Nicholas Berry
Senior Analyst, nberry@cdi.org
CDI Asia Forum, 8 August 2001.
President Jiang Zemin announced on July 1 at the 80th anniversary of the Communist Party that China is modernizing on the one-party nationalist model incorporating all socio-economic classes. What response does this recommend for other countries in their dealings with China? How does China's abandonment of the class struggle - thus the abandonment of Marxism - affect the security environment and relations in Asia and the world?
The answers depend on how China is likely to continue its reorientation.
Five trends are already identifiable:
1. China will not network through international links with other communist parties to create united front policies. Relations with other communist parties, such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Workers Party, will remain unbroken, but the ties will not constitute an international movement. China will continue to deal with established governments and conduct normal state-to-state diplomacy.
2. Beijing will abandon forever the impulse to export the Chinese political model. "Socialism with Chinese characteristics" cannot be imposed on countries with other national characteristics.
3. By incorporating the interests of workers, farmers, entrepreneurs, professionals, joint enterprise executives, and others, China will become less vulnerable to foreign liberal-democratic propaganda, penetration, and subversion. Nationalism will grow, and the expansion of civil and political rights will increasingly stimulate domestic demands for human rights. The more rights citizens
attain, the more they will want.
4. China, with a more secure and nationalist population, will persist in measured openings to global information flows. The private sector will expand its power and increasingly become a constraint on the political power of the Communist Party. Already, Chinese officials take seriously Chinese public opinion, and such professions appear genuine.
5. Beijing will rely on traditional measures to influence other governments, including foreign aid; cultural and educational exchanges; military sales, demonstrations, and joint exercises; trade pacts; information programs; and participation in international organizations.
All states will find themselves compelled to adjust to the New China. States failing to do so and instead perpetuate a Cold-War modus operandi will inevitably create hostile relations. This will result because ulterior Chinese motives will be assumed, mutual benefits in agreements doubted, and isolation and containment policies practiced or kept in reserve. China will react with equal suspicion, making relations a product of self-fulfilling hostile motives, imagined or not.
The countries that have to adjust the most to the New China are Japan, North and South Korea, Taiwan, India, Russia, and the United States. What follows are the most likely and most optimum policy shifts for each country.
Japan
Japan remains the pariah of Asia. The legacy of World War II still hangs heavy, as witnessed by the uproar in both Koreas, China and elsewhere over Japanese officials authorizing a middle school textbook that belittles Japan's wartime atrocities. Japan's political culture is also severely fractured on national security issues. An enhanced Japanese security role runs the risk of reminding its neighbors of wartime misdeeds and thus triggering a negative response, yet Japan's capabilities and interests call for a larger role. This creates a dilemma. The new prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, has pledged to review Japan's military role, but he knows two things. First, economic reform takes precedence because it is the country's top problem and there is a rough consensus that something must be done. And second, any
decision on military reforms will alienate a majority of the nation. This is because there exist three equally strong public attitudes: become a "normal" military power; engage only in UN-approved military operations; and remain faithful to the constitution's Article 9 and engage in no armed military operations. Two-thirds of the nation, therefore, would oppose any sudden change in Japan's Self Defense Force role.
In the midst of these dilemmas, Japan faces a new Chinese reality and must adjust to it. China is Japan's number two trading partner and potential number one security threat. Tokyo, therefore, will work to promote trade and prevent the threat. How can this best be done?
1. Japan must put World War II out of the minds of its neighbors, especially China. It will not be easy. A major address by Koizumi admitting in detail Japan's misdeeds in the war would be a good start, followed by a sincere apology, and concluding with a statement that it is time to move on. No wartime Japanese official
remains in office, wounds must heal, and Japan has changed. Koizumi could speak of a new beginning, of beneficial relations, of trade and direct investment in China's future. Koizumi could end foreign aid to China as part of the process; it appears to be tribute as compensation for Japan's 14-year assault and occupation and thus is a reminder of the war. Time to move on. Japan only keeps the war alive by approving dishonest textbooks (and only 6 of 532 public school districts have adopted the controversial text, proving that appeasing the right-wing Tsukuru Kai and its textbook was a huge mistake). Top officials visiting the Yasukuni shrine to the war dead, including homage to 14 war criminals, is also offensive to foreigners without garnering significant domestic approval. Time to move on.
2. Tokyo could offer to be a partner in joint projects with China. Both countries face environmental and energy- and water-shortage problems. Positive proposals make news. They sway public opinion. They discredit hard-line opponents abroad.
3. Japan could expand cultural and educational exchanges with China, which are always seen as acts of goodwill.
4. Maintaining the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty assures China that Japan will not create a military establishment capable of independent military operations. However, bolstering that alliance, as Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage unwisely recommends, would be seen in Beijing as directed at only one place. Specifically, Japan must avoid integrating its ballistic missile defense - if it decides to develop one - with the United States, or link it with the defense of Taiwan. Both moves would be hostile acts directed at China. Equally hostile would be a positive response to recent Australian and American calls for a more formal military relationship between these two allies and Japan and South Korea. Even an informal quadripartite pact would be seen as directed towards containing China.
