By Greg Grant
Defense News, 20 February 2006
After U.S. special forces killed the Palestinian-born terrorist Abu Azzam in September, U.S. President George W. Bush hailed the death of the “second-most-wanted al-Qaida leader in Iraq,” and said it showed that the Iraq insurgency was weakening.
But a U.S. Army intelligence officer who tracked al-Qaida fighters in Baghdad said the removal of high-profile insurgent leaders has little effect on the overall insurgency, and the terrorist network soon recovered.
“When they got Abu Azzam, we saw a fairly good disruption — for maybe three weeks,” Capt. David Conkle said in a December interview.
The resiliency of Iraq’s insurgent networks are troubling the U.S. military, more than two and a half years after the invasion. According to figures released by Multi National Forces-Iraq, 24,470 suspected insurgents were killed or detained in 2004, and 26,500 in 2005. Still, the insurgency remains a potent fighting force; during January, it launched 433 attacks across Iraq.
“We take a lot of people off the streets, but they can regenerate very rapidly,” said Army Col. Edward Cardon, who commanded a brigade in Baghdad as part of the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division. “The insurgent networks are complex and diffuse. We can take out the leadership, but it doesn’t take long for them to grow new legs.”
Iraqis’ anger about the U.S. occupation helps the insurgents recruit new fighters.
“I went out on an operation, I killed 27 [insurgents] in October,” said Army Lt. Col. Ross Brown, squadron commander in the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. “All they do is fill their spaces with more people; they have an infinite supply of replacements. We kill a leader or we detain a leader, and there is somebody else in charge. Every time I feel good about killing or detaining this guy, there is somebody else to fill the boots, somebody is standing right behind ready to jump up.”
Brown says the 2003 decision to disband the Iraqi military freed up trained soldiers, leaders and intelligence gatherers to join the insurgency.
“The guy who was in the army and has five kids, who trained in the army for 20 years — this is what he knows,” Brown said. “If you pay me $300 to blow up a Bradley, and I trained my whole life to blow up Bradleys, sooner or later I’m going to blow up a Bradley.”
A Broad Insurgency
The Bush administration and Pentagon focus much of their rhetoric on foreign fighters affiliated with Zarqawi’s al-Qaida in Iraq network. In 2005 alone, according to statistics provided by the military, 111 fighters identified as leaders of Zarqawi’s network were either captured or killed. But military sources in Iraq believe Zarqawi’s group functions more as a facilitator, largely through financing or franchising out attacks carried out by an almost exclusively Iraqi insurgency.
Conkle said the term “al-Qaida” is now applied to any fighter in Iraq, regardless of affiliation. “It’s kind of like ‘Xerox’; it’s a ubiquitous term. Anybody who is a terrorist is labeled ‘al-Qaida.’ [But] they’re not foreigners, they’re Iraqis.”
American military officers in Iraq also insist it is simplistic and wrong to portray the insurgency in Iraq as purely a Sunni endeavor. Many attacks on U.S. troops are mounted by Shia insurgent groups, whose ranks come from Shiite cleric Moqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi militia, and other Shiite militias.
The Shia groups led the development and use of the explosively formed penetrator improvised explosive devices, one of the deadliest weapons in the insurgent arsenal, before they shared the know-how with Sunni groups.
“The lines blur after a while between groups — can’t say, ‘that’s Ansar al Sunna’ or ‘that group’s al-Qaida in Iraq.’ They cross cells,” said Lt. Col. David Funk, who commanded an infantry battalion in Baghdad’s troubled southwestern district. “Half these guys are going to the highest bidder.”
Funk said the insurgent leadership is mostly former Iraqi military officers, well-educated and affluent. “They attach themselves to Zarqawi because of the money. They figure if they’re going to attack Americans anyway, why not get financed for it?”
Iraq’s high unemployment rate makes it easy to find foot soldiers. In the early morning hours in Baghdad, unemployed workers gather in the streets with the hopes of being chosen for day labor. The insurgent networks draw from the same pool to find men willing to place a roadside bomb or shoot at American patrols.
“These low-level guys, they get pissed off that they can’t get a job, their electricity doesn’t work and they have sewage in the streets,” said Army Capt. Stephen Capeheart, who commanded a tank company in Baghdad. “And so they get pissed off, so they go out and attack Americans.”
In testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Feb. 8, Joseph Christoff of the Government Accountability Office provided statistics that showed insurgent attacks had steadily increased since June 2003 through December 2005, when there were 2,500 attacks across Iraq.
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Citation: Greg Grant. " Iraqi Insurgents Find Ways To Bounce Back," Defense News, 20 February 2006.
Original URL: http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1484873&C=america
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