35 years have occurred since the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist strikes in the U.S., according to the RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management. And 80 percent of those have been carried out by radical Islamic groups, said the center's director, Bruce Hoffman.
But religion is only part of the picture. Moqadi said that wasn't his motivation.
"The main reason was to resist the (Israeli) occupation, to create a balance of power with the Israeli army," he said.
"At the moment they put the (explosives) belt on me there were a few seconds of doubt," he said. "But after that I felt strength. I felt stronger than the whole state of Israel. It was a good feeling."
Moqadi, who is serving a 14-year sentence in the southern Israeli city of Beersheba, said he graduated high school and worked with his brothers laying tile before joining the Hamas militant group in 2002. The soft-spoken 26-year-old with neatly cropped hair said he did so in response to massive gunbattles between Israeli forces and Palestinians in Jenin.
Now, Moqadi spends most of his time in jail learning to speak, read and write Hebrew, the language of the Jewish state. Islam, he said, teaches that it's important to "know your enemy."
Moqadi is not alone in having doubts before pressing the button, said Ariel Merari, an Israeli psychologist who has interviewed numerous would-be bombers.
"A person who volunteers usually hesitates. He has second thoughts," Merari said.
Often what makes the person carry out the mission is commitment to a group, making it difficult to back out without losing face, experts say. Many of today's suicide bombers, especially in Iraq and the Palestinian territories, come from societies where many people condone the action, making it easier to execute.
"Usually there are rites and rituals just before launching that constitute the last nail in the coffin," Merari said.
For Palestinian attackers, the last ritual is usually the making of a videotape in which the bomber proclaims commitment to national liberation. In Sri Lanka, when suicide bombings were prevalent, it was often a final dinner with rebel leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.
Since the early 1980s, three countries have accounted for the vast majority of suicide bombings: Iraq, Israel and Sri Lanka. Iraq has become the global leader in suicide attacks, with an average of two a day during the past six months, attracting jihadists the world over, said Merari, who studies the issue at Tel Aviv University.
The conflicts in Israel and Iraq provide a fertile battlefield for suicide bombers, just as the conflict in Lebanon did during the 1980s and the one in Sri Lanka did from 1987 to 2002.
Hoffman attributes the sharp upturn in suicide bombings to their success in achieving the attackers' goal. His studies reveal that suicide strikes around the world kill four times as many people as other kinds of terrorism.
On Thursday alone, three suicide car bombs exploding nearly simultaneously killed at least 60 people in a city north of Baghdad.
In Afghanistan, another post Sept. 11 war front, a man launched a rare suicide attack in that country Wednesday outside a military training center in Kabul, killing nine people and breaking 10 days of relative calm after landmark parliamentary elections. The bombing, the worst to hit Kabul in a year, added to fears insurgents could copy tactics used in Iraq.
Recent studies have debunked some common misperceptions about suicide bombers: that most are poor, that they're in it for personal revenge, that they're crazy and uneducated.
"He wasn't short of money," said Bilal Ardo, whose 16-year-old son Hussam was arrested in March 2004 at a West Bank checkpoint with an explosives belt strapped to his body. "I have a supermarket and his pockets were never empty."
Many suicide bombers have come from middle class families and have attended university. But most were "relatively unimportant people, not leader types but follower types," Merari said.
Most have been men, but in places like Sri Lanka and Chechnya, up to 40 percent have been women, he said. Most were in their late teens or early 20s but some, including many of the 9/11 bombers, were a decade or more older. Almost all have been single and childless.
Some bombers do seek revenge, such as Hanadi Jaradat, 27, who blew up herself and 19 others at a restaurant in northern Israel in 2003 after seeing her brother die at the hands of Israeli troops. But most thwarted bombers say their motivation was nationalist, not personal.
A letter appearing this week in the journal Nature noted that many of today's Islamic radicals ? especially those operating in the West like in London or Madrid ? have no clear political goals but instead act "to oppose a perceived global evil." The letter, by researchers Scott Atran and Jessica Stern, said many potential suicide bombers in the West feel marginalized from society and "bond as they surf jihadi websites to find direction and purpose."
Abdel Haleem Izzedin, an Islamic Jihad leader in the West Bank town of Jenin, said Palestinian candidates for suicide bombings are "normal people" who "believe that Israel is occupying and confiscating their land and want to fight back."
Bombers in places like Madrid and London, he said, were "unusual" and "extreme."
Citation: Steven Gutkin. "Humiliation a Factor in Suicide Attacks," Associated Press, 29 September 2005.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20050929/ap_on_re_mi_ea/inside_bombers__minds
Associated Press, 29 September 2005.
BEERSHEBA, Israel - A bomb strapped to his abdomen, Rafat Moqadi walked into a Tel Aviv restaurant and saw a woman dining with her two little girls. "Seeing that, I decided not to carry out the operation. I couldn't do it," he said.
Yet, Moqadi said he longed for what he believes awaits a suicide bomber in the hereafter ? God's reward and a special place in heaven for martyrs. "He has a life in paradise," he told The Associated Press on Thursday. "He doesn't die."
A rare jailhouse interview with the would-be suicide bomber revealed a common thread running through the rising worldwide phenomenon: Most attackers are driven not by poverty or ignorance, but by a lethal mix of nationalism, zealotry and humiliation.
As the pace of attacks increases in the Middle East and beyond, a surprising profile is emerging of those willing to take their own lives: many are young, middle class and educated.
Nearly four-fifths of all suicide attacks over the past 35 years have occurred since the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist strikes in the U.S., according to the RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management. And 80 percent of those have been carried out by radical Islamic groups, said the center's director, Bruce Hoffman.
But religion is only part of the picture. Moqadi said that wasn't his motivation.
"The main reason was to resist the (Israeli) occupation, to create a balance of power with the Israeli army," he said.
"At the moment they put the (explosives) belt on me there were a few seconds of doubt," he said. "But after that I felt strength. I felt stronger than the whole state of Israel. It was a good feeling."
Moqadi, who is serving a 14-year sentence in the southern Israeli city of Beersheba, said he graduated high school and worked with his brothers laying tile before joining the Hamas militant group in 2002. The soft-spoken 26-year-old with neatly cropped hair said he did so in response to massive gunbattles between Israeli forces and Palestinians in Jenin.
Now, Moqadi spends most of his time in jail learning to speak, read and write Hebrew, the language of the Jewish state. Islam, he said, teaches that it's important to "know your enemy."
Moqadi is not alone in having doubts before pressing the button, said Ariel Merari, an Israeli psychologist who has interviewed numerous would-be bombers.
"A person who volunteers usually hesitates. He has second thoughts," Merari said.
Often what makes the person carry out the mission is commitment to a group, making it difficult to back out without losing face, experts say. Many of today's suicide bombers, especially in Iraq and the Palestinian territories, come from societies where many people condone the action, making it easier to execute.
"Usually there are rites and rituals just before launching that constitute the last nail in the coffin," Merari said.
For Palestinian attackers, the last ritual is usually the making of a videotape in which the bomber proclaims commitment to national liberation. In Sri Lanka, when suicide bombings were prevalent, it was often a final dinner with rebel leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.
Since the early 1980s, three countries have accounted for the vast majority of suicide bombings: Iraq, Israel and Sri Lanka. Iraq has become the global leader in suicide attacks, with an average of two a day during the past six months, attracting jihadists the world over, said Merari, who studies the issue at Tel Aviv University.
The conflicts in Israel and Iraq provide a fertile battlefield for suicide bombers, just as the conflict in Lebanon did during the 1980s and the one in Sri Lanka did from 1987 to 2002.
Hoffman attributes the sharp upturn in suicide bombings to their success in achieving the attackers' goal. His studies reveal that suicide strikes around the world kill four times as many people as other kinds of terrorism.
On Thursday alone, three suicide car bombs exploding nearly simultaneously killed at least 60 people in a city north of Baghdad.
In Afghanistan, another post Sept. 11 war front, a man launched a rare suicide attack in that country Wednesday outside a military training center in Kabul, killing nine people and breaking 10 days of relative calm after landmark parliamentary elections. The bombing, the worst to hit Kabul in a year, added to fears insurgents could copy tactics used in Iraq.
Recent studies have debunked some common misperceptions about suicide bombers: that most are poor, that they're in it for personal revenge, that they're crazy and uneducated.
"He wasn't short of money," said Bilal Ardo, whose 16-year-old son Hussam was arrested in March 2004 at a West Bank checkpoint with an explosives belt strapped to his body. "I have a supermarket and his pockets were never empty."
Many suicide bombers have come from middle class families and have attended university. But most were "relatively unimportant people, not leader types but follower types," Merari said.
Most have been men, but in places like Sri Lanka and Chechnya, up to 40 percent have been women, he said. Most were in their late teens or early 20s but some, including many of the 9/11 bombers, were a decade or more older. Almost all have been single and childless.
Some bombers do seek revenge, such as Hanadi Jaradat, 27, who blew up herself and 19 others at a restaurant in northern Israel in 2003 after seeing her brother die at the hands of Israeli troops. But most thwarted bombers say their motivation was nationalist, not personal.
A letter appearing this week in the journal Nature noted that many of today's Islamic radicals ? especially those operating in the West like in London or Madrid ? have no clear political goals but instead act "to oppose a perceived global evil." The letter, by researchers Scott Atran and Jessica Stern, said many potential suicide bombers in the West feel marginalized from society and "bond as they surf jihadi websites to find direction and purpose."
Abdel Haleem Izzedin, an Islamic Jihad leader in the West Bank town of Jenin, said Palestinian candidates for suicide bombings are "normal people" who "believe that Israel is occupying and confiscating their land and want to fight back."
Bombers in places like Madrid and London, he said, were "unusual" and "extreme."
Citation: Steven Gutkin. "Humiliation a Factor in Suicide Attacks," Associated Press, 29 September 2005.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20050929/ap_on_re_mi_ea/inside_bombers__minds
Rumsfeld and the Army
By David C. Isby
Washington Times, 16 June 2003.
News reports that retired Gen. Peter Jan Schoomaker has been selected by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as the next Army Chief of Staff have been seen in Washington as another battle between the transformation-minded secretary and an Army leadership still wedded to its big battalions. The selection of a retiree from Special Forces, the Green Berets, is seen by some as a slap at the Army's serving "conventional" generals. The selection comes on the heels of Mr. Rumsfeld's firing of Secretary of the Army Thomas White, with former Air Force Secretary (and naval officer) James Roche to replace him.
Other tensions come from the continued unrest in Iraq. There, the services - especially the Army - had asked for more troops and capabilities than Mr. Rumsfeld sent in the critical days when Saddam's regime crumbled. This time, the military leadership's position seemed to have been justified by the course of events, more so than when it initially opposed the form of the planned operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, wanting them larger and more conventional. The Army's leadership knows that superior firepower and battlefield skills do not provide commensurate advantages at imposing peace and achieving stability in Third World countries. Mr. Rumsfeld's recent declaration of military success in Afghanistan has not prevented U.S. forces there from having to deal with resurgent terrorism. The Army - despite its institutional aversion to such manpower-intensive commitments - has received open-ended missions in Iraq and Afghanistan to add to those that it reluctantly took up in Bosnia and Kosovo.
Yet the Rumsfeld-Army confrontation has been a limited conflict. While bringing in new men at the top, Mr. Rumsfeld has not fired any of the generals he supposedly sees as embodying the old ways. Nor has he killed any of the major equipment programs that they support (with the exception of the Crusader self-propelled howitzer, now reincarnated as part of the Army Future Combat System). From a man that Henry Kissinger reportedly once described as "the most ruthless I ever met, third world dictators not excluded," one would have expected blood in the A-Ring and discarded prototype weapons littering the Pentagon parking lots. The confrontation has much of its origin in appearances and attitudes rather than hard realities.
Mr. Rumsfeld will find military transformation difficult to achieve even with the cooperation of the Army leadership. Aiming for cooperation is no mere popularity contest. In the past, the military has gone along with secretaries of defense that imposed large-scale cuts, so long as it thought its institutions were being dealt with fairly and not led into actions where they would suffer. That is why retired warriors are inclined to pass over the deep spending, personnel and force structure cuts under Charles Wilson and Neil McElroy (Eisenhower's defense secretaries) but still go livid over the dealings of Robert McNamara on the path to the Vietnam War.
But today's uniformed leadership is more politicized than the one that saluted Eisenhower's "New Look." This is a legacy of the Clinton years, when military leaders acted politically to counter some of that administration's policies and the administration responded by politicizing the senior officer selection process to an unprecedented extent.Mr. Rumsfeld - and his appointees, including Mr. Roche and Gen. Schoomaker - may encounter similar opposition inside the Army. If so, a confrontation has the potential to hurt the Army and undercut needed transformation. In such a battle, secretary and service may both suffer.
Mr. Rumsfeld and the Army's leaders are potential allies in seeking to secure the changes needed for effective transformation. This will indeed require new thinking. Gen. Schoomaker may provide it; in recent years he helped expand the role of Special Operations Command, took part in the well-publicized Army Transformation Wargames and pressed CENTCOM Commander Gen. Tommy Franks to accord a greater role to special operations forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. But there is much more to institutional change - especially in the Pentagon - than the personnel at the top. Mr. Rumsfeld has much more to do to ensure the Army achieves transformation rather than confrontation.
David Isby is a Washington-based national security consultant and author.
Citation: David C. Isby, "Rumsfeld and the Army," Washington Times, 16 June 2003.
Original URL: http://www.washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20030615-112307-4307r.htm
Washington Times, 16 June 2003.
News reports that retired Gen. Peter Jan Schoomaker has been selected by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as the next Army Chief of Staff have been seen in Washington as another battle between the transformation-minded secretary and an Army leadership still wedded to its big battalions. The selection of a retiree from Special Forces, the Green Berets, is seen by some as a slap at the Army's serving "conventional" generals. The selection comes on the heels of Mr. Rumsfeld's firing of Secretary of the Army Thomas White, with former Air Force Secretary (and naval officer) James Roche to replace him.
Other tensions come from the continued unrest in Iraq. There, the services - especially the Army - had asked for more troops and capabilities than Mr. Rumsfeld sent in the critical days when Saddam's regime crumbled. This time, the military leadership's position seemed to have been justified by the course of events, more so than when it initially opposed the form of the planned operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, wanting them larger and more conventional. The Army's leadership knows that superior firepower and battlefield skills do not provide commensurate advantages at imposing peace and achieving stability in Third World countries. Mr. Rumsfeld's recent declaration of military success in Afghanistan has not prevented U.S. forces there from having to deal with resurgent terrorism. The Army - despite its institutional aversion to such manpower-intensive commitments - has received open-ended missions in Iraq and Afghanistan to add to those that it reluctantly took up in Bosnia and Kosovo.
Yet the Rumsfeld-Army confrontation has been a limited conflict. While bringing in new men at the top, Mr. Rumsfeld has not fired any of the generals he supposedly sees as embodying the old ways. Nor has he killed any of the major equipment programs that they support (with the exception of the Crusader self-propelled howitzer, now reincarnated as part of the Army Future Combat System). From a man that Henry Kissinger reportedly once described as "the most ruthless I ever met, third world dictators not excluded," one would have expected blood in the A-Ring and discarded prototype weapons littering the Pentagon parking lots. The confrontation has much of its origin in appearances and attitudes rather than hard realities.
Mr. Rumsfeld will find military transformation difficult to achieve even with the cooperation of the Army leadership. Aiming for cooperation is no mere popularity contest. In the past, the military has gone along with secretaries of defense that imposed large-scale cuts, so long as it thought its institutions were being dealt with fairly and not led into actions where they would suffer. That is why retired warriors are inclined to pass over the deep spending, personnel and force structure cuts under Charles Wilson and Neil McElroy (Eisenhower's defense secretaries) but still go livid over the dealings of Robert McNamara on the path to the Vietnam War.
But today's uniformed leadership is more politicized than the one that saluted Eisenhower's "New Look." This is a legacy of the Clinton years, when military leaders acted politically to counter some of that administration's policies and the administration responded by politicizing the senior officer selection process to an unprecedented extent.Mr. Rumsfeld - and his appointees, including Mr. Roche and Gen. Schoomaker - may encounter similar opposition inside the Army. If so, a confrontation has the potential to hurt the Army and undercut needed transformation. In such a battle, secretary and service may both suffer.
Mr. Rumsfeld and the Army's leaders are potential allies in seeking to secure the changes needed for effective transformation. This will indeed require new thinking. Gen. Schoomaker may provide it; in recent years he helped expand the role of Special Operations Command, took part in the well-publicized Army Transformation Wargames and pressed CENTCOM Commander Gen. Tommy Franks to accord a greater role to special operations forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. But there is much more to institutional change - especially in the Pentagon - than the personnel at the top. Mr. Rumsfeld has much more to do to ensure the Army achieves transformation rather than confrontation.
David Isby is a Washington-based national security consultant and author.
Citation: David C. Isby, "Rumsfeld and the Army," Washington Times, 16 June 2003.
Original URL: http://www.washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20030615-112307-4307r.htm
20 December 2007
Staying cool with China
By Jonathan D. Pollack
The Christian Science Monitor, 5 April 2001.
NEWPORT, R.I. - Abruptly and unexpectedly, US-China relations are imperiled by events far removed from either nation's capital.
Sunday's mid-air collision of a US Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese Naval Air Force fighter near Hainan Island was an accident waiting to happen. Chinese pilots, presumably with authorization from their military superiors, had been engaged in much closer pursuit of US intelligence-gathering aircraft in recent months, and US officials had repeatedly warned Chinese counterparts about the increased risks inherent in such conduct.
The warnings have come to naught, resulting in the death of one Chinese pilot and the emergency landing of the EP-3 at a Chinese naval air base on Hainan, with 24 US military personnel under the physical control of local authorities. Given the extensive damage to the American aircraft, the US personnel are fortunate to have escaped with their lives.
Neither country's leaders should take much solace that this accident did not involve the loss of far more lives. It has already engendered consequences for the perennially troubled Sino-American relationship that could prove very difficult to repair, at least in the near term. Less than three months into the George W. Bush presidency, the two countries confront the prospect of a major diplomatic row, one whose reverberations could set the tone for bilateral relations for years to come.
At time of writing, the Bush administration clearly hoped that a firm but respectful attitude in negotiations over release of the crew would soon bear fruit, though the prospects for the early return of the aircraft seemed far more problematic. The new foreign policy team recognizes that there can be no gain in stoking the aggrieved Chinese nationalism upon which Beijing leaders are only too prepared to rely. But the president's deportment has yet to be reciprocated by leaders in China, who may well be animated by domestic preoccupations far more pressing than an expeditious conclusion to the events in the South China Sea.
It seems incomprehensible that last Sunday's incident could indefinitely preoccupy the Chinese and US leaderships, thereby foreclosing the development of more productive ties. But political support for the bilateral relationship seems extraordinarily shallow in both countries. Despite the compelling incentives for cordial if not intimate relations between the United States and China over an array of international issues, the center of gravity in bilateral relations seems increasingly unsteady. With few leaders prepared to expend appreciable political capital on enhancing bilateral ties, senior officials are denied the creativity and flexibility essential under more stressful circumstances.
