By The Associated Press, 31 January 2006
WASHINGTON, Jan. 30 (AP) — National Guard officials said Monday that recruiting had accelerated so much in recent months that they expected to expand the Guard even as the Bush administration proposes to shrink it.
The National Guard Bureau, the Pentagon office that administers the Guard, issued a statement outlining a turnaround in recruiting and predicting that it would continue to rise this year. In the last quarter of 2005, the Guard signed up 13,466 recruits, above its goal of 12,605. It was the first time since 1993 that the Guard exceeded its goal in that period.
In his 2007 budget, to be sent to Congress on Feb. 6, President Bush would pay for a Guard of 333,000 soldiers; its Congressionally authorized limit is 350,000. Administration officials say that is not a cut, because the Guard now has 333,000 soldiers.
On Monday, the Guard said it was "aggressively working" to reach 350,000 troops by the end of the current budget year on Sept. 30.
Army Secretary Francis J. Harvey had said that if the Guard was able to grow beyond 333,000, the Army would shift money from elsewhere in its budget to pay for the extra soldiers.
Mark Allen, a National Guard Bureau spokesman, attributed the recruiting improvement to a new advertising campaign, a large increase in financial incentives and a near doubling of the number of recruiters, to 5,100 from 2,700.
The Guard, like other branches of the military, had been struggling for recruits earlier in the year. In the 2005 budget year that ended Sept. 30, the Army National Guard fell 20 percent short of its recruiting goal. The active-duty Army fell 8 percent short, and the Army Reserve missed its goal by 16 percent.
The administration's plan to pay for a smaller Guard has stirred opposition in Congress and among groups like the National Guard Association of the United States, which represents current and former Army Guard and Air Guard officers.
John Goheen, a spokesman for the association, said Monday that his group agreed with the National Guard Bureau that recent gains in recruiting might enable the Guard to increase beyond its current troop strength of 333,000.
Mr. Goheen said his group opposed Mr. Bush's proposal and disputed the administration's claim that it did not amount to shrinking the Guard.
------------------------------
Citation: "Turnaround in Recruiting Puts Guard on Path for Expansion," The Associated Press, 31 January 2006.
Original URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/31/politics/31guard.html
------------------------------
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31 January 2006
A New Kind of Care in a New Era of Casualties
By Erik Eckholm
The New York Times, 31 January 2006
TAMPA, Fla. — Morning rounds at the Tampa veterans hospital, and a phalanx of specialists stands at Joshua Cooley's door.
Inert in his bed, the 29-year-old Marine reservist is a survivor of an Iraq car bombing and a fearsome scramble of wounds: profound brain injury, arm and facial fractures, third-degree burns, tenacious infections of the central nervous system. Each doctor, six in all on a recent day, is here to monitor some aspect of his care.
As they cluster at the threshold, one gently closes the door — not to shield their patient from bad news, but to avoid overstimulating the nervous system of a man whose frontal lobe has been ripped by shrapnel. Not that the news right now is good: Corporal Cooley is spiking a fever, presumably because of his newest problem, blood clots in his left leg.
The doctors sort through a calculus of competing interests. Should they prescribe a blood thinner to dissolve the dangerous clots, even though that could cause more bleeding in the brain? Or should they just wait? At this point, the doctors decide, the clots pose the greater risk.
Thousands of miles from the battlefield, intricate medical choices have become routine here, at one of four special rehabilitation centers the government created last year to treat the war's most catastrophically wounded troops.
"These soldiers were kept alive," said Dr. Steven G. Scott, the Tampa center's director. "Now it's up to us to try and give them some meaningful life."
With their concentrated batteries of specialists and therapists, these centers are developing a new model of advanced care, a response to the distinctive medical conundrum of the Iraq war. With better battlefield care and protective gear, the military is saving more of the wounded, yet the insurgents' heavy reliance on car bombs and buried explosives means the survivors are more damaged — and damaged in more different ways — than ever before.
To describe the maimed survivors of this ugly new war, a graceless new word, polytrauma, has entered the medical lexicon. Each soldier arriving at Tampa's Polytrauma Rehabilitation Center, inside the giant veterans hospital, brings a whole world of injury. The typical patient, Dr. Scott said, has head injuries, vision and hearing loss, nerve damage, multiple bone fractures, unhealed body wounds, infections and emotional or behavioral problems. Some have severed limbs or spinal cords.
"Two years ago we started seeing injured soldiers coming back of a different nature," recalled Dr. Scott, who is also the hospital's chief of physical medicine and rehabilitation. Then last spring, with a Congressional mandate, the Department of Veterans Affairs created the four new centers, formalizing changes that a few top veterans hospitals were already starting to make.
After weeks or months of intensive care in military hospitals, more than 215 soldiers and a few more each week — still a tiny fraction of the roughly 16,000 soldiers who have been wounded in Iraq — have been sent here or to the other centers, inside V.A. hospitals in California, Minnesota and Virginia.
The surge in complex casualties, doctors found, required major reorganizing, enabling them to focus extraordinary medical and therapeutic expertise on each patient and to offer counseling, housing and other aid to their often shellshocked wives, children and parents.
"In the outside world you might have two or three consultants seeing a patient," said Dr. Andrew Koon, a specialist in internal medicine who was checking laboratory results on a portable computer during bedside rounds. "Here it's not unusual to have 10 specialists on board."
The multiple wounds have required medical balancing acts and unusual cooperation across departments. One quadriplegic patient was so weakened by recurring infections that doctors had to wait a year before removing shrapnel from his neck. In other cases, the risk of new infection has delayed treatment of the spasms that some paralyzed patients suffer, which can require an implanted pump to inject medicine into the spinal column.
Of some 90 soldiers with extreme injuries who were treated in Tampa over the last year only one has died, of a rare form of meningitis. The drama here is more excruciatingly drawn out: Over months and months of painstaking physical and psychological therapy, the patients and their families start learning the boundaries of their future lives.
Quiet Struggles
The medical challenges are often persistent and daunting, but the real focus of the new centers is rehabilitation. Even as doctors battle drug-resistant bacteria blown into wounds with Iraqi dirt, patients start relearning to talk and focus their thoughts, to walk and run or maneuver a wheelchair. Some go home in almost normal shape; for others, simply swallowing is a milestone.
To spend several recent days here is to witness a panorama of quiet struggles. A young man with brain and nerve damage slowly fits big round pegs into big round holes. Another beams after jogging a full minute for the first time since his injury, but cannot voice his mix of pride and impatience because shrapnel destroyed the language center in his brain.
A quadriplegic is lifted by a giant sling from his bed to a high-tech wheelchair, which he has learned to drive with a mouthpiece.
Progress on these wards can be measured in agonizing increments.
Corporal Cooley, a 6-foot 6-inch former deputy sheriff, arrived in Tampa on Sept. 29 after more than two months at the Bethesda Naval Hospital outside Washington. His doctors and relatives were encouraged when, after another couple of months, he wriggled his fingers and feet, and answered yes-no questions with blinks.
"They got him to make noises the other day," offered his wife, Christina. "He's doing really well." At "rehab rounds" one recent day, assorted therapists took up Corporal Cooley's case, reporting on small steps forward and compromises along the way.
The speech therapist said he was responding to questions with blinks about 30 percent of the time when she was alone with him, but less if distracted. She described her gingerly efforts to train him to swallow, using thin pudding, apple sauce and ice chips.
The respiratory therapist said his tracheotomy had to be changed to a larger, cuffed device that would allow them to expand his lower right lung.
The speech therapist groaned, "That will make it harder to swallow." They agreed that the lung had to take priority, but the speech therapist added, "Let's get rid of that cuffed trach as soon as possible."
Brain injuries — the signature wounds inflicted by the blast waves and flying shrapnel of explosives — are pervasive, and they tend to dictate the arc of care.
"It's really the brain injury that directs how we approach other impairments," Dr. Barbara Sigford, V.A.'s national director of physical medicine and rehabilitation and chief of the Minneapolis polytrauma center, said in a telephone interview. "Many types of rehab rely on intact thinking, learning and memory skills."
Using advanced prosthetic limbs, for example, requires control of specific muscles; patients without that capacity must use simpler models. Blind people are normally taught to navigate using their memory of the environment; if memory is spotty, they must find other ways.
In the recreational therapy room in Tampa on a recent day, several men are being led through a round of Uno, a card game that involves matching numbers and colors. Some play well. Some fumble trying to pick up cards. One rocks in frustration at his inability to summon the word "blue."
Sgt. Antwain Vaughn, 31, an Army combat engineer who took a roadside blast in the face on Aug. 31, arrives late and in a wheelchair. A padded helmet covers a large indentation where his shattered skull will receive a metal plate.
Sergeant Vaughn came to Tampa after two months on a ventilator and feeding tube. In addition to brain damage, facial fractures, pulmonary problems, blood clots and infections, he lost an eye and has trouble with complex tasks, something the card game could help.
Here he has learned to swallow and eat and in daily therapy, when he is feeling up to it, he is working to reclaim a life. But this time, he will not join the game. "My head's hurting a lot," he quietly tells the group.
Head injuries have also left some soldiers in a peculiar psychological box. Before Iraq, most head injuries at the Tampa hospital involved car accidents, said Dr. Rodney D. Vanderploeg, the chief of neuropsychology. Though it may seem counterintuitive, soldiers with penetrating brain injuries, in which a fragment crashed through their skulls, are far more likely to remember the attack and its bloody aftermath, perhaps including the deaths of friends, he said.
These memories often cause great psychological stress. But psychotherapy becomes especially difficult if injury has impaired a patient's insight and understanding.
Making Progress
In the hallways, the banter tends to be upbeat, as perhaps it needs to be for patients and staff. A patient shows off his stair-climbing wheelchair. Others compare the merits of prosthetic leg models. Nearly every patient vows, not always realistically, that he will get back on his feet and more.
"The way I see it, if I get able to walk a little bit, then eventually I'm going to walk a lot," said Specialist Charles Mays, 31, who was left with multiple fractures and partial paralysis of his legs after being blasted out of his Humvee by a vertically buried rocket south of Baghdad.
Sometimes the hallways bring success stories like Specialist Nicholas Boutin, who was slowly walking on his own to speech therapy in a hockey helmet, apparently not at all self-conscious about the red pit where an artificial eye will be implanted or about the large dent where a piece of skull will be replaced.
Specialist Boutin, 21, had arrived in Tampa just five weeks before, mute and hardly able to swallow, his right arm and leg almost useless. During a midnight patrol in a village near Samarra, an insurgent dropped a grenade into his Bradley fighting vehicle. Fragments sprayed into his face and the left side of his brain, leaving him with Broca's aphasia — able to comprehend but not to speak.
He weathered fungal infections, facial pain where nerves were damaged and the destruction of his pituitary gland and a maxillary sinus, the kind of internal wound that can torment a person for life.
But now, after hard hours each day in therapy, he can jog briefly and write messages with his right hand. As speech therapists coax the right side of his brain to take over lost functions from the left, he has begun to make one-word responses and spontaneously utter a few words at a time. Soon he will head home to Georgia for continued therapy.
"Yes," he uttered instantly when asked if he felt he was progressing. Determination gleamed from his remaining eye.
Behind closed doors, though, bravado sometimes gives way to depression, explosive anger, survivors' guilt. Some patients sit quietly with glum faces or obsess endlessly about their buddies and time in Iraq.
As much as the nurses are often buoyed by their patients' progress, they say the relentless intensity of the work can sometimes bring them to tears. They spend as much time interacting with stressed-out relatives as with the patients.
"Relatives take out their frustrations on the nurses," said Laureen G. Doloresco, assistant nursing chief. "It's also hard on the nurses because of the youth of the patients. Many of them have sons the same age."
Support Systems
At the bedsides of many of these young men are their equally young wives, whose lives have also been wrenched onto unexpected paths.
Before he was sent to Iraq last Jan. 1, Corporal Cooley and his wife were partners on the vice/narcotics squad of a sheriff's department in central Florida. They married just before his deployment.
Soon after the car bombing on July 5, she and her husband's parents were summoned to the American military hospital in Landstuhl, Germany, and warned to expect the worst.
After the car bomb detonated, near the town of Hit, Corporal Cooley had been pulled from his burning amtrack, an armored vehicle, unconscious and with a gaping hole in his head. The medics had at first refused to load him onto the evacuation helicopter, Christina Cooley later learned. They changed their minds when they heard a moan.
Ms. Cooley recalled telling doctors that they were showing her the wrong patient, that this bloated figure was not her husband. She was convinced only after she saw his tattoos.
She also saw, though, that he was breathing on his own. Days later, he was flown to the Bethesda Naval Hospital, and for two months, his wife and the in-laws she still barely knew shared a hotel room and spent their days around Corporal Cooley's bed in intensive care.
Here in Tampa, despite continued medical setbacks like the blood clots, attention was turning to his potential for physical and mental recovery.
So far, he had been put in a chair for a few hours a day and strapped into a "tilt board" at a 45-degree angle for 10 minutes at a time, to forestall the drops in blood pressure that occur when long-prone patients raise up.
His wife finds hope where she can.
Corporal Cooley often stares vacantly, she said, and "you don't know if he's there." But one day when she asked him, "Who's my hero?" he pointed a finger toward himself.
Their home county, outside Tampa, has raised money that she plans to use on an accessible house.
"I hope he'll walk through the door of that house," she said. "If not, I'll take him as a vegetable. I'll take care of him the rest of my life. I love that man to death."
Overhearing her, Dr. Scott, the center's director, marshaled his characteristic optimism. "He can already move both legs," he said. "It's possible he can be rehabbed to walk. How far he'll go we just don't know."
The polytrauma centers themselves remain works in progress, sharing lessons with one another and with the major military hospitals by videophone, and pushing scientific inquiry into the myriad, often invisible effects of explosive blasts.
The Department of Veterans Affairs says it has not calculated the cost of establishing the centers, bolstering their staffs and treating patients so long and intensively. The Tampa hospital's director, Forest Farley Jr., said that here alone, it was "several millions of dollars."
Though the average stay in polytrauma centers is 40 days, many patients remain for months and some for more than a year. In the end, a few must go to nursing homes, but most go home, where they receive continued care at less-specialized veterans hospitals, with oversight from the centers. Some require round-the-clock home aides and therapists and costly equipment, paid for by the government on top of monthly disability payments. Even so, wives or parents often must give up their jobs.
For the worst off, the ongoing annual costs — largely hidden costs of this war — can easily be several hundred thousand dollars or more.
"We expect to follow these patients for the rest of their lives," Dr. Scott said. "But I have a great deal of concern about our country's long-term commitment to these individuals. Will the resources be there over time?"
-----------------------
Citation: Erik Eckholm. "A New Kind of Care in a New Era of Casualties," The New York Times, 31 January 2006.
Original URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/31/national/31wounded.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
-----------------------
The New York Times, 31 January 2006
TAMPA, Fla. — Morning rounds at the Tampa veterans hospital, and a phalanx of specialists stands at Joshua Cooley's door.
Inert in his bed, the 29-year-old Marine reservist is a survivor of an Iraq car bombing and a fearsome scramble of wounds: profound brain injury, arm and facial fractures, third-degree burns, tenacious infections of the central nervous system. Each doctor, six in all on a recent day, is here to monitor some aspect of his care.
As they cluster at the threshold, one gently closes the door — not to shield their patient from bad news, but to avoid overstimulating the nervous system of a man whose frontal lobe has been ripped by shrapnel. Not that the news right now is good: Corporal Cooley is spiking a fever, presumably because of his newest problem, blood clots in his left leg.
The doctors sort through a calculus of competing interests. Should they prescribe a blood thinner to dissolve the dangerous clots, even though that could cause more bleeding in the brain? Or should they just wait? At this point, the doctors decide, the clots pose the greater risk.
Thousands of miles from the battlefield, intricate medical choices have become routine here, at one of four special rehabilitation centers the government created last year to treat the war's most catastrophically wounded troops.
"These soldiers were kept alive," said Dr. Steven G. Scott, the Tampa center's director. "Now it's up to us to try and give them some meaningful life."
With their concentrated batteries of specialists and therapists, these centers are developing a new model of advanced care, a response to the distinctive medical conundrum of the Iraq war. With better battlefield care and protective gear, the military is saving more of the wounded, yet the insurgents' heavy reliance on car bombs and buried explosives means the survivors are more damaged — and damaged in more different ways — than ever before.
To describe the maimed survivors of this ugly new war, a graceless new word, polytrauma, has entered the medical lexicon. Each soldier arriving at Tampa's Polytrauma Rehabilitation Center, inside the giant veterans hospital, brings a whole world of injury. The typical patient, Dr. Scott said, has head injuries, vision and hearing loss, nerve damage, multiple bone fractures, unhealed body wounds, infections and emotional or behavioral problems. Some have severed limbs or spinal cords.
"Two years ago we started seeing injured soldiers coming back of a different nature," recalled Dr. Scott, who is also the hospital's chief of physical medicine and rehabilitation. Then last spring, with a Congressional mandate, the Department of Veterans Affairs created the four new centers, formalizing changes that a few top veterans hospitals were already starting to make.
After weeks or months of intensive care in military hospitals, more than 215 soldiers and a few more each week — still a tiny fraction of the roughly 16,000 soldiers who have been wounded in Iraq — have been sent here or to the other centers, inside V.A. hospitals in California, Minnesota and Virginia.
The surge in complex casualties, doctors found, required major reorganizing, enabling them to focus extraordinary medical and therapeutic expertise on each patient and to offer counseling, housing and other aid to their often shellshocked wives, children and parents.
"In the outside world you might have two or three consultants seeing a patient," said Dr. Andrew Koon, a specialist in internal medicine who was checking laboratory results on a portable computer during bedside rounds. "Here it's not unusual to have 10 specialists on board."
The multiple wounds have required medical balancing acts and unusual cooperation across departments. One quadriplegic patient was so weakened by recurring infections that doctors had to wait a year before removing shrapnel from his neck. In other cases, the risk of new infection has delayed treatment of the spasms that some paralyzed patients suffer, which can require an implanted pump to inject medicine into the spinal column.
Of some 90 soldiers with extreme injuries who were treated in Tampa over the last year only one has died, of a rare form of meningitis. The drama here is more excruciatingly drawn out: Over months and months of painstaking physical and psychological therapy, the patients and their families start learning the boundaries of their future lives.
Quiet Struggles
The medical challenges are often persistent and daunting, but the real focus of the new centers is rehabilitation. Even as doctors battle drug-resistant bacteria blown into wounds with Iraqi dirt, patients start relearning to talk and focus their thoughts, to walk and run or maneuver a wheelchair. Some go home in almost normal shape; for others, simply swallowing is a milestone.
To spend several recent days here is to witness a panorama of quiet struggles. A young man with brain and nerve damage slowly fits big round pegs into big round holes. Another beams after jogging a full minute for the first time since his injury, but cannot voice his mix of pride and impatience because shrapnel destroyed the language center in his brain.
A quadriplegic is lifted by a giant sling from his bed to a high-tech wheelchair, which he has learned to drive with a mouthpiece.
Progress on these wards can be measured in agonizing increments.
Corporal Cooley, a 6-foot 6-inch former deputy sheriff, arrived in Tampa on Sept. 29 after more than two months at the Bethesda Naval Hospital outside Washington. His doctors and relatives were encouraged when, after another couple of months, he wriggled his fingers and feet, and answered yes-no questions with blinks.
"They got him to make noises the other day," offered his wife, Christina. "He's doing really well." At "rehab rounds" one recent day, assorted therapists took up Corporal Cooley's case, reporting on small steps forward and compromises along the way.
The speech therapist said he was responding to questions with blinks about 30 percent of the time when she was alone with him, but less if distracted. She described her gingerly efforts to train him to swallow, using thin pudding, apple sauce and ice chips.
The respiratory therapist said his tracheotomy had to be changed to a larger, cuffed device that would allow them to expand his lower right lung.
The speech therapist groaned, "That will make it harder to swallow." They agreed that the lung had to take priority, but the speech therapist added, "Let's get rid of that cuffed trach as soon as possible."
Brain injuries — the signature wounds inflicted by the blast waves and flying shrapnel of explosives — are pervasive, and they tend to dictate the arc of care.
