10 January 2006

Reality Check: U.S. House Vote Enhances Tensions, Not Taiwan's Security

By Greg May
The Nixon Center, March 2000

The U.S. House of Representatives did Taiwan no favors by passing the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA) on Tuesday. This bill succeeds in worsening an already tense situation without actually doing anything substantial to "enhance" Taiwan's security.

The timing of Tuesday's vote showed a remarkable lack of concern for Taiwan. Though the House leadership delayed consideration of the legislation last fall to avoid interfering with negotiations on China's entry into the WTO, the leadership apparently did not consider Taiwan's presidential election next month as reason enough for further delay. It was during the last presidential campaign four years ago that the PRC "test fired" missiles into waters near Taiwan as a warning to the island not to pursue independence. This time around, the PRC is taking a wait-and-see attitude and has so far refrained from reckless saber rattling. The House vote only gives Beijing a reason to second guess its restraint. Senate leaders, who have indicated they may delay consideration of the bill until after the March 18 balloting, are showing more wisdom in this regard.

Despite the dangers and the potential for unintended consequences, it's easy to see why the Act passed by a veto proof 341 to 70 votes. It makes a strong symbolic statement in support of a democratic Taiwan and those who authored and support the bill do so with noble intentions. Those who oppose it risk appearing supportive of China at the expense of a democratic Taiwan. But the problem is the legislation does not make any improvements to current U.S. policy that could justify the likely damage to Taiwan-China and U.S.-China relations.

By far the most significant provision of the bill is the one requiring the Secretary of Defense to certify that "direct secure communications" exist between the American and Taiwanese militaries. If enacted, this measure creates the appearance of an alliance-like relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan, yet does not require the kind of commitments that normally come with such a relationship. Establishing alliance-like communication links in the absence of real operational links between the two militaries (the kind the U.S. has with its NATO allies in Europe) arguably only adds to the ambiguity in U.S. policy that the authors of this legislation want to dispel.

Other provisions of the bill--including reserving additional spots at U.S. military schools for Taiwanese officers, increasing the number of technical staff at the American Institute in Taiwan (the unofficial embassy in Taipei), and a slew of reporting requirements--all lack any real security protein.

All this leads to the question of why this bill is even necessary. In its findings section, the TSEA notes that "The Taiwan Relations Act has been instrumental in maintaining peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the Western Pacific since its enactment in 1979." Indeed, everything in the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act could be done under the TRA. Like the U.S. Constitution, the TRA works well because it is clear on basic principles yet allows flexibility in implementation. The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act sets a precedent for congressional micro-management that will not necessarily work in Taiwan's favor in the future, especially given that the political makeup and priorities of Congress change over time.

Although the Clinton administration is fiercely opposed to the TSEA, it is also indirectly responsible for its creation. The President's June 1998 "three no's" pledge--no support for Taiwan independence, two Chinas, or Taiwan's membership in state-based international organizations like the UN--was a mistake. The statement broke past tradition of public neutrality on the question of Taiwan's ultimate status, raised anxieties in Taipei, and prompted Congress to step in on Taiwan's behalf. Taiwan's adoption of a "special state-to-state" model for cross-Strait relations and the TSEA are both unintended consequences of the "three no's."

But, despite the "three no's" misstep, the Clinton administration has supported Taiwan when the chips are down. Not only did President Clinton elevate Taiwan-U.S. political relations by allowing more cabinet-level exchanges, but he also unambiguously dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region during the March 1996 missile crisis. The Clinton administration has overseen the sale of the Patriot missile, the Stinger and Avenger surface-to-air missiles, 300 M-60 tanks, the Harpoon anti-ship missile, new E-2T early-warning aircraft, and a new ground-based early-warning radar, among other high tech arms. The administration has also significantly expanded exchanges with the Taiwanese military. This was demonstrated in October 1998 when Taiwan's Chief of the General Staff Tang Fei (who is now defense minister) held private meetings with Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Henry Shelton.

In assisting in Taiwan's defense, the U.S. needs to act in the spirit of a well-known shoe commercial and "just do it." That is, Washington should quietly but firmly make it clear to the PRC that the U.S. will not tolerate the use of armed force in the Taiwan Strait. This was the message sent in March 1996. Four years later, there is little purpose served by rubbing China's nose in the fact that it still cannot take Taiwan militarily and, ultimately, this is all the TSEA accomplishes.

Greg May is Assistant Director of The Nixon Center in Washington DC. He can be reached by email at gmay@nixoncenter.org.

---------------------
Citation: Greg May. "Reality Check: U.S. House Vote Enhances Tensions, Not Taiwan's Security," The Nixon Center, March 2000.
Original URL: http://www.chinaonline.com/commentary_analysis/intrelations/currentnews/secure/c000203May.asp
---------------------