In the charged atmosphere of Beijing politics, it is often difficult to filter the signals from the noise. However, the Bush administration has no alternative but to conduct private and public relations with China in a forthright manner, while avoiding needless provocation of Beijing that feeds those forces in China who would welcome a severe estrangement in US-China ties.
Should the impasse persist, however, the administration will also face growing pressure to "do something," especially from members of Congress. Used judiciously, quiet reminders to Chinese interlocutors can underscore the potential risks to bilateral relations should the contretemps persist without satisfactory resolution, let alone deteriorate further.
But the events in the South China Sea can also have a chastening effect on the new administration. Upon entering office, President Bush pledged to devote his primary foreign policy efforts to reinvigorating relations with America's major allies, which he claimed had been neglected at the expense of the Clinton administration's efforts to cultivate ties with Russia and with China. By implication, the new foreign policy leadership sought to defer fuller consideration of relations with Moscow and with Beijing, and quite possibly relegate both to a lesser priority in US policy concerns.
Recent events, therefore, could well have an unanticipated if somewhat salutary effect. They have provided a sobering reminder to the new administration that it does not have the luxury of deferring development of a credible, sustainable China policy to a later date. Indeed, America's closest allies in Asia probably worry more about the consequences of a prolonged US-China estrangement for their own interests than any other issue in regional relations.
Both literally and figuratively, therefore, the new administration unexpectedly finds China on its radar screen. Though President Bush must now deal with US-China relations far sooner than he might have preferred, it is the reality he now confronts.
The immediacy of an early foreign policy crisis with China should be chastening to the new team, but the risks and dangers should be equally sobering to the Chinese. Dealing credibly and coolly with this incident presents both leaderships with the opportunity to develop meaningful rules of the road for the longer term, and will also underscore a shared stake in effective crisis management.
Failure to achieve satisfactory outcomes will entail even larger potential consequences. Even as China characterizes itself as the aggrieved party that must be compensated for last Sunday's events, the prospect of a deeper US-China estrangement ought to give both countries pause. Neither can afford to let events in the South China Sea determine its policies for the indefinite future.
• Jonathan D. Pollack is chairman of the Strategic Research Department of the Naval War College in Newport, R. I., where he also directs the college's Asia-Pacific Studies Group. The opinions expressed here are entirely his own, and should not be attributed to the Naval War College or the US government.
Citation: Jonathan D. Pollack. "Staying cool with China," The Christian Science Monitor, 5 April 2001.
Original URL: http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/2001/04/05/fp11s1-csm.shtml
The Christian Science Monitor, 5 April 2001.
NEWPORT, R.I. - Abruptly and unexpectedly, US-China relations are imperiled by events far removed from either nation's capital.
Sunday's mid-air collision of a US Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese Naval Air Force fighter near Hainan Island was an accident waiting to happen. Chinese pilots, presumably with authorization from their military superiors, had been engaged in much closer pursuit of US intelligence-gathering aircraft in recent months, and US officials had repeatedly warned Chinese counterparts about the increased risks inherent in such conduct.
The warnings have come to naught, resulting in the death of one Chinese pilot and the emergency landing of the EP-3 at a Chinese naval air base on Hainan, with 24 US military personnel under the physical control of local authorities. Given the extensive damage to the American aircraft, the US personnel are fortunate to have escaped with their lives.
Neither country's leaders should take much solace that this accident did not involve the loss of far more lives. It has already engendered consequences for the perennially troubled Sino-American relationship that could prove very difficult to repair, at least in the near term. Less than three months into the George W. Bush presidency, the two countries confront the prospect of a major diplomatic row, one whose reverberations could set the tone for bilateral relations for years to come.
At time of writing, the Bush administration clearly hoped that a firm but respectful attitude in negotiations over release of the crew would soon bear fruit, though the prospects for the early return of the aircraft seemed far more problematic. The new foreign policy team recognizes that there can be no gain in stoking the aggrieved Chinese nationalism upon which Beijing leaders are only too prepared to rely. But the president's deportment has yet to be reciprocated by leaders in China, who may well be animated by domestic preoccupations far more pressing than an expeditious conclusion to the events in the South China Sea.
It seems incomprehensible that last Sunday's incident could indefinitely preoccupy the Chinese and US leaderships, thereby foreclosing the development of more productive ties. But political support for the bilateral relationship seems extraordinarily shallow in both countries. Despite the compelling incentives for cordial if not intimate relations between the United States and China over an array of international issues, the center of gravity in bilateral relations seems increasingly unsteady. With few leaders prepared to expend appreciable political capital on enhancing bilateral ties, senior officials are denied the creativity and flexibility essential under more stressful circumstances.
In the charged atmosphere of Beijing politics, it is often difficult to filter the signals from the noise. However, the Bush administration has no alternative but to conduct private and public relations with China in a forthright manner, while avoiding needless provocation of Beijing that feeds those forces in China who would welcome a severe estrangement in US-China ties.
Should the impasse persist, however, the administration will also face growing pressure to "do something," especially from members of Congress. Used judiciously, quiet reminders to Chinese interlocutors can underscore the potential risks to bilateral relations should the contretemps persist without satisfactory resolution, let alone deteriorate further.
But the events in the South China Sea can also have a chastening effect on the new administration. Upon entering office, President Bush pledged to devote his primary foreign policy efforts to reinvigorating relations with America's major allies, which he claimed had been neglected at the expense of the Clinton administration's efforts to cultivate ties with Russia and with China. By implication, the new foreign policy leadership sought to defer fuller consideration of relations with Moscow and with Beijing, and quite possibly relegate both to a lesser priority in US policy concerns.
Recent events, therefore, could well have an unanticipated if somewhat salutary effect. They have provided a sobering reminder to the new administration that it does not have the luxury of deferring development of a credible, sustainable China policy to a later date. Indeed, America's closest allies in Asia probably worry more about the consequences of a prolonged US-China estrangement for their own interests than any other issue in regional relations.
Both literally and figuratively, therefore, the new administration unexpectedly finds China on its radar screen. Though President Bush must now deal with US-China relations far sooner than he might have preferred, it is the reality he now confronts.
The immediacy of an early foreign policy crisis with China should be chastening to the new team, but the risks and dangers should be equally sobering to the Chinese. Dealing credibly and coolly with this incident presents both leaderships with the opportunity to develop meaningful rules of the road for the longer term, and will also underscore a shared stake in effective crisis management.
Failure to achieve satisfactory outcomes will entail even larger potential consequences. Even as China characterizes itself as the aggrieved party that must be compensated for last Sunday's events, the prospect of a deeper US-China estrangement ought to give both countries pause. Neither can afford to let events in the South China Sea determine its policies for the indefinite future.
• Jonathan D. Pollack is chairman of the Strategic Research Department of the Naval War College in Newport, R. I., where he also directs the college's Asia-Pacific Studies Group. The opinions expressed here are entirely his own, and should not be attributed to the Naval War College or the US government.
Citation: Jonathan D. Pollack. "Staying cool with China," The Christian Science Monitor, 5 April 2001.
Original URL: http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/2001/04/05/fp11s1-csm.shtml
PRC arms itself to wage war on U.S.
China's acquisition of cruise-missile weapons systems from Russia poses a clear and present danger to U.S. naval forces—and to the American homeland as well
By Zoli Simon
Insight Magazine, 22 July 2002.
Here's a scenario: The rhetoric is heating up the Taiwan Strait as the People's Republic of China (PRC) accuses Taiwan of preparing to declare its independence. Analysts predict war. President George W. Bush dispatches two U.S. Navy carrier battle groups to the region in response to the crisis. The Chinese, just as they have been threatening in open publications of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), decide to go after the carriers, counting on delivering a devastating psychological blow. They initiate a saturation raid on the battle groups with cruise missiles launched from land, sea and the air--including the supersonic Russian-made Moskit, with a 120-kilometer (74-mile) range, and Yakhont, with a 300-kilometer (186-mile) range. Could the American fleet defend itself and survive? A top U.S. defense expert with naval experience has his doubts.
The effectiveness of the fleet's so-called "close-in" defenses against the Moskit and the Yakhont are "questionable," says the defense expert. All the more so since such missiles are capable of "endgame maneuvers" designed to thwart U.S. defenses.
Those trying to downplay the cruise-missile threat point to the option of pre-emption: taking out the cruise-missile platforms before they could launch their deadly payload. This would mean shooting down airborne jets, sinking the Sovremny-class destroyers that China bought from Russia and chasing road-mobile cruise-missile launchers across the Chinese mainland. Given that there was not one confirmed kill of such a platform during the Persian Gulf War, the latter is regarded by the Pentagon as the more difficult.
The expert notes that U.S. Los Angeles class attack submarines easily could take out the Sovremnys, and that it was a good idea for the Bush administration to allow the sale of less-advanced subs to Taiwan. As he adds, however, the problem with pre-emption is that "in a time period leading up to a crisis, Americans don't shoot first." He warns, "If [the enemy] throw[s] the first punch, that could be a roundhouse knockout. We would ultimately win, but it would hurt the battle group severely." As Richard Fisher, a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, pointed out, even if a cruise-missile attack scores only a "soft kill" such as fire on the flight deck of a U.S. carrier that might stop air operations for hours, that could be decisive in a battle situation.
According to a General Accounting Office (GAO) report on ship-based cruise-missile defenses: Although the Navy has made progress in improving surface ship self-defense capabilities, most ships continue to have only limited capabilities against cruise-missile threats." The report, issued at the end of the Clinton administration, says these self-defense capabilities will grow less effective with time as mid- and longer-term cruise-missile threats materialize.
What makes matters even worse, the GAO pointed out, is that "Research-and-development spending related to ship self-defense has declined about 9.4 percent over the last five years and is projected to decline more than 44 percent over the next six years."
Bill Triplett, a former aide to GOP Sens. Jesse Helms of North Carolina and Robert Bennett of Utah, is concerned about cruise-missile proliferation from China to rogue states such as Iran. Triplett tells INSIGHT the Clinton administration never enforced the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, even though one of its cosponsors in the Senate was vice president Al Gore. Triplett points out that China, meanwhile, has been selling air-, sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles to Iran.
Triplett's recommendations include going ahead with U.S. missile defense and "enforcing American law." As he puts it, the Bush administration should "look seriously at enforcing" the Gore/McCain sanctions.
It's not only the U.S. fleet that's at risk. According to defense expert Dennis Gormley in Senate testimony, "Even a large, bulky cruise missile like the Chinese Silkworm could readily fit inside a standard 12-meter (40-foot) shipping container equipped with a small internal erector for launching. Such a ship-launched cruise missile could be positioned just outside territorial waters to strike virtually any important capital or large industrial area anywhere on the globe. And, because a cruise missile is an ideal means for effectively delivering small but highly lethal quantities of a biological agent, a state or terrorist group could forgo acquiring or building a nuclear weapon without sacrificing the ability to cause catastrophic damage."
As for the threat faced by the fleet, Fisher warns about China's growing cruise-missile capabilities. As he points out, the Chinese air force's new strike aircraft (the Russian SU-30MKK and the Chinese Xian JH-7A) will by the end of this decade carry "long-range antiradar or antiship missiles, some of which will have supersonic speeds that can defeat U.S. close-in weapon systems." Also, the Chinese navy's new Russian Kilo-class submarines will be armed with Club antiship cruise missiles from Russia, at least one of which can be configured to attack targets on land. In addition, Fisher says, the Sovremny destroyers the PLA acquired from Russia carry the Moskit and Yakhont cruise missiles.
China is not the only problem. As Christopher Bolkcom from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has pointed out, "81 countries appear to have" cruise missiles from one source or another. Peter Huessy of the National Defense University Foundation sees proliferation of cruise missiles as "an attempt ... to stop the U.S. from defending its allies" by sending in the fleet.
According to a 1999 GAO report titled Cruise Missile Defense--Progress Made But Significant Challenges Remain, while an aircraft flying at 10,000 feet can be spotted by radar at a distance of 150 miles, a cruise missile can be detected only when it is 20 miles away. Even with the subsonic Exocet missile, British sailors in the Falklands War "saw it coming only four seconds before it hit" a 1993 Washington Post article pointed out. An earlier version of the Moskit (the SS-N-22 Sunburn) is four times faster than the Exocet, performs evasive S-turns and reportedly could defeat defensive U.S. electronic countermeasures, the Post noted.
While the SS-N-22 can be armed with a nuclear warhead, even when it is not, the energy of a supersonic cruise missile slamming into its target can be devastating. This missile, or one of its versions, has been sold by Russia to India, China and Iran, says CRS' Bolkcom.
According to Bolkcom, cruise missiles can be used to "level the playing field against more advanced militaries." They're cheaper than ballistic missiles, and even the older cruise missiles the rogue states tend to get "appear capable of attacking fixed-area targets from theater ranges. These include population centers, ports, airfields, military headquarters and logistics infrastructures."
Another problem is the necessity of distinguishing them from friendly aircraft, Bolkcom pointed out. Also, they are more survivable before launch than "manned aircraft and, perhaps, tactical ballistic missiles." They have "relatively benign infrastructure and handling requirements" compared to ballistic missiles, and it is not difficult to convert antiship cruise missiles into land-attack versions.
As a CRS report for Congress points out, the intelligence community estimates that by the end of the decade a cruise-missile attack on the American homeland might be possible. As Frank Gaffney, president of the Center for Security Policy, says, however, a cruise-missile attack on the American homeland could happen "at any time, even now." The same CRS report notes that all major cruise-missile components already can be purchased on the commercial market. This not only makes monitoring cruise-missile development next to impossible, it also makes getting cruise-missile technology cheaper for rogue states or terrorist groups.
The Missile Technology Control Regime and the Wassenaar Agreement have been ineffective in stopping cruise-missile proliferation, say defense experts. Currently, the Pentagon is working on better detection capabilities, integrating air- and missile-defense systems and providing a single air picture for warfighters. However, it will be some time before any full system is operational. According to defense expert Gormley, "Even a limited defense of the entire U.S. homeland against offshore cruise missiles would cost at least $30 billion to $40 billion." But a future cruise-missile defense system could build on such air/missile defense systems as THAAD, the Navy's Aegis and the multigenerational Patriot.
As the CRS report points out, "coordinating military and civilian airspace monitoring and control entities [North American Aerospace Defense Command and the Federal Aviation Administration, respectively] will likely be key" to successful cruise-missile defense of the homeland. Jamestown's Fisher suggests going ahead with rapidly deployable, compact, cruise-missile defenses, the most efficient of which in his view would be based on directed-energy technologies.
Citation: Zoli Simon. "PRC Arms Itself to Wage War on U.S.," Insight Magazine, 22 July 2002.
Original URL: http://www.elfis.net/phorum/read.php?f=36&i=215&t=215
By Zoli Simon
Insight Magazine, 22 July 2002.
Here's a scenario: The rhetoric is heating up the Taiwan Strait as the People's Republic of China (PRC) accuses Taiwan of preparing to declare its independence. Analysts predict war. President George W. Bush dispatches two U.S. Navy carrier battle groups to the region in response to the crisis. The Chinese, just as they have been threatening in open publications of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), decide to go after the carriers, counting on delivering a devastating psychological blow. They initiate a saturation raid on the battle groups with cruise missiles launched from land, sea and the air--including the supersonic Russian-made Moskit, with a 120-kilometer (74-mile) range, and Yakhont, with a 300-kilometer (186-mile) range. Could the American fleet defend itself and survive? A top U.S. defense expert with naval experience has his doubts.
The effectiveness of the fleet's so-called "close-in" defenses against the Moskit and the Yakhont are "questionable," says the defense expert. All the more so since such missiles are capable of "endgame maneuvers" designed to thwart U.S. defenses.
Those trying to downplay the cruise-missile threat point to the option of pre-emption: taking out the cruise-missile platforms before they could launch their deadly payload. This would mean shooting down airborne jets, sinking the Sovremny-class destroyers that China bought from Russia and chasing road-mobile cruise-missile launchers across the Chinese mainland. Given that there was not one confirmed kill of such a platform during the Persian Gulf War, the latter is regarded by the Pentagon as the more difficult.
The expert notes that U.S. Los Angeles class attack submarines easily could take out the Sovremnys, and that it was a good idea for the Bush administration to allow the sale of less-advanced subs to Taiwan. As he adds, however, the problem with pre-emption is that "in a time period leading up to a crisis, Americans don't shoot first." He warns, "If [the enemy] throw[s] the first punch, that could be a roundhouse knockout. We would ultimately win, but it would hurt the battle group severely." As Richard Fisher, a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, pointed out, even if a cruise-missile attack scores only a "soft kill" such as fire on the flight deck of a U.S. carrier that might stop air operations for hours, that could be decisive in a battle situation.
According to a General Accounting Office (GAO) report on ship-based cruise-missile defenses: Although the Navy has made progress in improving surface ship self-defense capabilities, most ships continue to have only limited capabilities against cruise-missile threats." The report, issued at the end of the Clinton administration, says these self-defense capabilities will grow less effective with time as mid- and longer-term cruise-missile threats materialize.
What makes matters even worse, the GAO pointed out, is that "Research-and-development spending related to ship self-defense has declined about 9.4 percent over the last five years and is projected to decline more than 44 percent over the next six years."
Bill Triplett, a former aide to GOP Sens. Jesse Helms of North Carolina and Robert Bennett of Utah, is concerned about cruise-missile proliferation from China to rogue states such as Iran. Triplett tells INSIGHT the Clinton administration never enforced the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, even though one of its cosponsors in the Senate was vice president Al Gore. Triplett points out that China, meanwhile, has been selling air-, sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles to Iran.
Triplett's recommendations include going ahead with U.S. missile defense and "enforcing American law." As he puts it, the Bush administration should "look seriously at enforcing" the Gore/McCain sanctions.
It's not only the U.S. fleet that's at risk. According to defense expert Dennis Gormley in Senate testimony, "Even a large, bulky cruise missile like the Chinese Silkworm could readily fit inside a standard 12-meter (40-foot) shipping container equipped with a small internal erector for launching. Such a ship-launched cruise missile could be positioned just outside territorial waters to strike virtually any important capital or large industrial area anywhere on the globe. And, because a cruise missile is an ideal means for effectively delivering small but highly lethal quantities of a biological agent, a state or terrorist group could forgo acquiring or building a nuclear weapon without sacrificing the ability to cause catastrophic damage."
As for the threat faced by the fleet, Fisher warns about China's growing cruise-missile capabilities. As he points out, the Chinese air force's new strike aircraft (the Russian SU-30MKK and the Chinese Xian JH-7A) will by the end of this decade carry "long-range antiradar or antiship missiles, some of which will have supersonic speeds that can defeat U.S. close-in weapon systems." Also, the Chinese navy's new Russian Kilo-class submarines will be armed with Club antiship cruise missiles from Russia, at least one of which can be configured to attack targets on land. In addition, Fisher says, the Sovremny destroyers the PLA acquired from Russia carry the Moskit and Yakhont cruise missiles.
China is not the only problem. As Christopher Bolkcom from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has pointed out, "81 countries appear to have" cruise missiles from one source or another. Peter Huessy of the National Defense University Foundation sees proliferation of cruise missiles as "an attempt ... to stop the U.S. from defending its allies" by sending in the fleet.