"It's really the brain injury that directs how we approach other impairments," Dr. Barbara Sigford, V.A.'s national director of physical medicine and rehabilitation and chief of the Minneapolis polytrauma center, said in a telephone interview. "Many types of rehab rely on intact thinking, learning and memory skills."
Using advanced prosthetic limbs, for example, requires control of specific muscles; patients without that capacity must use simpler models. Blind people are normally taught to navigate using their memory of the environment; if memory is spotty, they must find other ways.
In the recreational therapy room in Tampa on a recent day, several men are being led through a round of Uno, a card game that involves matching numbers and colors. Some play well. Some fumble trying to pick up cards. One rocks in frustration at his inability to summon the word "blue."
Sgt. Antwain Vaughn, 31, an Army combat engineer who took a roadside blast in the face on Aug. 31, arrives late and in a wheelchair. A padded helmet covers a large indentation where his shattered skull will receive a metal plate.
Sergeant Vaughn came to Tampa after two months on a ventilator and feeding tube. In addition to brain damage, facial fractures, pulmonary problems, blood clots and infections, he lost an eye and has trouble with complex tasks, something the card game could help.
Here he has learned to swallow and eat and in daily therapy, when he is feeling up to it, he is working to reclaim a life. But this time, he will not join the game. "My head's hurting a lot," he quietly tells the group.
Head injuries have also left some soldiers in a peculiar psychological box. Before Iraq, most head injuries at the Tampa hospital involved car accidents, said Dr. Rodney D. Vanderploeg, the chief of neuropsychology. Though it may seem counterintuitive, soldiers with penetrating brain injuries, in which a fragment crashed through their skulls, are far more likely to remember the attack and its bloody aftermath, perhaps including the deaths of friends, he said.
These memories often cause great psychological stress. But psychotherapy becomes especially difficult if injury has impaired a patient's insight and understanding.
Making Progress
In the hallways, the banter tends to be upbeat, as perhaps it needs to be for patients and staff. A patient shows off his stair-climbing wheelchair. Others compare the merits of prosthetic leg models. Nearly every patient vows, not always realistically, that he will get back on his feet and more.
"The way I see it, if I get able to walk a little bit, then eventually I'm going to walk a lot," said Specialist Charles Mays, 31, who was left with multiple fractures and partial paralysis of his legs after being blasted out of his Humvee by a vertically buried rocket south of Baghdad.
Sometimes the hallways bring success stories like Specialist Nicholas Boutin, who was slowly walking on his own to speech therapy in a hockey helmet, apparently not at all self-conscious about the red pit where an artificial eye will be implanted or about the large dent where a piece of skull will be replaced.
Specialist Boutin, 21, had arrived in Tampa just five weeks before, mute and hardly able to swallow, his right arm and leg almost useless. During a midnight patrol in a village near Samarra, an insurgent dropped a grenade into his Bradley fighting vehicle. Fragments sprayed into his face and the left side of his brain, leaving him with Broca's aphasia — able to comprehend but not to speak.
He weathered fungal infections, facial pain where nerves were damaged and the destruction of his pituitary gland and a maxillary sinus, the kind of internal wound that can torment a person for life.
But now, after hard hours each day in therapy, he can jog briefly and write messages with his right hand. As speech therapists coax the right side of his brain to take over lost functions from the left, he has begun to make one-word responses and spontaneously utter a few words at a time. Soon he will head home to Georgia for continued therapy.
"Yes," he uttered instantly when asked if he felt he was progressing. Determination gleamed from his remaining eye.
Behind closed doors, though, bravado sometimes gives way to depression, explosive anger, survivors' guilt. Some patients sit quietly with glum faces or obsess endlessly about their buddies and time in Iraq.
As much as the nurses are often buoyed by their patients' progress, they say the relentless intensity of the work can sometimes bring them to tears. They spend as much time interacting with stressed-out relatives as with the patients.
"Relatives take out their frustrations on the nurses," said Laureen G. Doloresco, assistant nursing chief. "It's also hard on the nurses because of the youth of the patients. Many of them have sons the same age."
Support Systems
At the bedsides of many of these young men are their equally young wives, whose lives have also been wrenched onto unexpected paths.
Before he was sent to Iraq last Jan. 1, Corporal Cooley and his wife were partners on the vice/narcotics squad of a sheriff's department in central Florida. They married just before his deployment.
Soon after the car bombing on July 5, she and her husband's parents were summoned to the American military hospital in Landstuhl, Germany, and warned to expect the worst.
After the car bomb detonated, near the town of Hit, Corporal Cooley had been pulled from his burning amtrack, an armored vehicle, unconscious and with a gaping hole in his head. The medics had at first refused to load him onto the evacuation helicopter, Christina Cooley later learned. They changed their minds when they heard a moan.
Ms. Cooley recalled telling doctors that they were showing her the wrong patient, that this bloated figure was not her husband. She was convinced only after she saw his tattoos.
She also saw, though, that he was breathing on his own. Days later, he was flown to the Bethesda Naval Hospital, and for two months, his wife and the in-laws she still barely knew shared a hotel room and spent their days around Corporal Cooley's bed in intensive care.
Here in Tampa, despite continued medical setbacks like the blood clots, attention was turning to his potential for physical and mental recovery.
So far, he had been put in a chair for a few hours a day and strapped into a "tilt board" at a 45-degree angle for 10 minutes at a time, to forestall the drops in blood pressure that occur when long-prone patients raise up.
His wife finds hope where she can.
Corporal Cooley often stares vacantly, she said, and "you don't know if he's there." But one day when she asked him, "Who's my hero?" he pointed a finger toward himself.
Their home county, outside Tampa, has raised money that she plans to use on an accessible house.
"I hope he'll walk through the door of that house," she said. "If not, I'll take him as a vegetable. I'll take care of him the rest of my life. I love that man to death."
Overhearing her, Dr. Scott, the center's director, marshaled his characteristic optimism. "He can already move both legs," he said. "It's possible he can be rehabbed to walk. How far he'll go we just don't know."
The polytrauma centers themselves remain works in progress, sharing lessons with one another and with the major military hospitals by videophone, and pushing scientific inquiry into the myriad, often invisible effects of explosive blasts.
The Department of Veterans Affairs says it has not calculated the cost of establishing the centers, bolstering their staffs and treating patients so long and intensively. The Tampa hospital's director, Forest Farley Jr., said that here alone, it was "several millions of dollars."
Though the average stay in polytrauma centers is 40 days, many patients remain for months and some for more than a year. In the end, a few must go to nursing homes, but most go home, where they receive continued care at less-specialized veterans hospitals, with oversight from the centers. Some require round-the-clock home aides and therapists and costly equipment, paid for by the government on top of monthly disability payments. Even so, wives or parents often must give up their jobs.
For the worst off, the ongoing annual costs — largely hidden costs of this war — can easily be several hundred thousand dollars or more.
"We expect to follow these patients for the rest of their lives," Dr. Scott said. "But I have a great deal of concern about our country's long-term commitment to these individuals. Will the resources be there over time?"
-----------------------
Citation: Erik Eckholm. "A New Kind of Care in a New Era of Casualties," The New York Times, 31 January 2006.
Original URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/31/national/31wounded.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
-----------------------
New U.S. Commander to Change Iraq Focus
By Jim Krane
The Associated Press, 30 January 2006
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates - With a new general in charge, the U.S. military's plans to fight Iraq's insurgents are expected to emphasize improving Iraqis' quality of life, rather than killing or capturing guerrillas.
Army Lt. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli, who became commander of Multi-National Corps Iraq last week, said he would employ across Iraq many of the strategies he used to quell uprisings in Baghdad when he led the Army's 1st Cavalry Division in 2003 and 2004.
"It was not uncommon for the 1st Cavalry Division to be engaged in intense urban combat in one part of the city, while just a few blocks away we had units replacing damaged infrastructure, helping to foster small business growth, or facilitating the development of local government," Chiarelli told The Associated Press in an e-mail.
The goal, he said, is to "deprive insurgents and terrorists of their support base" among disaffected Iraqis — part of a strategy that parallels U.S. political overtures to the Sunni Arabs.
Counterinsurgency experts in Washington and allies in Britain have long urged the
Pentagon to pursue a more nuanced style in Iraq, saying the U.S. preference for "search and destroy" offensives squandered precious time and helped send new recruits to the guerrillas.
Experts criticize the Bush administration's preference for expensive capital rebuilding schemes such as large power stations that have largely been scuttled by insurgent attacks and whose benefits have often not trickled down to Iraqis.
A U.S. government audit released last week also showed that billions of dollars in projects to improve water, sewer and electrical systems in Iraq could not be completed because the money had to be used to increase security.
Many say Chiarelli's maverick methods from 2004 — favoring smaller-scale, more easily completed projects such as wells and sewage — are being seen as prescient, dovetailing with a rethinking in Washington of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy.
In Baghdad's Shiite Muslim slum of Sadr City in 2004, Chiarelli's troops fought street battles with heavily armed insurgents while escorting plumbers and sewage contractors to streets nearby, where they upgraded squalid living conditions.
The tactic led to grass-roots pressure on the Shiite rebels to end their resistance and give the Americans a chance to make good on their promises.
"What we found in Baghdad is that some of the greatest infrastructure problems existed at the neighborhood level," said Chiarelli, 55, a Seattle native who replaced Lt. Gen. John R. Vines as commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, which comprises 150,000 troops from 27 countries.
Sadr City residents today credit American forces with modest improvements, although short of what they'd hoped for. Many believe the neighborhood's calm owes more to the entry into politics of militia leader and radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
Chiarelli also said American troops will transfer more battle duties to Iraqi troops with embedded U.S. trainers. Future offensives, Chiarelli said, "will increasingly be precision, intelligence-based operations with the Iraqis in the lead."
The Iraqi army, in turn, will shift responsibility for internal security to Iraqi police, he said.
More U.S. Army Military Police will be embedded in Iraqi police units "as we focus effort on putting the police in the lead for domestic security," he said.
The new MP mission is expected to be one of the most dangerous in Iraq, since thousands of Iraqi police have been killed in an onslaught of suicide bombings and other attacks.
The strategy is worth the risks, said Andrew Krepinevich, a retired Army officer and counterinsurgency expert whose criticisms of U.S. efforts in Iraq have been cited by Chiarelli and other top U.S. generals.
"If our only objective was to avoid casualties, we would abandon Iraq," said Krepinevich, who directs the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington. "We have to risk increased casualties in the near term to achieve the mission and reduce casualties in the long term."
Chiarelli said American units would be "exposed to some hazards that are unique to policing" but that it was unclear whether police trainers were at higher risk than other front-line troops.
The commander was cautious when asked whether his changes in strategy would quell Iraq's rampant violence.
"I can't predict when the violence will subside and I fully expect there to be spikes in enemy activity as we continue this mission," he said. "But I do believe that if we are successful in implementing the strategies outlined earlier, the Iraqi people will be given a fair chance to determine which governmental, economic and security systems are appropriate for their future."
The new strategy comes as U.S. officials are making overtures to Sunni Arabs, who form most of the insurgent ranks. U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad is urging Shiites and Kurds to bring more Sunnis into the next government, in hopes of preventing the schism between the groups from widening into civil war.
Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, deputy director of planning for the U.S. Central Command, said Chiarelli "clearly had a different idea" about counterinsurgency warfare than other American commanders.
Chiarelli's "hearts-and-minds" strategy is welcome among those who said U.S. offensives like those recently near
Syria were making matters worse by spurring revenge attacks and insurgent recruiting drives.
History shows that local forces — not foreign troops — stand a better chance against an established insurgency, said James Dobbins, a former Bush administration envoy to
Afghanistan who now heads military analysis for the Rand Corp.
"That we have had to spend several years relearning these lessons is a measure of the U.S. defense establishment's failure to take counterinsurgency seriously after the American retreat from Vietnam," Dobbins said.
-----------------------
Citation: Jim Krane. "New U.S. Commander to Change Iraq Focus," The Associated Press, 30 January 2006.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060130/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_new_war
-----------------------
The Associated Press, 30 January 2006
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates - With a new general in charge, the U.S. military's plans to fight Iraq's insurgents are expected to emphasize improving Iraqis' quality of life, rather than killing or capturing guerrillas.
Army Lt. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli, who became commander of Multi-National Corps Iraq last week, said he would employ across Iraq many of the strategies he used to quell uprisings in Baghdad when he led the Army's 1st Cavalry Division in 2003 and 2004.
"It was not uncommon for the 1st Cavalry Division to be engaged in intense urban combat in one part of the city, while just a few blocks away we had units replacing damaged infrastructure, helping to foster small business growth, or facilitating the development of local government," Chiarelli told The Associated Press in an e-mail.
The goal, he said, is to "deprive insurgents and terrorists of their support base" among disaffected Iraqis — part of a strategy that parallels U.S. political overtures to the Sunni Arabs.
Counterinsurgency experts in Washington and allies in Britain have long urged the
Pentagon to pursue a more nuanced style in Iraq, saying the U.S. preference for "search and destroy" offensives squandered precious time and helped send new recruits to the guerrillas.
Experts criticize the Bush administration's preference for expensive capital rebuilding schemes such as large power stations that have largely been scuttled by insurgent attacks and whose benefits have often not trickled down to Iraqis.
A U.S. government audit released last week also showed that billions of dollars in projects to improve water, sewer and electrical systems in Iraq could not be completed because the money had to be used to increase security.
Many say Chiarelli's maverick methods from 2004 — favoring smaller-scale, more easily completed projects such as wells and sewage — are being seen as prescient, dovetailing with a rethinking in Washington of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy.
In Baghdad's Shiite Muslim slum of Sadr City in 2004, Chiarelli's troops fought street battles with heavily armed insurgents while escorting plumbers and sewage contractors to streets nearby, where they upgraded squalid living conditions.
The tactic led to grass-roots pressure on the Shiite rebels to end their resistance and give the Americans a chance to make good on their promises.
"What we found in Baghdad is that some of the greatest infrastructure problems existed at the neighborhood level," said Chiarelli, 55, a Seattle native who replaced Lt. Gen. John R. Vines as commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, which comprises 150,000 troops from 27 countries.
Sadr City residents today credit American forces with modest improvements, although short of what they'd hoped for. Many believe the neighborhood's calm owes more to the entry into politics of militia leader and radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
Chiarelli also said American troops will transfer more battle duties to Iraqi troops with embedded U.S. trainers. Future offensives, Chiarelli said, "will increasingly be precision, intelligence-based operations with the Iraqis in the lead."
The Iraqi army, in turn, will shift responsibility for internal security to Iraqi police, he said.
More U.S. Army Military Police will be embedded in Iraqi police units "as we focus effort on putting the police in the lead for domestic security," he said.
The new MP mission is expected to be one of the most dangerous in Iraq, since thousands of Iraqi police have been killed in an onslaught of suicide bombings and other attacks.
The strategy is worth the risks, said Andrew Krepinevich, a retired Army officer and counterinsurgency expert whose criticisms of U.S. efforts in Iraq have been cited by Chiarelli and other top U.S. generals.
"If our only objective was to avoid casualties, we would abandon Iraq," said Krepinevich, who directs the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington. "We have to risk increased casualties in the near term to achieve the mission and reduce casualties in the long term."
Chiarelli said American units would be "exposed to some hazards that are unique to policing" but that it was unclear whether police trainers were at higher risk than other front-line troops.
The commander was cautious when asked whether his changes in strategy would quell Iraq's rampant violence.
"I can't predict when the violence will subside and I fully expect there to be spikes in enemy activity as we continue this mission," he said. "But I do believe that if we are successful in implementing the strategies outlined earlier, the Iraqi people will be given a fair chance to determine which governmental, economic and security systems are appropriate for their future."
The new strategy comes as U.S. officials are making overtures to Sunni Arabs, who form most of the insurgent ranks. U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad is urging Shiites and Kurds to bring more Sunnis into the next government, in hopes of preventing the schism between the groups from widening into civil war.
Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, deputy director of planning for the U.S. Central Command, said Chiarelli "clearly had a different idea" about counterinsurgency warfare than other American commanders.
Chiarelli's "hearts-and-minds" strategy is welcome among those who said U.S. offensives like those recently near
Syria were making matters worse by spurring revenge attacks and insurgent recruiting drives.
History shows that local forces — not foreign troops — stand a better chance against an established insurgency, said James Dobbins, a former Bush administration envoy to
Afghanistan who now heads military analysis for the Rand Corp.
"That we have had to spend several years relearning these lessons is a measure of the U.S. defense establishment's failure to take counterinsurgency seriously after the American retreat from Vietnam," Dobbins said.
-----------------------
Citation: Jim Krane. "New U.S. Commander to Change Iraq Focus," The Associated Press, 30 January 2006.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060130/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_new_war
-----------------------
American and Iranian interests meet in Iraq
By Charles Kupchan and Ray Takeyh
International Herald Tribune, 30 January 2006
WASHINGTON The crisis over Iran's nuclear program is fast heating up. Now that Tehran is developing the technology needed to produce bomb-grade uranium, the United States and the European Union are pressing to take the issue to the UN Security Council. Iran's hard-line president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has scoffed at the looming threat of sanctions, telling the Western powers that, "those who use harsh language against Iran need Iran 10 times more than we need them."
Ahmadinejad's belligerence and anti-Israel rants may call into question his judgment, but his analysis of the nuclear standoff is close to the mark - Iran does indeed hold an impressive deck of cards.
As the world's fourth-largest exporter of oil, Iran has considerable sway over petroleum markets. Tehran also wields extensive influence over Iraq. The two countries share a long, porous border. Many of Iraq's most influential clerics have lived or studied in Iran, giving Tehran exclusive entrée to the politicians and clerics destined to dominate Iraq's politics.
Iran's influence in Iraq does contribute to its intransigence, but it also provides a potential solution to the current nuclear impasse. Tehran's nuclear ambitions represent not an unbridled quest for regional hegemony, but an anxious search for adequate deterrence against perceived external threats. From this perspective, only by addressing the issue within the broader context of regional security in the Gulf can Tehran's nuclear program be contained.
Paradoxically, it is in Iraq, where U.S. and Iranian interests coincide, that the two countries could work together to advance regional stability. The resulting improvements in U.S.-Iranian relations and in regional security could at once defuse the nuclear crisis and advance the prospects for a stable Iraq.
Iranians are delighted that Saddam Hussein, who started the Iran-Iraq war, is languishing in prison. But now Iran itself is in America's crosshairs, with a vast arsenal of U.S. military power parked next door. Faced with these insecurities Tehran is unlikely to abandon its nuclear aspirations in response to the threat of economic sanctions and military strikes. Indeed, such sticks promise to be counterproductive unless complemented by an alluring carrot: the prospect of alleviating the fears stemming from Iran's dangerous neighborhood and its longstanding duel with America. It is here that Iraq enters the picture.
The United States and Iran have many common interests in Iraq, providing a unique opportunity for Tehran and Washington to edge toward normalization. Tehran, like Washington, is keenly interested in avoiding a civil war and sustaining Iraq as a unitary state. Iranian elites support a democratic Iraq, fully aware that consensual arrangements for power-sharing among Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds are vital to Iraq's survival.
Washington and Tehran should capitalize on their common interests in Iraq to cooperate on a host of issues. Iran can help U.S. economic reconstruction efforts through its ties to the Iraqi merchant community and its own official aid to Baghdad. As for political stability, the United States may have the boots on the ground, but America's coercive potential must be backed up by Iran's soft power.
Iran's seminaries, clerics, politicians and businessmen hold powerful sway over elites in Baghdad as well as local leaders. Tehran's interest in preventing the fragmentation of Iraq gives it reason to encourage all Shiite parties, including the independent militias, to work with the central government and resist secessionist temptations.
An Iraqi-Iranian-American dialogue could eventually provide a foundation for a new security architecture for the Gulf. A regional body could begin with confidence-building measures and arms-control pacts, and move toward collective security institutions and common markets. This endpoint is admittedly far off, but the process of getting there would help ease the geopolitical uncertainties that fuel Iran's nuclear ambitions and Iraq's disarray.
To pursue this agenda, Washington needs a willing partner in Tehran. Ahmadinejad is not that man. But a subtle power struggle is going on within the clerical state between the pragmatists, such as Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the new president and his entourage of firebrands.
