J. Alexander Thier
New York Times
24 September 2004
On Tuesday, President George W. Bush told the UN General Assembly that "the Afghan people are on the path to democracy and freedom." Yet in nearly three years the United States has failed to create security, stability, prosperity or the rule of law in Afghanistan.
These failings are not just a reflection of the great difficulties of nation-building. They are also the direct result of the Bush administration's policy decisions. The efforts in Afghanistan are underfinanced and undermanned.
The root of the problem is that we invaded Afghanistan to destroy something - the Taliban and Al Qaeda - but we didn't think much about what would grow in its place. While we focus on fighting the terrorists (and even there our effectiveness has been questionable), Afghanistan has become a collection of warlord-run fiefs fueled by a
multibillion-dollar opium economy.
We armed and financed warlords with records of drug-running and human rights abuses stretching back two decades. These decisions were made with disregard for the long-term implications for the mission there.
The U.S. Army continues to hunt insurgents in the mountains, but Washington has refused to take the steps necessary to secure the rest of the country, and it shows. More coalition and Afghan government soldiers and aid workers have died this year than in each of the previous two.
The opium trade is also out of control, fueling lawlessness and financing terrorists. Last year, opium brought in $2.3 billion; this year, opium production is expected to increase by 50 to 100 percent.
Amid terrorist attacks and fighting among regional warlords, the country is preparing for presidential elections on Oct. 9. A recent UN report warned that warlords were intimidating voters and candidates. This month, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, which has monitored post-conflict elections in trouble spots like Bosnia and Kosovo, declared that Afghanistan was too dangerous for its election monitors (it is sending a small "election support team" instead).
President Hamid Karzai narrowly escaped assassination last week on his first campaign trip outside Kabul. Eight other candidates have called for elections to be delayed, saying it's too dangerous for them to campaign.
Many of these problems stem from early mistakes. Rather than moving quickly to establish security and then gradually turning over control to a legitimate domestic authority, we have done the opposite. As fighting among warlord militias in the countryside intensifies, we are slowly expanding our presence and being dragged into conflicts.
In Kabul, the effort to build a stable, capable government has also lagged dangerously. Karzai has begun to show great fortitude in challenging warlords. But his factious cabinet, born of political compromise, has collapsed under the pressure of the country's hurried presidential elections.
Outside Kabul, Karzai's control remains tenuous in some places, nonexistent in others. Kabul's Supreme Court, the only other branch of government, is controlled by Islamic fundamentalists.
It's true that there have been several important accomplishments. The Taliban and Al Qaeda no longer sit in Kabul's presidential palace; girls are back in school in many parts of the country; some roads and buildings have been rebuilt, and more than 10 million Afghans have registered to vote in the presidential elections. Thousands of international aid workers are working with the Afghans, often at great risk. Despite the slow progress, most Afghans are more hopeful about their future than they have been in years.
But many people working there feel that much more could have been done both to help Afghanistan and fight terrorism over the last three years. Unless the next administration steps up to the plate, we may soon be asking, "Who lost Afghanistan?"
J. Alexander Thier, a fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University, was a legal adviser to Afghanistan's constitutional and judicial reform commissions.
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Citation:
J. Alexander Thier, "Afghanistan I: Back to Warlords and Opium," New York Time/International Herald Tribune, 24 September 2004.
Original URL: http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?file=540233.html