According to a 1999 GAO report titled Cruise Missile Defense--Progress Made But Significant Challenges Remain, while an aircraft flying at 10,000 feet can be spotted by radar at a distance of 150 miles, a cruise missile can be detected only when it is 20 miles away. Even with the subsonic Exocet missile, British sailors in the Falklands War "saw it coming only four seconds before it hit" a 1993 Washington Post article pointed out. An earlier version of the Moskit (the SS-N-22 Sunburn) is four times faster than the Exocet, performs evasive S-turns and reportedly could defeat defensive U.S. electronic countermeasures, the Post noted.
While the SS-N-22 can be armed with a nuclear warhead, even when it is not, the energy of a supersonic cruise missile slamming into its target can be devastating. This missile, or one of its versions, has been sold by Russia to India, China and Iran, says CRS' Bolkcom.
According to Bolkcom, cruise missiles can be used to "level the playing field against more advanced militaries." They're cheaper than ballistic missiles, and even the older cruise missiles the rogue states tend to get "appear capable of attacking fixed-area targets from theater ranges. These include population centers, ports, airfields, military headquarters and logistics infrastructures."
Another problem is the necessity of distinguishing them from friendly aircraft, Bolkcom pointed out. Also, they are more survivable before launch than "manned aircraft and, perhaps, tactical ballistic missiles." They have "relatively benign infrastructure and handling requirements" compared to ballistic missiles, and it is not difficult to convert antiship cruise missiles into land-attack versions.
As a CRS report for Congress points out, the intelligence community estimates that by the end of the decade a cruise-missile attack on the American homeland might be possible. As Frank Gaffney, president of the Center for Security Policy, says, however, a cruise-missile attack on the American homeland could happen "at any time, even now." The same CRS report notes that all major cruise-missile components already can be purchased on the commercial market. This not only makes monitoring cruise-missile development next to impossible, it also makes getting cruise-missile technology cheaper for rogue states or terrorist groups.
The Missile Technology Control Regime and the Wassenaar Agreement have been ineffective in stopping cruise-missile proliferation, say defense experts. Currently, the Pentagon is working on better detection capabilities, integrating air- and missile-defense systems and providing a single air picture for warfighters. However, it will be some time before any full system is operational. According to defense expert Gormley, "Even a limited defense of the entire U.S. homeland against offshore cruise missiles would cost at least $30 billion to $40 billion." But a future cruise-missile defense system could build on such air/missile defense systems as THAAD, the Navy's Aegis and the multigenerational Patriot.
As the CRS report points out, "coordinating military and civilian airspace monitoring and control entities [North American Aerospace Defense Command and the Federal Aviation Administration, respectively] will likely be key" to successful cruise-missile defense of the homeland. Jamestown's Fisher suggests going ahead with rapidly deployable, compact, cruise-missile defenses, the most efficient of which in his view would be based on directed-energy technologies.
Citation: Zoli Simon. "PRC Arms Itself to Wage War on U.S.," Insight Magazine, 22 July 2002.
Original URL: http://www.elfis.net/phorum/read.php?f=36&i=215&t=215
19 December 2007
A victory, but little to cheer: Afghanistan's bleak north-south divide
The Economist, 17 December 2007
THE confrontation probably marked the end the current fighting season. As some 5,000 NATO and Afghan soldiers last week massed around Musa Qala, a town in southern Afghanistan’s troubled Helmand province, its Taliban defenders held on for four days before their resistance melted. The local fighters then slipped away into nearby hills, making the unconvincing claim that their retreat was out of concern for the safety of the civilian population.
The recapture of a town that was previously controlled by Western troops is welcome, but it represents a limited triumph for the outsiders as winter freezes much of the country quiet. The year has seen neither the Taliban nor outside troops gain telling advantage. NATO has won all the battles and has managed to preserve the support of most Afghans: if opinion polls can be believed Afghans still support an international military presence in their country (one published by the BBC this month suggested that 71% of Afghans want American forces to stay). Yet overall levels of Taliban violence continue to rise across southern and eastern Afghanistan. Worse, they have spread significantly into the border areas of Pakistan.
Across southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban effort is focused, the upward trend of violence coincides with continuing weakness and problems of legitimacy for the government. In practice this means the uneven development of Afghanistan’s own security forces, startlingly high levels of narcotics production and corruption (the latter fuelled by the drugs industry), and a general malaise in the legitimate economy in the region.
Elsewhere matters are more complex. In the north, and in some provinces along the eastern border patrolled by the Americans, security has improved. The northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif is enjoying an economic boom. The warlords who once dominated the north are now somewhat diminished figures, and many have turned away from brute force to profit instead from business or politics (albeit of a dubious hue). And in the north opium cultivation is also down, although many farmers have simply planted cannabis instead of poppy.
But the rough division between north and south looks more stark now. The south continues to move steadily in the wrong direction. Instability has spread to a number of previously benign provinces. Some countries, especially European ones that have contributed to NATO’s forces, are unenthusiastic about the shooting war they find themselves involved in. After a summer of repeatedly retaking the same two districts of Kandahar province, the Canadian commander, Brigadier-General Guy Laroche, commented: “Everything we have done in that regard is not a waste of time, but close to it”.
There are signs, too, that as the insurgency meshes itself tightly with the drugs trade, a sizeable proportion of the population may feel it has a vested interest in prolonged insecurity which allows narcotics production to flourish.
The winter is at least a moment to pause and reflect on strategy for next year. At Musa Qala, NATO and Afghan forces easily defeated the Taliban but as diplomats in Kabul, the capital, concede, a far greater challenge is then defending against reinfiltration. Securing territory means getting the support of local people. In Helmand, for example, this requires teams of anthropologists and political officers to deal with a mosaic of tribal interest groups, an approach used by American forces elsewhere in the country. That means a greater emphasis on reconciliation and negotiation with local Taliban leaders, as well as training Afghan forces so they are able to take the lead in military operations.
Politically the challenges are no easier. The Afghan public, particularly in the south, is gloomy about the future. Dismay over corruption and wrangling between different ethnic groups suggest that Afghan leaders, such as President Hamid Karzai, will need substantial support from outsiders for a long time yet. America is backing the idea of sending a “super envoy” to co-ordinate international efforts in Afghanistan. But the government remains unable even to reach out across areas of the south. Where it cannot reach there may need to be more controversial “tribal solutions”, such as village militias to provide local security and efforts to empower tribal elders and local systems of justice.
Citation: "A victory, but little to cheer: Afghanistan's bleak north-south divide," The Economist, 17 December 2007.
Original URL: http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10315840&top_story=1
THE confrontation probably marked the end the current fighting season. As some 5,000 NATO and Afghan soldiers last week massed around Musa Qala, a town in southern Afghanistan’s troubled Helmand province, its Taliban defenders held on for four days before their resistance melted. The local fighters then slipped away into nearby hills, making the unconvincing claim that their retreat was out of concern for the safety of the civilian population.
The recapture of a town that was previously controlled by Western troops is welcome, but it represents a limited triumph for the outsiders as winter freezes much of the country quiet. The year has seen neither the Taliban nor outside troops gain telling advantage. NATO has won all the battles and has managed to preserve the support of most Afghans: if opinion polls can be believed Afghans still support an international military presence in their country (one published by the BBC this month suggested that 71% of Afghans want American forces to stay). Yet overall levels of Taliban violence continue to rise across southern and eastern Afghanistan. Worse, they have spread significantly into the border areas of Pakistan.
Across southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban effort is focused, the upward trend of violence coincides with continuing weakness and problems of legitimacy for the government. In practice this means the uneven development of Afghanistan’s own security forces, startlingly high levels of narcotics production and corruption (the latter fuelled by the drugs industry), and a general malaise in the legitimate economy in the region.
Elsewhere matters are more complex. In the north, and in some provinces along the eastern border patrolled by the Americans, security has improved. The northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif is enjoying an economic boom. The warlords who once dominated the north are now somewhat diminished figures, and many have turned away from brute force to profit instead from business or politics (albeit of a dubious hue). And in the north opium cultivation is also down, although many farmers have simply planted cannabis instead of poppy.
But the rough division between north and south looks more stark now. The south continues to move steadily in the wrong direction. Instability has spread to a number of previously benign provinces. Some countries, especially European ones that have contributed to NATO’s forces, are unenthusiastic about the shooting war they find themselves involved in. After a summer of repeatedly retaking the same two districts of Kandahar province, the Canadian commander, Brigadier-General Guy Laroche, commented: “Everything we have done in that regard is not a waste of time, but close to it”.
There are signs, too, that as the insurgency meshes itself tightly with the drugs trade, a sizeable proportion of the population may feel it has a vested interest in prolonged insecurity which allows narcotics production to flourish.
The winter is at least a moment to pause and reflect on strategy for next year. At Musa Qala, NATO and Afghan forces easily defeated the Taliban but as diplomats in Kabul, the capital, concede, a far greater challenge is then defending against reinfiltration. Securing territory means getting the support of local people. In Helmand, for example, this requires teams of anthropologists and political officers to deal with a mosaic of tribal interest groups, an approach used by American forces elsewhere in the country. That means a greater emphasis on reconciliation and negotiation with local Taliban leaders, as well as training Afghan forces so they are able to take the lead in military operations.
Politically the challenges are no easier. The Afghan public, particularly in the south, is gloomy about the future. Dismay over corruption and wrangling between different ethnic groups suggest that Afghan leaders, such as President Hamid Karzai, will need substantial support from outsiders for a long time yet. America is backing the idea of sending a “super envoy” to co-ordinate international efforts in Afghanistan. But the government remains unable even to reach out across areas of the south. Where it cannot reach there may need to be more controversial “tribal solutions”, such as village militias to provide local security and efforts to empower tribal elders and local systems of justice.
Citation: "A victory, but little to cheer: Afghanistan's bleak north-south divide," The Economist, 17 December 2007.
Original URL: http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10315840&top_story=1
US: Turkish attack 'not as agreed to'
By Pauline Jelinek
The Associated Press, 19 December 2007
WASHINGTON - U.S. and Turkish military officials were working Wednesday to streamline procedures for any future attacks against rebels in northern Iraq after top American officials in Baghdad were angered about how Sunday's Turkish bombing unfolded.
Americans have been providing Turkey with intelligence to go after the Kurdish rebels, and a "coordination center" has been set up in Ankara so Turks, Iraqis and Americans can share information, officials have said.
But State Department and Defense Department officials in Washington and Baghdad said top U.S. commanders in Iraq didn't know about the incursion until the first of two waves of Turkish planes were already on their way — either crossing the border or already over it.
The Turkish military did not inform the American military as quickly as had been agreed. That meant the U.S. had to rush to clear air space for the incursion, two defense officials and a State Department official said on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.
One Washington official said the top U.S. commander in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, was angered by the development. Another said American diplomats complained to the Turks about it.
The Turks replied they were chasing rebels and there hadn't been time for notification earlier, according to a senior State Department official. "They said it was hot pursuit," the U.S. official said.
"There are supposed to be coordinating mechanisms for this kind of thing with us and the Iraqis, and whatever happens in the heat of the moment, they have to tell us in a reasonable and timely manner," the official added. "We have told them it would be extremely helpful if they were more forthcoming on the notification."
Turkey's ambassador to Washington, Nabi Sensoy, said Wednesday the strike against targets of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, was made possible by intelligence from the U.S.
"There's no doubt that this operation was due to the information shared by the United States of America," he said in an interview with The Associated Press.
Under an agreement between the countries, Turkey is to analyze U.S. data, decide whether it will take military action, then notify the U.S. of its plan, one official said. Sensoy said he was "not aware of any direct complaint" over the timing of Turkey's notification.
Defense Department spokesman Bryan Whitman Wednesday disputed there was a problem, saying "the right people knew at the time." He declined to elaborate.
None of the officials gave details about precisely what procedures had been agreed to. But one noted that the process is complex because it involves Turkey, Iraq, the U.S. and potentially neighboring governments such as Tehran because some PKK camps are near the Iranian border.
For the U.S. alone, the issue cuts across two military commands — the European Command that takes in Turkey and the Central Command, which is managing the war in Iraq.
"It starts in Ankara (with the Turkish military informing the U.S. military) ... then goes up the chain, then the air space is de-conflicted," or cleared, one Washington official said. "It was the Turks who on the first go-around did not give the desired lead time."
It was the American military in Baghdad that ended up notifying the Iraqi government that planes had already been sent to strike rebel positions inside their country.
The Iraqi parliament on Monday condemned the bombing, calling it an "outrageous" violation of Iraq's sovereignty that killed innocent civilians.
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said his government thought Turkey would coordinate with it before striking the rebels inside Iraq.
Sensoy dismissed the Iraqi complaint, saying Turkey has been unhappy with cooperation from Iraq's central government and its regional Kurdish government in the north. The process for coordinating among the United States, Iraq and Turkey is not working, he said.
Some reports said there were up to 50 planes involved Sunday, which would be the largest aerial attack in years against the outlawed rebel separatist group. Others put the number at a much less and Sensoy said there were 24 aircraft.
The Turkish army also sent soldiers about 1.5 miles into northern Iraq in an overnight operation on Tuesday, Kurdish officials said. Kurdish officials said the Turkish troops left Iraq about 15 hours later.
___
Associated Press writers Matthew Lee, Lolita C. Baldor and Desmond Butler contributed to this report.
Citation: Pauline Jelinek. " US: Turkish attack 'not as agreed to'," The Associated Press, 19 December 2007 .
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071219/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_iraq_turkey
The Associated Press, 19 December 2007
WASHINGTON - U.S. and Turkish military officials were working Wednesday to streamline procedures for any future attacks against rebels in northern Iraq after top American officials in Baghdad were angered about how Sunday's Turkish bombing unfolded.
Americans have been providing Turkey with intelligence to go after the Kurdish rebels, and a "coordination center" has been set up in Ankara so Turks, Iraqis and Americans can share information, officials have said.
But State Department and Defense Department officials in Washington and Baghdad said top U.S. commanders in Iraq didn't know about the incursion until the first of two waves of Turkish planes were already on their way — either crossing the border or already over it.
The Turkish military did not inform the American military as quickly as had been agreed. That meant the U.S. had to rush to clear air space for the incursion, two defense officials and a State Department official said on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.
One Washington official said the top U.S. commander in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, was angered by the development. Another said American diplomats complained to the Turks about it.
The Turks replied they were chasing rebels and there hadn't been time for notification earlier, according to a senior State Department official. "They said it was hot pursuit," the U.S. official said.
"There are supposed to be coordinating mechanisms for this kind of thing with us and the Iraqis, and whatever happens in the heat of the moment, they have to tell us in a reasonable and timely manner," the official added. "We have told them it would be extremely helpful if they were more forthcoming on the notification."
Turkey's ambassador to Washington, Nabi Sensoy, said Wednesday the strike against targets of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, was made possible by intelligence from the U.S.
"There's no doubt that this operation was due to the information shared by the United States of America," he said in an interview with The Associated Press.
Under an agreement between the countries, Turkey is to analyze U.S. data, decide whether it will take military action, then notify the U.S. of its plan, one official said. Sensoy said he was "not aware of any direct complaint" over the timing of Turkey's notification.
Defense Department spokesman Bryan Whitman Wednesday disputed there was a problem, saying "the right people knew at the time." He declined to elaborate.
None of the officials gave details about precisely what procedures had been agreed to. But one noted that the process is complex because it involves Turkey, Iraq, the U.S. and potentially neighboring governments such as Tehran because some PKK camps are near the Iranian border.
For the U.S. alone, the issue cuts across two military commands — the European Command that takes in Turkey and the Central Command, which is managing the war in Iraq.
"It starts in Ankara (with the Turkish military informing the U.S. military) ... then goes up the chain, then the air space is de-conflicted," or cleared, one Washington official said. "It was the Turks who on the first go-around did not give the desired lead time."
It was the American military in Baghdad that ended up notifying the Iraqi government that planes had already been sent to strike rebel positions inside their country.
The Iraqi parliament on Monday condemned the bombing, calling it an "outrageous" violation of Iraq's sovereignty that killed innocent civilians.
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said his government thought Turkey would coordinate with it before striking the rebels inside Iraq.
Sensoy dismissed the Iraqi complaint, saying Turkey has been unhappy with cooperation from Iraq's central government and its regional Kurdish government in the north. The process for coordinating among the United States, Iraq and Turkey is not working, he said.
Some reports said there were up to 50 planes involved Sunday, which would be the largest aerial attack in years against the outlawed rebel separatist group. Others put the number at a much less and Sensoy said there were 24 aircraft.
The Turkish army also sent soldiers about 1.5 miles into northern Iraq in an overnight operation on Tuesday, Kurdish officials said. Kurdish officials said the Turkish troops left Iraq about 15 hours later.
___
Associated Press writers Matthew Lee, Lolita C. Baldor and Desmond Butler contributed to this report.
Citation: Pauline Jelinek. " US: Turkish attack 'not as agreed to'," The Associated Press, 19 December 2007 .
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071219/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_iraq_turkey
14 December 2007
US launches public-private bid to reform Afghan justice
Agence France-Presse, 13 December 2007
WASHINGTON (AFP) - The United States on Thursday launched a public-private partnership to promote an independent and fair judicial system in Afghanistan, which has been battered by decades of war and turmoil.
In a ceremony chaired by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Afghan Attorney General Abdul Jabar Sabit, US law firms and law schools agreed to fund projects that train members of the legal profession and offer aid to the poor.
"Establishing a fair, democratic and transparent justice system in Afghanistan is essential to the country's success. And we know that there is much work remaining to be done," Rice said in a speech.
"One concern for the justice system is the deficiency of basic equipment, such as just office supplies, vehicles, and the limited availability of defense attorneys and private practitioners," she said.
"Another challenge is to expand public awareness of legal rights, which is especially lacking in rural areas," Rice added.
"Increasing the number of women judges is also a key priority. Afghanistan currently has over 1,500 judges nationwide, yet only 60 are women," she said.
"It is imperative that Afghanistan develop a well-trained, educated and demographically-representative cadre of judges to serve in courts across the country," the secretary of state said.
Sabit said the reforms would fight crime, corruption, terrorism and drug trafficking.
He said an important "first step" is training lawyers and prosecutors.
"Raising the salaries of prosecutors and judges would help us fight corruption," he added.
In partnership with the US State Department are the Law Offices of Donald Edgar of Santa Rosa, California, and Arent Fox LLP of Washington D.C. as well as the University of Utah School of Law.
Citation: " US launches public-private bid to reform Afghan justice," Agence France-Presse, 13 December 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071214/pl_afp/afghanistanjusticeuscorruption
WASHINGTON (AFP) - The United States on Thursday launched a public-private partnership to promote an independent and fair judicial system in Afghanistan, which has been battered by decades of war and turmoil.
In a ceremony chaired by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Afghan Attorney General Abdul Jabar Sabit, US law firms and law schools agreed to fund projects that train members of the legal profession and offer aid to the poor.
"Establishing a fair, democratic and transparent justice system in Afghanistan is essential to the country's success. And we know that there is much work remaining to be done," Rice said in a speech.
"One concern for the justice system is the deficiency of basic equipment, such as just office supplies, vehicles, and the limited availability of defense attorneys and private practitioners," she said.
"Another challenge is to expand public awareness of legal rights, which is especially lacking in rural areas," Rice added.