Ahmadinejad came into office determined to consolidate his power by rekindling revolutionary fires and ensuring Iran's isolation. By refusing to play along and instead seeking to forge a common approach toward Iraq, the Bush administration could help tip the domestic balance in favor of the forces of moderation, paving the way for a government ready to work with Washington.
Given the Iranian president's repellent rhetoric and political intransigence, it may seem an odd moment to advise Washington to reach out to Tehran. But doing so holds out the best hope for not only taming Iran's nuclear aspirations, but also stabilizing Iraq.
Charles Kupchan and Ray Takeyh are senior fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations.
--------------------------
Citation: Charles Kupchan and Ray Takeyh. "American and Iranian interests meet in Iraq," International Herald Tribune, 30 January 2006.
Original URL: http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/30/opinion/edtakeyh.php
--------------------------
--------------------------
International Herald Tribune, 30 January 2006
WASHINGTON The crisis over Iran's nuclear program is fast heating up. Now that Tehran is developing the technology needed to produce bomb-grade uranium, the United States and the European Union are pressing to take the issue to the UN Security Council. Iran's hard-line president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has scoffed at the looming threat of sanctions, telling the Western powers that, "those who use harsh language against Iran need Iran 10 times more than we need them."
Ahmadinejad's belligerence and anti-Israel rants may call into question his judgment, but his analysis of the nuclear standoff is close to the mark - Iran does indeed hold an impressive deck of cards.
As the world's fourth-largest exporter of oil, Iran has considerable sway over petroleum markets. Tehran also wields extensive influence over Iraq. The two countries share a long, porous border. Many of Iraq's most influential clerics have lived or studied in Iran, giving Tehran exclusive entrée to the politicians and clerics destined to dominate Iraq's politics.
Iran's influence in Iraq does contribute to its intransigence, but it also provides a potential solution to the current nuclear impasse. Tehran's nuclear ambitions represent not an unbridled quest for regional hegemony, but an anxious search for adequate deterrence against perceived external threats. From this perspective, only by addressing the issue within the broader context of regional security in the Gulf can Tehran's nuclear program be contained.
Paradoxically, it is in Iraq, where U.S. and Iranian interests coincide, that the two countries could work together to advance regional stability. The resulting improvements in U.S.-Iranian relations and in regional security could at once defuse the nuclear crisis and advance the prospects for a stable Iraq.
Iranians are delighted that Saddam Hussein, who started the Iran-Iraq war, is languishing in prison. But now Iran itself is in America's crosshairs, with a vast arsenal of U.S. military power parked next door. Faced with these insecurities Tehran is unlikely to abandon its nuclear aspirations in response to the threat of economic sanctions and military strikes. Indeed, such sticks promise to be counterproductive unless complemented by an alluring carrot: the prospect of alleviating the fears stemming from Iran's dangerous neighborhood and its longstanding duel with America. It is here that Iraq enters the picture.
The United States and Iran have many common interests in Iraq, providing a unique opportunity for Tehran and Washington to edge toward normalization. Tehran, like Washington, is keenly interested in avoiding a civil war and sustaining Iraq as a unitary state. Iranian elites support a democratic Iraq, fully aware that consensual arrangements for power-sharing among Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds are vital to Iraq's survival.
Washington and Tehran should capitalize on their common interests in Iraq to cooperate on a host of issues. Iran can help U.S. economic reconstruction efforts through its ties to the Iraqi merchant community and its own official aid to Baghdad. As for political stability, the United States may have the boots on the ground, but America's coercive potential must be backed up by Iran's soft power.
Iran's seminaries, clerics, politicians and businessmen hold powerful sway over elites in Baghdad as well as local leaders. Tehran's interest in preventing the fragmentation of Iraq gives it reason to encourage all Shiite parties, including the independent militias, to work with the central government and resist secessionist temptations.
An Iraqi-Iranian-American dialogue could eventually provide a foundation for a new security architecture for the Gulf. A regional body could begin with confidence-building measures and arms-control pacts, and move toward collective security institutions and common markets. This endpoint is admittedly far off, but the process of getting there would help ease the geopolitical uncertainties that fuel Iran's nuclear ambitions and Iraq's disarray.
To pursue this agenda, Washington needs a willing partner in Tehran. Ahmadinejad is not that man. But a subtle power struggle is going on within the clerical state between the pragmatists, such as Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the new president and his entourage of firebrands.
Ahmadinejad came into office determined to consolidate his power by rekindling revolutionary fires and ensuring Iran's isolation. By refusing to play along and instead seeking to forge a common approach toward Iraq, the Bush administration could help tip the domestic balance in favor of the forces of moderation, paving the way for a government ready to work with Washington.
Given the Iranian president's repellent rhetoric and political intransigence, it may seem an odd moment to advise Washington to reach out to Tehran. But doing so holds out the best hope for not only taming Iran's nuclear aspirations, but also stabilizing Iraq.
Charles Kupchan and Ray Takeyh are senior fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations.
--------------------------
Citation: Charles Kupchan and Ray Takeyh. "American and Iranian interests meet in Iraq," International Herald Tribune, 30 January 2006.
Original URL: http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/30/opinion/edtakeyh.php
--------------------------
--------------------------
Auditors Find Widespread Waste and Unfinished Work in Iraqi Rebuilding Contracts
By James Glanz
The New York Times, 31 January 2006
A sweeping examination of thousands of contracts that the United States underwrote with Iraqi money has provided the most comprehensive look yet at the confusion, waste and lack of accountability in rebuilding and training programs during the first years of the American-led occupation, say the Iraqi finance minister and a retired American officer who led an investigative arm of the audit.
The effort, which is being undertaken by a contracting office in Baghdad that reports to the United States Army and which has not previously been disclosed, began in March 2005 and is close to completion. Previous audits have focused more narrowly on construction contracts and work done in specific areas of Iraq.
The audit of about 9,000 contracts worth at least $5.8 billion in Iraqi oil money and assets seized from Saddam Hussein's government was undertaken to determine how much of the money originally set aside for the work should ultimately be paid.
The contracts in the new examination cover everything from purchases of pistols, radios and four-wheel-drive vehicles for the Iraqi Army to construction of hospitals and power lines to support fledgling Iraqi media outlets.
The examination exposed a system riddled with problems, like projects that were assigned but never carried out and Iraqi subcontractors who did not know they had been awarded jobs, the American officer, Scott Meehan, a retired Army major, said yesterday. He worked on the project from March through August 2005, when roughly 2,000 of the contracts were examined.
Ali Allawi, the Iraqi finance minister, said in a telephone interview over the weekend, "I think you're seeing chaos, basically," and added, "No matter how you cut it, it's very poor project design and implementation."
Mr. Allawi said the American administration brought with it a contracting procedure that may have worked in the orderly environment of the United States. "Once you brought it in the context of Iraq," Mr. Allawi said, "it fell flat on its face."
As an example of the findings, Mr. Meehan cited a contract for a hospital. "We come across this contract," he said, and when he and a team of Iraqis he led checked into the project, "we find nothing."
"We find no indication of the project being done," he said.
But he said that in other cases, contractors had carried out the work. "A lot of times they did, a lot of times they didn't," Mr. Meehan said. "It was definitely in disarray and a mess."
Maj. Gen. John M. Urias, who leads the Joint Contracting Command, which carried out the examination, declined to discuss findings on individual contracts but said the main outcome of the examination was a "reconciliation" between the Iraqi money that had been set aside for the contracts and the money that is owed for work actually performed.
General Urias said his auditors had determined that there was no justification for paying about $230 million originally committed to the thousands of contracts. He characterized the reconciliation as a routine practice in contracting and said that the outcome of the examination was entirely positive, since the money would now be freed for other purposes. Iraqi oil proceeds are kept in an account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Mr. Meehan also characterized the examination as a "good news story," because it effectively involves giving Iraqi money back to Iraqis. But he said that in case after case, the residual money reflected work that had been abandoned, only partly carried out or simply lost in the confusion of a nation at war. "There was a breakdown in the middle administrative system," Mr. Meehan said.
By agreement with Mr. Allawi's Finance Ministry, General Urias said, $150 million of that money will now be used for rebuilding projects in areas damaged by fighting, including $75 million in Anbar Province, which includes Falluja, which was heavily damaged in a siege by the United States to root out insurgents.
"It's a good story, a good point, that the Iraqis are going to be the beneficiary of new projects using Iraqi money that was residual after the execution of those contracts back in the C.P.A. days," the general said, referring to the Coalition Provisional Authority.
Mr. Allawi said the Iraqi government had agreed to allow the money to be used for repairing war damage only on condition that the United States match, dollar for dollar, all expenditures made from the residual fund. General Urias did not immediately respond to a written request for further information on the arrangement described by Mr. Allawi.
But the general said in an interview that the careful work of assessing the contracts would also allow the United States to turn over responsibility for them to the Iraqi government eventually.
Representative Henry A. Waxman, a Democrat from California who is the ranking minority member of the House Committee on Government Reform, said in a statement that the new findings pointed up the need for a wider investigation of how Iraqi money was used to underwrite contracts in Iraq. "This is far from a complete accounting," he said. "We still don't know how many millions were wasted on contractor overcharges and shoddy work. Congress should conduct a thorough investigation into the administration's use of Iraqi funds."
General Urias said that the examination began in March 2005 with 2,400 contracts totaling $3.3 billion, but that the effort quickly expanded when his team started collecting contracts written in areas outside Iraq. He said the effort started with 13 contracting experts from the Defense Contract Management Agency at the Pentagon and gradually hired and trained 26 local Iraqis.
So far, the general said, all but about 100 of the 9,000 known contracts have been looked at, and what he called the residual, or money left over after work was done, worked out.
"Sometimes when you finish the work, it didn't cost as much as you thought it would," General Urias said. "It's an estimate."
Mr. Allawi also said that reconciling the amount set aside for the contracts in what he called a "subaccount" at the Federal Reserve Bank and the amount that actually needed to be paid amounted to standard practice in the contracting world. But he added that the specific findings in the audit would do little to improve contracting procedures. "Very little of it filters back into Iraq and very little of it has any impact," he said.
"It just confirms the general sense that Iraqi government money has been squandered," Mr. Allawi said.
Mr. Meehan, who said that he led a team of 13 Iraqis in carrying out the work, added that some of the findings baffled his team. In one case, a particular contracting officer from the Pentagon wrote dozens of contracts for roads, bridges and hospitals but little or none of the work was ever performed, Mr. Meehan said.
In another development, the Halliburton Company subsidiary Kellogg Brown & Root has agreed to cut $9 million from contracts paid for with Iraqi oil money after auditors questioned $208 million in possible overcharges, an international watchdog agency said yesterday.
Melissa Norcross, a K.B.R. spokeswoman, said the sums had been questioned because of a lack of supporting documentation and called it "flat wrong" to describe them as overcharges, Reuters reported.
----------------------------------
Citation: James Glanz. "Auditors Find Widespread Waste and Unfinished Work in Iraqi Rebuilding Contracts," The New York Times, 31 January 2006.
Original URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/31/international/middleeast/31audit.html
----------------------------------
The New York Times, 31 January 2006
A sweeping examination of thousands of contracts that the United States underwrote with Iraqi money has provided the most comprehensive look yet at the confusion, waste and lack of accountability in rebuilding and training programs during the first years of the American-led occupation, say the Iraqi finance minister and a retired American officer who led an investigative arm of the audit.
The effort, which is being undertaken by a contracting office in Baghdad that reports to the United States Army and which has not previously been disclosed, began in March 2005 and is close to completion. Previous audits have focused more narrowly on construction contracts and work done in specific areas of Iraq.
The audit of about 9,000 contracts worth at least $5.8 billion in Iraqi oil money and assets seized from Saddam Hussein's government was undertaken to determine how much of the money originally set aside for the work should ultimately be paid.
The contracts in the new examination cover everything from purchases of pistols, radios and four-wheel-drive vehicles for the Iraqi Army to construction of hospitals and power lines to support fledgling Iraqi media outlets.
The examination exposed a system riddled with problems, like projects that were assigned but never carried out and Iraqi subcontractors who did not know they had been awarded jobs, the American officer, Scott Meehan, a retired Army major, said yesterday. He worked on the project from March through August 2005, when roughly 2,000 of the contracts were examined.
Ali Allawi, the Iraqi finance minister, said in a telephone interview over the weekend, "I think you're seeing chaos, basically," and added, "No matter how you cut it, it's very poor project design and implementation."
Mr. Allawi said the American administration brought with it a contracting procedure that may have worked in the orderly environment of the United States. "Once you brought it in the context of Iraq," Mr. Allawi said, "it fell flat on its face."
As an example of the findings, Mr. Meehan cited a contract for a hospital. "We come across this contract," he said, and when he and a team of Iraqis he led checked into the project, "we find nothing."
"We find no indication of the project being done," he said.
But he said that in other cases, contractors had carried out the work. "A lot of times they did, a lot of times they didn't," Mr. Meehan said. "It was definitely in disarray and a mess."
Maj. Gen. John M. Urias, who leads the Joint Contracting Command, which carried out the examination, declined to discuss findings on individual contracts but said the main outcome of the examination was a "reconciliation" between the Iraqi money that had been set aside for the contracts and the money that is owed for work actually performed.
General Urias said his auditors had determined that there was no justification for paying about $230 million originally committed to the thousands of contracts. He characterized the reconciliation as a routine practice in contracting and said that the outcome of the examination was entirely positive, since the money would now be freed for other purposes. Iraqi oil proceeds are kept in an account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Mr. Meehan also characterized the examination as a "good news story," because it effectively involves giving Iraqi money back to Iraqis. But he said that in case after case, the residual money reflected work that had been abandoned, only partly carried out or simply lost in the confusion of a nation at war. "There was a breakdown in the middle administrative system," Mr. Meehan said.
By agreement with Mr. Allawi's Finance Ministry, General Urias said, $150 million of that money will now be used for rebuilding projects in areas damaged by fighting, including $75 million in Anbar Province, which includes Falluja, which was heavily damaged in a siege by the United States to root out insurgents.
"It's a good story, a good point, that the Iraqis are going to be the beneficiary of new projects using Iraqi money that was residual after the execution of those contracts back in the C.P.A. days," the general said, referring to the Coalition Provisional Authority.
Mr. Allawi said the Iraqi government had agreed to allow the money to be used for repairing war damage only on condition that the United States match, dollar for dollar, all expenditures made from the residual fund. General Urias did not immediately respond to a written request for further information on the arrangement described by Mr. Allawi.
But the general said in an interview that the careful work of assessing the contracts would also allow the United States to turn over responsibility for them to the Iraqi government eventually.
Representative Henry A. Waxman, a Democrat from California who is the ranking minority member of the House Committee on Government Reform, said in a statement that the new findings pointed up the need for a wider investigation of how Iraqi money was used to underwrite contracts in Iraq. "This is far from a complete accounting," he said. "We still don't know how many millions were wasted on contractor overcharges and shoddy work. Congress should conduct a thorough investigation into the administration's use of Iraqi funds."
General Urias said that the examination began in March 2005 with 2,400 contracts totaling $3.3 billion, but that the effort quickly expanded when his team started collecting contracts written in areas outside Iraq. He said the effort started with 13 contracting experts from the Defense Contract Management Agency at the Pentagon and gradually hired and trained 26 local Iraqis.
So far, the general said, all but about 100 of the 9,000 known contracts have been looked at, and what he called the residual, or money left over after work was done, worked out.
"Sometimes when you finish the work, it didn't cost as much as you thought it would," General Urias said. "It's an estimate."
Mr. Allawi also said that reconciling the amount set aside for the contracts in what he called a "subaccount" at the Federal Reserve Bank and the amount that actually needed to be paid amounted to standard practice in the contracting world. But he added that the specific findings in the audit would do little to improve contracting procedures. "Very little of it filters back into Iraq and very little of it has any impact," he said.
"It just confirms the general sense that Iraqi government money has been squandered," Mr. Allawi said.
Mr. Meehan, who said that he led a team of 13 Iraqis in carrying out the work, added that some of the findings baffled his team. In one case, a particular contracting officer from the Pentagon wrote dozens of contracts for roads, bridges and hospitals but little or none of the work was ever performed, Mr. Meehan said.
In another development, the Halliburton Company subsidiary Kellogg Brown & Root has agreed to cut $9 million from contracts paid for with Iraqi oil money after auditors questioned $208 million in possible overcharges, an international watchdog agency said yesterday.
Melissa Norcross, a K.B.R. spokeswoman, said the sums had been questioned because of a lack of supporting documentation and called it "flat wrong" to describe them as overcharges, Reuters reported.
----------------------------------
Citation: James Glanz. "Auditors Find Widespread Waste and Unfinished Work in Iraqi Rebuilding Contracts," The New York Times, 31 January 2006.
Original URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/31/international/middleeast/31audit.html
----------------------------------
30 January 2006
Army forces 50,000 soldiers into extended duty
By Will Dunham
Reuters, 29 January 2006
The U.S. Army has forced about 50,000 soldiers to continue serving after their voluntary stints ended under a policy called "stop-loss," but while some dispute its fairness, court challenges have fallen flat.
The policy applies to soldiers in units due to deploy for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The Army said stop-loss is vital to maintain units that are cohesive and ready to fight. But some experts said it shows how badly the Army is stretched and could further complicate efforts to attract new recruits.
"As the war in Iraq drags on, the Army is accumulating a collection of problems that cumulatively could call into question the viability of an all-volunteer force," said defense analyst Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute think tank.
"When a service has to repeatedly resort to compelling the retention of people who want to leave, you're edging away from the whole notion of volunteerism."
When soldiers enlist, they sign a contract to serve for a certain number of years, and know precisely when their service obligation ends so they can return to civilian life. But stop-loss allows the Army, mindful of having fully manned units, to keep soldiers on the verge of leaving the military.
Under the policy, soldiers who normally would leave when their commitments expire must remain in the Army, starting 90 days before their unit is scheduled to depart, through the end of their deployment and up to another 90 days after returning to their home base.
With yearlong tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, some soldiers can be forced to stay in the Army an extra 18 months.
HARDSHIP FOR SOME SOLDIERS
Lt. Col. Bryan Hilferty, an Army spokesman, said that "there is no plan to discontinue stop-loss."
"We understand that this is causing hardship for some individual soldiers, and we take individual situations into consideration," Hilferty said.
Hilferty said there are about 12,500 soldiers in the regular Army, as well as the part-time National Guard and Reserve, currently serving involuntarily under the policy, and that about 50,000 have had their service extended since the program began in 2002. An initial limited use of stop-loss was expanded in subsequent years to affect many more.
"While the policies relative to the stop-loss seem harsh, in terms of suspending scheduled separation dates (for leaving the Army), they are not absolute," Hilferty said. "And we take individual situations into consideration for compelling and compassionate reasons."
Hilferty noted the Army has given "exceptions" to 210 enlisted soldiers "due to personal hardship reasons" since October 2004, allowing them to leave as scheduled.
"The nation is at war and we are stop-lossing units deploying to a combat theater to ensure they mobilize, train, deploy, fight, redeploy and demobilize as a team," he said.
NO LUCK IN COURT
A few soldiers have gone to court to challenge stop-loss.
One such case fizzled last week, when U.S. District Judge Royce Lamberth in Washington dismissed a suit filed in 2004 by two Army National Guard soldiers. The suit claimed the Army fraudulently induced soldiers to enlist without specifying that their service might be involuntarily extended.
Courts also have backed the policy's legality in Oregon and California cases.
Jules Lobel, a University of Pittsburgh law professor who represented the National Guard soldiers, said a successful challenge to stop-loss was still possible.
"I think the whole stop-loss program is a misrepresentation to people of how long they're going to actually serve. I think it's caused tremendous morale problems, tremendous psychological damage to people," Lobel said.
"When you sign up for the military, you're saying, 'I'll give you, say, six years and then after six years I get my life back.' And they're saying, 'No, really, we can extend you indefinitely."'
Congressional critics have assailed stop-loss, and 2004 Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry called it "a back-door draft." The United States abolished the draft in 1973, but the all-volunteer military never before has been tested by a protracted war.
A report commissioned by the Pentagon called stop-loss a "short-term fix" enabling the Army to meet ongoing troop deployment requirements, but said such policies "risk breaking the force as recruitment and retention problems mount." It was written by Andrew Krepinevich, a retired Army officer.
