By Mitchell B. Reiss
Boston Globe, 22 January 2006
AMERICA'S DEBATE on Iraq is over. Iraq's elections last month and an emerging bipartisan consensus in the United States have ensured that America will leave only as soon as the Iraqi military, security, and police forces are capable of performing their respective missions. For Washington, what remains undecided are tactical issues -- the precise timing and terms of our departure and the residual American force presence.
While these issues will command much attention in the coming months, Washington needs to address the strategic consequences of its exit from Iraq. How the United States manages its departure will influence not only the future of Iraq and security of the Persian Gulf, but also America's global standing. Guiding a successful transition will be the primary diplomatic challenge for the Bush administration.
Unfortunately, Washington may be unable to control all aspects of its transition from Iraq. The pace and timing of our exit may be set by the new Iraqi government, which could find it irresistible to burnish its nationalist credentials by demanding that US forces leave Iraq ahead of the Pentagon's timetable. The insurgents are also likely to continue their murderous assault on US forces in order to claim credit for driving the United States from the field. Overseas opponents of the war will portray America's withdrawal as failed imperial hubris.
To counter any perception of weakness, the United States needs to devise a comprehensive strategy that not only maximizes the chances for success in Iraq, but also reassures the Persian Gulf states that Washington will continue to play a stabilizing regional role and works with the international community to ensure it will emerge from Iraq in a stronger strategic position.
A relatively stable, representative, and economically viable Iraq will clearly be the most effective rebuttal to any perceptions of American infirmity. Washington must continue to support the new Iraqi government, promote the inclusion of all factions, and complete the training of security and police forces.
The military task can be made easier if Iraqi forces can concentrate on internal security and not worry about external threats. The United States and the international community should guarantee Iraq's borders against its meddlesome neighbors. Reaffirming Iraq's territorial integrity through a UN Security Council resolution would tie the UN and great powers more firmly to Iraq's future and place its neighbors on notice.
The Persian Gulf states are especially anxious that the US withdrawal from Iraq not herald a wholesale exit from the region, especially given Iran's newly aggressive foreign policy. The United States must reassure them that they remain a vital national security interest.
This message can be conveyed by our continued military presence elsewhere in the region, which should remain robust. But it needs to be supplemented by creative diplomacy that promotes greater integration of counter-terrorism and border security efforts among these countries. We should also consider a more active role for NATO, which would serve the dual purpose of investing our European allies in this region and providing a multilateral context in which US forces could operate more effectively.
The Bush administration will need to convince an American people wearying of overseas commitments that there is little security in retreating behind Fortress America. Much important work remains. The war on terror and the transnational threats identified in the administration's 2002 National Security Strategy should receive greater time, attention, and resources than before.
It is essential to enlist partners to address these threats. Both the United States and Europe have a responsibility to ensure that the withdrawal from Iraq does not cause the same type of estrangement as did the run-up to the war. No one committed to the Atlantic Alliance can wish for a return to those days, or for an America that emerges from Iraq either weakened or isolationist.
As America leaves Iraq, we should recall that the decision to enter the war evolved from a debate over Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction to a debate over the uses of American power in a post-9/11 world. That debate remains unfinished. The Bush administration needs to reengage its critics and explain when America will defend its interests unilaterally, if necessary, and when it will act as a benign superpower willing to place its power in service to multilateral ends.
The White House's recent ''National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" spelled out succinctly the consequences of failure. But as we've learned all too well in Iraq, even battlefield victory is not enough to avoid reverses. As the United States exits Iraq, it needs to ensure that the manner of its departure advances America's broader strategic position in the region and globally.
Mitchell B. Reiss, director of policy planning at the US State Department from 2003-2005, is a vice provost at the College of William & Mary in Williamsburg, Va.
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Citation: Mitchell B. Reiss. "Not with a bang, but a strategy," Boston Globe, 22 January 2006.
Original URL: http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/01/22/not_with_a_bang_but_a_strategy/
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