"Increasing the number of women judges is also a key priority. Afghanistan currently has over 1,500 judges nationwide, yet only 60 are women," she said.
"It is imperative that Afghanistan develop a well-trained, educated and demographically-representative cadre of judges to serve in courts across the country," the secretary of state said.
Sabit said the reforms would fight crime, corruption, terrorism and drug trafficking.
He said an important "first step" is training lawyers and prosecutors.
"Raising the salaries of prosecutors and judges would help us fight corruption," he added.
In partnership with the US State Department are the Law Offices of Donald Edgar of Santa Rosa, California, and Arent Fox LLP of Washington D.C. as well as the University of Utah School of Law.
Citation: " US launches public-private bid to reform Afghan justice," Agence France-Presse, 13 December 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071214/pl_afp/afghanistanjusticeuscorruption
US army 'construction surge' in Afghanistan
Agence France-Presse, 13 December 2007
KABUL (AFP) - A US army "construction surge" in Afghanistan next year worth nearly two-billion dollars will go mainly on infrastructure for the growing army and police, the chief of engineers said Thursday.
The amount planned for next year is up on the 2.8-billion dollars spent between 2003 and 2007 by the US Army Corps of Engineers.
About 75 percent of next year's allocation would go towards building facilities for the Afghan security forces on which the country depends, the head of the corps, Lieutenant General Robert L. Van Antwerp, told reporters.
The 228 US army engineers in Afghanistan were also building roads and surveying dams for use to provide power, irrigation and drinking water, he said after a short visit to Afghanistan.
"In 2008 the corps of engineers is planning a construction surge through Afghanistan costing nearly two-billion dollars," a statement on his visit said.
The corps, which in Afghanistan is 70 percent civilian, has already built nine brigade bases for the Afghan National Army that include barracks, dining facilities, power supplies and sewage treatment facilities.
It also built a 37-million-dollar bridge between Tajikistan and Afghanistan that was opened in August.
The aim is "getting the country on its feet," Van Antwerp said. "We have got a country that has been at war for 30 years and that has taken its toll."
The growth of the Afghan army and police was particularly important.
"If people aren't afraid to go to market, if they aren't afraid to have a bazaar, then you start to get the freedom that enables people to be entrepreneurs," he said.
The United States led the invasion that toppled the Taliban government in late 2001 weeks after the 9/11 attacks by Al-Qaeda, which then had training camps in Afghanistan.
It is the country's main supporter as it battles a Taliban-led insurgency that has been its deadliest this year.
Washington in January announced 10.6-billion dollars in aid over the next two years, of which 8.6-billion dollars was for training and equipping Afghan security forces and two billion for reconstruction.
Citation: " US army 'construction surge' in Afghanistan," Agence France-Presse, 13 December 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071213/pl_afp/afghanistanunrestusmilitaryconstruction_071213174732
KABUL (AFP) - A US army "construction surge" in Afghanistan next year worth nearly two-billion dollars will go mainly on infrastructure for the growing army and police, the chief of engineers said Thursday.
The amount planned for next year is up on the 2.8-billion dollars spent between 2003 and 2007 by the US Army Corps of Engineers.
About 75 percent of next year's allocation would go towards building facilities for the Afghan security forces on which the country depends, the head of the corps, Lieutenant General Robert L. Van Antwerp, told reporters.
The 228 US army engineers in Afghanistan were also building roads and surveying dams for use to provide power, irrigation and drinking water, he said after a short visit to Afghanistan.
"In 2008 the corps of engineers is planning a construction surge through Afghanistan costing nearly two-billion dollars," a statement on his visit said.
The corps, which in Afghanistan is 70 percent civilian, has already built nine brigade bases for the Afghan National Army that include barracks, dining facilities, power supplies and sewage treatment facilities.
It also built a 37-million-dollar bridge between Tajikistan and Afghanistan that was opened in August.
The aim is "getting the country on its feet," Van Antwerp said. "We have got a country that has been at war for 30 years and that has taken its toll."
The growth of the Afghan army and police was particularly important.
"If people aren't afraid to go to market, if they aren't afraid to have a bazaar, then you start to get the freedom that enables people to be entrepreneurs," he said.
The United States led the invasion that toppled the Taliban government in late 2001 weeks after the 9/11 attacks by Al-Qaeda, which then had training camps in Afghanistan.
It is the country's main supporter as it battles a Taliban-led insurgency that has been its deadliest this year.
Washington in January announced 10.6-billion dollars in aid over the next two years, of which 8.6-billion dollars was for training and equipping Afghan security forces and two billion for reconstruction.
Citation: " US army 'construction surge' in Afghanistan," Agence France-Presse, 13 December 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071213/pl_afp/afghanistanunrestusmilitaryconstruction_071213174732
US may reduce Iraq reconstruction teams in 2009: official
Agence France-Presse, 13 December 2007
WASHINGTON (AFP) - The United States may begin reducing the number of reconstruction teams in Iraq in 2009 and hand more of the development responsibilities to Iraqis, a US aid official said Thursday.
Thomas Staal, the Iraq reconstruction director at the US Agency for International Development (USAID), said Iraq's local and national governments are making progress while the security situation has improved.
"The Iraqi government is already making good progress, so we see that at that point (2009) they should be able to take over more and more of the activities" of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), Staal said at a news conference.
He stressed, however, that 2009 was "not a hard and fast" date and that the team reduction "depends on the security situation, it depends on the Iraqi government's own ability to take over things."
But, he added, "I don't see that the PRTs will be there five years from now."
The number of reconstruction teams grew from 10 in 2006 to 25 today as part of President George W. Bush's strategy to send a "surge" of about 30,000 troops earlier this year in an effort to improve security in Iraq, he said.
The 25 teams, which are led by the US State Department, total about 200 staff members, including foreigners, Staal said.
In his overview of reconstruction in Iraq, Staal said the first phase -- rebuilding infrastructure -- was complete and that the current focus was on improving government effectiveness and the economy.
In the third phase, the Iraqi government is to take the lead from the PRTs. Reconstruction teams would withdraw from the provinces but maintain a presence in Baghdad, Staal said.
Citation: " US may reduce Iraq reconstruction teams in 2009: official," Agence France-Presse, 13 December 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071213/pl_afp/usiraqpoliticsaidreconstruction
WASHINGTON (AFP) - The United States may begin reducing the number of reconstruction teams in Iraq in 2009 and hand more of the development responsibilities to Iraqis, a US aid official said Thursday.
Thomas Staal, the Iraq reconstruction director at the US Agency for International Development (USAID), said Iraq's local and national governments are making progress while the security situation has improved.
"The Iraqi government is already making good progress, so we see that at that point (2009) they should be able to take over more and more of the activities" of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), Staal said at a news conference.
He stressed, however, that 2009 was "not a hard and fast" date and that the team reduction "depends on the security situation, it depends on the Iraqi government's own ability to take over things."
But, he added, "I don't see that the PRTs will be there five years from now."
The number of reconstruction teams grew from 10 in 2006 to 25 today as part of President George W. Bush's strategy to send a "surge" of about 30,000 troops earlier this year in an effort to improve security in Iraq, he said.
The 25 teams, which are led by the US State Department, total about 200 staff members, including foreigners, Staal said.
In his overview of reconstruction in Iraq, Staal said the first phase -- rebuilding infrastructure -- was complete and that the current focus was on improving government effectiveness and the economy.
In the third phase, the Iraqi government is to take the lead from the PRTs. Reconstruction teams would withdraw from the provinces but maintain a presence in Baghdad, Staal said.
Citation: " US may reduce Iraq reconstruction teams in 2009: official," Agence France-Presse, 13 December 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071213/pl_afp/usiraqpoliticsaidreconstruction
Taliban collected taxes, ran heroin labs
By Noor Khan
The Associated Press, 12 December 2007
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan - The Taliban appointed a judge and a police chief and drove through town in stolen police trucks. They oversaw dozens of heroin labs, using the profits to fund their insurgency.
That was life under the Taliban in the key southern town of Musa Qala — a rule that ended, at least for now, when Afghan and international troops moved in this week and the militants retreated.
But residents say it will be a battle to keep the Taliban from returning.
Security forces need to consolidate control over a region that has slipped in and out of their hands over the past two years, a back-and-forth emblematic of the failure of President Hamid Karzai's government to assert itself in the Taliban's southern heartland.
After overrunning Musa Qala in February, the Taliban installed their own government structure. Residents said hundreds of fighters roamed the streets, and militants killed people they accused of being spies for the Afghan government and NATO forces.
Notably, though, the militants did not impose a strict ban on radios, televisions and kite flying — the type of restrictions that made the Islamic militia unpopular when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan.
But the fighters did collect "taxes" from businesses, farmers and others, money used to help fund the insurgency that raged across the northern part of Helmand province in 2007, a year of record violence in Afghanistan.
Fariq Khan, a Musa Qala resident in his early 30s who owns a telephone shop, said the Taliban would take about $8 from each family every month during a collection at the mosque. Though small, the amount is significant; teachers in Afghanistan are paid only $50 a month.
Trucks passing through paid $50 and poppy farmers had to turn over 10 percent of their profits, Khan said, speaking to The Associated Press in Kandahar.
Musa Qala was the site of 50 to 70 heroin labs used to process the opium poppies grown across northern Helmand — the world's largest poppy growing region. Khan said small labs employed 15 Afghans, while larger operations had some 60 workers.
Another Musa Qala resident, Mohammed Rauf, said the town has dozens of labs run by residents. "When the Taliban took control after this peace agreement failed, the heroin factories increased," he said in a telephone interview.
Gen. Sharif Khan, a counternarcotics official in the Interior Ministry, said the government had reports of more than 70 heroin labs in Musa Qala before this week's attack on the town. He said counternarcotics forces would soon travel to Musa Qala to investigate.
In its annual report, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime published a map showing a number of heroin labs in northern Helmand, where Musa Qala is located.
A Taliban spokesman couldn't be reached for comment.
Though the militants were pushed out of Musa Qala — an important symbolic victory for Afghan and NATO troops — Taliban fighters still control three remote districts in the north of the province, Washer, Naw Zad and Bagrhan, said Defense Ministry spokesman Gen. Mohammad Zahir Azimi. The Afghan-NATO force will continue operations in those areas, he said.
Afghanistan this year produced 93 percent of the world's opium, the main ingredient in heroin, and Helmand produced more than 50 percent of the country's opium. More than 80 percent of the province's farmers are involved in the opium trade.
A local tribal leader said the government should appoint powerful but honest government leaders and police for Musa Qala.
"If they build roads and clinics and provide jobs, then it will be easy to win the sympathies of the people," Jalal Khan said by telephone from the nearby Gereshk district.
He said Taliban fighters have moved from Musa Qala into the nearby districts of Kajaki, Sangin and Naw Zad, and that Afghan and international troops would need to take on the militants in those areas as well.
The Ministry of Defense said Wednesday that more than 50 Taliban fighters fleeing Musa Qala were killed in two days of battles in Sangin.
"If the NATO and Afghan forces carry out operations in the neighboring districts as well, then it will be easy to control Musa Qala," Jalal Khan said. "But if they only patrol Musa Qala ... then the Taliban will constantly be attacking Musa Qala and checkpoints and planting roadside bombs, and they won't have control around Musa Qala for a long time."
Rauf, who stayed home during the fighting in Musa Qala, said some residents were starting to return. But he said it wasn't clear if the Taliban's ouster will be a good thing for residents.
"We don't know anything right now. The government hasn't even announced that it's safe to return to Musa Qala," Rauf said. "We will wait and see if this is good for us. We can't talk about these things in the future."
Citation: Noor Khan. " Taliban collected taxes, ran heroin labs," The Associated Press, 12 December 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071212/ap_on_re_as/afghan_taliban_town_1
The Associated Press, 12 December 2007
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan - The Taliban appointed a judge and a police chief and drove through town in stolen police trucks. They oversaw dozens of heroin labs, using the profits to fund their insurgency.
That was life under the Taliban in the key southern town of Musa Qala — a rule that ended, at least for now, when Afghan and international troops moved in this week and the militants retreated.
But residents say it will be a battle to keep the Taliban from returning.
Security forces need to consolidate control over a region that has slipped in and out of their hands over the past two years, a back-and-forth emblematic of the failure of President Hamid Karzai's government to assert itself in the Taliban's southern heartland.
After overrunning Musa Qala in February, the Taliban installed their own government structure. Residents said hundreds of fighters roamed the streets, and militants killed people they accused of being spies for the Afghan government and NATO forces.
Notably, though, the militants did not impose a strict ban on radios, televisions and kite flying — the type of restrictions that made the Islamic militia unpopular when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan.
But the fighters did collect "taxes" from businesses, farmers and others, money used to help fund the insurgency that raged across the northern part of Helmand province in 2007, a year of record violence in Afghanistan.
Fariq Khan, a Musa Qala resident in his early 30s who owns a telephone shop, said the Taliban would take about $8 from each family every month during a collection at the mosque. Though small, the amount is significant; teachers in Afghanistan are paid only $50 a month.
Trucks passing through paid $50 and poppy farmers had to turn over 10 percent of their profits, Khan said, speaking to The Associated Press in Kandahar.
Musa Qala was the site of 50 to 70 heroin labs used to process the opium poppies grown across northern Helmand — the world's largest poppy growing region. Khan said small labs employed 15 Afghans, while larger operations had some 60 workers.
Another Musa Qala resident, Mohammed Rauf, said the town has dozens of labs run by residents. "When the Taliban took control after this peace agreement failed, the heroin factories increased," he said in a telephone interview.
Gen. Sharif Khan, a counternarcotics official in the Interior Ministry, said the government had reports of more than 70 heroin labs in Musa Qala before this week's attack on the town. He said counternarcotics forces would soon travel to Musa Qala to investigate.
In its annual report, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime published a map showing a number of heroin labs in northern Helmand, where Musa Qala is located.
A Taliban spokesman couldn't be reached for comment.
Though the militants were pushed out of Musa Qala — an important symbolic victory for Afghan and NATO troops — Taliban fighters still control three remote districts in the north of the province, Washer, Naw Zad and Bagrhan, said Defense Ministry spokesman Gen. Mohammad Zahir Azimi. The Afghan-NATO force will continue operations in those areas, he said.
Afghanistan this year produced 93 percent of the world's opium, the main ingredient in heroin, and Helmand produced more than 50 percent of the country's opium. More than 80 percent of the province's farmers are involved in the opium trade.
A local tribal leader said the government should appoint powerful but honest government leaders and police for Musa Qala.
"If they build roads and clinics and provide jobs, then it will be easy to win the sympathies of the people," Jalal Khan said by telephone from the nearby Gereshk district.
He said Taliban fighters have moved from Musa Qala into the nearby districts of Kajaki, Sangin and Naw Zad, and that Afghan and international troops would need to take on the militants in those areas as well.
The Ministry of Defense said Wednesday that more than 50 Taliban fighters fleeing Musa Qala were killed in two days of battles in Sangin.
"If the NATO and Afghan forces carry out operations in the neighboring districts as well, then it will be easy to control Musa Qala," Jalal Khan said. "But if they only patrol Musa Qala ... then the Taliban will constantly be attacking Musa Qala and checkpoints and planting roadside bombs, and they won't have control around Musa Qala for a long time."
Rauf, who stayed home during the fighting in Musa Qala, said some residents were starting to return. But he said it wasn't clear if the Taliban's ouster will be a good thing for residents.
"We don't know anything right now. The government hasn't even announced that it's safe to return to Musa Qala," Rauf said. "We will wait and see if this is good for us. We can't talk about these things in the future."
Citation: Noor Khan. " Taliban collected taxes, ran heroin labs," The Associated Press, 12 December 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071212/ap_on_re_as/afghan_taliban_town_1
12 December 2007
U.S. military says Iraq is the priority
Democratic lawmakers want the Pentagon to put more troops and resources in Afghanistan. But Gates says that is NATO's responsibility.
By Julian E. Barnes
Los Angeles Times, 12 December 2007
WASHINGTON -- The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged Tuesday that the U.S. military's primary focus remained the war in Iraq, not Afghanistan, prompting criticism from Democratic lawmakers who want the Pentagon to devote more attention and resources to the Afghan conflict.
Adm. Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the war in Afghanistan was an "economy of force" operation, a military label for a mission of secondary importance.
"Our main focus, militarily, in the region and in the world right now is rightly and firmly in Iraq," Mullen said before the House Armed Services Committee. "It is simply a matter of resources, of capacity. In Afghanistan, we do what we can. In Iraq, we do what we must."
Mullen appeared with Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates before the House panel as U.S. officials sought to increase pressure on North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to boost the number of troops and equipment the alliance is providing for the Afghan mission.
But Rep. Joe Sestak (D-Pa.), a retired Navy vice admiral, challenged Mullen. Sestak argued that in years to come the U.S. might regret not sending more of its own troops, particularly military trainers, to Afghanistan.
"I would think the better approach might be what Winston Churchill said: Sometimes it is not enough to do our best. Sometimes we have to do what is required," Sestak said. "How can we point at NATO when we haven't done what is required?"
Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, called for the Pentagon to shift resources from Iraq and to make Afghanistan the focus of the war on terrorism.
The U.S. launched its invasion of Afghanistan a month after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to drive from power the Taliban regime, which had provided sanctuary to Al Qaeda. But many critics say the Bush administration turned its attention to Iraq before the job was finished.
"Afghanistan has been the forgotten war. Opportunities have been squandered, and now we're clearly seeing the effects," Skelton said. "We must re-prioritize and shift needed resources from Iraq to Afghanistan."
Mullen disputed the idea that Afghanistan was forgotten, and Gates said that achieving success in Afghanistan and Iraq was crucial. But the Defense secretary made clear that he was trying to increase pressure on NATO to do more.
"I am not ready to let NATO off the hook in Afghanistan at this point," Gates said.
Although security in Iraq has been improving in recent months, violence in Afghanistan is on the rise. There have been growing numbers of suicide attacks and roadside bombs.
Gates acknowledged the increasing number of attacks, but said the violence was a result of stepped-up NATO operations. He insisted that the Taliban had made no real military gains, and that only when security increased would governance improve and reconstruction projects expand.
"The Taliban and their former guests, Al Qaeda, do not have the ability to reimpose their rule," Gates said.
The Defense Department is trying to persuade NATO allies to send an additional 3,500 trainers and a similar number of combat troops, along with 20 more helicopters.
Gates said he was pressing for a civilian official to be appointed to coordinate reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan.
Although he did not mention any names, a military official said last week that Paddy Ashdown, a British diplomat who served as the administrator of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was the leading candidate for the post.
This week, Gates will travel to Scotland for a meeting with the NATO nations serving in the southern region of Afghanistan, where some of the most fierce fighting has taken place.
Gates is pushing the alliance to develop a three- to five-year plan that will set out measures to judge progress in Afghanistan. He argued that such a plan could help build public support in Europe for the Afghan mission.
"I think part of the problem that the European governments are having in selling their publics on the importance of their commitment in Afghanistan is a lack of understanding in Europe, particularly, of what we're trying to accomplish and why it's important," Gates said.
Citation: Julian E. Barnes. "U.S. military says Iraq is the priority," Los Angeles Times, 12 December 2007.