5. Japan could publicly and officially link its military role abroad to UN Security Council resolutions, on which China exercises a veto. The slow and deliberate integration of Japanese forces in peacekeeping operations would serve to calm fears of a revival of Japanese militarism.
North Korea
The hermit kingdom is, in fits and starts, coming out. Pyongyang still rattles sabers to win concessions, but the change in China will increasingly deflate the credibility of North Korea's threats. Bereft of allies and ideological compatriots, North Korea would fight and lose alone. Such belligerence is unlikely. Instead, Kim Jong Il will adjust to China's new road and emphasize the following policies:
1. Pyongyang has everything to gain by resuming the dialogue with the United States over its missile program, a move strongly recommended by Beijing and one that would continue U.S. aid to the North's stricken economy.
2. North Korea can only expect aid from China if it resumes the dialogue with South Korea. China's trade with South Korea is roughly 70 times that with the North ($25 billion versus $.37 billion), and China will not sacrifice such lucrative trade to back the North's threats. In short, China's new road will continue to tame Pyongyang.
South Korea
Seoul continues to expand its trade and diplomatic exchanges with Beijing. Two-way trade continues to expand. What South Korea wants to avoid is being caught in the middle of U.S.-China disputes and thus be forced to take sides. This calls for the following policies:
1. Seoul will expand trade relations with China and continue expressions of goodwill. Increasingly as the world economy slows down, maintaining economic prosperity will keep governing parties in power, and South Korea is no exception. With Chinese political and economic reforms taking hold, South Korea will find its fastest growing market next door. And this will cement strong Beijing-Seoul relations.
2. Like Japan, South Korea will continue to reject association with U.S. missile defense and will resist formation of an Australian-American-Japanese-South Korean military forum.
3. Seoul will likely find it advantageous to rely more on China and less on the United States to pressure North Korea to work towards reconciliation and eventual reunification.
Taiwan
China's dumping of Marxism has to be good news for Taiwan. Officials in Taipei, regardless of party, want to maintain Taiwan's autonomy up to the point when eventual reunification with the mainland becomes close to painless. China's new road paves the way for it to become more like Taiwan, first in the economy and then inevitably in the political system. Eventually, economic and political convergence will bond the Chineseness of both political entities, or at least reduce conflicting interests to the point where a common nationalism will become paramount. (A current joke in Taiwan says that the mainland will reach full capitalism before Taiwan, and Taiwan
will attain communism before the mainland.) To buy time and speed China's transformation, Taiwan is likely to accelerate some policies and adopt new ones.
1. Taipei will continue to relax restrictions on the "three links" of trade, people, and communication. Limits on direct investment on the mainland, already proposed, will likely disappear eventually.
2. Taiwan's officials will find it safe, perhaps soon, to accept Beijing's demand that it accept the "one-China principle." Such a move would quiet Beijing, set the stage for closer relations, and preserve Taiwan's political autonomy.
3. Offers to help China in particular areas where Taiwan has developed expertise and China has problems could facilitate the mainland's reform. Assistance in areas such as legal training - although this is a sensitive area - and finance/banking would serve to speed mainland modernization. Although Beijing would never acknowledge the fact, Taipei could imagine itself as changing China in its own image.
4. Taiwan's current policies of getting iron-clad U.S. protection and buying offensive weapons could be dropped without affecting the ultimate guarantee of U.S. assistance if China makes an unprovoked attack.
India
India's concern about China's ambitions and its ties with Pakistan dominates New Delhi's national security policies. Such concern by the current government of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee has led to an opening to the United States, but without cutting off India's military ties and purchases from Russia. The opening to Washington gives New Delhi a security backstop versus China and leverage versus Russia. While a closer relationship with the United States is not necessarily a hostile act towards China, something approaching a military alliance would be. And it is not in India's interest to worsen relations with China at a time when that country's new road presents New Delhi with new opportunities.
1. India will worsen relations with China if it publicly proposes more formal military ties with Washington. Such a move would be counter to Indian initiatives that could take advantage of China's internal reform focus and would be best avoided.
2. A proposal by India to finally agree to a settlement of its border dispute with China would be an important test of China's commitment to domestic reform. Now on hold following a 1993 status-quo agreement, the border problem is symptomatic of historic distrust between the world's two most populous nations. It sours every relationship, as most border disputes do.
3. India could propose a trade agreement with China lowering tariff barriers. The two largest populated markets conduct minimal trade (only a measly $2 billion), and the potential is there for a huge expansion.
4. India could also propose arms control talks, especially limits on the number of long-range ballistic missiles. This and other confidence-building measures could lessen tensions and allow India to reduce is burgeoning military budget.
Russia
Russian officials since Tsarist times have harbored suspicions about their heavily-populated neighbor to the southeast. China's switch in systems will not erase that suspicion, but it should provide space for Russia to get its own house in order. After all, Russia maintains a robust nuclear deterrent as an ultimate insurance policy against Chinese encroachments, even if such aggression remains distinctly remote. Russia already has created a good foundation for cooperative ties with China and can now expand them.