Thompson added, "The persistent use of stop-loss underscores the fact that the war-fighting burden is being carried by a handful of soldiers while the vast majority of citizens incur no sacrifice at all."
------------------------
Citation: Will Dunham. "Army forces 50,000 soldiers into extended duty," Reuters, 29 January 2006.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20060129/pl_nm/iraq_usa_stoploss_dc
------------------------
Reuters, 29 January 2006
The U.S. Army has forced about 50,000 soldiers to continue serving after their voluntary stints ended under a policy called "stop-loss," but while some dispute its fairness, court challenges have fallen flat.
The policy applies to soldiers in units due to deploy for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The Army said stop-loss is vital to maintain units that are cohesive and ready to fight. But some experts said it shows how badly the Army is stretched and could further complicate efforts to attract new recruits.
"As the war in Iraq drags on, the Army is accumulating a collection of problems that cumulatively could call into question the viability of an all-volunteer force," said defense analyst Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute think tank.
"When a service has to repeatedly resort to compelling the retention of people who want to leave, you're edging away from the whole notion of volunteerism."
When soldiers enlist, they sign a contract to serve for a certain number of years, and know precisely when their service obligation ends so they can return to civilian life. But stop-loss allows the Army, mindful of having fully manned units, to keep soldiers on the verge of leaving the military.
Under the policy, soldiers who normally would leave when their commitments expire must remain in the Army, starting 90 days before their unit is scheduled to depart, through the end of their deployment and up to another 90 days after returning to their home base.
With yearlong tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, some soldiers can be forced to stay in the Army an extra 18 months.
HARDSHIP FOR SOME SOLDIERS
Lt. Col. Bryan Hilferty, an Army spokesman, said that "there is no plan to discontinue stop-loss."
"We understand that this is causing hardship for some individual soldiers, and we take individual situations into consideration," Hilferty said.
Hilferty said there are about 12,500 soldiers in the regular Army, as well as the part-time National Guard and Reserve, currently serving involuntarily under the policy, and that about 50,000 have had their service extended since the program began in 2002. An initial limited use of stop-loss was expanded in subsequent years to affect many more.
"While the policies relative to the stop-loss seem harsh, in terms of suspending scheduled separation dates (for leaving the Army), they are not absolute," Hilferty said. "And we take individual situations into consideration for compelling and compassionate reasons."
Hilferty noted the Army has given "exceptions" to 210 enlisted soldiers "due to personal hardship reasons" since October 2004, allowing them to leave as scheduled.
"The nation is at war and we are stop-lossing units deploying to a combat theater to ensure they mobilize, train, deploy, fight, redeploy and demobilize as a team," he said.
NO LUCK IN COURT
A few soldiers have gone to court to challenge stop-loss.
One such case fizzled last week, when U.S. District Judge Royce Lamberth in Washington dismissed a suit filed in 2004 by two Army National Guard soldiers. The suit claimed the Army fraudulently induced soldiers to enlist without specifying that their service might be involuntarily extended.
Courts also have backed the policy's legality in Oregon and California cases.
Jules Lobel, a University of Pittsburgh law professor who represented the National Guard soldiers, said a successful challenge to stop-loss was still possible.
"I think the whole stop-loss program is a misrepresentation to people of how long they're going to actually serve. I think it's caused tremendous morale problems, tremendous psychological damage to people," Lobel said.
"When you sign up for the military, you're saying, 'I'll give you, say, six years and then after six years I get my life back.' And they're saying, 'No, really, we can extend you indefinitely."'
Congressional critics have assailed stop-loss, and 2004 Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry called it "a back-door draft." The United States abolished the draft in 1973, but the all-volunteer military never before has been tested by a protracted war.
A report commissioned by the Pentagon called stop-loss a "short-term fix" enabling the Army to meet ongoing troop deployment requirements, but said such policies "risk breaking the force as recruitment and retention problems mount." It was written by Andrew Krepinevich, a retired Army officer.
Thompson added, "The persistent use of stop-loss underscores the fact that the war-fighting burden is being carried by a handful of soldiers while the vast majority of citizens incur no sacrifice at all."
------------------------
Citation: Will Dunham. "Army forces 50,000 soldiers into extended duty," Reuters, 29 January 2006.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20060129/pl_nm/iraq_usa_stoploss_dc
------------------------
Army's Rising Promotion Rate Called Ominous
Experts say the quality of the officer corps is threatened as the service fights to retain leaders during wartime and fill new command slots.
By Mark Mazzetti
Los Angeles Times, 30 January 2006
WASHINGTON — Struggling to retain enough officers to lead its forces, the Army has begun to dramatically increase the number of soldiers it promotes, raising fears within the service that wartime strains are diluting the quality of the officer corps.
Last year, the Army promoted 97% of all eligible captains to the rank of major, Pentagon data show. That was up from a historical average of 70% to 80%.
Traditionally, the Army has used the step to major as a winnowing point to push lower-performing soldiers out of the military.
The service also promoted 86% of eligible majors to the rank of lieutenant colonel in 2005, up from the historical average of 65% to 75%.
The higher rates of promotion are part of efforts to fill new slots created by an Army reorganization and to compensate for officers who are resigning from the service, many after multiple rotations to Iraq.
The promotion rates "are much higher than they have been in the past because we need more officers than we did before," said Lt. Col. Bryan Hilferty, an Army spokesman.
The Army has long taken pride in the competitiveness of its promotions, and insists that only officers that meet rigorous standards are elevated through its ranks.
But the recent trends in promotions have stirred concerns that the Army is being forced to lower its standards to provide leaders for combat units that will be deployed overseas.
"The problem here is that you're not knocking off the bottom 20%," said a high-ranking Army officer at the Pentagon. "Basically, if you haven't been court-martialed, you're going to be promoted to major."
The officer spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to publicly discuss the issue.
Army officials say the primary cause of the jump in promotions is the service's ongoing effort to create more combat units without an overall expansion.
The Army hopes to increase the number of active-duty combat brigades from 33 to 42 over the next several years by cutting headquarters staff and transferring soldiers from support jobs into frontline combat positions.
The push to fill the new units means that more officers are being promoted, officials say. In addition, they say the military's deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan have improved the overall quality of the Army's officer corps.
"These are people who have spent a year in combat," Hilferty said. "We think that we are promoting well-trained people."
Yet the increase in promotions is partly due to the large number of Army officers choosing to leave the service. Army officers are getting out of the military at the highest rate since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, shrinking the pool of officers eligible for promotion.
According to Army data, the portion of junior officers (lieutenants and captains) choosing to depart for civilian life rose last year to 8.6%, up from 6.3% in 2004. The attrition rate for majors rose to 7% last year, up from 6.4% in 2005. And the rate for lieutenant colonels was 13.7%, the highest in more than a decade.
"The most precious thing in the military is our talent and not our technology," said retired Army Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, who traveled to Iraq and Afghanistan last year to assess the state of the U.S. military missions in the countries. "What we don't want to do is come out of [these wars] and lose what we lost after Vietnam."
The departure of Army officers in those years created what many military historians have called a "hollow force."
Last year, the Army exceeded by 8% its overall goal for retaining active-duty enlisted troops, a figure President Bush cited last week as a sign of the service's health.
Also last week, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld dismissed recent reports — including one commissioned by the Pentagon — that the Army was facing a looming personnel crisis, and said the "battle-hardened" military was as strong as ever.
Yet many senior officers and outside experts worry that rising attrition rates for officers could be an ominous sign of an eventual exodus from the service's leadership ranks.
They say that with many officers in line for a third yearlong combat tour in Iraq, it is inevitable that a growing number would choose to leave the military to relieve strain on their family lives.
The exodus "will be among officers whose families say, 'Look, there are 300 million people in this country; let somebody else take their turn,' " McCaffrey said.
The Pentagon-commissioned report, released publicly last week, agreed.
"The demands for Army ground-force deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq are not likely to decline substantially any time soon," said the report by retired Army Lt. Col. Andrew F. Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. The service "risks having many of its soldiers decide that a military career is too arduous or too risky an occupation for them and their families to pursue."
Hilferty, the Army spokesman, said there was only "anecdotal evidence" that the strains of war were pushing officers out of the Army.
"Right now, the data is not yet alarming," he said.
But, he said, the Army has begun a series of initiatives to keep young officers in its ranks, including a program that pays graduate school tuition for those who agree to sign up for more years of military service.
Krepinevich, in his study, warned of other "storm clouds on the horizon" for the Army, including the rise in divorce rates for active-duty soldiers.
Also, the Army has begun lowering recruiting requirements, such as accepting more high school dropouts and Category IV recruits — those who score near the bottom of the military's entrance exam.
Commanders in Iraq say morale among officers and enlisted soldiers in the field remains strong, even among those wrapping up their second tour of duty in some of the country's most violent territory.
"Are our professional commitments as soldiers out of whack with our family and personal lives for these troopers? I mean, certainly they are," said Army Col. H.R. McMaster, commander of the 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment that serves in Iraq's restive Al Anbar province. "But you know, it's wartime, and our troopers understand it."
-------------------------------
Citation: Mark Mazzetti. "Army's Rising Promotion Rate Called Ominous," Los Angeles Times, 30 January 2006.
Original URL: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-officers30jan30,0,4783289.story?coll=la-headlines-nation
-------------------------------
By Mark Mazzetti
Los Angeles Times, 30 January 2006
WASHINGTON — Struggling to retain enough officers to lead its forces, the Army has begun to dramatically increase the number of soldiers it promotes, raising fears within the service that wartime strains are diluting the quality of the officer corps.
Last year, the Army promoted 97% of all eligible captains to the rank of major, Pentagon data show. That was up from a historical average of 70% to 80%.
Traditionally, the Army has used the step to major as a winnowing point to push lower-performing soldiers out of the military.
The service also promoted 86% of eligible majors to the rank of lieutenant colonel in 2005, up from the historical average of 65% to 75%.
The higher rates of promotion are part of efforts to fill new slots created by an Army reorganization and to compensate for officers who are resigning from the service, many after multiple rotations to Iraq.
The promotion rates "are much higher than they have been in the past because we need more officers than we did before," said Lt. Col. Bryan Hilferty, an Army spokesman.
The Army has long taken pride in the competitiveness of its promotions, and insists that only officers that meet rigorous standards are elevated through its ranks.
But the recent trends in promotions have stirred concerns that the Army is being forced to lower its standards to provide leaders for combat units that will be deployed overseas.
"The problem here is that you're not knocking off the bottom 20%," said a high-ranking Army officer at the Pentagon. "Basically, if you haven't been court-martialed, you're going to be promoted to major."
The officer spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to publicly discuss the issue.
Army officials say the primary cause of the jump in promotions is the service's ongoing effort to create more combat units without an overall expansion.
The Army hopes to increase the number of active-duty combat brigades from 33 to 42 over the next several years by cutting headquarters staff and transferring soldiers from support jobs into frontline combat positions.
The push to fill the new units means that more officers are being promoted, officials say. In addition, they say the military's deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan have improved the overall quality of the Army's officer corps.
"These are people who have spent a year in combat," Hilferty said. "We think that we are promoting well-trained people."
Yet the increase in promotions is partly due to the large number of Army officers choosing to leave the service. Army officers are getting out of the military at the highest rate since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, shrinking the pool of officers eligible for promotion.
According to Army data, the portion of junior officers (lieutenants and captains) choosing to depart for civilian life rose last year to 8.6%, up from 6.3% in 2004. The attrition rate for majors rose to 7% last year, up from 6.4% in 2005. And the rate for lieutenant colonels was 13.7%, the highest in more than a decade.
"The most precious thing in the military is our talent and not our technology," said retired Army Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, who traveled to Iraq and Afghanistan last year to assess the state of the U.S. military missions in the countries. "What we don't want to do is come out of [these wars] and lose what we lost after Vietnam."
The departure of Army officers in those years created what many military historians have called a "hollow force."
Last year, the Army exceeded by 8% its overall goal for retaining active-duty enlisted troops, a figure President Bush cited last week as a sign of the service's health.
Also last week, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld dismissed recent reports — including one commissioned by the Pentagon — that the Army was facing a looming personnel crisis, and said the "battle-hardened" military was as strong as ever.
Yet many senior officers and outside experts worry that rising attrition rates for officers could be an ominous sign of an eventual exodus from the service's leadership ranks.
They say that with many officers in line for a third yearlong combat tour in Iraq, it is inevitable that a growing number would choose to leave the military to relieve strain on their family lives.
The exodus "will be among officers whose families say, 'Look, there are 300 million people in this country; let somebody else take their turn,' " McCaffrey said.
The Pentagon-commissioned report, released publicly last week, agreed.
"The demands for Army ground-force deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq are not likely to decline substantially any time soon," said the report by retired Army Lt. Col. Andrew F. Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. The service "risks having many of its soldiers decide that a military career is too arduous or too risky an occupation for them and their families to pursue."
Hilferty, the Army spokesman, said there was only "anecdotal evidence" that the strains of war were pushing officers out of the Army.
"Right now, the data is not yet alarming," he said.
But, he said, the Army has begun a series of initiatives to keep young officers in its ranks, including a program that pays graduate school tuition for those who agree to sign up for more years of military service.
Krepinevich, in his study, warned of other "storm clouds on the horizon" for the Army, including the rise in divorce rates for active-duty soldiers.
Also, the Army has begun lowering recruiting requirements, such as accepting more high school dropouts and Category IV recruits — those who score near the bottom of the military's entrance exam.
Commanders in Iraq say morale among officers and enlisted soldiers in the field remains strong, even among those wrapping up their second tour of duty in some of the country's most violent territory.
"Are our professional commitments as soldiers out of whack with our family and personal lives for these troopers? I mean, certainly they are," said Army Col. H.R. McMaster, commander of the 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment that serves in Iraq's restive Al Anbar province. "But you know, it's wartime, and our troopers understand it."
-------------------------------
Citation: Mark Mazzetti. "Army's Rising Promotion Rate Called Ominous," Los Angeles Times, 30 January 2006.
Original URL: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-officers30jan30,0,4783289.story?coll=la-headlines-nation
-------------------------------
Guess Who Likes the G.I.'s in Iraq (Look in Iran's Halls of Power)
By Michael Slackman
The New York Times, 29 January 2006
TEHRAN - NOT long after the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq in 2003, a top aide to L. Paul Bremer III, then the head of the American occupation authority there, excitedly explained that Iraq had just become the front line in Washington's effort to neutralize Iran as a regional force.
If America could promote a moderate, democratic, American-friendly alternate center of Shiite Islam in Iraq, the official said, it could defang one of its most implacable foes in the Middle East.
Iran, in other words, had for decades been both the theological center of Shiite Islam and a regional sponsor of militant anti-American Islamic groups like Hezbollah. But if westward-looking Shiites — secular or religious — came to power in southern Iraq, they could give the lie to arguments that Shiites had to see America as an enemy.
So far, though, Iran's mullahs aren't feeling much pain from the Americans next door. In fact, officials at all levels of government here say they see the American presence as a source of strength for themselves as they face the Bush administration.
In almost every conversation about Iran's nuclear showdown with the United States and Europe, they cite the Iraq war as a factor Iran can play to its own advantage.
"America is extremely vulnerable right now," said Akbar Alami, a member of the Iran's Parliament often critical of the government but on this point hewing to the government line. "If the U.S. takes any unwise action" to punish Iran for pursuing its nuclear program, he said, "certainly the U.S. and other countries will share the harm."
Iranians know that American forces, now stretched thin, are unlikely to invade Iran. And if the United States or Europe were to try a small-scale, targeted attack, the proximity of American forces makes them potential targets for retaliation. Iranians also know the fighting in Iraq has helped raise oil prices, and any attempt to impose sanctions could push prices higher.
In addition, the Iranians have longstanding ties to influential Shiite religious leaders in Iraq, and at least one recently promised that his militia would make real trouble for the Americans if they moved militarily against Iran.
All of those calculations have reduced Iranian fears of going ahead with their nuclear program — a prospect that frightens not just the United States, Europe and Israel, but many of the Sunni Muslim-dominated nations in the region, including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
In recent days, Iran has moved aggressively to restart its nuclear program, insisting that it is aimed only at research and producing energy. The United States and Europe, who remain suspicious of Iran's intentions, are trying to block it, with cooperation from Russia and China, and have threatened to take Iran to the United Nations Security Council.
Disagreement between the West and Iran on this issue is not new. But Iran's apparent confidence that it can move ahead with little risk of serious punishment is. It is part of a change in the way Iran has decided to address the world, abandoning a strategy of diplomatic compromise pursued by the reformist president Muhammad Khatami, who served from 1997 until last year.
The hard-line conservative, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was elected in June to replace Mr. Khatami, has joined the religious leadership in a policy of confrontation.
With the Americans stuck fighting a protracted, murky war in Iraq, the Iranians felt they were in a position to defy the West even over the nuclear issue.
A Western diplomat based in Tehran said that Iran's recent behavior has been infuriating, an apparent effort to undermine the diplomatic process. The envoy said that in August, when Europe was about to offer what it called a compromise, the Iranians balked even before seeing the proposal.
"Before we even met, they said: 'We know what's in it. We know what we are looking for is not there,' " the diplomat said, insisting on remaining anonymous so as not to antagonize Iranian authorities.
The West has tried to push back, but Iran has barely budged. Part of the reason, the diplomat said, is that "what was seen as power then may be seen as weakness now," referring to the American presence in Iraq.
This month, Iran welcomed the Iraqi cleric Muktada al-Sadr in a way that helped send just that message. The cleric's militia, the Mahdi Army, rose up twice in 2004 against the American military. Mr. Sadr and his followers have since joined the political process in Iraq, but during his visit to Tehran he warned that any attack on Iran could inspire a response from his militia.
"If neighboring Islamic countries, including Iran, become the target of attacks, we will support them," he said in comments reported by The Associated Press. "The Mahdi Army is beyond the Iraqi Army. It was established to defend Islam."
Not all Iranians think their country's aggressive drive to resume its nuclear program will work as a long-term strategy.
Iran's influence in Iraq and Afghanistan has limits, said Davoud Hermidas Bavand, a political science professor at Tehran University. "It might work as a deterrent for a military strike against Iran but it is not a deterrent to lift the pressure against Iran's nuclear program."
Still, there is near unanimity in the government that the nuclear program should not be canceled. Nasser Hadian, a political science professor at Tehran University who said he has close ties with many in government, said there was a compromise among the core factions over how far to go in the nuclear program. Basically, he said, there is agreement to develop a weapons capability, but not to go as far as building a bomb.
The logic, he said, is based on an assessment that if Iran builds a bomb, it could set off an arms race in the Middle East that could "eventually undermine Iran's conventional superiority if others, like Syria and Egypt, get the bomb."
--------------------------
Citation: Michael Slackman. "Guess Who Likes the G.I.'s in Iraq (Look in Iran's Halls of Power)," The New York Times, 29 January 2006.
Original URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/29/weekinreview/29slackman.html?ei=5090&en=56a0e84b550c50a0&ex=1296190800&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=print
--------------------------
The New York Times, 29 January 2006
TEHRAN - NOT long after the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq in 2003, a top aide to L. Paul Bremer III, then the head of the American occupation authority there, excitedly explained that Iraq had just become the front line in Washington's effort to neutralize Iran as a regional force.
If America could promote a moderate, democratic, American-friendly alternate center of Shiite Islam in Iraq, the official said, it could defang one of its most implacable foes in the Middle East.
Iran, in other words, had for decades been both the theological center of Shiite Islam and a regional sponsor of militant anti-American Islamic groups like Hezbollah. But if westward-looking Shiites — secular or religious — came to power in southern Iraq, they could give the lie to arguments that Shiites had to see America as an enemy.
So far, though, Iran's mullahs aren't feeling much pain from the Americans next door. In fact, officials at all levels of government here say they see the American presence as a source of strength for themselves as they face the Bush administration.
In almost every conversation about Iran's nuclear showdown with the United States and Europe, they cite the Iraq war as a factor Iran can play to its own advantage.
"America is extremely vulnerable right now," said Akbar Alami, a member of the Iran's Parliament often critical of the government but on this point hewing to the government line. "If the U.S. takes any unwise action" to punish Iran for pursuing its nuclear program, he said, "certainly the U.S. and other countries will share the harm."