Original URL: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/iraq/complete/la-fg-usafghan12dec12,1,2188309.story?coll=la-iraq-complete&ctrack=2&cset=true
By Julian E. Barnes
Los Angeles Times, 12 December 2007
WASHINGTON -- The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged Tuesday that the U.S. military's primary focus remained the war in Iraq, not Afghanistan, prompting criticism from Democratic lawmakers who want the Pentagon to devote more attention and resources to the Afghan conflict.
Adm. Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the war in Afghanistan was an "economy of force" operation, a military label for a mission of secondary importance.
"Our main focus, militarily, in the region and in the world right now is rightly and firmly in Iraq," Mullen said before the House Armed Services Committee. "It is simply a matter of resources, of capacity. In Afghanistan, we do what we can. In Iraq, we do what we must."
Mullen appeared with Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates before the House panel as U.S. officials sought to increase pressure on North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to boost the number of troops and equipment the alliance is providing for the Afghan mission.
But Rep. Joe Sestak (D-Pa.), a retired Navy vice admiral, challenged Mullen. Sestak argued that in years to come the U.S. might regret not sending more of its own troops, particularly military trainers, to Afghanistan.
"I would think the better approach might be what Winston Churchill said: Sometimes it is not enough to do our best. Sometimes we have to do what is required," Sestak said. "How can we point at NATO when we haven't done what is required?"
Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, called for the Pentagon to shift resources from Iraq and to make Afghanistan the focus of the war on terrorism.
The U.S. launched its invasion of Afghanistan a month after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to drive from power the Taliban regime, which had provided sanctuary to Al Qaeda. But many critics say the Bush administration turned its attention to Iraq before the job was finished.
"Afghanistan has been the forgotten war. Opportunities have been squandered, and now we're clearly seeing the effects," Skelton said. "We must re-prioritize and shift needed resources from Iraq to Afghanistan."
Mullen disputed the idea that Afghanistan was forgotten, and Gates said that achieving success in Afghanistan and Iraq was crucial. But the Defense secretary made clear that he was trying to increase pressure on NATO to do more.
"I am not ready to let NATO off the hook in Afghanistan at this point," Gates said.
Although security in Iraq has been improving in recent months, violence in Afghanistan is on the rise. There have been growing numbers of suicide attacks and roadside bombs.
Gates acknowledged the increasing number of attacks, but said the violence was a result of stepped-up NATO operations. He insisted that the Taliban had made no real military gains, and that only when security increased would governance improve and reconstruction projects expand.
"The Taliban and their former guests, Al Qaeda, do not have the ability to reimpose their rule," Gates said.
The Defense Department is trying to persuade NATO allies to send an additional 3,500 trainers and a similar number of combat troops, along with 20 more helicopters.
Gates said he was pressing for a civilian official to be appointed to coordinate reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan.
Although he did not mention any names, a military official said last week that Paddy Ashdown, a British diplomat who served as the administrator of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was the leading candidate for the post.
This week, Gates will travel to Scotland for a meeting with the NATO nations serving in the southern region of Afghanistan, where some of the most fierce fighting has taken place.
Gates is pushing the alliance to develop a three- to five-year plan that will set out measures to judge progress in Afghanistan. He argued that such a plan could help build public support in Europe for the Afghan mission.
"I think part of the problem that the European governments are having in selling their publics on the importance of their commitment in Afghanistan is a lack of understanding in Europe, particularly, of what we're trying to accomplish and why it's important," Gates said.
Citation: Julian E. Barnes. "U.S. military says Iraq is the priority," Los Angeles Times, 12 December 2007.
Original URL: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/iraq/complete/la-fg-usafghan12dec12,1,2188309.story?coll=la-iraq-complete&ctrack=2&cset=true
Shi'ite factions proclaim truce in Iraq's Basra
By Aref Mohammed
Reuters, 11 December 2007
BASRA, Iraq (Reuters) - The Shi'ite factions that have feuded over control of Iraq's southern oil hub Basra have proclaimed a truce, but the challenge will come soon when Britain hands responsibility for the province to Iraqi forces.
The handover of security in Basra, expected next week, will be the biggest test yet of the Iraqi government's ability to maintain order without relying on U.S. or British soldiers.
U.S. and British forces have already handed eight of Iraq's 18 provinces over to Iraqi control. But Basra, with Iraq's second-largest city, only port and oil exports providing most of the government's revenue, is a challenge of a different scale.
By the middle of next year, Britain, which patrolled the province since 2003, will have just a token force of 2,500 troops, confined to an airbase outside Basra city.
Iraqi authorities say they have the firepower for the job.
"Our forces in Basra have tanks, armoured vehicles and planes. We are backed directly by the interior minister and the prime minister," Lieutenant-General Mohan al-Firaiji, head of Basra's security operations, told Reuters in an interview.
He said leaders of the city's main rival armed Shi'ite factions met in a mosque last week and signed a pact to cooperate with security forces and not carry guns.
Washington and London say responsibility for averting a meltdown now rests firmly with the Iraqis.
"We didn't create the mess in Basra," a senior U.S. official said in Baghdad last week.
"This is a case where this government, the Shi'a parties have failed to act responsibly. They are now taking notice of it and there seems to be some efforts to try to get the different parties represented to start making an accommodation."
MILITIA VIOLENCE
Rival Shi'ite factions, each with their own militia and political agendas, have vied for control in Basra since 2003.
Cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's followers are thought to have the most clout on the streets, while the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council has influence in the security forces and the smaller Fadhila party controls the governorate.
Each has a different view on regional autonomy: Sadr opposes it, the Supreme Council wants Basra as part of a Shi'ite region across the south and Fadhila wants autonomy for Basra itself.
Some of the militia have imposed strict Islamic codes. Women have been killed for so-called "honour crimes" and walls have been painted with threats against those who go out unveiled.
For much of the year, the situation deteriorated. British troops who patrolled Basra came under escalating bombing and mortar attacks until September, when they quit their base in the city centre for the airbase on its outskirts.
Since then, with no more British troops in the city to attack, violence has abated. Many ordinary Basrawis say the city feels safer and government troops appear to be in charge.
"I don't think there's any truth to talk of militias ruling Basra. It's true that sometimes they carry weapons and sometimes spark clashes but the government and its forces are the ones who almost always win," said university lecturer Wisam Hamid.
Commander Firaiji said most violence was not political.
"We have no militants in the streets, no terrorism in Basra, no crime-infested areas. We still have some organised crime, honour crimes and personal acts of revenge. But politically motivated crimes do not exceed four percent," he said.
Faction leaders, once at daggers drawn, have taken to making conciliatory remarks.
"The period of dispute between us and the governor are over. We have good relations with the governor and the Fadhila party," Sheikh Ali al-Suaidi, a senior Sadrist in Basra, told Reuters.
Prominent Fadhila member Aqeel Talib said the Sadr movement had "played a positive role in recent weeks".
But the test of their willingness to lay down arms will be deeds, not words, said Oslo-based historian Reidar Visser, an expert on southern Iraq who edits the Web site historiae.org.
"As with other such pacts ... it is the facts on the ground rather than the statements that will count," he said.
(Additional reporting by Peter Graff, Dean Yates and Mussab al-Khairalla in Baghdad; writing by Peter Graff; Editing by Dean Yates)
Citation: Aref Mohammed. "Shi'ite factions proclaim truce in Iraq's Basra," Reuters, 11 December 2007.
Original URL: http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKL113898120071211
Reuters, 11 December 2007
BASRA, Iraq (Reuters) - The Shi'ite factions that have feuded over control of Iraq's southern oil hub Basra have proclaimed a truce, but the challenge will come soon when Britain hands responsibility for the province to Iraqi forces.
The handover of security in Basra, expected next week, will be the biggest test yet of the Iraqi government's ability to maintain order without relying on U.S. or British soldiers.
U.S. and British forces have already handed eight of Iraq's 18 provinces over to Iraqi control. But Basra, with Iraq's second-largest city, only port and oil exports providing most of the government's revenue, is a challenge of a different scale.
By the middle of next year, Britain, which patrolled the province since 2003, will have just a token force of 2,500 troops, confined to an airbase outside Basra city.
Iraqi authorities say they have the firepower for the job.
"Our forces in Basra have tanks, armoured vehicles and planes. We are backed directly by the interior minister and the prime minister," Lieutenant-General Mohan al-Firaiji, head of Basra's security operations, told Reuters in an interview.
He said leaders of the city's main rival armed Shi'ite factions met in a mosque last week and signed a pact to cooperate with security forces and not carry guns.
Washington and London say responsibility for averting a meltdown now rests firmly with the Iraqis.
"We didn't create the mess in Basra," a senior U.S. official said in Baghdad last week.
"This is a case where this government, the Shi'a parties have failed to act responsibly. They are now taking notice of it and there seems to be some efforts to try to get the different parties represented to start making an accommodation."
MILITIA VIOLENCE
Rival Shi'ite factions, each with their own militia and political agendas, have vied for control in Basra since 2003.
Cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's followers are thought to have the most clout on the streets, while the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council has influence in the security forces and the smaller Fadhila party controls the governorate.
Each has a different view on regional autonomy: Sadr opposes it, the Supreme Council wants Basra as part of a Shi'ite region across the south and Fadhila wants autonomy for Basra itself.
Some of the militia have imposed strict Islamic codes. Women have been killed for so-called "honour crimes" and walls have been painted with threats against those who go out unveiled.
For much of the year, the situation deteriorated. British troops who patrolled Basra came under escalating bombing and mortar attacks until September, when they quit their base in the city centre for the airbase on its outskirts.
Since then, with no more British troops in the city to attack, violence has abated. Many ordinary Basrawis say the city feels safer and government troops appear to be in charge.
"I don't think there's any truth to talk of militias ruling Basra. It's true that sometimes they carry weapons and sometimes spark clashes but the government and its forces are the ones who almost always win," said university lecturer Wisam Hamid.
Commander Firaiji said most violence was not political.
"We have no militants in the streets, no terrorism in Basra, no crime-infested areas. We still have some organised crime, honour crimes and personal acts of revenge. But politically motivated crimes do not exceed four percent," he said.
Faction leaders, once at daggers drawn, have taken to making conciliatory remarks.
"The period of dispute between us and the governor are over. We have good relations with the governor and the Fadhila party," Sheikh Ali al-Suaidi, a senior Sadrist in Basra, told Reuters.
Prominent Fadhila member Aqeel Talib said the Sadr movement had "played a positive role in recent weeks".
But the test of their willingness to lay down arms will be deeds, not words, said Oslo-based historian Reidar Visser, an expert on southern Iraq who edits the Web site historiae.org.
"As with other such pacts ... it is the facts on the ground rather than the statements that will count," he said.
(Additional reporting by Peter Graff, Dean Yates and Mussab al-Khairalla in Baghdad; writing by Peter Graff; Editing by Dean Yates)
Citation: Aref Mohammed. "Shi'ite factions proclaim truce in Iraq's Basra," Reuters, 11 December 2007.
Original URL: http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKL113898120071211
Iraq rejects permanent U.S. bases
By Peter Graff
Reuters, 11 December 2007
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Iraq will never allow the United States to have permanent military bases on its soil, the government's national security adviser said, calling the issue a "red line" that cannot be crossed.
"We need the United States in our war against terrorism, we need them to guard our border sometimes, we need them for economic support and we need them for diplomatic and political support," Mowaffaq al-Rubaie said.
"But I say one thing, permanent forces or bases in Iraq for any foreign forces is a red line that cannot be accepted by any nationalist Iraqi," he told Dubai-based al Arabiya television.
Rubaie's comments, in an interview first broadcast late on Monday night, were the clearest sign yet that Iraq's leaders are looking ahead to the days when they have full responsibility for the country's defence.
The United States has around 160,000 troops in Iraq, officially under a United Nations mandate enacted after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003.
Iraq formally asked the United Nations on Monday to renew that mandate for a year until the end of 2008. It made clear it would not extend the mandate beyond next year and the mandate could be revoked sooner at Iraq's request.
U.S. President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki signed a declaration of principles last month agreeing to friendly long-term ties. Arrangements for U.S. troops to stay beyond next year will be negotiated in early 2008.
Violence in Iraq has fallen in recent months after Bush sent an extra 30,000 troops. Washington intends to reduce its force by more than 20,000 by June 2008 and is expected to decide in March on troop levels beyond that date.
FULLY DEPLOYED
The total number of attacks has fallen 60 percent since June when the additional U.S. troops became fully deployed.
In a statement, the U.S. military said the number of mortar and rocket attacks in Baghdad fell by nearly half last month, to 25 in November from 49 in October.
But U.S. commanders say al Qaeda Sunni Arab militants remain a serious threat, especially in the north of the country.
A suicide car bomb killed one U.S. soldier and wounded two north of Baghdad on Monday, the military said. Nearly 3,900 U.S. troops have been killed in Iraq since 2003.
A suicide car bomb also exploded on Tuesday at a checkpoint in a heavily guarded Baghdad neighbourhood near the homes of former interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and the leader of a small Sunni Arab party.
Two people were killed and 12 wounded. Neither politician was at his home and both spend a lot of time abroad.
Allawi's party said two weeks ago it had warned U.S.-led forces and the Iraqi government about threats to kill Allawi, and said its warnings had been ignored.
The head of Iraq's largest mental hospital was killed by gunmen in a drive-by shooting on Monday night, the latest in attacks on medical experts that has caused an exodus of doctors.
U.S. forces detained a suspected Shi'ite militia leader who played a key role training militants how to use weapons such as explosively formed projectiles, a particularly lethal roadside bomb that the military says is made from Iranian components.
The U.S. military said the suspect, who was not identified, was detained along with 10 others in Baghdad on Tuesday.
(Additional reporting by Mussab Al-Khairalla, Dean Yates, Aseel Kami and Aws Qusay in Baghdad and Claudia Parsons in New York; Editing by Dean Yates)
Citation: Peter Graff. "Iraq rejects permanent U.S. bases," Reuters, 11 December 2007.
Original URL: http://africa.reuters.com/world/news/usnL11202737.html
Reuters, 11 December 2007
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Iraq will never allow the United States to have permanent military bases on its soil, the government's national security adviser said, calling the issue a "red line" that cannot be crossed.
"We need the United States in our war against terrorism, we need them to guard our border sometimes, we need them for economic support and we need them for diplomatic and political support," Mowaffaq al-Rubaie said.
"But I say one thing, permanent forces or bases in Iraq for any foreign forces is a red line that cannot be accepted by any nationalist Iraqi," he told Dubai-based al Arabiya television.
Rubaie's comments, in an interview first broadcast late on Monday night, were the clearest sign yet that Iraq's leaders are looking ahead to the days when they have full responsibility for the country's defence.
The United States has around 160,000 troops in Iraq, officially under a United Nations mandate enacted after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003.
Iraq formally asked the United Nations on Monday to renew that mandate for a year until the end of 2008. It made clear it would not extend the mandate beyond next year and the mandate could be revoked sooner at Iraq's request.
U.S. President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki signed a declaration of principles last month agreeing to friendly long-term ties. Arrangements for U.S. troops to stay beyond next year will be negotiated in early 2008.
Violence in Iraq has fallen in recent months after Bush sent an extra 30,000 troops. Washington intends to reduce its force by more than 20,000 by June 2008 and is expected to decide in March on troop levels beyond that date.
FULLY DEPLOYED
The total number of attacks has fallen 60 percent since June when the additional U.S. troops became fully deployed.
In a statement, the U.S. military said the number of mortar and rocket attacks in Baghdad fell by nearly half last month, to 25 in November from 49 in October.
But U.S. commanders say al Qaeda Sunni Arab militants remain a serious threat, especially in the north of the country.
A suicide car bomb killed one U.S. soldier and wounded two north of Baghdad on Monday, the military said. Nearly 3,900 U.S. troops have been killed in Iraq since 2003.
A suicide car bomb also exploded on Tuesday at a checkpoint in a heavily guarded Baghdad neighbourhood near the homes of former interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and the leader of a small Sunni Arab party.
Two people were killed and 12 wounded. Neither politician was at his home and both spend a lot of time abroad.
Allawi's party said two weeks ago it had warned U.S.-led forces and the Iraqi government about threats to kill Allawi, and said its warnings had been ignored.
The head of Iraq's largest mental hospital was killed by gunmen in a drive-by shooting on Monday night, the latest in attacks on medical experts that has caused an exodus of doctors.
U.S. forces detained a suspected Shi'ite militia leader who played a key role training militants how to use weapons such as explosively formed projectiles, a particularly lethal roadside bomb that the military says is made from Iranian components.
The U.S. military said the suspect, who was not identified, was detained along with 10 others in Baghdad on Tuesday.
(Additional reporting by Mussab Al-Khairalla, Dean Yates, Aseel Kami and Aws Qusay in Baghdad and Claudia Parsons in New York; Editing by Dean Yates)
Citation: Peter Graff. "Iraq rejects permanent U.S. bases," Reuters, 11 December 2007.
Original URL: http://africa.reuters.com/world/news/usnL11202737.html
10 December 2007
Lost in the Land of the Taliban
In Ghazni, the Taliban continue to rule with an iron fist, intimidating the locals and killing the cops.
By Jeffrey Stern
Esquire, 10 December 2007
For the most part they’re content to operate as an invisible fist; a capo in the shadows able to affect his own morality on the city folk because he’s frightening and unpredictable. Accordingly, every once in awhile they do something scary in Ghazni to reassert their authority. This summer they hijacked a bus full of Korean missionaries and killed a couple of them; a month ago they tried to assassinate the mayor, and for the past week they’ve been robbing cars and burning trucks. Sixty people have been abducted in Ghazni since April, and by the end of the summer, the BBC was reporting that the Taliban “control the road and many of the villages by night and in places even by day.”
I’m going down that road into Ghazni with my friend Qais (pronounced, if anglified, as Kice) who has brought me along to meet, of all people, wool merchants. Along with a resurgent Taliban presence, Ghazni has some of the finest wool in the country. Wool gets made into carpets and carpets are a hopeful product for a country that has few legitimate exports, but Afghan carpets have to go back and forth to Pakistan to be cut, dyed, and washed, and when they’re finally exported they’re sent from Pakistan as Pakistani carpets. Aside from the general mistrust -- if not outright hostility -- Afghans harbor towards Pakistan, Afghanistan loses out on a rare economic opportunity. So a few years ago a big time wool trader (if “big time wool trader” isn’t oxymoronic) had the idea of building a wool-washing plant in Ghazni and nationalizing the carpet-making process. Qais has been sent by a USAID-funded initiative dedicated to ensuring “no carpet crosses that border with Pakistan,” to see about establishing a wool-traders association. I couldn’t make this stuff up.
*****
Qais has a sense of humor that preys on my characteristic American ignorance. When his father gave me a prayer rug as a gift, Qais told me I had better use it to pray, because if I “use it as a carpet or doormat, more sins will add up in a folder of your sins and on the day of resurrection you have to carry all those folders on your shoulders to cross the bridge which is as thin as a hair.” I had been using it exactly as he warned against and Qais let me dwell on my impending fate for a week before letting on that he’d made it up. Having once been a journalist himself, he is quick to tell me when I’m selling out to the sensationalism foreign correspondents posted here exploit to get their bylines above the fold, and he’s recently taken to testing my integrity by feeding me irresistible conspiracy theories with the same straight face he wears when imparting his considerable wisdom. “This road was built by the Taliban because they wanted to bring poppy from Kandahar to Kabul and from there to other countries,” he says. “And when the Americans came, they kept building it because they wanted to keep the poppy trade.” “Oh yeah Qais?” “Yeah, everybody knows.”
