By Carl Conetta
Global Beat Syndicate, 16 February 2006
WASHINGTON - The original purpose of the Quadrennial Defense Review was to show how America's military strategy, its armed forces, and its defense budget matched up. Based on this standard, the 2006 QDR is long on assertion and short on quantification. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld assures us that all the variables are aligned, but he gives us little reason to believe.
The Congressional Budget Office has already cast doubt on the Pentagon's ability to deliver its modernization plans within budget. Another area of concern is the match - or lack of it - between planned forces and missions. Our manifest difficulties in Iraq make this more than an academic issue.
The QDR says counter-insurgency and nation-building exercises are not easy to win "swiftly" or "decisively." But this concession to reality does not lead Rumsfeld to prescribe fewer such adventures for the future. Instead, the QDR foresees increasing the demands on our military in these areas - and almost every other as well.
The question is whether planned force enhancements are sufficient to support another quantum leap in activity. For that matter, are forces sufficient to turn the tide in Iraq? That is anyone's guess, because the document does not provide enough detail to allow clear judgments. But our experience over the past few years argues against blind faith in Rumsfeld's assurances.
The QDR divides military missions into two categories: "steady state" and "surge." With
regard to the first, it foresees an increase in counter-terror, counter-proliferation, counter-insurgency, stability, and nation-building operations. It also suggests that our military will be involved in more countries building partnerships with foreign military establishments - and must routinely recruit, train, equip and maintain our forces. Add to that big list "military transformation." This, too, must march steadily forward down both new and familiar avenues. Units are supposed to re-orient globally while also integrating a new generation of weapons, becoming better "networked," and improving their capacities for irregular warfare.
Meantime, "surge activities" include responding to a catastrophic attack on the homeland and being able to wage two nearly simultaneous larger-scale wars.
One new element in the 2006 QDR is that the two "big wars" may be either two conventional campaigns or one conventional and counter-insurgency war, for example Iraq plus North Korea (or maybe China). Of course, adding a big counter-insurgency war to the possible mix will boost requirements because the forces suitable for fighting two conventional wars would not be entirely suitable for fighting one conventional war plus one irregular war. When it addresses proposed force changes, the QDR calls for a reduction in active duty personnel, down to the level set by the previous administration.
By various counts, this means a loss of between 60,000 and 75,000 personnel. Of course, the Pentagon says it plans to use the remainder more efficiently. As for "force enhancements," almost all of the previously planned "big ticket" items have been spared the axe. If affordable, these will enhance conventional war-fighting capabilities - at least those planned for the air forces. But the feasibility of the Army's future weapon systems remains hotly contested. Also controversial are the Army's efforts to squeeze 42 combat brigades out of the existing force of 33.
The real beef of immediate transformation - available within the next five years or so - comes down to 14,000 special operations personnel (shifted from other duties) and 322 additional unmanned aerial vehicles.
But how does this add up to a match between missions and forces? That is a mystery, mostly. So far, we can be sure of only one thing: The Pentagon will spend $2.5 trillion during the next five years - not counting the incremental (added) cost of combat operations.
Understandably, we Americans may want to know more about how Secretary Rumsfeld plans to spend our treasure and use our vital assets.
Several types of information would help close the credibility gap: first, the Pentagon needs to show how it might allocate its assets to fulfill the expanded roster of "steady state" activities, including training and transformation. And second, it needs to us show how the proposed force might manage several types of "surge" situations - especially complex ones involving multiple conflicts.
In this way, Rumsfeld can indicate the strength, flexibility and resilience of the force he proposes. And once better informed, if we are not convinced, we might want to consider different goals, a different strategy, different forces - or a different budget.
Carl Conetta is co-director of the Project on Defense Alternatives, a nonprofit think tank focused on national security issues.
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Citation: Carl Conetta. "The Pentagon's disconnect between planned forces and missions," Global Beat Syndicate, 16 February 2006.
Original URL: http://www.sltrib.com/portlet/article/html/fragments/print_article.jsp?article=3512541
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