Iranians know that American forces, now stretched thin, are unlikely to invade Iran. And if the United States or Europe were to try a small-scale, targeted attack, the proximity of American forces makes them potential targets for retaliation. Iranians also know the fighting in Iraq has helped raise oil prices, and any attempt to impose sanctions could push prices higher.
In addition, the Iranians have longstanding ties to influential Shiite religious leaders in Iraq, and at least one recently promised that his militia would make real trouble for the Americans if they moved militarily against Iran.
All of those calculations have reduced Iranian fears of going ahead with their nuclear program — a prospect that frightens not just the United States, Europe and Israel, but many of the Sunni Muslim-dominated nations in the region, including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
In recent days, Iran has moved aggressively to restart its nuclear program, insisting that it is aimed only at research and producing energy. The United States and Europe, who remain suspicious of Iran's intentions, are trying to block it, with cooperation from Russia and China, and have threatened to take Iran to the United Nations Security Council.
Disagreement between the West and Iran on this issue is not new. But Iran's apparent confidence that it can move ahead with little risk of serious punishment is. It is part of a change in the way Iran has decided to address the world, abandoning a strategy of diplomatic compromise pursued by the reformist president Muhammad Khatami, who served from 1997 until last year.
The hard-line conservative, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was elected in June to replace Mr. Khatami, has joined the religious leadership in a policy of confrontation.
With the Americans stuck fighting a protracted, murky war in Iraq, the Iranians felt they were in a position to defy the West even over the nuclear issue.
A Western diplomat based in Tehran said that Iran's recent behavior has been infuriating, an apparent effort to undermine the diplomatic process. The envoy said that in August, when Europe was about to offer what it called a compromise, the Iranians balked even before seeing the proposal.
"Before we even met, they said: 'We know what's in it. We know what we are looking for is not there,' " the diplomat said, insisting on remaining anonymous so as not to antagonize Iranian authorities.
The West has tried to push back, but Iran has barely budged. Part of the reason, the diplomat said, is that "what was seen as power then may be seen as weakness now," referring to the American presence in Iraq.
This month, Iran welcomed the Iraqi cleric Muktada al-Sadr in a way that helped send just that message. The cleric's militia, the Mahdi Army, rose up twice in 2004 against the American military. Mr. Sadr and his followers have since joined the political process in Iraq, but during his visit to Tehran he warned that any attack on Iran could inspire a response from his militia.
"If neighboring Islamic countries, including Iran, become the target of attacks, we will support them," he said in comments reported by The Associated Press. "The Mahdi Army is beyond the Iraqi Army. It was established to defend Islam."
Not all Iranians think their country's aggressive drive to resume its nuclear program will work as a long-term strategy.
Iran's influence in Iraq and Afghanistan has limits, said Davoud Hermidas Bavand, a political science professor at Tehran University. "It might work as a deterrent for a military strike against Iran but it is not a deterrent to lift the pressure against Iran's nuclear program."
Still, there is near unanimity in the government that the nuclear program should not be canceled. Nasser Hadian, a political science professor at Tehran University who said he has close ties with many in government, said there was a compromise among the core factions over how far to go in the nuclear program. Basically, he said, there is agreement to develop a weapons capability, but not to go as far as building a bomb.
The logic, he said, is based on an assessment that if Iran builds a bomb, it could set off an arms race in the Middle East that could "eventually undermine Iran's conventional superiority if others, like Syria and Egypt, get the bomb."
--------------------------
Citation: Michael Slackman. "Guess Who Likes the G.I.'s in Iraq (Look in Iran's Halls of Power)," The New York Times, 29 January 2006.
Original URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/29/weekinreview/29slackman.html?ei=5090&en=56a0e84b550c50a0&ex=1296190800&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=print
--------------------------
Playing Den Mother to a Fledgling Iraqi Army
By Roger Cohen
The New York Times, 29 January 2006
BAGHDAD, Iraq - It was when the Iraqi Army platoon, riding at midnight on the back of a Korean-made cargo truck, managed to get the vehicle stuck on the median of a bridge that the American Army captain finally lost his cool.
"I don't know why the hell they tried to jump the curb," said the captain, Christopher Center of the First Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, as he gazed out into the Baghdad night from his seat behind a computer screen in an armored Humvee. "This amazes me sometimes. The I.A. needs to get out of Baghdad to border areas. They should be securing the borders."
For now, however, units like this platoon from the Iraqi Army's First Brigade, Sixth Division, are being trained by officers like Captain Center. The training is important. The pace of an eventual withdrawal of more than 140,000 American troops depends on it. There's progress, but it's not easy. Baghdad by day is no picnic. By night it's ugly, a world of stray dogs on deserted streets and intermittent small-arms fire.
Sgt. Christopher Bush, seated behind Captain Center, shook his head. "They try so desperately to be like us," he said. To the point of driving a jury-rigged goods vehicle over a median because, hey, a Humvee can do it.
Sergeant Bush clambered out. Twenty minutes later, the Iraqis were back on the road.
"This is true Iraqi-American cooperation," Captain Center said, rolling again into the western Shula district of Baghdad. "This is how it all comes together. They're great guys, they mean well, they just sometimes don't have the equipment."
Captain Center had regained his can-do composure. But almost three years into the United States effort to remake Iraq, the scene on the bridge was not encouraging: a bunch of guys, Iraqis and Americans, in a spooky place, unable to talk to each other without an interpreter, trying to attach a cord to the stranded truck of an embryonic army.
When Saigon fell in 1975, a framed quotation from T. E. Lawrence was found on a wall of the United States Embassy. "Better to let them do it imperfectly than to do it perfectly yourself, for it is their country, their way, and your time is short."
Three decades later, the Vietnamese prime minister, Phan Van Khai, was in New York ringing the opening bell on Wall Street. So perhaps in Iraq, too, it would be best to get out of the way and wait for time to do its mysterious work.
Col. Mark Meadows, whose father was a legend of special operations in Vietnam and elsewhere, thinks not. "They don't want us to leave, they're worried that if we leave the government is not strategically prepared," he said. "The Iraqi Army is gaining respect here and has to carry the weight of the nation until the government gets on its feet."
That could take time. It will most likely be months before a coalition government is formed out of the Dec. 15 elections. Until then the Iraqi Army, in its United States Army surplus uniforms, is indeed the most visible face of nascent Iraqi authority. Colonel Meadows is concerned that current Shiite and Kurdish domination of the army may skew that authority; he wants more Sunnis in the armed forces. But at least the army has secured the airport road, now less dangerous than it was. It "owns the battle space," in American army parlance, across much of Baghdad.
That space is lined with mushrooming concrete blast walls. The walls are adorned with fraying election posters. Is the insurgency prevailing, as all the concrete suggests, or freedom, as embodied in those pictures of Middle Eastern politicians trying to raise a reassuring smile?
Anyone who claims to know the answer is bluffing. The only certainty in Iraq is the uncertainty of the outcome.
But a functioning army would help. Based in a former torture center of Saddam Hussein's intelligence services (the wood-chip machines found in the basement are said to have been used to process human flesh), the Iraqi brigade working with Captain Center in western Baghdad at what is now named Camp Justice is one of the more advanced in the training program now at the heart of America's exit strategy.
Col. Jeffrey Snow explained. These troops have reached Level 2 — defined as the capacity to plan and execute and sustain counterinsurgency operations with American support. If they could do it without the support, they'd be at Level 1. When everyone's at that level, Americans can turn out the lights (actually, they're out already, much of the time) and go home.
But there are problems: Iraqi forces need far greater logistical capacity (anyone got some spare parts?), a clear command structure, a proper definition of authority at the Ministry of Defense, an unambiguous division of responsibilities between that ministry and the Interior Ministry, a larger Sunni presence and an effective noncommissioned officer corps.
"Down here we're really moving on a professional army," Colonel Snow said. "But then we'll get the minister of defense calling a brigadier — I mean, it would be like Donald Rumsfeld calling me. And he says, 'Hey, would you do this for me today?' There's no real chain of command; the links of family or tribe can seem stronger."
Sorting out command structures is complicated by the fact that the Interior Ministry, now under Shiite control, has its own militias. During a visit I made to the Iraqi Islamic Party, a Sunni party now entering the democratic fray, a sobbing couple abruptly confronted me.
Hussein Alwan Radli, a retired engineer, and his wife, Attaya, said their son, Ali, 39, had been seized that morning by a militia group and had disappeared. The couple — Sunnis — accused Shiite Interior Ministry forces. Whether this was true, and where he had gone, was lost in the fog of war. But the couple's pain was irrefutable.
As for the fog, it, too, was irrefutable out on patrol with Captain Center. Shula is not lovely. Even in winter its canal-side market, where animals are slaughtered, stinks. Guts are left on the road. Its late-night charm receded further when shots rang out.
"Small-arms fire!" crackled over the radio. Yeah, right.
The Humvee wheeled around. "Light the building," Captain Center ordered. A strong beam swept across the squat dun-colored buildings. Their facades offered as few clues as an expressionless Iraqi face.
"They'll pop off a few rounds and disappear," Sergeant Bush said. On his second Iraq tour in three years, he knows the scene. Still, the American and Iraqi platoons plunged into a warren of narrow streets, beaming lights into bedrooms and earning a disdainful stare from two men on a street corner.
Was this action disruptive to the insurgency or likely to make more enemies of startled Iraqis? It was hard to know. "There's some of the worst evil here," Captain Center said. "It's our presence that prevents all-out civil war. Training this army will do that, too. It's the key — and they're getting there."
So I asked Brig. Gen. Jaleel Khalaf Shouail, the commander of the Iraqi Army's First Brigade, how soon American forces could leave. "We need permanent United States military bases in Iraq," he said. "Look at Japan, look at Germany, look at Italy. They all have bases and they're successful societies. We can be the same."
He gave me a radiant smile. Simple.
----------------------------
Citation: Roger Cohen. "Playing Den Mother to a Fledgling Iraqi Army," The New York Times, 29 January 2006.
Original URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/29/weekinreview/29word.html?_r=1
----------------------------
The New York Times, 29 January 2006
BAGHDAD, Iraq - It was when the Iraqi Army platoon, riding at midnight on the back of a Korean-made cargo truck, managed to get the vehicle stuck on the median of a bridge that the American Army captain finally lost his cool.
"I don't know why the hell they tried to jump the curb," said the captain, Christopher Center of the First Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, as he gazed out into the Baghdad night from his seat behind a computer screen in an armored Humvee. "This amazes me sometimes. The I.A. needs to get out of Baghdad to border areas. They should be securing the borders."
For now, however, units like this platoon from the Iraqi Army's First Brigade, Sixth Division, are being trained by officers like Captain Center. The training is important. The pace of an eventual withdrawal of more than 140,000 American troops depends on it. There's progress, but it's not easy. Baghdad by day is no picnic. By night it's ugly, a world of stray dogs on deserted streets and intermittent small-arms fire.
Sgt. Christopher Bush, seated behind Captain Center, shook his head. "They try so desperately to be like us," he said. To the point of driving a jury-rigged goods vehicle over a median because, hey, a Humvee can do it.
Sergeant Bush clambered out. Twenty minutes later, the Iraqis were back on the road.
"This is true Iraqi-American cooperation," Captain Center said, rolling again into the western Shula district of Baghdad. "This is how it all comes together. They're great guys, they mean well, they just sometimes don't have the equipment."
Captain Center had regained his can-do composure. But almost three years into the United States effort to remake Iraq, the scene on the bridge was not encouraging: a bunch of guys, Iraqis and Americans, in a spooky place, unable to talk to each other without an interpreter, trying to attach a cord to the stranded truck of an embryonic army.
When Saigon fell in 1975, a framed quotation from T. E. Lawrence was found on a wall of the United States Embassy. "Better to let them do it imperfectly than to do it perfectly yourself, for it is their country, their way, and your time is short."
Three decades later, the Vietnamese prime minister, Phan Van Khai, was in New York ringing the opening bell on Wall Street. So perhaps in Iraq, too, it would be best to get out of the way and wait for time to do its mysterious work.
Col. Mark Meadows, whose father was a legend of special operations in Vietnam and elsewhere, thinks not. "They don't want us to leave, they're worried that if we leave the government is not strategically prepared," he said. "The Iraqi Army is gaining respect here and has to carry the weight of the nation until the government gets on its feet."
That could take time. It will most likely be months before a coalition government is formed out of the Dec. 15 elections. Until then the Iraqi Army, in its United States Army surplus uniforms, is indeed the most visible face of nascent Iraqi authority. Colonel Meadows is concerned that current Shiite and Kurdish domination of the army may skew that authority; he wants more Sunnis in the armed forces. But at least the army has secured the airport road, now less dangerous than it was. It "owns the battle space," in American army parlance, across much of Baghdad.
That space is lined with mushrooming concrete blast walls. The walls are adorned with fraying election posters. Is the insurgency prevailing, as all the concrete suggests, or freedom, as embodied in those pictures of Middle Eastern politicians trying to raise a reassuring smile?
Anyone who claims to know the answer is bluffing. The only certainty in Iraq is the uncertainty of the outcome.
But a functioning army would help. Based in a former torture center of Saddam Hussein's intelligence services (the wood-chip machines found in the basement are said to have been used to process human flesh), the Iraqi brigade working with Captain Center in western Baghdad at what is now named Camp Justice is one of the more advanced in the training program now at the heart of America's exit strategy.
Col. Jeffrey Snow explained. These troops have reached Level 2 — defined as the capacity to plan and execute and sustain counterinsurgency operations with American support. If they could do it without the support, they'd be at Level 1. When everyone's at that level, Americans can turn out the lights (actually, they're out already, much of the time) and go home.
But there are problems: Iraqi forces need far greater logistical capacity (anyone got some spare parts?), a clear command structure, a proper definition of authority at the Ministry of Defense, an unambiguous division of responsibilities between that ministry and the Interior Ministry, a larger Sunni presence and an effective noncommissioned officer corps.
"Down here we're really moving on a professional army," Colonel Snow said. "But then we'll get the minister of defense calling a brigadier — I mean, it would be like Donald Rumsfeld calling me. And he says, 'Hey, would you do this for me today?' There's no real chain of command; the links of family or tribe can seem stronger."
Sorting out command structures is complicated by the fact that the Interior Ministry, now under Shiite control, has its own militias. During a visit I made to the Iraqi Islamic Party, a Sunni party now entering the democratic fray, a sobbing couple abruptly confronted me.
Hussein Alwan Radli, a retired engineer, and his wife, Attaya, said their son, Ali, 39, had been seized that morning by a militia group and had disappeared. The couple — Sunnis — accused Shiite Interior Ministry forces. Whether this was true, and where he had gone, was lost in the fog of war. But the couple's pain was irrefutable.
As for the fog, it, too, was irrefutable out on patrol with Captain Center. Shula is not lovely. Even in winter its canal-side market, where animals are slaughtered, stinks. Guts are left on the road. Its late-night charm receded further when shots rang out.
"Small-arms fire!" crackled over the radio. Yeah, right.
The Humvee wheeled around. "Light the building," Captain Center ordered. A strong beam swept across the squat dun-colored buildings. Their facades offered as few clues as an expressionless Iraqi face.
"They'll pop off a few rounds and disappear," Sergeant Bush said. On his second Iraq tour in three years, he knows the scene. Still, the American and Iraqi platoons plunged into a warren of narrow streets, beaming lights into bedrooms and earning a disdainful stare from two men on a street corner.
Was this action disruptive to the insurgency or likely to make more enemies of startled Iraqis? It was hard to know. "There's some of the worst evil here," Captain Center said. "It's our presence that prevents all-out civil war. Training this army will do that, too. It's the key — and they're getting there."
So I asked Brig. Gen. Jaleel Khalaf Shouail, the commander of the Iraqi Army's First Brigade, how soon American forces could leave. "We need permanent United States military bases in Iraq," he said. "Look at Japan, look at Germany, look at Italy. They all have bases and they're successful societies. We can be the same."
He gave me a radiant smile. Simple.
----------------------------
Citation: Roger Cohen. "Playing Den Mother to a Fledgling Iraqi Army," The New York Times, 29 January 2006.
Original URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/29/weekinreview/29word.html?_r=1
----------------------------
Shiite-Sunni Security Tensions Rising
By Robert H. Reid
Associated Press, 29 January 2006
It's already a bitter fight and getting more acrimonious by the day — the question of who should control Iraq's police and army.
At stake is whether Iraq slides toward civil war — and how long American troops might have to stay to keep the peace.
In a clear sign of the issue's importance, American officials have been pointed in their demands that the two sides reach a deal, and that no one group should monopolize key ministries. But so far, the sides are getting further apart, not compromising.
Sunni Arabs insist that Shiites aligned with sectarian groups with private militias cannot control the key interior and defense ministries that run the police and the army.
"We will work hard to not allow the security ministries to be in the hands of groups that have militias. And we will also work hard not to let those sectarian people head these ministries," said Thafir al-Ani, a spokesman of the main Sunni Arab bloc. "We will absolutely not allow this."
But Shiites say they must control those key ministries to ensure that members of their majority community are protected.
"We have red lines that cannot be crossed in regard to electoral weight and the interest of national security," Hadi al-Amri, head of the Shiite Badr militia. "We will never surrender these. We are subjected to a daily slaughter. We will not relinquish security portfolios."
For months, each side has accused the other of targeting its civilians — Sunnis say the Shiite-run Interior Ministry runs death squads. Shiites say Sunni extremists target Shiites with car bombings and suicide attacks.
U.S. officials believe the Dec. 15 election, in which Sunni Arabs scored more than a threefold increase in parliament seats after boycotting the last vote, offers a historic opportunity to build the kind of inclusive government capable of winning trust from the minority and undermining the Sunni-dominated insurgency.
If that happens, the next stage could be the phased withdrawal of substantial numbers of American and other foreign troops.
All that depends on a deal among the Iraqis themselves. Failure would sharpen sectarian tensions, fuel the insurgency and force Washington to do some hard thinking about the impact of a major troop withdrawal.
A Sunni Arab now runs the Defense Ministry, which controls the army. More controversial is the Interior Ministry, which runs the police and paramilitary commandos.
Interior Ministry Bayan Jabr is a top official in the biggest Shiite religious party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or SCIRI. He is also a former official of the Badr militia, which once fought Saddam Hussein's forces from bases in Iran.
Sunni politicians have not publicly demanded the Interior Ministry post for themselves. But they don't want it in the hands of someone closely identified with the Shiite religious parties either.
However, the alliance of Shiite religious parties won 128 of the 275 parliament seats, the biggest single bloc. Shiite politicians believe that gives them the right to the major say in security issues.
"The Interior Ministry is not sectarian," al-Amri said. "We are the victims of sectarianism. We did not kill anyone because he was a Sunni. The Shiites are killed because they are Shiites. We are the victims."
But the Shiites are coming under strong U.S. and international pressure to compromise with the Sunnis. U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and U.N. special envoy Ashraf Jehangir Qazi have delivered that message in meetings with top Shiite politician Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and others.
"A monopoly by this group or that group on certain portfolios may not be in the better interests of Iraq," U.N. spokesman Said Arikat told The Associated Press.
Adnan al-Dulaimi, a major Sunni Arab politician, fears that if an agreement cannot be reached soon, the momentum for bringing the Sunni community into the political process will be lost.
He told reporters that Iraqi military operations such as Friday's raids in western Baghdad were widely seen among Sunni Arabs as a provocation.
"When the next government is formed, we will try to end such problems," al-Dulaimi said. "But we are afraid that the peoples' patience will run out and the country will slip into turmoil and disaster."
-----------------------------
Citation: Robert H. Reid. "Shiite-Sunni Security Tensions Rising," Associated Press, 29 January 2006.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060129/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_the_showdown
-----------------------------
Associated Press, 29 January 2006
It's already a bitter fight and getting more acrimonious by the day — the question of who should control Iraq's police and army.
At stake is whether Iraq slides toward civil war — and how long American troops might have to stay to keep the peace.
In a clear sign of the issue's importance, American officials have been pointed in their demands that the two sides reach a deal, and that no one group should monopolize key ministries. But so far, the sides are getting further apart, not compromising.
Sunni Arabs insist that Shiites aligned with sectarian groups with private militias cannot control the key interior and defense ministries that run the police and the army.