I can’t argue with him; it didn’t take me long to realize that he’s a lot smarter than I am. He speaks Urdu, Pashto, English, and Dari, all so fluently that when he woke from general anesthesia a few weeks ago after having his appendix removed, he groggily complained to his concerned father, brother, and I in each language, and continued cycling through tongues semi-consciously until the doctor told him to “shut up and stop shaming me in front of this American.”
As we drive through towards Ghazni city where an assembly of wool-merchants awaits us, we pass a sedan accoutered with floral adornments and full of smiling passengers. “I really love my country. You see the wedding car? They don’t care about Taliban.” Qais is uniquely sanguine about Afghanistan and is the only Afghan I know who isn’t desperate to leave, although that may have something to do with the fact that he’s been able to. Either way, it strikes me as undue optimism that has compelled him to leave his Leggor at home after promising me he’d bring it. While he does an adequate job of convincing me that should we find ourselves looking down the business end of a Kalashnikov, a handgun in his back pocket would probably cause more problems than it could possibly solve, it’s still unsettling to venture unarmed down the stretch of road Qais calls the most dangerous in this part of Afghanistan.
We drive without incident for more than an hour, passing beneath arches that welcome us into each district, and advertise telecommunications outfits. “Keep talking with Afghan wireless,” one offers as we move further towards Ghazni city. When we pass into Salar, Qais turns back to me (I’ve been relegated to the backseat) and tells me it’s the worst stretch of road on the way to Ghazni city. He cites as evidence the freshly burnt trucks along the roadside and the assassination attempt here last month.
The driver concurs, and adds that this place has always been the most volatile. He was a policeman in Ghazni once upon a time, but he’d studied in Russia and sided with the Soviets during their occupation, so, he says, he was fired when the Americans came. He points to where the flashpoints were twenty-five years ago; the hillsides from which he and his comrades provided covering fire for Soviet tanks rolling by below; the scrub brush where the Mujahideen hid with their American weapons to ambush Soviet vehicles.
He says “American weapons” with a palpable spite that is wholly inconsistent for this country; most people speak of American military technology with an awestruck reverence for the mythical power and surgical precision displayed when the Taliban was first driven out. Every Afghan has a story about a Taliban hideout they saw destroyed while an adjacent school or medical clinic remained untouched (though one must acknowledge that the bar for military precision was set just above sea-level by the indiscriminate shelling of Afghanistan’s civil war only five years before).
I’m enjoying the driver’s history lesson; superimposing today’s conflict here on the one two and a half decades ago, when we round a bend and see three men standing in the road with machine guns.
*****
The weapons are fed by magazines taped to upside-down spares, so in the throws of a firefight, the whole thing can be released, flipped, and reloaded with no excess movement. The guns are all I can see through the window from my seat in the back of the car, where I suddenly feel fraudulent in my Afghan clothing and prayer cap. There is cool conversation in Dari or Pashto; Qais and the men exchanging words in the even tone applied by implicit adversaries when both bury emotion. Something is being worked out.
Then the men are lowering their heads to the rear window to look in; they open the door, and climb into the back seat with me.
The gunmen smell strongly of smoke and what I incorrectly identify as game; I infer that they’ve spent the night cooking lamb kebabs over open flame, though I will later learn that the smell is more likely blood. Qais is calm and appears unthreatened by the men so I endeavor to follow his lead, though I find myself wondering if this is how being kidnapped begins, and how long I can delay disclosing inadvertently that I’m American. Salam, I say quietly.
The men have rested their machine guns butt-first on the floor, holding them loosely so that they jump each time the car hits a bump, and I notice myself staring conspicuously at the weapons, wondering what kind of jolt it would take to induce an accidental discharge. Riding next to a pair of bouncing Kalashnikovs pointing up and in my general direction, I try not to think about Pulp Fiction.
The day before, a twenty-year-old police officer named Haron was assigned a patrol around a village in Ghazni province. He had just been transferred from Shamali, and was sent to the villiage to familiarize himself with the area. He went reluctantly; it was a dangerous assignment, and he had a new fiancée to think about. In this part of the world you don’t touch a woman until you take a bride, and Haron surely preferred his adolescent mind touring all the worldly discoveries of recent betrothal rather than consumed with the disheartening prescience he shared with his friends. But insolence is intolerable to the NATO-trained police force, and the young man had no choice but to go.
When he entered the village, the Taliban learned of his trespass. They knew there was only one route out, so they set a mine on the road. Haron finished his patrol and turned back to head home, the car’s driver-side wheel rolled over the mine, and the explosion cut him in half.
The police in Ghazni generally know better than to challenge the Taliban so many of them operate just like the insurgency; they dress to blend in. They wear worn earth tones rather than uniforms, choosing discretion over outward signs of professionalism. Two weeks after our trip, four policemen were killed in a gun battle with Taliban fighters on the city’s outskirts. Publicly identifying oneself as police in a land controlled by the Taliban is waving red in front of a bull, so officers dress like mujahideen. Their weapons don’t compromise the disguise; there are enough guns here that carrying one doesn’t identify you as anything other than prudent.
This is all to say that when Haron’s police friends finished cleaning his blood from the road the next morning so that people wouldn’t be walking and driving over it; when they hiked up to the main road and flagged down the first vehicle that came by to take them to the hospital in Ghazni city so they could visit the explosion’s only survivor, they appeared to the car’s occupants -- to me -- like Taliban.
Every war correspondent at some point in their career embeds with defense forces; now, seeking the protection of anonymous civilian transport, they had embedded with us.
*****
The meeting with the wool shavers was uneventful as far as I could tell, and the city of Ghazni like Kabul on a smaller scale. The Afghan National Army drive around looking antsy on the back of pick-up trucks with quivers of RPG rounds within easy reach, but there’s not much of an official presence. Partly because the police don’t want to be seen; partly because there’s just not that many of them. Meanwhile, the Taliban’s numbers here have been growing because according to military officials, NATO operations in Helmand and Kandahar have pushed them North. The governor of Ghazni has publicly complained that he can’t fight the Taliban because he doesn’t have the manpower, he doesn’t have the money, he doesn’t “have enough ammunition, and police salaries are low which leads to more corruption." As a result, people here are not always what they seem. Driving through Maidan Shahr, Qais had pointed to men we passed on the side of the road, “just normal people during the day,” he had said, “but at night they put a gun on their shoulder and call themselves Taliban.”
Citation: Jeffrey Stern. "Lost in the Land of the Taliban," Esquire, 10 December 2007.
Original URL: http://www.esquire.com/the-side/blog/land-of-taliban-121007
By Jeffrey Stern
Esquire, 10 December 2007
For the most part they’re content to operate as an invisible fist; a capo in the shadows able to affect his own morality on the city folk because he’s frightening and unpredictable. Accordingly, every once in awhile they do something scary in Ghazni to reassert their authority. This summer they hijacked a bus full of Korean missionaries and killed a couple of them; a month ago they tried to assassinate the mayor, and for the past week they’ve been robbing cars and burning trucks. Sixty people have been abducted in Ghazni since April, and by the end of the summer, the BBC was reporting that the Taliban “control the road and many of the villages by night and in places even by day.”
I’m going down that road into Ghazni with my friend Qais (pronounced, if anglified, as Kice) who has brought me along to meet, of all people, wool merchants. Along with a resurgent Taliban presence, Ghazni has some of the finest wool in the country. Wool gets made into carpets and carpets are a hopeful product for a country that has few legitimate exports, but Afghan carpets have to go back and forth to Pakistan to be cut, dyed, and washed, and when they’re finally exported they’re sent from Pakistan as Pakistani carpets. Aside from the general mistrust -- if not outright hostility -- Afghans harbor towards Pakistan, Afghanistan loses out on a rare economic opportunity. So a few years ago a big time wool trader (if “big time wool trader” isn’t oxymoronic) had the idea of building a wool-washing plant in Ghazni and nationalizing the carpet-making process. Qais has been sent by a USAID-funded initiative dedicated to ensuring “no carpet crosses that border with Pakistan,” to see about establishing a wool-traders association. I couldn’t make this stuff up.
*****
Qais has a sense of humor that preys on my characteristic American ignorance. When his father gave me a prayer rug as a gift, Qais told me I had better use it to pray, because if I “use it as a carpet or doormat, more sins will add up in a folder of your sins and on the day of resurrection you have to carry all those folders on your shoulders to cross the bridge which is as thin as a hair.” I had been using it exactly as he warned against and Qais let me dwell on my impending fate for a week before letting on that he’d made it up. Having once been a journalist himself, he is quick to tell me when I’m selling out to the sensationalism foreign correspondents posted here exploit to get their bylines above the fold, and he’s recently taken to testing my integrity by feeding me irresistible conspiracy theories with the same straight face he wears when imparting his considerable wisdom. “This road was built by the Taliban because they wanted to bring poppy from Kandahar to Kabul and from there to other countries,” he says. “And when the Americans came, they kept building it because they wanted to keep the poppy trade.” “Oh yeah Qais?” “Yeah, everybody knows.”
I can’t argue with him; it didn’t take me long to realize that he’s a lot smarter than I am. He speaks Urdu, Pashto, English, and Dari, all so fluently that when he woke from general anesthesia a few weeks ago after having his appendix removed, he groggily complained to his concerned father, brother, and I in each language, and continued cycling through tongues semi-consciously until the doctor told him to “shut up and stop shaming me in front of this American.”
As we drive through towards Ghazni city where an assembly of wool-merchants awaits us, we pass a sedan accoutered with floral adornments and full of smiling passengers. “I really love my country. You see the wedding car? They don’t care about Taliban.” Qais is uniquely sanguine about Afghanistan and is the only Afghan I know who isn’t desperate to leave, although that may have something to do with the fact that he’s been able to. Either way, it strikes me as undue optimism that has compelled him to leave his Leggor at home after promising me he’d bring it. While he does an adequate job of convincing me that should we find ourselves looking down the business end of a Kalashnikov, a handgun in his back pocket would probably cause more problems than it could possibly solve, it’s still unsettling to venture unarmed down the stretch of road Qais calls the most dangerous in this part of Afghanistan.
We drive without incident for more than an hour, passing beneath arches that welcome us into each district, and advertise telecommunications outfits. “Keep talking with Afghan wireless,” one offers as we move further towards Ghazni city. When we pass into Salar, Qais turns back to me (I’ve been relegated to the backseat) and tells me it’s the worst stretch of road on the way to Ghazni city. He cites as evidence the freshly burnt trucks along the roadside and the assassination attempt here last month.
The driver concurs, and adds that this place has always been the most volatile. He was a policeman in Ghazni once upon a time, but he’d studied in Russia and sided with the Soviets during their occupation, so, he says, he was fired when the Americans came. He points to where the flashpoints were twenty-five years ago; the hillsides from which he and his comrades provided covering fire for Soviet tanks rolling by below; the scrub brush where the Mujahideen hid with their American weapons to ambush Soviet vehicles.
He says “American weapons” with a palpable spite that is wholly inconsistent for this country; most people speak of American military technology with an awestruck reverence for the mythical power and surgical precision displayed when the Taliban was first driven out. Every Afghan has a story about a Taliban hideout they saw destroyed while an adjacent school or medical clinic remained untouched (though one must acknowledge that the bar for military precision was set just above sea-level by the indiscriminate shelling of Afghanistan’s civil war only five years before).
I’m enjoying the driver’s history lesson; superimposing today’s conflict here on the one two and a half decades ago, when we round a bend and see three men standing in the road with machine guns.
*****
The weapons are fed by magazines taped to upside-down spares, so in the throws of a firefight, the whole thing can be released, flipped, and reloaded with no excess movement. The guns are all I can see through the window from my seat in the back of the car, where I suddenly feel fraudulent in my Afghan clothing and prayer cap. There is cool conversation in Dari or Pashto; Qais and the men exchanging words in the even tone applied by implicit adversaries when both bury emotion. Something is being worked out.
Then the men are lowering their heads to the rear window to look in; they open the door, and climb into the back seat with me.
The gunmen smell strongly of smoke and what I incorrectly identify as game; I infer that they’ve spent the night cooking lamb kebabs over open flame, though I will later learn that the smell is more likely blood. Qais is calm and appears unthreatened by the men so I endeavor to follow his lead, though I find myself wondering if this is how being kidnapped begins, and how long I can delay disclosing inadvertently that I’m American. Salam, I say quietly.
The men have rested their machine guns butt-first on the floor, holding them loosely so that they jump each time the car hits a bump, and I notice myself staring conspicuously at the weapons, wondering what kind of jolt it would take to induce an accidental discharge. Riding next to a pair of bouncing Kalashnikovs pointing up and in my general direction, I try not to think about Pulp Fiction.
The day before, a twenty-year-old police officer named Haron was assigned a patrol around a village in Ghazni province. He had just been transferred from Shamali, and was sent to the villiage to familiarize himself with the area. He went reluctantly; it was a dangerous assignment, and he had a new fiancée to think about. In this part of the world you don’t touch a woman until you take a bride, and Haron surely preferred his adolescent mind touring all the worldly discoveries of recent betrothal rather than consumed with the disheartening prescience he shared with his friends. But insolence is intolerable to the NATO-trained police force, and the young man had no choice but to go.
When he entered the village, the Taliban learned of his trespass. They knew there was only one route out, so they set a mine on the road. Haron finished his patrol and turned back to head home, the car’s driver-side wheel rolled over the mine, and the explosion cut him in half.
The police in Ghazni generally know better than to challenge the Taliban so many of them operate just like the insurgency; they dress to blend in. They wear worn earth tones rather than uniforms, choosing discretion over outward signs of professionalism. Two weeks after our trip, four policemen were killed in a gun battle with Taliban fighters on the city’s outskirts. Publicly identifying oneself as police in a land controlled by the Taliban is waving red in front of a bull, so officers dress like mujahideen. Their weapons don’t compromise the disguise; there are enough guns here that carrying one doesn’t identify you as anything other than prudent.
This is all to say that when Haron’s police friends finished cleaning his blood from the road the next morning so that people wouldn’t be walking and driving over it; when they hiked up to the main road and flagged down the first vehicle that came by to take them to the hospital in Ghazni city so they could visit the explosion’s only survivor, they appeared to the car’s occupants -- to me -- like Taliban.
Every war correspondent at some point in their career embeds with defense forces; now, seeking the protection of anonymous civilian transport, they had embedded with us.
*****
The meeting with the wool shavers was uneventful as far as I could tell, and the city of Ghazni like Kabul on a smaller scale. The Afghan National Army drive around looking antsy on the back of pick-up trucks with quivers of RPG rounds within easy reach, but there’s not much of an official presence. Partly because the police don’t want to be seen; partly because there’s just not that many of them. Meanwhile, the Taliban’s numbers here have been growing because according to military officials, NATO operations in Helmand and Kandahar have pushed them North. The governor of Ghazni has publicly complained that he can’t fight the Taliban because he doesn’t have the manpower, he doesn’t have the money, he doesn’t “have enough ammunition, and police salaries are low which leads to more corruption." As a result, people here are not always what they seem. Driving through Maidan Shahr, Qais had pointed to men we passed on the side of the road, “just normal people during the day,” he had said, “but at night they put a gun on their shoulder and call themselves Taliban.”
Citation: Jeffrey Stern. "Lost in the Land of the Taliban," Esquire, 10 December 2007.
Original URL: http://www.esquire.com/the-side/blog/land-of-taliban-121007
Iraq's hardline Baathists prefer to stay in the shadows
Agence France-Presse, 09 December 2007
BAGHDAD (AFP) — Hardline Baathists, the remnants of Saddam Hussein's regime, prefer to remain in the shadows in Baghdad's Sunni neighbourhoods, fearing that a new law to bring them back into public life will instead serve as their death warrants.
Without work, isolated and believing themselves to be targets of the Shiite-dominated government, the Sunni former elite have no faith in the new Justice and Accountability Law now before the parliament.
The bill aims partly to reverse the purge of tens of thousands of members of Saddam's Baath party from government jobs after he was ousted in the US-led invasion of 2003.
Under the proposed law, senior party leaders who implemented the oppressive policies of the regime would remain banned from holding public jobs but middle-ranking officials not implicated in any crimes would be reintegrated into the civil service.
"The law in parliament is worse for us," said a professor who would only give his name as Dawood, fearing reprisals from Shiite militias.
"It is against the Baathists. It is a punishment to Baathists," Dawood told AFP in an interview at his house deep inside Baghdad's Sunni stronghold of Adhamiyah, now marked by broken drainage pipes, piles of stinking rubbish and gun-toting Sunni militias.
He lost his job in a leading educational institution on May 15, 2003 -- two weeks after US President George W. Bush declared an end to the Iraq conflict and Paul Bremer took over as US administrator in Iraq.
Bremer's de-Baathification law turned thousands of Baathists, especially members of armed forces, against the US military. Civilian employees also nurtured grievances, with many supporting the insurgency.
Baath, meaning "resurrection," promotes pan-Arab nationalism and socialism.
The party, officially inaugurated in 1947 in Damascus, took power in Iraq in 1968.
Faced with ineffective government, an inefficient Iraqi military, mounting US casualties and a brutal sectarian conflict between Shiites and Sunnis, Washington has now changed tack -- it wants to bring Baathists who have no criminal records back into public life.
The passing of the Justice and Accountability Law is one of 18 benchmarks Washington has set for measuring progress in political reconciliation in Iraq.
The bill has generated heated debate in parliament, once again exposing the sharp sectarian divides bedevilling political reconciliation.
The Shiite-led government claims that it has already taken back hundreds of former Baathists into public service despite the pending new law.
But middle-ranking Baathists interviewed by AFP in a small house in Adhamiyah do not believe that the bill will help them in any way.
"They cut my life source suddenly. I was not a criminal. I had to flee to Syria in 2004 because militias started targeting us. How do we trust that the new leaders will enforce the law justly?" asked Dawood, as he slipped prayer beads through his fingers.
"The very name of the law is against us. It is called Justice and Accountability. Who are we accountable to and why?" asked Abu Abdallah, who spent 30 years as a government employee under the previous regime.
"If you want to promote reconciliation, then don't ask questions. Trust us and take us back," said Abdallah, a bald and tired-looking 60-year-old, dressed in a brown leather jacket to protect himself from the winter chill.
"I too lost my job. The family is surviving somehow, but four months ago my son was detained by Iraqi troops without any reason. For what and why?" he asked, sitting beside Dawood.
"They think they can change us by doing this. Baath is an ideology. It's in the head. It can't be changed."
Although the Baath party was outlawed in Iraq after the regime change, its supporters still operate clandestinely in several Sunni strongholds, including Adhamiyah.
This week they distributed leaflets in the neighbourhood promoting the party under the leadership of Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, Saddam's deputy and the most high-ranking former regime official still on the run.
"We defend jihad and the mujahedeen to protect our honour from occupiers and Safavids," one leaflet said, referring to the US and Iranians respectively.