1. Russia and China have successfully managed issues of border demarcation and control, terrorism, and separatism via their membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (along with other SCO members Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan). The SCO has proven a valuable forum.
2. Moscow will make a mistake if it sells the People's Liberation Army (PLA) all the weapon systems and technology it wants. So far, Russia has resisted transferring the technology to produce entire weapon systems, such as engines for the Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, and thus maintains a constraint on the PLA's capability (and thus the PLA's influence in Beijing). Weapon sales, however, do promote relations and bring needed foreign exchange.
3. Russia will continue to work with China to advance common interests in relations with the United States, especially with efforts to limit U.S. missile defense and space warfare capabilities. The friendship treaty signed in Moscow in July provides the cover for further cooperation, but does not constitute an alliance neither country wants nor will establish.
4. Russian leaders, facing a more benign China, need to focus on reform and modernization with the same intensity as China. Beijing accepts globalization with its emphasis on being economically competitive abroad and prosperous at home. This stance is worth emulation.
The United States
Although Jiang in his address expressed no intention of China adopting a multi-party system, he did commit China to becoming a more modern, open, and internationally integrated state playing by UN rules. For the United States to treat China - without evidence - as the new global threat would directly counter and inhibit China's reforms. Moves to contain China will only lend credence to the Communist old guard in Beijing who oppose abandoning orthodox Marxism and oppose domestic reforms. China's new road, as it does with the other countries above, creates numerous opportunities for the United States that need not be missed.
1. Washington, by accepting the fact that China will become a major player in world affairs, will reduce China's not-so-latent xenophobia and paranoia, sometimes referred to as a "victim's syndrome" resulting from China's 100 years of "humiliation" by the outside world. It is not appeasement to recognize that China
has interests commensurate with its rising capabilities, but only common sense to treat China as a normal state, which it is becoming. Voices in the Pentagon, especially that of Andrew Marshall head of the Office of Net Assessment and author of one of Rumsfeld's strategic reviews, make no secret that they consider China the next security threat. Their considerable technical expertise has not yet been accompanied by an understanding of Chinese history and politics. As it is oft said, to treat a country as an enemy is to make an enemy of that country.
2. While it may be true, as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld repeats, that China obtains more information than does the United States from military exchanges, this fact misses the wider picture of the benefits of military-to-military relations. They are: the development of personal relations -the schmooze factor - that furthers friendships and the understanding of organizational and national interests; the tracking of policy shifts by tracking who in China is up and who is down; and cultivating access to military policy-makers that may be needed in key situations (such as the U.S. needed during the EP-3 incident in April). Americans live in
an open society, and so foreigners from more closed societies will always have more information available to them than Americans have in their land. So it is wise to maximize access to more closed societies to get what information one can. The restoration of regular - not case-by-case - military relations with China is in
order.
3. The United States maintains its support of Chinese membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and that policy has facilitated the continued growth in U.S.-China trade, now surpassing $115 billion. Although a trade deficit of $80 billion can affect the value of the U.S. dollar (it has not so far), abundant and inexpensive Chinese goods suppress inflation and create a mutual dependence that neither country wants or dares to destroy. Strong economic relations create vested interests in countries to maintain those relations. The stronger the ties, the stronger these pressure groups become.
4. The Bush administration is determined to proceed with national missile defense (NMD), regardless. The threat this poses to China is two-fold. NMD could neutralize China's deterrent, now consisting of 18 aging ICBMs. It could also make the United States, appearing absolutely secure, immune to Chinese counter-action and thus take on the role of bully. Both threats can be mitigated by the United States offering to sign a communiqué setting limits on its NMD interceptors and allowing on-site verification to prevent suspicion of a breakout greatly expanding the system. (The same offer can be made to Russia.) This would allow China to maintain a deterrent with its new DF-41 ICBM without having to MIRV or continually add expensive missiles.
5. Washington needs to clarify its policy on Taiwan. What did it mean when Bush said the United States would do "whatever it took to help Taiwan defend itself?" Under what conditions? Would it mean the abandonment of the one-China policy? Beijing opposes any American attempt to further the independence movement on Taiwan. Unless Washington wants to pick a fight with China, U.S. assistance to Taiwan should only be provided upon an unprovoked attack from the mainland. On the positive side, current trends on increased cross-Strait relations can be encouraged to facilitate an eventual reconciliation. An independent Taiwan is impossible without war, and the United States should neither provoke it by pushing Taiwan independence nor change its policy to move against any side that starts one.
Conclusion
It made sense to be wary of China as a revolutionary communist state committed to a worldwide class struggle and revolution. But it makes little sense to maintain the same wariness to a state strongly committed to domestic reform, to the maintenance of the principle of sovereignty for itself and all other states, and the to the norms of the UN Charter.
Furthermore, it is the height of hubris for the United States to deny China the status of a major power when America takes so much pride and invests so many resources to achieve that very same status.
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Citation: Nicholas Berry, "Adjusting to China's New Road," CDI Asia Forum, 8 August 2001.
Original URL: http://www.cdi.org/asia/fa082801.html
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