"We will work hard to not allow the security ministries to be in the hands of groups that have militias. And we will also work hard not to let those sectarian people head these ministries," said Thafir al-Ani, a spokesman of the main Sunni Arab bloc. "We will absolutely not allow this."
But Shiites say they must control those key ministries to ensure that members of their majority community are protected.
"We have red lines that cannot be crossed in regard to electoral weight and the interest of national security," Hadi al-Amri, head of the Shiite Badr militia. "We will never surrender these. We are subjected to a daily slaughter. We will not relinquish security portfolios."
For months, each side has accused the other of targeting its civilians — Sunnis say the Shiite-run Interior Ministry runs death squads. Shiites say Sunni extremists target Shiites with car bombings and suicide attacks.
U.S. officials believe the Dec. 15 election, in which Sunni Arabs scored more than a threefold increase in parliament seats after boycotting the last vote, offers a historic opportunity to build the kind of inclusive government capable of winning trust from the minority and undermining the Sunni-dominated insurgency.
If that happens, the next stage could be the phased withdrawal of substantial numbers of American and other foreign troops.
All that depends on a deal among the Iraqis themselves. Failure would sharpen sectarian tensions, fuel the insurgency and force Washington to do some hard thinking about the impact of a major troop withdrawal.
A Sunni Arab now runs the Defense Ministry, which controls the army. More controversial is the Interior Ministry, which runs the police and paramilitary commandos.
Interior Ministry Bayan Jabr is a top official in the biggest Shiite religious party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or SCIRI. He is also a former official of the Badr militia, which once fought Saddam Hussein's forces from bases in Iran.
Sunni politicians have not publicly demanded the Interior Ministry post for themselves. But they don't want it in the hands of someone closely identified with the Shiite religious parties either.
However, the alliance of Shiite religious parties won 128 of the 275 parliament seats, the biggest single bloc. Shiite politicians believe that gives them the right to the major say in security issues.
"The Interior Ministry is not sectarian," al-Amri said. "We are the victims of sectarianism. We did not kill anyone because he was a Sunni. The Shiites are killed because they are Shiites. We are the victims."
But the Shiites are coming under strong U.S. and international pressure to compromise with the Sunnis. U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and U.N. special envoy Ashraf Jehangir Qazi have delivered that message in meetings with top Shiite politician Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and others.
"A monopoly by this group or that group on certain portfolios may not be in the better interests of Iraq," U.N. spokesman Said Arikat told The Associated Press.
Adnan al-Dulaimi, a major Sunni Arab politician, fears that if an agreement cannot be reached soon, the momentum for bringing the Sunni community into the political process will be lost.
He told reporters that Iraqi military operations such as Friday's raids in western Baghdad were widely seen among Sunni Arabs as a provocation.
"When the next government is formed, we will try to end such problems," al-Dulaimi said. "But we are afraid that the peoples' patience will run out and the country will slip into turmoil and disaster."
-----------------------------
Citation: Robert H. Reid. "Shiite-Sunni Security Tensions Rising," Associated Press, 29 January 2006.
Original URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060129/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_the_showdown
-----------------------------
29 January 2006
Defining Homeland Security
Signal Magazine, 05 January 2006
More than 4 years have passed since the September 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States, and no consensus yet has been reached on what constitutes homeland security. Suggestions range from the ability to recover in the wake of a terrorist-induced catastrophe to the complete freedom from fear of any kind of terrorist attack.
Neither is there a defining consensus on who should be responsible for homeland security. Many diverse organizations are involved through longtime missions that have been tailored for counterterrorism, and others are adjusting to new and unfamiliar taskings. Ensuring that these organizations work together under U.S. laws is another challenge.
Technology plays a major role on both sides of the conflict, of course. The United States is counting on bringing its information supremacy to bear against its shadowy adversary. And, that foe is exploiting information technologies in its efforts to bypass defensive measures and inflict maximum damage on an innocent public.
But what the war on terrorism comes down to is how the United States—and the Free World as a whole—will define homeland security. Is homeland security complete freedom from fear, to paraphrase Franklin Delano Roosevelt? Or is it really a global form of risk management?
Achieving total security may require financial expenditures—including those for more extensive overseas military operations—beyond the reach of even the richest nation on Earth. Defining the ideal homeland security architecture for diverse federal, state and local government organizations also may be an ever-elusive goal.
And, there is the issue of civil liberties. The public may have to face the daunting proposition that impenetrable security probably is not possible without forfeiting virtually all of the civil liberties that define a free country. More than 200 years ago, Ben Franklin said, “Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty or safety.” No one wants to destroy the country in order to save it.
The founding fathers were wise in their establishment of the Constitution and its basic protections, but they would not want to see their ground-breaking efforts to build a better nation disappear at the hands of an enemy that hides behind the very system it seeks to destroy. Much work remains to determine the proper balance of laws that continue to protect the rights of citizens while simultaneously denying terrorists any shelter within those very same protections.
Meanwhile, as the country continues to work out the long-term details, the war on terrorism goes on. Law enforcement agencies and intelligence organizations at home and abroad keep on maintaining their vigilance and establishing measures designed to deter attacks. Industry continues to introduce new technologies and capabilities tailored for the fight against the unyielding enemy.
And the result may be public acceptance that the risk can never be eliminated. The nation may be able to continue life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, but it may never be able to do so without experiencing substantial loss of life from an occasional act of terror.
Achieving perfect security may require too high a price—financially and socially—to pay. The public accepts that no endeavor in life is risk-free. Even though the death toll in an airline crash makes headlines, people do not shun commercial flights. More than 40,000 people died in automobile accidents in the United States last year, but people are driving as much as ever. People are willing to accept some degree of risk as a normal part of their lives.
The United States has been fortunate in that, as of this writing, it has not been victimized by a major terrorist action since the benchmark attacks in 2001. That period of safety has been characterized by effective deterrence in the form of preventive law enforcement measures; international cooperation to deny terrorists easy travel and financing; and pre-emptive military operations offshore to remove enemy sanctuaries.
But make no mistake: The war on terrorism will be long and costly in more ways than one. It is entirely possible that the United States never again will suffer a terrorist attack equal to or greater than those of 9/11. But, it is more likely that the nihilistic murderers will succeed at least one more time in inflicting mass casualties among innocents. If that does happen, then the people of the United States must recognize that it is merely one battle in the long war. Many more remain to be fought or prevented, and a single setback does not translate to defeat. At the end of this war, the winner will be the one that survives intact; the loser will disappear from the world scene. Because of that absolute verdict, the United States will win because it has the resources, it has the will and it has the support of most of the countries on Earth. And, most importantly, it will win because it has no choice.
-----------------------
Citation: "Defining Homeland Security," Signal Magazine, 05 January 2006.
Original URL: http://www.imakenews.com/eletra/mod_print_view.cfm?this_id=509335&u=signal&issue_id=000103968&show=F,T,T,T,F,Article,F,F,F,F,T,T,F,F,T,T
-----------------------
More than 4 years have passed since the September 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States, and no consensus yet has been reached on what constitutes homeland security. Suggestions range from the ability to recover in the wake of a terrorist-induced catastrophe to the complete freedom from fear of any kind of terrorist attack.
Neither is there a defining consensus on who should be responsible for homeland security. Many diverse organizations are involved through longtime missions that have been tailored for counterterrorism, and others are adjusting to new and unfamiliar taskings. Ensuring that these organizations work together under U.S. laws is another challenge.
Technology plays a major role on both sides of the conflict, of course. The United States is counting on bringing its information supremacy to bear against its shadowy adversary. And, that foe is exploiting information technologies in its efforts to bypass defensive measures and inflict maximum damage on an innocent public.
But what the war on terrorism comes down to is how the United States—and the Free World as a whole—will define homeland security. Is homeland security complete freedom from fear, to paraphrase Franklin Delano Roosevelt? Or is it really a global form of risk management?
Achieving total security may require financial expenditures—including those for more extensive overseas military operations—beyond the reach of even the richest nation on Earth. Defining the ideal homeland security architecture for diverse federal, state and local government organizations also may be an ever-elusive goal.
And, there is the issue of civil liberties. The public may have to face the daunting proposition that impenetrable security probably is not possible without forfeiting virtually all of the civil liberties that define a free country. More than 200 years ago, Ben Franklin said, “Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty or safety.” No one wants to destroy the country in order to save it.
The founding fathers were wise in their establishment of the Constitution and its basic protections, but they would not want to see their ground-breaking efforts to build a better nation disappear at the hands of an enemy that hides behind the very system it seeks to destroy. Much work remains to determine the proper balance of laws that continue to protect the rights of citizens while simultaneously denying terrorists any shelter within those very same protections.
Meanwhile, as the country continues to work out the long-term details, the war on terrorism goes on. Law enforcement agencies and intelligence organizations at home and abroad keep on maintaining their vigilance and establishing measures designed to deter attacks. Industry continues to introduce new technologies and capabilities tailored for the fight against the unyielding enemy.
And the result may be public acceptance that the risk can never be eliminated. The nation may be able to continue life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, but it may never be able to do so without experiencing substantial loss of life from an occasional act of terror.
Achieving perfect security may require too high a price—financially and socially—to pay. The public accepts that no endeavor in life is risk-free. Even though the death toll in an airline crash makes headlines, people do not shun commercial flights. More than 40,000 people died in automobile accidents in the United States last year, but people are driving as much as ever. People are willing to accept some degree of risk as a normal part of their lives.
The United States has been fortunate in that, as of this writing, it has not been victimized by a major terrorist action since the benchmark attacks in 2001. That period of safety has been characterized by effective deterrence in the form of preventive law enforcement measures; international cooperation to deny terrorists easy travel and financing; and pre-emptive military operations offshore to remove enemy sanctuaries.
But make no mistake: The war on terrorism will be long and costly in more ways than one. It is entirely possible that the United States never again will suffer a terrorist attack equal to or greater than those of 9/11. But, it is more likely that the nihilistic murderers will succeed at least one more time in inflicting mass casualties among innocents. If that does happen, then the people of the United States must recognize that it is merely one battle in the long war. Many more remain to be fought or prevented, and a single setback does not translate to defeat. At the end of this war, the winner will be the one that survives intact; the loser will disappear from the world scene. Because of that absolute verdict, the United States will win because it has the resources, it has the will and it has the support of most of the countries on Earth. And, most importantly, it will win because it has no choice.
-----------------------
Citation: "Defining Homeland Security," Signal Magazine, 05 January 2006.
Original URL: http://www.imakenews.com/eletra/mod_print_view.cfm?this_id=509335&u=signal&issue_id=000103968&show=F,T,T,T,F,Article,F,F,F,F,T,T,F,F,T,T
-----------------------
27 January 2006
Think Inside the Box
By Stephen E. Flynn and Lawrence M. Wein
The New York Times, 29 November 2005
THIS week President Bush will seek to focus the nation's attention on border security and immigration reform. But the president's proposals won't protect Americans from our gravest cross-border threat: the possibility that a ship, truck or train will one day import a 40-foot cargo container in which terrorists have hidden a dirty bomb or nuclear weapon.
The Bush administration maintains that it has a smart strategy to reduce this risk. A new 24-Hour Rule requires that importers report the contents of their containers to customs inspectors one day before the boxes are loaded on ships bound for the United States. The Department of Homeland Security's National Targeting Center then reviews the data, checking against other intelligence to determine which boxes may pose a threat. Although the containers deemed high risk are inspected at cooperating foreign ports or when they enter the United States, the rest - more than 90 percent - land here without any perusal.
We have two concerns about this strategy. First, it presumes that the United States government has good enough intelligence about Al Qaeda to reliably discern which containers are suspicious and which are not. But our inability to thwart the attacks in Iraq demonstrates that we lack such specific tactical intelligence. And supporting customs inspectors, who must make the first assessment of risk, is not a priority for the intelligence agencies. Inspectors must rely on their experience in spotting anomalies - a company that claims to be exporting pineapples from Iceland, for example.
Second, determined terrorists can easily take advantage of the knowledge that customs inspectors routinely designate certain shipments as low risk. A container frequently makes 10 or more stops between its factory of origin and the vessel carrying it to American shores. Many of the way stations are in poorly policed parts of the world. Because name-brand companies like Wal-Mart and General Motors are widely known to be considered low-risk, terrorists need only to stake out their shipment routes and exploit the weakest points to introduce a weapon of mass destruction. A terrorist cell posing as a legal shipping company for more than two years, or a terrorist truck driver hauling goods from a well-known shipper, can also be confident of being perceived as low risk.
So what needs to be done? A pilot project under way in Hong Kong, the world's largest container port along with Singapore, offers one piece of a potential solution. At an estimated cost of $7 per container, new technology can photograph the box's exterior, screen for radioactive material, and collect a gamma-ray image of a box's contents while the truck on which it is carried moves at 10 miles per hour.
Terrorists can defeat radiation sensors by shielding a dirty bomb with dense materials like lead. But by combining those sensors with gamma ray images, the Hong Kong system allows inspectors to sound the alarm on suspiciously dense objects. Inspectors would need to analyze enough of the scans - perhaps 20 percent to 30 percent - to convince terrorists that there is a good chance that an indistinct image will lead a container's contents to be sent for more reliable X-ray or manual examinations. Images of container contents would then be reviewed remotely by inspectors inside the United States who are trained to spot possible nuclear weapons.
If terrorists were to succeed in shipping a dirty bomb, for example, the database of these images could serve as a kind of black box - an invaluable forensic tool in the effort to identify how and where security was breached. That information could help prevent politicians from reacting spasmodically and freezing the entire container system after an attack.
Such a program could significantly reduce the likelihood that terrorists will smuggle plutonium or a dirty bomb through American ports. But it still would not stop a terrorist from importing highly enriched uranium, which can be used to construct a nuclear weapon. Lengthening the time that a container is screened for radiation would help, and this could be done without increasing waiting times if additional monitors were added to the Hong Kong system near the gate where the trucks must already stop for driver identification checks. Better still would be for the Department of Homeland Security to make the development of new technology that can recognize the unique signature of highly enriched uranium an urgent priority.
Finally, we must find ways to ensure that terrorists do not breach containers before shipments arrive at loading ports. Sensors should be installed inside containers in order to track their movements, detect any infiltration and discern the presence of radioactive material. Where boxes are loaded, certified independent inspectors should verify that companies have followed adequate protocols to ensure that legitimate and authorized goods are being shipped.
Taken together, these recommendations will require new investments and an extraordinary degree of international cooperation. But increased container security will not only help the United States prevent terrorism, it will also help all countries reduce theft, stop the smuggling of drugs and humans, crack down on tariff evasion and improve export controls. What's more, such a program would require an investment of just one one-hundredth of the capital that could be lost if we shut down the global container shipping system after an attack.
Container security is a complex problem with enormous stakes. American officials insist that existing programs have matters well in hand. But we cannot afford to take these perky reassurances at face value while the same officials fail to embrace promising initiatives like the Hong Kong pilot project.
Stephen E. Flynn, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of "America the Vulnerable." Lawrence M. Wein is a professor at Stanford's graduate school of business.
----------------------------
Citation: Stephen E. Flynn and Lawrence M. Wein. "Think Inside the Box," The New York Times, 29 November 2005.
Original URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/29/opinion/29weinflynn.html?ex=1290920400&en=fea984a46126bf13&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss
----------------------------
The New York Times, 29 November 2005
THIS week President Bush will seek to focus the nation's attention on border security and immigration reform. But the president's proposals won't protect Americans from our gravest cross-border threat: the possibility that a ship, truck or train will one day import a 40-foot cargo container in which terrorists have hidden a dirty bomb or nuclear weapon.
The Bush administration maintains that it has a smart strategy to reduce this risk. A new 24-Hour Rule requires that importers report the contents of their containers to customs inspectors one day before the boxes are loaded on ships bound for the United States. The Department of Homeland Security's National Targeting Center then reviews the data, checking against other intelligence to determine which boxes may pose a threat. Although the containers deemed high risk are inspected at cooperating foreign ports or when they enter the United States, the rest - more than 90 percent - land here without any perusal.
We have two concerns about this strategy. First, it presumes that the United States government has good enough intelligence about Al Qaeda to reliably discern which containers are suspicious and which are not. But our inability to thwart the attacks in Iraq demonstrates that we lack such specific tactical intelligence. And supporting customs inspectors, who must make the first assessment of risk, is not a priority for the intelligence agencies. Inspectors must rely on their experience in spotting anomalies - a company that claims to be exporting pineapples from Iceland, for example.
Second, determined terrorists can easily take advantage of the knowledge that customs inspectors routinely designate certain shipments as low risk. A container frequently makes 10 or more stops between its factory of origin and the vessel carrying it to American shores. Many of the way stations are in poorly policed parts of the world. Because name-brand companies like Wal-Mart and General Motors are widely known to be considered low-risk, terrorists need only to stake out their shipment routes and exploit the weakest points to introduce a weapon of mass destruction. A terrorist cell posing as a legal shipping company for more than two years, or a terrorist truck driver hauling goods from a well-known shipper, can also be confident of being perceived as low risk.
So what needs to be done? A pilot project under way in Hong Kong, the world's largest container port along with Singapore, offers one piece of a potential solution. At an estimated cost of $7 per container, new technology can photograph the box's exterior, screen for radioactive material, and collect a gamma-ray image of a box's contents while the truck on which it is carried moves at 10 miles per hour.
Terrorists can defeat radiation sensors by shielding a dirty bomb with dense materials like lead. But by combining those sensors with gamma ray images, the Hong Kong system allows inspectors to sound the alarm on suspiciously dense objects. Inspectors would need to analyze enough of the scans - perhaps 20 percent to 30 percent - to convince terrorists that there is a good chance that an indistinct image will lead a container's contents to be sent for more reliable X-ray or manual examinations. Images of container contents would then be reviewed remotely by inspectors inside the United States who are trained to spot possible nuclear weapons.
If terrorists were to succeed in shipping a dirty bomb, for example, the database of these images could serve as a kind of black box - an invaluable forensic tool in the effort to identify how and where security was breached. That information could help prevent politicians from reacting spasmodically and freezing the entire container system after an attack.
Such a program could significantly reduce the likelihood that terrorists will smuggle plutonium or a dirty bomb through American ports. But it still would not stop a terrorist from importing highly enriched uranium, which can be used to construct a nuclear weapon. Lengthening the time that a container is screened for radiation would help, and this could be done without increasing waiting times if additional monitors were added to the Hong Kong system near the gate where the trucks must already stop for driver identification checks. Better still would be for the Department of Homeland Security to make the development of new technology that can recognize the unique signature of highly enriched uranium an urgent priority.
Finally, we must find ways to ensure that terrorists do not breach containers before shipments arrive at loading ports. Sensors should be installed inside containers in order to track their movements, detect any infiltration and discern the presence of radioactive material. Where boxes are loaded, certified independent inspectors should verify that companies have followed adequate protocols to ensure that legitimate and authorized goods are being shipped.
Taken together, these recommendations will require new investments and an extraordinary degree of international cooperation. But increased container security will not only help the United States prevent terrorism, it will also help all countries reduce theft, stop the smuggling of drugs and humans, crack down on tariff evasion and improve export controls. What's more, such a program would require an investment of just one one-hundredth of the capital that could be lost if we shut down the global container shipping system after an attack.
Container security is a complex problem with enormous stakes. American officials insist that existing programs have matters well in hand. But we cannot afford to take these perky reassurances at face value while the same officials fail to embrace promising initiatives like the Hong Kong pilot project.
Stephen E. Flynn, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of "America the Vulnerable." Lawrence M. Wein is a professor at Stanford's graduate school of business.
----------------------------
Citation: Stephen E. Flynn and Lawrence M. Wein. "Think Inside the Box," The New York Times, 29 November 2005.
Original URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/29/opinion/29weinflynn.html?ex=1290920400&en=fea984a46126bf13&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss
----------------------------
In NATO, Technology Challenges Yield to Political Interoperability Hurdles
By Robert K. Ackerman
Signal Magazine, 05 January 2006
The greatest challenge facing NATO interoperability is the desire of individual nations to safeguard information and technology from their allies, according to the general manager of the agency tasked with enabling coalition interoperability.
Nations with extensive data collection and processing systems are reluctant to share all elements of detailed information with even longtime allies, lest sensitive intelligence and technology aspects are revealed. And, many useful information technologies and systems developed by an individual nation are subject to export controls, which hinders their acceptance and implementation by other NATO nations.