Baathists gathered in the Adhamiyah house said the new law would be a death sentence for them.
"Once I return to duty I become a known face and an easy target for militias," said Abu Ali, 54, giving a fictitious name.
"Or somebody can file a false case against me and send me to jail. There is no justice in this Justice and Accountability Law," the former communication expert said.
"The fact also is, as my friend said, 'Baath is an ideology. It can't be changed'."
Citation: "Iraq's hardline Baathists prefer to stay in the shadows," Agence France-Presse, 09 December 2007.
Original URL: http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hmaKJe_dfN_Bo_uWXkbaE2v4eHrQ
BAGHDAD (AFP) — Hardline Baathists, the remnants of Saddam Hussein's regime, prefer to remain in the shadows in Baghdad's Sunni neighbourhoods, fearing that a new law to bring them back into public life will instead serve as their death warrants.
Without work, isolated and believing themselves to be targets of the Shiite-dominated government, the Sunni former elite have no faith in the new Justice and Accountability Law now before the parliament.
The bill aims partly to reverse the purge of tens of thousands of members of Saddam's Baath party from government jobs after he was ousted in the US-led invasion of 2003.
Under the proposed law, senior party leaders who implemented the oppressive policies of the regime would remain banned from holding public jobs but middle-ranking officials not implicated in any crimes would be reintegrated into the civil service.
"The law in parliament is worse for us," said a professor who would only give his name as Dawood, fearing reprisals from Shiite militias.
"It is against the Baathists. It is a punishment to Baathists," Dawood told AFP in an interview at his house deep inside Baghdad's Sunni stronghold of Adhamiyah, now marked by broken drainage pipes, piles of stinking rubbish and gun-toting Sunni militias.
He lost his job in a leading educational institution on May 15, 2003 -- two weeks after US President George W. Bush declared an end to the Iraq conflict and Paul Bremer took over as US administrator in Iraq.
Bremer's de-Baathification law turned thousands of Baathists, especially members of armed forces, against the US military. Civilian employees also nurtured grievances, with many supporting the insurgency.
Baath, meaning "resurrection," promotes pan-Arab nationalism and socialism.
The party, officially inaugurated in 1947 in Damascus, took power in Iraq in 1968.
Faced with ineffective government, an inefficient Iraqi military, mounting US casualties and a brutal sectarian conflict between Shiites and Sunnis, Washington has now changed tack -- it wants to bring Baathists who have no criminal records back into public life.
The passing of the Justice and Accountability Law is one of 18 benchmarks Washington has set for measuring progress in political reconciliation in Iraq.
The bill has generated heated debate in parliament, once again exposing the sharp sectarian divides bedevilling political reconciliation.
The Shiite-led government claims that it has already taken back hundreds of former Baathists into public service despite the pending new law.
But middle-ranking Baathists interviewed by AFP in a small house in Adhamiyah do not believe that the bill will help them in any way.
"They cut my life source suddenly. I was not a criminal. I had to flee to Syria in 2004 because militias started targeting us. How do we trust that the new leaders will enforce the law justly?" asked Dawood, as he slipped prayer beads through his fingers.
"The very name of the law is against us. It is called Justice and Accountability. Who are we accountable to and why?" asked Abu Abdallah, who spent 30 years as a government employee under the previous regime.
"If you want to promote reconciliation, then don't ask questions. Trust us and take us back," said Abdallah, a bald and tired-looking 60-year-old, dressed in a brown leather jacket to protect himself from the winter chill.
"I too lost my job. The family is surviving somehow, but four months ago my son was detained by Iraqi troops without any reason. For what and why?" he asked, sitting beside Dawood.
"They think they can change us by doing this. Baath is an ideology. It's in the head. It can't be changed."
Although the Baath party was outlawed in Iraq after the regime change, its supporters still operate clandestinely in several Sunni strongholds, including Adhamiyah.
This week they distributed leaflets in the neighbourhood promoting the party under the leadership of Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, Saddam's deputy and the most high-ranking former regime official still on the run.
"We defend jihad and the mujahedeen to protect our honour from occupiers and Safavids," one leaflet said, referring to the US and Iranians respectively.
Baathists gathered in the Adhamiyah house said the new law would be a death sentence for them.
"Once I return to duty I become a known face and an easy target for militias," said Abu Ali, 54, giving a fictitious name.
"Or somebody can file a false case against me and send me to jail. There is no justice in this Justice and Accountability Law," the former communication expert said.
"The fact also is, as my friend said, 'Baath is an ideology. It can't be changed'."
Citation: "Iraq's hardline Baathists prefer to stay in the shadows," Agence France-Presse, 09 December 2007.
Original URL: http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hmaKJe_dfN_Bo_uWXkbaE2v4eHrQ
05 December 2007
110,000 fewer Iraqis displaced -Red Crescent
Reuters, 05 December 2007
BAGHDAD, Dec 5 (Reuters) - Nearly 110,000 Iraqis displaced within the country returned to their homes in October, according to figures released on Wednesday by the Iraqi Red Crescent.
The Red Crescent figures show the number of internally displaced Iraqis falling to 2.19 million from 2.3 million.
Iraqis have been returning to their homes from refuges they sought within the country and from abroad as violence in the country has fallen over the last few months.
Iraqi government figures showed there were 538 civilians killed in the country in November, a sharp fall from monthly tolls of nearly 2,000 at the beginning of this year.
About 2 million Iraqis are believed to have fled to neighbouring countries, most to Syria and Jordan. The United Nations estimates about 1,000 more Iraqis are returning from Syria each day than leaving.
But the U.N. refugee agency UNHCR has also said it does not believe Iraq is safe enough to recommend a mass return. (Editing by Catherine Evans)
Citation: "110,000 fewer Iraqis displaced -Red Crescent," Reuters, 05 December 2007.
Original URL: http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L05645626.htm
BAGHDAD, Dec 5 (Reuters) - Nearly 110,000 Iraqis displaced within the country returned to their homes in October, according to figures released on Wednesday by the Iraqi Red Crescent.
The Red Crescent figures show the number of internally displaced Iraqis falling to 2.19 million from 2.3 million.
Iraqis have been returning to their homes from refuges they sought within the country and from abroad as violence in the country has fallen over the last few months.
Iraqi government figures showed there were 538 civilians killed in the country in November, a sharp fall from monthly tolls of nearly 2,000 at the beginning of this year.
About 2 million Iraqis are believed to have fled to neighbouring countries, most to Syria and Jordan. The United Nations estimates about 1,000 more Iraqis are returning from Syria each day than leaving.
But the U.N. refugee agency UNHCR has also said it does not believe Iraq is safe enough to recommend a mass return. (Editing by Catherine Evans)
Citation: "110,000 fewer Iraqis displaced -Red Crescent," Reuters, 05 December 2007.
Original URL: http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L05645626.htm
NATO revamps measures of Afghan progress
By Andrew Gray
Reuters, 05 December 2007
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - NATO has developed a standardized system for tracking progress in Afghanistan because the war so far has been judged largely using anecdotal evidence, the alliance's top commander said on Tuesday.
NATO headquarters had drawn up a set of 63 indicators to measure trends in the fight against Taliban Islamists and other militants in Afghanistan, where violence has surged over the past two years, U.S. Army Gen. John Craddock said.
"These metrics may not be right and we will probably have to adjust them, but we want to start out now," Craddock, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, told a news conference in Washington.
"I would submit to you that, to date, most of the assessments of progress have been against anecdotal information," he said.
Asked why such an effort to measure progress was taking place only now, some six years after U.S.-led forces toppled the Taliban government, Craddock did not answer directly.
He said one challenge was bringing together data from the many different organizations working in Afghanistan.
International efforts in Afghanistan are largely measured now according using statistics such as how many kilometers of roads or how many schools had been built, he said.
"All good things," Craddock said. "But the question in my mind is: What's the effect it's produced?"
For example, he said, when a road was built, did it allow local farmers to get more crops to market, so they could earn more and be less susceptible to militant recruitment? Or were militants preventing people from using the road?
STRUGGLE FOR STATISTICS
Analysts and reporters have struggled to get information on the Afghan war. Statistics have generally been much easier to obtain for the war in Iraq.
"Most of the official reporting on Afghanistan -- whether US, NATO, or allied country -- is little more than public relations material," Anthony Cordesman, a military analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, wrote in a report released this week.
Craddock, who took up his post last December, said work began on the new effort about six months ago and a first analysis of trends was due in late January. He did not say whether the information would be made public.
There is widespread agreement that violence in Afghanistan is worsening. The United Nations estimates the number of security incidents has risen by 20 to 30 percent from last year.
Craddock also said the war was not just a fight pitting the Afghan government and NATO's 40,000-strong International Security Assistance Force against the Taliban.
He used the broader term "opposing militant forces" to describe NATO's enemies and said they included the Taliban as well as other hardliners, tribal warlords and criminals.
"While in most cases they do not work in an organized fashion, they do work toward a common goal -- that of preventing the democratically elected government of Afghanistan from becoming the dominant governing body," Craddock said.
Citation: Andrew Gray. "NATO revamps measures of Afghan progress," Reuters, 05 December 2007.
Original URL: http://in.reuters.com/article/southAsiaNews/idINIndia-30829020071204
Reuters, 05 December 2007
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - NATO has developed a standardized system for tracking progress in Afghanistan because the war so far has been judged largely using anecdotal evidence, the alliance's top commander said on Tuesday.
NATO headquarters had drawn up a set of 63 indicators to measure trends in the fight against Taliban Islamists and other militants in Afghanistan, where violence has surged over the past two years, U.S. Army Gen. John Craddock said.
"These metrics may not be right and we will probably have to adjust them, but we want to start out now," Craddock, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, told a news conference in Washington.
"I would submit to you that, to date, most of the assessments of progress have been against anecdotal information," he said.
Asked why such an effort to measure progress was taking place only now, some six years after U.S.-led forces toppled the Taliban government, Craddock did not answer directly.
He said one challenge was bringing together data from the many different organizations working in Afghanistan.
International efforts in Afghanistan are largely measured now according using statistics such as how many kilometers of roads or how many schools had been built, he said.
"All good things," Craddock said. "But the question in my mind is: What's the effect it's produced?"
For example, he said, when a road was built, did it allow local farmers to get more crops to market, so they could earn more and be less susceptible to militant recruitment? Or were militants preventing people from using the road?
STRUGGLE FOR STATISTICS
Analysts and reporters have struggled to get information on the Afghan war. Statistics have generally been much easier to obtain for the war in Iraq.
"Most of the official reporting on Afghanistan -- whether US, NATO, or allied country -- is little more than public relations material," Anthony Cordesman, a military analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, wrote in a report released this week.
Craddock, who took up his post last December, said work began on the new effort about six months ago and a first analysis of trends was due in late January. He did not say whether the information would be made public.
There is widespread agreement that violence in Afghanistan is worsening. The United Nations estimates the number of security incidents has risen by 20 to 30 percent from last year.
Craddock also said the war was not just a fight pitting the Afghan government and NATO's 40,000-strong International Security Assistance Force against the Taliban.
He used the broader term "opposing militant forces" to describe NATO's enemies and said they included the Taliban as well as other hardliners, tribal warlords and criminals.
"While in most cases they do not work in an organized fashion, they do work toward a common goal -- that of preventing the democratically elected government of Afghanistan from becoming the dominant governing body," Craddock said.
Citation: Andrew Gray. "NATO revamps measures of Afghan progress," Reuters, 05 December 2007.
Original URL: http://in.reuters.com/article/southAsiaNews/idINIndia-30829020071204
Karzai: Afghan Military Needs Equipment
By Lolita C. Baldor
The Associated Press, 04 December 2007
KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — The Afghanistan military needs more trainers and equipment in order to gain control of the country's security, President Hamid Karzai and his defense chief told Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on Tuesday.
Karzai said he was satisfied with the quality of training of the Afghan army, but he said he hoped that the U.S. and its NATO allies would expedite the delivery of air transportation and other assets, which could include planes and helicopters needed to fight al-Qaida and Taliban forces.
Gates, during a joint news conference with Karzai, said there is funding in the war supplemental request currently stalled in Congress, and he has repeatedly promised to continue pressing his NATO partners to meet their commitments to help Afghanistan.
Gates and other U.S. military commanders also agreed there are concerns about the increased violence in Afghanistan this year. And Maj. Gen. David Rodriguez confirmed that there have been indications of growing al-Qaida activity.
Noting the increase in suicide bombings — which were not a frequent problem three years ago — Rodriguez said, "We believe that it's the violent extremists that are behind it," including some who may be transferring the tactic from Iraq.
Gates said that while he is also concerned about the violence, "The consistent message I heard today from both American and Afghan military leaders ... was that an important reason for the increased violence is because there is a much more aggressive effort" by coalition forces to go after the Taliban.
The Afghan president presented a positive outlook on the ongoing fight against militants and terrorists.
"Al-Qaida is on the run. It is defeated," Karzai claimed, although violence has increased recently.
This year has been the most violent since the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Insurgency-related violence has claimed nearly 6,200 lives, according to a tally of figures from Afghan and Western officials. The number of attacks has surged, including roadside bombings and suicide assaults.
Before Gates arrived in Kabul, a U.S. defense official expressed concern that one reason for increased violence in Afghanistan could be an escalation of al-Qaida activity — in addition to the ongoing Taliban insurgency.
On his third trip to Afghanistan, Gates said he has not yet seen data on any uptick in al-Qaida activity, but increasing levels of violence in the country are clear and he plans to talk about it with other defense leaders from NATO nations operating in Afghanistan.
Earlier, Gates met with Afghan Gen. Bismillah Khan, who said that while "the U.S. has been more than generous," the Afghan army's weapons are inadequate and old, specifically its heavy artillery and armored vehicles. Speaking through an interpreter while sitting at a small table with Gates, the Afghan defense chief added that "we don't have enough mentors, enough advisers."
Gates told Khan that "we know your interest in small arms and mortars and we are looking for ways to expedite" the equipment. And he added that he also was well aware of the shortage of trainers — a shortfall U.S. military officials said was more than 3,000.
According to Maj. Gen. Robert Cone, the U.S. is about to begin providing M-16 rifles to the Afghans, and is poised to deliver about 10,000 a month, up to 60,000. And he said there is an ongoing effort to obtain helicopters for the Afghanistan forces, including plans for an additional 34 in the near future.
Cone said the helicopters will be key to relieving some stress on U.S. and NATO forces, which currently have to shuttle Afghan troops around the country.
"Giving the Afghans their own capabilities is the answer," said Cone, as Gates toured the training base. About 70 U.S. trainers are working there, but the bulk of the instruction is done by Afghanistan military.
Early in the day, Gates met with NATO coalition commanders then toured Afghanistan's main military training compound outside Kabul where as many as 3,000 Afghan troops at one time get instruction.
In Khost province, near the snowcapped peaks along the Pakistan border, Gates heard from military, civil affairs, U.S. State Department and USAID representatives who said an additional several hundred million dollars in investment could make the security gains there irreversible.
As if to underscore the concern, a suicide car bomber targeted a NATO convoy in Kabul on Tuesday not long after Gates had passed along the same road. The road was closed to other traffic while Gates traveled back by the blast site later.
Military officials have long said that the Taliban in Afghanistan is being resupplied from outside the country, possibly by militants in Pakistan crossing the border, or through support from other countries in the region sympathetic to the militants.
Currently there are about 26,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, including 13,000 with the NATO-led coalition. The other 13,000 U.S. troops are training the Afghan forces and hunting al-Qaida terrorists.
Citation: Lolita C. Baldor. "Karzai: Afghan Military Needs Equipment," The Associated Press, 04 December 2007.
Original URL: http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5g4Y2OIVhugHSGoXJPn_opoNf6tIwD8TAP5EG0
The Associated Press, 04 December 2007
KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — The Afghanistan military needs more trainers and equipment in order to gain control of the country's security, President Hamid Karzai and his defense chief told Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on Tuesday.
Karzai said he was satisfied with the quality of training of the Afghan army, but he said he hoped that the U.S. and its NATO allies would expedite the delivery of air transportation and other assets, which could include planes and helicopters needed to fight al-Qaida and Taliban forces.
Gates, during a joint news conference with Karzai, said there is funding in the war supplemental request currently stalled in Congress, and he has repeatedly promised to continue pressing his NATO partners to meet their commitments to help Afghanistan.
Gates and other U.S. military commanders also agreed there are concerns about the increased violence in Afghanistan this year. And Maj. Gen. David Rodriguez confirmed that there have been indications of growing al-Qaida activity.
Noting the increase in suicide bombings — which were not a frequent problem three years ago — Rodriguez said, "We believe that it's the violent extremists that are behind it," including some who may be transferring the tactic from Iraq.
Gates said that while he is also concerned about the violence, "The consistent message I heard today from both American and Afghan military leaders ... was that an important reason for the increased violence is because there is a much more aggressive effort" by coalition forces to go after the Taliban.
The Afghan president presented a positive outlook on the ongoing fight against militants and terrorists.
"Al-Qaida is on the run. It is defeated," Karzai claimed, although violence has increased recently.
This year has been the most violent since the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Insurgency-related violence has claimed nearly 6,200 lives, according to a tally of figures from Afghan and Western officials. The number of attacks has surged, including roadside bombings and suicide assaults.
Before Gates arrived in Kabul, a U.S. defense official expressed concern that one reason for increased violence in Afghanistan could be an escalation of al-Qaida activity — in addition to the ongoing Taliban insurgency.
On his third trip to Afghanistan, Gates said he has not yet seen data on any uptick in al-Qaida activity, but increasing levels of violence in the country are clear and he plans to talk about it with other defense leaders from NATO nations operating in Afghanistan.
Earlier, Gates met with Afghan Gen. Bismillah Khan, who said that while "the U.S. has been more than generous," the Afghan army's weapons are inadequate and old, specifically its heavy artillery and armored vehicles. Speaking through an interpreter while sitting at a small table with Gates, the Afghan defense chief added that "we don't have enough mentors, enough advisers."
Gates told Khan that "we know your interest in small arms and mortars and we are looking for ways to expedite" the equipment. And he added that he also was well aware of the shortage of trainers — a shortfall U.S. military officials said was more than 3,000.
According to Maj. Gen. Robert Cone, the U.S. is about to begin providing M-16 rifles to the Afghans, and is poised to deliver about 10,000 a month, up to 60,000. And he said there is an ongoing effort to obtain helicopters for the Afghanistan forces, including plans for an additional 34 in the near future.
Cone said the helicopters will be key to relieving some stress on U.S. and NATO forces, which currently have to shuttle Afghan troops around the country.
"Giving the Afghans their own capabilities is the answer," said Cone, as Gates toured the training base. About 70 U.S. trainers are working there, but the bulk of the instruction is done by Afghanistan military.
Early in the day, Gates met with NATO coalition commanders then toured Afghanistan's main military training compound outside Kabul where as many as 3,000 Afghan troops at one time get instruction.
In Khost province, near the snowcapped peaks along the Pakistan border, Gates heard from military, civil affairs, U.S. State Department and USAID representatives who said an additional several hundred million dollars in investment could make the security gains there irreversible.
As if to underscore the concern, a suicide car bomber targeted a NATO convoy in Kabul on Tuesday not long after Gates had passed along the same road. The road was closed to other traffic while Gates traveled back by the blast site later.
Military officials have long said that the Taliban in Afghanistan is being resupplied from outside the country, possibly by militants in Pakistan crossing the border, or through support from other countries in the region sympathetic to the militants.
Currently there are about 26,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, including 13,000 with the NATO-led coalition. The other 13,000 U.S. troops are training the Afghan forces and hunting al-Qaida terrorists.
Citation: Lolita C. Baldor. "Karzai: Afghan Military Needs Equipment," The Associated Press, 04 December 2007.
Original URL: http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5g4Y2OIVhugHSGoXJPn_opoNf6tIwD8TAP5EG0
15-month tours of Iraq likely for awhile
By Robert Burns
The Associated Press, 04 December 2007
WASHINGTON - The No. 2 U.S. commander in Iraq said Tuesday that 15-month combat tours are too long for U.S. soldiers but probably cannot be shortened until next fall as troop levels decline.
"The units now that are leaving have all done 15-month tours and I'm very pleased with how they handled it," Army Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno said in an Associated Press interview by telephone from his headquarters in Baghdad. "What they've accomplished is incredible, but I think it is too long."
Pentagon officials and outside analysts have cited the long tours, coupled with too-short periods between deployments, as a key factor in causing stress on soldiers as well as their families.
Ultimately, Odierno said, tour lengths for soldiers is a decision for the Army leadership at the Pentagon.
Odierno, the commander of Multinational Corps Iraq, said there is widespread agreement in the Army that it should return to the 12-month tour length that was the standard until early this year when it was stretched to 15 months to meet President Bush's request for an extra five brigades.
Gen. George Casey, who became the Army chief of staff in April after spending more than two years in Iraq as the top overall commander, told a think tank audience in Washington on Tuesday that the Army decided to go to 15-month tours "with the full understanding that it was temporary."
"We can't sustain that and have to come off of that," Casey said. As the Army considers how soon it can return to shorter tours it wants to be "darn sure that we're not going to have to go back" to 15 months.
"I expect an announcement on that in the next three or four months," Casey said.
Citation: Robert Burns. "15-month tours of Iraq likely for awhile," The Associated Press, 04 December 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071204/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_iraq_military_1
The Associated Press, 04 December 2007
WASHINGTON - The No. 2 U.S. commander in Iraq said Tuesday that 15-month combat tours are too long for U.S. soldiers but probably cannot be shortened until next fall as troop levels decline.
"The units now that are leaving have all done 15-month tours and I'm very pleased with how they handled it," Army Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno said in an Associated Press interview by telephone from his headquarters in Baghdad. "What they've accomplished is incredible, but I think it is too long."
Pentagon officials and outside analysts have cited the long tours, coupled with too-short periods between deployments, as a key factor in causing stress on soldiers as well as their families.
Ultimately, Odierno said, tour lengths for soldiers is a decision for the Army leadership at the Pentagon.
Odierno, the commander of Multinational Corps Iraq, said there is widespread agreement in the Army that it should return to the 12-month tour length that was the standard until early this year when it was stretched to 15 months to meet President Bush's request for an extra five brigades.
Gen. George Casey, who became the Army chief of staff in April after spending more than two years in Iraq as the top overall commander, told a think tank audience in Washington on Tuesday that the Army decided to go to 15-month tours "with the full understanding that it was temporary."
"We can't sustain that and have to come off of that," Casey said. As the Army considers how soon it can return to shorter tours it wants to be "darn sure that we're not going to have to go back" to 15 months.
"I expect an announcement on that in the next three or four months," Casey said.
Citation: Robert Burns. "15-month tours of Iraq likely for awhile," The Associated Press, 04 December 2007.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071204/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_iraq_military_1
Afghan Tradition Masks Political Ambush
By Michael M. Phillips
The Wall Street Journal, 01 December 2007
At a Gathering of Village Elders, the U.S. Helps Set in Motion an Enemy's Downfall
ZEROK - The villagers handed out red roses. The elders lined up to welcome guests to their ancient tradition, the shura. And John Gibson, a U.S. Army captain with sunburned cheeks, warmly embraced Haji Taday, a tribal leader with a black Abe Lincoln beard.
But what looked like a reunion with an old friend last month was really a political ambush of a bitter enemy.
"He takes us for fools," Capt. Gibson, smiling slightly, said minutes after hugging Mr. Taday. "We just got enough evidence to move against him."
In Afghanistan's insurgency, politics is warfare by other means. U.S. officers knew that if they wanted to take down Mr. Taday -- both a major figure in the local Taliban and chief of Zerok's council of elders -- they would have to avoid cultural missteps that could hand propaganda victories to their enemies.
So for the next hour, U.S. and Afghan officials used the shura, a traditional Pashtun gathering of respected senior villagers, to discredit Mr. Taday before his peers and engineer his downfall.
They succeeded, but not in the way they expected.
Capt. Gibson's boss, Lt. Col. Michael Fenzel, commander of the 1st Battalion of the 503rd Infantry Regiment, set the snare hours before the elders arrived at the Zerok district center. In a private meeting at the adjacent American combat outpost, the colonel laid out the case against Mr. Taday before a few trusted Afghan officials, including both the chief of intelligence and the head of shura for Paktika Province, where Zerok is located.
Lt. Col. Fenzel had a receptive audience. The Afghans had their own suspicions about Mr. Taday, not least because his nephew is Commander Sangeen, widely known to lead one of the Taliban factions in the area. Mr. Taday has provided safe haven for foreign fighters who cross the Pakistani border, some 20 miles away, and move into Zerok District, according to U.S. and Afghan intelligence reports. Mr. Taday also arranged the theft of a green Ford Ranger pickup truck from the Afghan National Police and delivered it to his nephew to use as a suicide car bomb, according to U.S. intelligence reports.
At the pre-shura meeting, Lt. Col. Fenzel told the Afghan officials he wanted the police to arrest Mr. Taday immediately. But Nawab Waziri, the provincial head elder, argued that such a move on shura day would cause an uproar. The colonel agreed to hold off, and the group headed next door to the shura at the district government office, a single-story building with broken windows, surrounded by a stone wall topped with razor wire.
Mr. Taday was waiting for them in the courtyard, lined up with the other elders. Appearing to be in his 60s, short and rotund, he wore a gray tunic and loose trousers, with a long brown vest and dirty white turban, striped delicately in black.
Despite the friendly embrace, Mr. Taday knew he had been in the captain's sights for months. In July, insurgents ambushed two U.S.-Afghan troop convoys near the Zerok outpost, leaving a pair of Afghan soldiers dead. Afterward, Capt. Gibson summoned the Zerok elders, pulled Mr. Taday into a room and yelled at him for 20 minutes, pausing only so the interpreter could translate the obscenity-laced tirade into Pashto.
"You say you're in charge and that there is security in Zerok, but there's not," Capt. Gibson said at the time. "Either you're lying to me or you're working for them. Which is it?"
At the shura last month, Afghans delivered the message. An Afghan army officer opened with a verse from the Koran, an effort to show that the Taliban, known for their fierce interpretation of Islam, don't have a monopoly on faith. "For 30 years we've been fighting and killing innocent people," said Mr. Waziri, the provincial chief elder. "It's time we stop fighting."
"Innocent people get killed when the Taliban attack," said the provincial intelligence chief, Yaseen, who uses only one name. "Every day they fire rockets. They put bombs in the roads. Where are the fighters coming from? You elders are helping them. Don't sell out your country for five rupees."
The Afghan officials urged all of the elders to come forward with information about insurgent movements. "You don't care about your country," Qadar Gul, the subgovernor for Zerok District, chided them. "You don't care about your area. You are Taliban."
As the Afghan officials spoke, Capt. Gibson, his lip full of Copenhagen snuff, took care of side business. He quietly radioed his men to order a symbolic artillery and mortar barrage intended to ward off potential attackers in the ridgelines above the base. He relayed Lt. Col. Fenzel's orders that the guns fire only illumination or smoke rounds, not explosive munitions that might endanger civilians -- and only after the shura ended.
From across the room, the village doctor asked Capt. Gibson when he would receive $1,500 in promised compensation for four cows and four chickens killed in a firefight between Taliban fighters and U.S. soldiers. "It will be next week," Capt. Gibson assured him.
Meantime, the Afghans began to direct their comments more pointedly at Mr. Taday, and his body spoke of his discomfort. He crossed his arms tightly, and, at one point, dropped his beard to his chest and his head to his hands.
"I know you," Mr. Yaseen said.
"OK, you know me, but I'm not an insurgent," Mr. Taday responded.
Mr. Yaseen and other Afghan officials interrupted Mr. Taday on several occasions, a rudeness meant to diminish his stature before his peers. Mr. Yaseen challenged him to provide the names of Taliban fighters to the intelligence service, while Mr. Taday continued to protest his innocence.
"I support the government," he said. "Everyone knows Sangeen is a bad guy, but we can't do anything about it. He lives in Pakistan. There are no insurgents living here in Zerok."
Last to speak was Lt. Col. Fenzel. "We will always conduct ourselves with respect for your culture and your religion, Islam," he promised the elders.
"As your guests, we would ask for your protection," he added. "My pledge to you is that our forces will always conduct themselves as guests. When you know the Taliban are coming, let us know so we can provide security."
The colonel then looked directly at Mr. Taday. "You can't be on both sides," he warned.
Mr. Taday stared glumly at the floor.
The next day, Lt. Col. Fenzel got word that other shura members -- who U.S. officers say had long remained quiet for fear of Commander Sangeen -- now planned to depose him. At the same time, the colonel began working to secure orders from the provincial governor, Akram Khapalwak, to have the police arrest Mr. Taday.
They never got the chance.
Three days later, Mr. Taday, his son and three bodyguards traveled from Zerok to a nearby town where he met with the local head of the Afghan intelligence service, according to a U.S. intelligence report. Another son told a local official later that his father also met with American intelligence agents that day.
On the way home, as the sun went down, Taliban insurgents ambushed Mr. Taday's vehicle, blasting it with rocket-propelled grenades and killing all five men inside.
Insurgents then launched rockets at the Zerok outpost, but missed their target by a couple of hundred yards. U.S. troops counterattacked with a barrage of mortars and artillery, killing 10 Taliban fighters, thought to be the same group that had ambushed Mr. Taday, according to a U.S. intelligence report.
Using live images from an unmanned spy plane, the U.S. soldiers later watched as three trucks carried the corpses of Haji Taday, his son and bodyguards along mountain roads and dried riverbeds back to his home village. When they arrived, the drivers sprinted into the houses to deliver the news, and dozens of men swarmed around the bed of a pickup truck, apparently to glimpse Mr. Taday's body.
Lt. Col. Fenzel was stunned by the turn of events. He didn't think the other shura members would be bold enough to have Mr. Taday killed. So he surmised that Taliban loyal to one of Commander Sangeen's rivals had seen Mr. Taday meet with the government spy boss and assumed that he was betraying them.
One Afghan official with access to intelligence reports said that the killers had left a letter with the bodies, accusing Messrs. Taday and Sangeen of betraying the Taliban cause. Days later, insurgent factions in the area battled each other, leaving two fighters dead, the official said. His report couldn't be verified.
That night, Lt. Col. Fenzel called Gov. Khapalwak and told him of Mr. Taday's fate. The governor said he would inform the local media that the Taliban had murdered one of Zerok's respected village elders.
Citation: Michael M. Phillips. "Afghan Tradition Masks Political Ambush," The Wall Street Journal, 01 December 2007.
Original URL: http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB119646564104110023.html
The Wall Street Journal, 01 December 2007
At a Gathering of Village Elders, the U.S. Helps Set in Motion an Enemy's Downfall
ZEROK - The villagers handed out red roses. The elders lined up to welcome guests to their ancient tradition, the shura. And John Gibson, a U.S. Army captain with sunburned cheeks, warmly embraced Haji Taday, a tribal leader with a black Abe Lincoln beard.
But what looked like a reunion with an old friend last month was really a political ambush of a bitter enemy.
"He takes us for fools," Capt. Gibson, smiling slightly, said minutes after hugging Mr. Taday. "We just got enough evidence to move against him."
In Afghanistan's insurgency, politics is warfare by other means. U.S. officers knew that if they wanted to take down Mr. Taday -- both a major figure in the local Taliban and chief of Zerok's council of elders -- they would have to avoid cultural missteps that could hand propaganda victories to their enemies.
So for the next hour, U.S. and Afghan officials used the shura, a traditional Pashtun gathering of respected senior villagers, to discredit Mr. Taday before his peers and engineer his downfall.
They succeeded, but not in the way they expected.
Capt. Gibson's boss, Lt. Col. Michael Fenzel, commander of the 1st Battalion of the 503rd Infantry Regiment, set the snare hours before the elders arrived at the Zerok district center. In a private meeting at the adjacent American combat outpost, the colonel laid out the case against Mr. Taday before a few trusted Afghan officials, including both the chief of intelligence and the head of shura for Paktika Province, where Zerok is located.
Lt. Col. Fenzel had a receptive audience. The Afghans had their own suspicions about Mr. Taday, not least because his nephew is Commander Sangeen, widely known to lead one of the Taliban factions in the area. Mr. Taday has provided safe haven for foreign fighters who cross the Pakistani border, some 20 miles away, and move into Zerok District, according to U.S. and Afghan intelligence reports. Mr. Taday also arranged the theft of a green Ford Ranger pickup truck from the Afghan National Police and delivered it to his nephew to use as a suicide car bomb, according to U.S. intelligence reports.
At the pre-shura meeting, Lt. Col. Fenzel told the Afghan officials he wanted the police to arrest Mr. Taday immediately. But Nawab Waziri, the provincial head elder, argued that such a move on shura day would cause an uproar. The colonel agreed to hold off, and the group headed next door to the shura at the district government office, a single-story building with broken windows, surrounded by a stone wall topped with razor wire.
Mr. Taday was waiting for them in the courtyard, lined up with the other elders. Appearing to be in his 60s, short and rotund, he wore a gray tunic and loose trousers, with a long brown vest and dirty white turban, striped delicately in black.
Despite the friendly embrace, Mr. Taday knew he had been in the captain's sights for months. In July, insurgents ambushed two U.S.-Afghan troop convoys near the Zerok outpost, leaving a pair of Afghan soldiers dead. Afterward, Capt. Gibson summoned the Zerok elders, pulled Mr. Taday into a room and yelled at him for 20 minutes, pausing only so the interpreter could translate the obscenity-laced tirade into Pashto.
"You say you're in charge and that there is security in Zerok, but there's not," Capt. Gibson said at the time. "Either you're lying to me or you're working for them. Which is it?"
At the shura last month, Afghans delivered the message. An Afghan army officer opened with a verse from the Koran, an effort to show that the Taliban, known for their fierce interpretation of Islam, don't have a monopoly on faith. "For 30 years we've been fighting and killing innocent people," said Mr. Waziri, the provincial chief elder. "It's time we stop fighting."
"Innocent people get killed when the Taliban attack," said the provincial intelligence chief, Yaseen, who uses only one name. "Every day they fire rockets. They put bombs in the roads. Where are the fighters coming from? You elders are helping them. Don't sell out your country for five rupees."
The Afghan officials urged all of the elders to come forward with information about insurgent movements. "You don't care about your country," Qadar Gul, the subgovernor for Zerok District, chided them. "You don't care about your area. You are Taliban."
As the Afghan officials spoke, Capt. Gibson, his lip full of Copenhagen snuff, took care of side business. He quietly radioed his men to order a symbolic artillery and mortar barrage intended to ward off potential attackers in the ridgelines above the base. He relayed Lt. Col. Fenzel's orders that the guns fire only illumination or smoke rounds, not explosive munitions that might endanger civilians -- and only after the shura ended.
From across the room, the village doctor asked Capt. Gibson when he would receive $1,500 in promised compensation for four cows and four chickens killed in a firefight between Taliban fighters and U.S. soldiers. "It will be next week," Capt. Gibson assured him.
Meantime, the Afghans began to direct their comments more pointedly at Mr. Taday, and his body spoke of his discomfort. He crossed his arms tightly, and, at one point, dropped his beard to his chest and his head to his hands.
"I know you," Mr. Yaseen said.
"OK, you know me, but I'm not an insurgent," Mr. Taday responded.
Mr. Yaseen and other Afghan officials interrupted Mr. Taday on several occasions, a rudeness meant to diminish his stature before his peers. Mr. Yaseen challenged him to provide the names of Taliban fighters to the intelligence service, while Mr. Taday continued to protest his innocence.
"I support the government," he said. "Everyone knows Sangeen is a bad guy, but we can't do anything about it. He lives in Pakistan. There are no insurgents living here in Zerok."
Last to speak was Lt. Col. Fenzel. "We will always conduct ourselves with respect for your culture and your religion, Islam," he promised the elders.
"As your guests, we would ask for your protection," he added. "My pledge to you is that our forces will always conduct themselves as guests. When you know the Taliban are coming, let us know so we can provide security."
The colonel then looked directly at Mr. Taday. "You can't be on both sides," he warned.
Mr. Taday stared glumly at the floor.
The next day, Lt. Col. Fenzel got word that other shura members -- who U.S. officers say had long remained quiet for fear of Commander Sangeen -- now planned to depose him. At the same time, the colonel began working to secure orders from the provincial governor, Akram Khapalwak, to have the police arrest Mr. Taday.
They never got the chance.
Three days later, Mr. Taday, his son and three bodyguards traveled from Zerok to a nearby town where he met with the local head of the Afghan intelligence service, according to a U.S. intelligence report. Another son told a local official later that his father also met with American intelligence agents that day.
On the way home, as the sun went down, Taliban insurgents ambushed Mr. Taday's vehicle, blasting it with rocket-propelled grenades and killing all five men inside.
Insurgents then launched rockets at the Zerok outpost, but missed their target by a couple of hundred yards. U.S. troops counterattacked with a barrage of mortars and artillery, killing 10 Taliban fighters, thought to be the same group that had ambushed Mr. Taday, according to a U.S. intelligence report.
Using live images from an unmanned spy plane, the U.S. soldiers later watched as three trucks carried the corpses of Haji Taday, his son and bodyguards along mountain roads and dried riverbeds back to his home village. When they arrived, the drivers sprinted into the houses to deliver the news, and dozens of men swarmed around the bed of a pickup truck, apparently to glimpse Mr. Taday's body.
Lt. Col. Fenzel was stunned by the turn of events. He didn't think the other shura members would be bold enough to have Mr. Taday killed. So he surmised that Taliban loyal to one of Commander Sangeen's rivals had seen Mr. Taday meet with the government spy boss and assumed that he was betraying them.
One Afghan official with access to intelligence reports said that the killers had left a letter with the bodies, accusing Messrs. Taday and Sangeen of betraying the Taliban cause. Days later, insurgent factions in the area battled each other, leaving two fighters dead, the official said. His report couldn't be verified.
That night, Lt. Col. Fenzel called Gov. Khapalwak and told him of Mr. Taday's fate. The governor said he would inform the local media that the Taliban had murdered one of Zerok's respected village elders.
Citation: Michael M. Phillips. "Afghan Tradition Masks Political Ambush," The Wall Street Journal, 01 December 2007.
Original URL: http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB119646564104110023.html