Ensuring coalition interoperability amid these conditions is complicated by the military transformation that is empowered by the rapid evolution of information technologies. The NATO Consultation, Command and Control (C3) Agency, or NC3A, is striving to enable coalition interoperability both through technological advances and by overcoming the political-cultural barriers that hinder interoperable military operations.
The NC3A faces a tougher task than its national equivalents because it must bring together systems that are designed to address national needs, which often differ widely even among member nations. Not only must these systems interoperate among other national systems, they also must interoperate with NATO systems and networks.
Dag Wilhelmsen, NC3A general manager, offers that the agency hopes to allow the alliance to address coalition interoperability through “the ability to operate as an unbiased coherent agent.” The NC3A would be able to assist nations in finding good, workable solutions between national systems and international infrastructures.
Wilhelmsen categorizes the challenge of achieving coalition interoperability into three different areas: the technical area, which focuses on architectures and standards; the programmatic area, which involves affecting national programs to achieve interoperability; and the political and cultural levels.
The NC3A general manager is unhesitating in his declaration that the political and cultural arenas pose the greatest challenge to NATO coalition interoperability. The ability to establish multilateral, trusted information-sharing environments that can be effective in a coalition setting hinges on solving that challenge, he states.
The political consensus that drives a coalition to function in an operation is not necessarily a permanent and fully multilateral base, Wilhelmsen continues. In many cases, a set of bilateral arrangements must be established to share information across a set of shared bilateral links. “That is obviously a very ineffective and difficult way to establish effective coalition operations,” Wilhelmsen emphasizes.
So, the cultural challenge is to establish a coalition setting where all the participants in the coalition will trust a common domain of information that can be shared by all participants, he says. Achieving that goal will require providing a secure information-sharing environment that is transparent enough for all the participants to understand that their information is protected fully.
This is more than just a focus on multilevel security concerns. Wilhelmsen suggests that NATO members agree on the goal, but they each see different priorities on the path to achieving that goal. This is why it is easier to agree on an ad hoc arrangement than on a permanent solution.
But the other areas pose challenges of their own. For the technical area, the agency is striving to create templates for new architectures that are service-oriented rather than system-design-oriented.
The programmatic area is where the technology gap rears its head. The United States is far ahead of even its most technologically capable allies, and many new and incoming NATO members are using obsolete 1960s and 1970s technologies. Wilhelmsen notes that the agency continues to assess the capability maturity of technologies that member nations bring to the coalition arena.
One useful tool in meeting the alliance’s interoperability challenges is the Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration, or CWID (SIGNAL Magazine, September 2005, page 71). Wilhelmsen offers that the key lessons that NATO continues to learn from CWID and its predecessors come from being able to bring together diverse national systems early enough in their development to allow changes for interoperability.
Two programs in particular benefited from CWID 2005. One, the Coalition Friendly Force Tracking Standard, is receiving its first trial with five nations’ systems being interconnected in NATO operations in Afghanistan. The next phase will be to establish a standard agreement for these systems to have a shared information exchange standard across systems.
The other program involves battlespace command and control systems working together using the Multilateral Interoperability Program, or MIP, standard. The ongoing MIP effort is furthering data exchange mechanisms through additional test programs. Wilhelmsen relates that NATO is establishing an experiment for MIP implementation in Afghanistan, where U.S. and NATO systems have begun a validation process for information exchange in a fielded environment.
----------------------------
Citation: Robert K. Ackerman. "In NATO, Technology Challenges Yield to Political Interoperability Hurdles," Signal Magazine, 05 January 2006.
Original URL: http://www.imakenews.com/eletra/mod_print_view.cfm?this_id=509437&u=signal&issue_id=000103968&show=F,T,T,T,F,Article,F,F,F,F,T,T,F,F,T,T
----------------------------
Signal Magazine, 05 January 2006
The greatest challenge facing NATO interoperability is the desire of individual nations to safeguard information and technology from their allies, according to the general manager of the agency tasked with enabling coalition interoperability.
Nations with extensive data collection and processing systems are reluctant to share all elements of detailed information with even longtime allies, lest sensitive intelligence and technology aspects are revealed. And, many useful information technologies and systems developed by an individual nation are subject to export controls, which hinders their acceptance and implementation by other NATO nations.
Ensuring coalition interoperability amid these conditions is complicated by the military transformation that is empowered by the rapid evolution of information technologies. The NATO Consultation, Command and Control (C3) Agency, or NC3A, is striving to enable coalition interoperability both through technological advances and by overcoming the political-cultural barriers that hinder interoperable military operations.
The NC3A faces a tougher task than its national equivalents because it must bring together systems that are designed to address national needs, which often differ widely even among member nations. Not only must these systems interoperate among other national systems, they also must interoperate with NATO systems and networks.
Dag Wilhelmsen, NC3A general manager, offers that the agency hopes to allow the alliance to address coalition interoperability through “the ability to operate as an unbiased coherent agent.” The NC3A would be able to assist nations in finding good, workable solutions between national systems and international infrastructures.
Wilhelmsen categorizes the challenge of achieving coalition interoperability into three different areas: the technical area, which focuses on architectures and standards; the programmatic area, which involves affecting national programs to achieve interoperability; and the political and cultural levels.
The NC3A general manager is unhesitating in his declaration that the political and cultural arenas pose the greatest challenge to NATO coalition interoperability. The ability to establish multilateral, trusted information-sharing environments that can be effective in a coalition setting hinges on solving that challenge, he states.
The political consensus that drives a coalition to function in an operation is not necessarily a permanent and fully multilateral base, Wilhelmsen continues. In many cases, a set of bilateral arrangements must be established to share information across a set of shared bilateral links. “That is obviously a very ineffective and difficult way to establish effective coalition operations,” Wilhelmsen emphasizes.
So, the cultural challenge is to establish a coalition setting where all the participants in the coalition will trust a common domain of information that can be shared by all participants, he says. Achieving that goal will require providing a secure information-sharing environment that is transparent enough for all the participants to understand that their information is protected fully.
This is more than just a focus on multilevel security concerns. Wilhelmsen suggests that NATO members agree on the goal, but they each see different priorities on the path to achieving that goal. This is why it is easier to agree on an ad hoc arrangement than on a permanent solution.
But the other areas pose challenges of their own. For the technical area, the agency is striving to create templates for new architectures that are service-oriented rather than system-design-oriented.
The programmatic area is where the technology gap rears its head. The United States is far ahead of even its most technologically capable allies, and many new and incoming NATO members are using obsolete 1960s and 1970s technologies. Wilhelmsen notes that the agency continues to assess the capability maturity of technologies that member nations bring to the coalition arena.
One useful tool in meeting the alliance’s interoperability challenges is the Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration, or CWID (SIGNAL Magazine, September 2005, page 71). Wilhelmsen offers that the key lessons that NATO continues to learn from CWID and its predecessors come from being able to bring together diverse national systems early enough in their development to allow changes for interoperability.
Two programs in particular benefited from CWID 2005. One, the Coalition Friendly Force Tracking Standard, is receiving its first trial with five nations’ systems being interconnected in NATO operations in Afghanistan. The next phase will be to establish a standard agreement for these systems to have a shared information exchange standard across systems.
The other program involves battlespace command and control systems working together using the Multilateral Interoperability Program, or MIP, standard. The ongoing MIP effort is furthering data exchange mechanisms through additional test programs. Wilhelmsen relates that NATO is establishing an experiment for MIP implementation in Afghanistan, where U.S. and NATO systems have begun a validation process for information exchange in a fielded environment.
----------------------------
Citation: Robert K. Ackerman. "In NATO, Technology Challenges Yield to Political Interoperability Hurdles," Signal Magazine, 05 January 2006.
Original URL: http://www.imakenews.com/eletra/mod_print_view.cfm?this_id=509437&u=signal&issue_id=000103968&show=F,T,T,T,F,Article,F,F,F,F,T,T,F,F,T,T
----------------------------
Navy Advances Lay the Groundwork for Revolutionary Changes
By Robert K. Ackerman
Signal Magazine, 04 November 2005
Changes are afoot in the fleet as the U.S. Navy plans for greater versatility in force and execution. The Navy’s vital FORCEnet program, which is the baseline for the service’s infostructure, will change Navy capabilities significantly. However, it is more than just an end in and of itself. As revolutionary as FORCEnet is to naval planning, it also represents an evolutionary phase that offers to lead to a complete revolution in warfighting amid seamless integration in the joint realm.
The Navy, the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force are working to develop a joint networked environment. FORCEnet is at the heart of the Navy’s effort in that arena, and the Navy already is working to quantify and document the new ways of warfighting that will be empowered by FORCEnet. Many of these concepts of operations emerging from Sea Basing, Sea Strike and Sea Shield are still embryonic. Planners must assume that the network is in place, the other services are interoperating with their own contributions, and the culture and policy have adjusted to the new capabilities.
Capt. Robert M. Zalaskus, USN, is the N-6 to Vice Adm. James D. McArthur Jr., USN, commander of the Naval Network Warfare Command. The captain’s title is director of enterprise architecture, and his responsibilities cover three primary areas: concept, integration and development; architecture, which turns those concepts into relationships; and modernization planning that reconciles operational needs, budgets and phased timing.
Capt. Zalaskus explains that the Navy continues to follow the FORCEnet functional concept as it transforms into a 21st century force. Much of this transformation focuses on the Navy’s contribution to the Global Information Grid (GIG). At this point in the transformation, the Navy has “a set of well-behaved types of applications and systems that work pretty well together,” the captain offers.
However, ensuring that the next step will continue to deliver FORCEnet requires that the Navy measure the degree of integration. Many programs are being developed by experts well versed in FORCEnet disciplines, but their efforts must be integrated at various layers to ensure that information flows more seamlessly in the future, Capt. Zalaskus points out.
A key metric in this endeavor may be information in motion. The captain explains that information in motion suggests information at work, which in turn translates to capability. Applying this as a metric for success may help the Navy bring together the diverse capabilities under development. This is vital as it works toward the necessary standards, interfaces and processes that allow that information to flow more readily among those individual efforts, he offers.
Ironically, the future probably will see a decreased emphasis on concepts such as FORCEnet, ConstellationNet and LandWarNet in favor of a more centralized view such as GIG-N, GIG-AF and GIG-A, the captain offers. Such an approach would have all of the services working on a common infostructure to move information more readily and seamlessly.
Moving away from service-oriented architectures will give way to an approach known as services-oriented architecture, which would break down the complex functions that are done by today’s command and control systems. Beginning by determining each system’s fundamental activities, planners would look at making these functions modular so they can be reused by many applications and shared among many users.
But, even that advanced architecture is not the end state. Further in the future lies event-driven architecture, which may represent the ultimate peak of a joint infostructure. In that environment, traditional actions of command and control will yield to radically new warfighting capabilities enabled by information across the battlespace.
However, getting to this event-driven architecture will require establishing the supporting infrastructure necessary for enabling the network. Services must be designed to function in the asymmetric environment. For example, a user’s information request generated as a message would enter the network, where a network broker would distribute it to the appropriate party for action. When the requested information becomes available, it would be sent back to the original sender. In an event-driven architecture, those two parties would not need to remain connected directly.
This infrastructure will evolve over time rather than appearing as a revolutionary development, Capt. Zalaskus continues, adding that a methodical approach is necessary to reach the end state desired for that type of network. However, along the way more revolutionary changes in operations will emerge as a solid infostructure is developed to support the network-centric environment.
Revolutionary changes already are in the works through FORCEnet. The captain notes that the FORCEnet functional concept can be distilled into 15 capabilities. These capabilities become the basis of future acquisition and resourcing strategies, and these strategies can serve as the guideposts for building new systems.
Three aspects of FORCEnet stand out from the other 12 as truly revolutionary, according to Capt. Zalaskus. One is that future warfighting problems will be so complex that a collaborative environment will be necessary to solve them.
Another will allow a unit to have more autonomy to execute the commander’s intent. The network will provide the feedback, which will be the new version of control for the commander. If that commander sees that the original intent is not being executed or it requires an adjustment, then the commander will issue a new intent.
The third revolutionary aspect is the idea of how information is shared—or even owned. The future will see a much greater dependence on refined information, but some users still will want to have access to some raw data. That runs afoul of traditional intelligence community processes that focus on providing knowledge rather than raw data.
When these revolutionary changes come to pass, their effects will be broad. “When you can start aligning operational activities and the roles that people play with system functions and systems that we build through our acquisition process, then you can derive organizational structure—and new organizational structures that we don’t even have today,” the captain observes.
---------------------------
Citation: Robert K. Ackerman. "Navy Advances Lay the Groundwork for Revolutionary Changes," Signal Magazine, 04 November 2005.
Original URL: http://www.imakenews.com/eletra/mod_print_view.cfm?this_id=481997&u=signal&issue_id=000096422&show=F,T,T,T,F,Article,F,F,F,F,T,T,F,F,T,T
---------------------------
Signal Magazine, 04 November 2005
Changes are afoot in the fleet as the U.S. Navy plans for greater versatility in force and execution. The Navy’s vital FORCEnet program, which is the baseline for the service’s infostructure, will change Navy capabilities significantly. However, it is more than just an end in and of itself. As revolutionary as FORCEnet is to naval planning, it also represents an evolutionary phase that offers to lead to a complete revolution in warfighting amid seamless integration in the joint realm.
The Navy, the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force are working to develop a joint networked environment. FORCEnet is at the heart of the Navy’s effort in that arena, and the Navy already is working to quantify and document the new ways of warfighting that will be empowered by FORCEnet. Many of these concepts of operations emerging from Sea Basing, Sea Strike and Sea Shield are still embryonic. Planners must assume that the network is in place, the other services are interoperating with their own contributions, and the culture and policy have adjusted to the new capabilities.
Capt. Robert M. Zalaskus, USN, is the N-6 to Vice Adm. James D. McArthur Jr., USN, commander of the Naval Network Warfare Command. The captain’s title is director of enterprise architecture, and his responsibilities cover three primary areas: concept, integration and development; architecture, which turns those concepts into relationships; and modernization planning that reconciles operational needs, budgets and phased timing.
Capt. Zalaskus explains that the Navy continues to follow the FORCEnet functional concept as it transforms into a 21st century force. Much of this transformation focuses on the Navy’s contribution to the Global Information Grid (GIG). At this point in the transformation, the Navy has “a set of well-behaved types of applications and systems that work pretty well together,” the captain offers.
However, ensuring that the next step will continue to deliver FORCEnet requires that the Navy measure the degree of integration. Many programs are being developed by experts well versed in FORCEnet disciplines, but their efforts must be integrated at various layers to ensure that information flows more seamlessly in the future, Capt. Zalaskus points out.
A key metric in this endeavor may be information in motion. The captain explains that information in motion suggests information at work, which in turn translates to capability. Applying this as a metric for success may help the Navy bring together the diverse capabilities under development. This is vital as it works toward the necessary standards, interfaces and processes that allow that information to flow more readily among those individual efforts, he offers.
Ironically, the future probably will see a decreased emphasis on concepts such as FORCEnet, ConstellationNet and LandWarNet in favor of a more centralized view such as GIG-N, GIG-AF and GIG-A, the captain offers. Such an approach would have all of the services working on a common infostructure to move information more readily and seamlessly.
Moving away from service-oriented architectures will give way to an approach known as services-oriented architecture, which would break down the complex functions that are done by today’s command and control systems. Beginning by determining each system’s fundamental activities, planners would look at making these functions modular so they can be reused by many applications and shared among many users.
But, even that advanced architecture is not the end state. Further in the future lies event-driven architecture, which may represent the ultimate peak of a joint infostructure. In that environment, traditional actions of command and control will yield to radically new warfighting capabilities enabled by information across the battlespace.
However, getting to this event-driven architecture will require establishing the supporting infrastructure necessary for enabling the network. Services must be designed to function in the asymmetric environment. For example, a user’s information request generated as a message would enter the network, where a network broker would distribute it to the appropriate party for action. When the requested information becomes available, it would be sent back to the original sender. In an event-driven architecture, those two parties would not need to remain connected directly.
This infrastructure will evolve over time rather than appearing as a revolutionary development, Capt. Zalaskus continues, adding that a methodical approach is necessary to reach the end state desired for that type of network. However, along the way more revolutionary changes in operations will emerge as a solid infostructure is developed to support the network-centric environment.
Revolutionary changes already are in the works through FORCEnet. The captain notes that the FORCEnet functional concept can be distilled into 15 capabilities. These capabilities become the basis of future acquisition and resourcing strategies, and these strategies can serve as the guideposts for building new systems.
Three aspects of FORCEnet stand out from the other 12 as truly revolutionary, according to Capt. Zalaskus. One is that future warfighting problems will be so complex that a collaborative environment will be necessary to solve them.
Another will allow a unit to have more autonomy to execute the commander’s intent. The network will provide the feedback, which will be the new version of control for the commander. If that commander sees that the original intent is not being executed or it requires an adjustment, then the commander will issue a new intent.
The third revolutionary aspect is the idea of how information is shared—or even owned. The future will see a much greater dependence on refined information, but some users still will want to have access to some raw data. That runs afoul of traditional intelligence community processes that focus on providing knowledge rather than raw data.
When these revolutionary changes come to pass, their effects will be broad. “When you can start aligning operational activities and the roles that people play with system functions and systems that we build through our acquisition process, then you can derive organizational structure—and new organizational structures that we don’t even have today,” the captain observes.
---------------------------
Citation: Robert K. Ackerman. "Navy Advances Lay the Groundwork for Revolutionary Changes," Signal Magazine, 04 November 2005.
Original URL: http://www.imakenews.com/eletra/mod_print_view.cfm?this_id=481997&u=signal&issue_id=000096422&show=F,T,T,T,F,Article,F,F,F,F,T,T,F,F,T,T
---------------------------
Robust Satellite Capacity Grows
Steerable spot beam coverage connects troops with critical command and control information.
By Clarence A. Robinson Jr.
Signal Magazine, December 2005
A new high-power commercial X-band communications satellite, designed to meet growing bandwidth demands, will help satiate the U.S. military’s voracious appetite for space-based connections. Rapidly increasing satellite communications requirements are expected to continue outstripping government-owned satellite capacity for the foreseeable future.
Called XTAR-EUR, this satellite with its greater bandwidth and higher power capability allows U.S. forces and other users to move their X-band spot beam coverage over any distance required in real time. The spacecraft is structured to interface with all current inventories of X-band terminals without the need for additional infrastructure. XTAR’s onboard switching and stackable spot beams are capable of fulfilling large bandwidth requirements. When necessary, the satellite can focus substantial bandwidth in one location such as an active military theater.
During recent tests in Germany and Great Britain, the XTAR successfully proved its interoperability with existing U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force satellite terminals using standard modems. The XTAR-EUR test results were briefed in late August to U.S. combatant commanders meeting in Crystal City, Virginia, making them aware of the spacecraft’s capability to augment tactical communications with minimal satellite antenna modifications.
The U.S. State Department also participated in the European-based military demonstrations at a separate site in Croughton, England, and already has contracted for XTAR use. Signed in early May, the indefinite delivery and indefinite quantity contract has a maximum value of $137 million over five years. Transponder allocation is by the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office (DTSPO), Fairfax, Virginia. This contract provides an established mechanism for the Defense Department and other U.S. government agencies to lease XTAR transponder capacity.
The DTSPO manages a worldwide communications network comprising government-owned and commercially leased assets for agencies that represent U.S. diplomatic posts abroad. An X-band commercial satellite network is being implemented by the DTSPO using government-owned earth terminals. There are 260 diplomatic sites around the world that represent some 50 U.S. agencies.
Financed privately, XTAR satellites are designed to provide customized communications services exclusively to U.S. and allied governments. The concept is to support military, diplomatic and security communications. Denmark, as an example, already is leasing the first left-hand circular polarizing capability on XTAR-EUR for use by its military. The satellite company manages transponder capacity for that nation.
XTAR began offering its capacity to customers in early 2005, following successful completion of in-orbit testing. XTAR-EUR’s satellite footprint reaches from eastern Brazil and the Atlantic Ocean, across all of Europe, Africa and the Middle East to as far as Singapore.
The satellite company, XTAR LLC, is a joint venture between Loral Space & Communications Limited and Spain’s HISDESAT Servicios Estratégicos, S.A. The Spanish Ministry of Defense is XTAR’s first customer, leasing 238 megahertz of capacity on XTAR-EUR until its own primary X-band satellite, SPAINSAT, enters service. When that occurs, XTAR-EUR will provide back-up capacity. SPAINSAT will operate from a geosynchronous slot at 30 degrees west longitude over the Atlantic Ocean.
In addition, XTAR LLC will lease eight 72-megahertz X-band transponders on SPAINSAT, designating them XTAR-LANT, to provide flexibility and additional services. Located at 29 degrees east longitude, XTAR-EUR offers a dozen 72-megahertz 100-watt transponders, two global beams, one fixed spot beam over Europe and four steerable spot beams, Dr. Denis J. Curtin explains. He is XTAR LLC’s chief operating officer.
“When XTAR-LANT is launched in early 2006, that satellite will carry eight 72-megahertz transponders, two global beams, one fixed beam over the United States and three steerable spot beams. The XTAR-LANT footprint will reach from Saudi Arabia to Denver, Colorado,” Curtin relates. With a 35-year career in satellite communications, he holds a bachelor’s and a master of science degree in physics and a doctorate in mechanical engineering from Catholic University, Washington, D.C.
Designed exclusively for government users, XTAR-EUR provides transponder bandwidth capacity for U.S. and allied forces in theaters of operation, Curtin points out. Built by Space Systems/Loral, XTAR-EUR was launched aboard an Ariane 5 ECA rocket from Kourou, French Guiana. SPAINSAT also is being built by Space Systems/Loral and is scheduled to be launched on an Ariane booster within four months.
Curtin credits the U.S. and Spanish governments for their cooperation with the satellite program. “The U.S. government supported XTAR from the embassy in Madrid and also approved the use of National Security Agency encryption on both satellites—the first time the encryption will be used by a non-English-speaking country. Indeed, the U.S. government also assisted in the coordination of satellite parking slots. The United States already had a satellite operating at 29 degrees east longitude with the possibility of subsequently adding an ultrahigh frequency (UHF) spacecraft at that location. However, the government agreed to move its existing satellite out of 29 degrees east once XTAR-EUR arrived in orbit. A further agreement calls for the government to handle any potential interference problems with XTAR and its ground segment, if a UHF satellite is moved into that geostationary position,” he explains.
Following extensive market research by Loral, it was determined that a very large number of legacy X-band terminals were available to the government and military for immediate use. A new X-band satellite could exploit this terminal availability since the military relied on X-band heavily for the Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS) prior to commercial satellite use, Curtin continues. However, the U.S. government has not been willing to license X-band satellite operations to American companies.
“As part of an evolving market analysis process, we discovered that Spain was interested in putting up its own military satellite, and that it also wanted a backup capability for that satellite. With mutual interests, we discovered that Spain already had filed for and had been granted X-band satellite slots,” Curtin discloses. “Spain’s interest extended to forming a joint venture to put up another spacecraft that could provide backup and residual capacity on a commercial basis and provide revenue to support their system.”
As a result of the joint venture, XTAR LLC emerged with Loral owning 56 percent and HISDESAT 44 percent. XTAR’s headquarters are in Rockville, Maryland, with offices in Arlington, Virginia; Palo Alto, California; and Madrid. “HISDESAT’s aims are the acquisition, operation and commercialization of government-oriented space systems, beginning with X-band and Ka-band frequencies. HISDESAT is owned jointly by HISPASAT, S.A., the Spanish commercial satellite services company; INSA, which is 100 percent owned by the Spanish government; and leaders of Spain’s space industries: EADS-CASA, Espacio, INDRA and SENER,” Curtin clarifies.
“A Space Systems/Loral 1300 platform is being used with both the XTAR-EUR and SPAINSAT. XTAR-EUR, which has a specified service life of 15 years, maintains stationkeeping and orbital stability by using bipropellant and momentum-bias systems. The satellites are three-axis stabilized with deployed solar arrays. The XTAR-EUR spacecraft provides both right- and left-hand circular polarization. This feature often is used on commercial satellites but not on U.S. military or NATO spacecraft, which are right-hand circular polarized,” Curtin states.
XTAR LLC decided to use both right- and left-hand circular polarization technologies because as a business venture this technique provides a more capable satellite. The approach also is gaining increasing acceptance within the U.S. government. The Army already is expected to issue contracts to industry for modification of legacy terminals with field installation kits, Curtin remarks. “New production terminals will be delivered with both right- and left-hand circular polarization capabilities,” he stresses. “The military would not commit to use the satellite’s transponders until their terminals successfully had undergone testing with XTAR-EUR. This was accomplished during the first test in Mannheim, Germany, in June, followed in July with tests at Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany.”
In the Mannheim tests conducted by the Army’s 7th Signal Brigade, a 16-foot-diameter dish antenna was used with a modified antenna feed, Dennis Evanchik says. An 8-foot-diameter tactical satellite antenna and related system components also were tested. Based at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, Evanchik is the project leader for the Army’s lightweight high-gain X-band antenna (LHGXA) and served as the Mannheim test director. “A series of interoperability demonstrations with both a standard and modified LHGXA feed assembly accessed the new XTAR-EUR X-band satellite. Using the standard modem currently installed in the AN/TSC-85C tactical satellite (TACSAT) van, a datalink of 8 megabits per second was established immediately.
“Harris Corporation, Melbourne, Florida, manufactures the LHGXA antenna, and along with L3 Communications Systems–West, Salt Lake City, provided modified antenna feeds. The feeds allowed 25-year-old terminals to use both the right- and left-hand circular polarizations available on the XTAR-EUR satellite,” Evanchik stresses. “Harris, using corporate research and development funding, modified the right-hand circular polarization feed. A rotary coupling was installed to allow 90 degrees of feed rotation. This rotation changed the standard right-hand configuration to a left-hand arrangement.”
L3 Corporation also used company funding to modify a standard AS-3036A right-hand feed to allow 90 degrees of feed rotation. The modification allows operation over XTAR-EUR in both right- and left-hand configurations. L3 also supplied a new model AMT-73L modem from Advantech AMT of Phoenix, and Dorval, Quebec, the same modem to be installed in the PHOENIX Block 2 upgrade. The Army’s PHOENIX satellite terminal provides quad-band (C, X, Ka and Ku) capability in the super high frequency range. This modem was later used in the demonstration at data rates in excess of the current L3 model 3501 modem, installed in the AN/TSC-85C TACSAT van.
“After installation of the new modem, stable data rates were in excess of 105 megabits per second while using less than 10 percent of satellite transponder power and 20 watts of terminal power when operating within the satellite’s spot beam,” Evanchik says. Despite the age of the terminals, engineers were able to transmit high data rates reliably over the satellite using 40 megahertz of bandwidth at quadrature amplitude modulation and Reed-Solomon forward error correction coding.
“We took conventional satellite communications equipment and an LHGXA terminal that had been in the field for many years and only modified two pieces of equipment—the XTAR-EUR feed, and installed a new modem in the van, replacing a 20-year-old design with the new PHOENIX modem for Army commonality. The tests were extremely successful—so much so that all new LHGXA systems will be built with XTAR capability for both right- and left-hand circular polarization. This is a product enhancement at minimal cost,” Evanchik reveals. “We are positioning for the future.”
The smaller USC-60A 8-foot-diameter antenna achieved stable data rates in excess of 75 megabits per second using less than 21 percent of satellite transponder power and 370 watts of terminal power. “From our perspective, the XTAR tests were a success,” Evanchik asserts. “Minimal antenna upgrade was required to access the XTAR left-hand circular polarization; minimal hardware upgrade was necessary with the modem and a multiplexer; and the cost per bit is significantly lower than commercial leases with Ku-band. As demonstrated, data rates with X-band exceed current Ku-band capability, and we are no longer power-limited.”
The final report for the Ramstein demonstration was still being prepared at press time. However, according to Rick Dunnegan, the test director, overall, the XTAR-EUR satellite performed well using tactical military terminals. “The satellite is technically suitable where X-band may be required for inter-theater applications using two transponders,” he reports. Dunnegan is a test engineer at the Joint Satellite Communications Engineering Center, Fort Monmouth. “Gateway access and control aspects worked well overall using military terminals with a few exceptions.”
At Ramstein and Croughton both Army and Air Force terminals and antennas were employed. In Germany, two USC-60A terminals were used. This highly transportable 2.4-meter-diameter terminal is primarily in use for joint deployable intelligence support systems, operating in C-, X-, and Ku-bands. In England the LHGXA with its 16-foot-diameter antenna was used. “Overall, XTAR-EUR worked as advertised as a very high-power satellite using military assets. It doubles the capacity of DSCS,” Dunnegan maintains. “However, some inexpensive terminals did not have the proper isolation required for XTAR, while other existing terminals in the inventory for years provided very good isolation.”
The State Department successfully conducted XTAR tests at a separate Croughton location using an SC-6 Enterprise terminal and a 66-foot-diameter dish antenna. U.S. Air Force terminals at the Croughton standard tactical entry point are focused on DSCS and were connected for the test to the SC-6 via fiber optic cable.
The Air Force will make a decision on whether to participate with XTAR-EUR based on the demonstration results in the final report, Col. Christopher L. Moore, USAF, says. He is deputy director of the Global Communications and Information Directorate, Air Force Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (AFC2ISRC), Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. The reason, Col. Moore explains, is the left-hand circular polarization requirement with military terminals. “They are not set up to handle both right- and left-hand polarization. Without knowing the technical results of the test, there could be interference issues with the opposite transponder that may reduce efficiencies or gains in bandwidth.
“But let me be clear; I’m very happy with what we have heard thus far, with respect to the test. XTAR gives us some increased flexibility in an extremely bandwidth-constrained environment that we work and fight our wars in today. However, I’m hesitant to say we had a fully successful demonstration without final test results, which could cause us not to pursue XTAR,” the colonel says. Adding that funding is tight, “the bill we may have to pay to make our legacy terminals compatible with this capability could be too high,” he continues.
Master Sgt. Tobey T. Sizemore, USAF, was the Ramstein demonstration point of contact for AFC2ISRC. He adds, “XTAR was tested in an unprecedented way.” The sergeant is the satellite communications programs superintendent for AFC2ISRC. “Without a doubt, there is increased capacity due to the improved power available on this commercial satellite. Still, there are some concerns with legacy terminals but not with all of them. The increases in power, whether on XTAR or the follow-on UHF wideband gap filler military satellites, will provide increased capacity to disadvantaged tactical terminals. And we successfully demonstrated that with some caveats. We wholeheartedly think that XTAR could provide an interim capability until the UHF comes along in a couple of years.”
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Citation: Clarence A. Robinson Jr. "Robust Satellite Capacity Grows," Signal Magazine, December 2005.
Original URL: http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/anmviewer.asp?a=1057&z=169
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By Clarence A. Robinson Jr.
Signal Magazine, December 2005
A new high-power commercial X-band communications satellite, designed to meet growing bandwidth demands, will help satiate the U.S. military’s voracious appetite for space-based connections. Rapidly increasing satellite communications requirements are expected to continue outstripping government-owned satellite capacity for the foreseeable future.
Called XTAR-EUR, this satellite with its greater bandwidth and higher power capability allows U.S. forces and other users to move their X-band spot beam coverage over any distance required in real time. The spacecraft is structured to interface with all current inventories of X-band terminals without the need for additional infrastructure. XTAR’s onboard switching and stackable spot beams are capable of fulfilling large bandwidth requirements. When necessary, the satellite can focus substantial bandwidth in one location such as an active military theater.
During recent tests in Germany and Great Britain, the XTAR successfully proved its interoperability with existing U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force satellite terminals using standard modems. The XTAR-EUR test results were briefed in late August to U.S. combatant commanders meeting in Crystal City, Virginia, making them aware of the spacecraft’s capability to augment tactical communications with minimal satellite antenna modifications.
The U.S. State Department also participated in the European-based military demonstrations at a separate site in Croughton, England, and already has contracted for XTAR use. Signed in early May, the indefinite delivery and indefinite quantity contract has a maximum value of $137 million over five years. Transponder allocation is by the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office (DTSPO), Fairfax, Virginia. This contract provides an established mechanism for the Defense Department and other U.S. government agencies to lease XTAR transponder capacity.
The DTSPO manages a worldwide communications network comprising government-owned and commercially leased assets for agencies that represent U.S. diplomatic posts abroad. An X-band commercial satellite network is being implemented by the DTSPO using government-owned earth terminals. There are 260 diplomatic sites around the world that represent some 50 U.S. agencies.
Financed privately, XTAR satellites are designed to provide customized communications services exclusively to U.S. and allied governments. The concept is to support military, diplomatic and security communications. Denmark, as an example, already is leasing the first left-hand circular polarizing capability on XTAR-EUR for use by its military. The satellite company manages transponder capacity for that nation.
XTAR began offering its capacity to customers in early 2005, following successful completion of in-orbit testing. XTAR-EUR’s satellite footprint reaches from eastern Brazil and the Atlantic Ocean, across all of Europe, Africa and the Middle East to as far as Singapore.
The satellite company, XTAR LLC, is a joint venture between Loral Space & Communications Limited and Spain’s HISDESAT Servicios Estratégicos, S.A. The Spanish Ministry of Defense is XTAR’s first customer, leasing 238 megahertz of capacity on XTAR-EUR until its own primary X-band satellite, SPAINSAT, enters service. When that occurs, XTAR-EUR will provide back-up capacity. SPAINSAT will operate from a geosynchronous slot at 30 degrees west longitude over the Atlantic Ocean.
In addition, XTAR LLC will lease eight 72-megahertz X-band transponders on SPAINSAT, designating them XTAR-LANT, to provide flexibility and additional services. Located at 29 degrees east longitude, XTAR-EUR offers a dozen 72-megahertz 100-watt transponders, two global beams, one fixed spot beam over Europe and four steerable spot beams, Dr. Denis J. Curtin explains. He is XTAR LLC’s chief operating officer.
“When XTAR-LANT is launched in early 2006, that satellite will carry eight 72-megahertz transponders, two global beams, one fixed beam over the United States and three steerable spot beams. The XTAR-LANT footprint will reach from Saudi Arabia to Denver, Colorado,” Curtin relates. With a 35-year career in satellite communications, he holds a bachelor’s and a master of science degree in physics and a doctorate in mechanical engineering from Catholic University, Washington, D.C.
Designed exclusively for government users, XTAR-EUR provides transponder bandwidth capacity for U.S. and allied forces in theaters of operation, Curtin points out. Built by Space Systems/Loral, XTAR-EUR was launched aboard an Ariane 5 ECA rocket from Kourou, French Guiana. SPAINSAT also is being built by Space Systems/Loral and is scheduled to be launched on an Ariane booster within four months.
Curtin credits the U.S. and Spanish governments for their cooperation with the satellite program. “The U.S. government supported XTAR from the embassy in Madrid and also approved the use of National Security Agency encryption on both satellites—the first time the encryption will be used by a non-English-speaking country. Indeed, the U.S. government also assisted in the coordination of satellite parking slots. The United States already had a satellite operating at 29 degrees east longitude with the possibility of subsequently adding an ultrahigh frequency (UHF) spacecraft at that location. However, the government agreed to move its existing satellite out of 29 degrees east once XTAR-EUR arrived in orbit. A further agreement calls for the government to handle any potential interference problems with XTAR and its ground segment, if a UHF satellite is moved into that geostationary position,” he explains.
Following extensive market research by Loral, it was determined that a very large number of legacy X-band terminals were available to the government and military for immediate use. A new X-band satellite could exploit this terminal availability since the military relied on X-band heavily for the Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS) prior to commercial satellite use, Curtin continues. However, the U.S. government has not been willing to license X-band satellite operations to American companies.
“As part of an evolving market analysis process, we discovered that Spain was interested in putting up its own military satellite, and that it also wanted a backup capability for that satellite. With mutual interests, we discovered that Spain already had filed for and had been granted X-band satellite slots,” Curtin discloses. “Spain’s interest extended to forming a joint venture to put up another spacecraft that could provide backup and residual capacity on a commercial basis and provide revenue to support their system.”
As a result of the joint venture, XTAR LLC emerged with Loral owning 56 percent and HISDESAT 44 percent. XTAR’s headquarters are in Rockville, Maryland, with offices in Arlington, Virginia; Palo Alto, California; and Madrid. “HISDESAT’s aims are the acquisition, operation and commercialization of government-oriented space systems, beginning with X-band and Ka-band frequencies. HISDESAT is owned jointly by HISPASAT, S.A., the Spanish commercial satellite services company; INSA, which is 100 percent owned by the Spanish government; and leaders of Spain’s space industries: EADS-CASA, Espacio, INDRA and SENER,” Curtin clarifies.
“A Space Systems/Loral 1300 platform is being used with both the XTAR-EUR and SPAINSAT. XTAR-EUR, which has a specified service life of 15 years, maintains stationkeeping and orbital stability by using bipropellant and momentum-bias systems. The satellites are three-axis stabilized with deployed solar arrays. The XTAR-EUR spacecraft provides both right- and left-hand circular polarization. This feature often is used on commercial satellites but not on U.S. military or NATO spacecraft, which are right-hand circular polarized,” Curtin states.
XTAR LLC decided to use both right- and left-hand circular polarization technologies because as a business venture this technique provides a more capable satellite. The approach also is gaining increasing acceptance within the U.S. government. The Army already is expected to issue contracts to industry for modification of legacy terminals with field installation kits, Curtin remarks. “New production terminals will be delivered with both right- and left-hand circular polarization capabilities,” he stresses. “The military would not commit to use the satellite’s transponders until their terminals successfully had undergone testing with XTAR-EUR. This was accomplished during the first test in Mannheim, Germany, in June, followed in July with tests at Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany.”
In the Mannheim tests conducted by the Army’s 7th Signal Brigade, a 16-foot-diameter dish antenna was used with a modified antenna feed, Dennis Evanchik says. An 8-foot-diameter tactical satellite antenna and related system components also were tested. Based at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, Evanchik is the project leader for the Army’s lightweight high-gain X-band antenna (LHGXA) and served as the Mannheim test director. “A series of interoperability demonstrations with both a standard and modified LHGXA feed assembly accessed the new XTAR-EUR X-band satellite. Using the standard modem currently installed in the AN/TSC-85C tactical satellite (TACSAT) van, a datalink of 8 megabits per second was established immediately.
“Harris Corporation, Melbourne, Florida, manufactures the LHGXA antenna, and along with L3 Communications Systems–West, Salt Lake City, provided modified antenna feeds. The feeds allowed 25-year-old terminals to use both the right- and left-hand circular polarizations available on the XTAR-EUR satellite,” Evanchik stresses. “Harris, using corporate research and development funding, modified the right-hand circular polarization feed. A rotary coupling was installed to allow 90 degrees of feed rotation. This rotation changed the standard right-hand configuration to a left-hand arrangement.”
L3 Corporation also used company funding to modify a standard AS-3036A right-hand feed to allow 90 degrees of feed rotation. The modification allows operation over XTAR-EUR in both right- and left-hand configurations. L3 also supplied a new model AMT-73L modem from Advantech AMT of Phoenix, and Dorval, Quebec, the same modem to be installed in the PHOENIX Block 2 upgrade. The Army’s PHOENIX satellite terminal provides quad-band (C, X, Ka and Ku) capability in the super high frequency range. This modem was later used in the demonstration at data rates in excess of the current L3 model 3501 modem, installed in the AN/TSC-85C TACSAT van.
“After installation of the new modem, stable data rates were in excess of 105 megabits per second while using less than 10 percent of satellite transponder power and 20 watts of terminal power when operating within the satellite’s spot beam,” Evanchik says. Despite the age of the terminals, engineers were able to transmit high data rates reliably over the satellite using 40 megahertz of bandwidth at quadrature amplitude modulation and Reed-Solomon forward error correction coding.
“We took conventional satellite communications equipment and an LHGXA terminal that had been in the field for many years and only modified two pieces of equipment—the XTAR-EUR feed, and installed a new modem in the van, replacing a 20-year-old design with the new PHOENIX modem for Army commonality. The tests were extremely successful—so much so that all new LHGXA systems will be built with XTAR capability for both right- and left-hand circular polarization. This is a product enhancement at minimal cost,” Evanchik reveals. “We are positioning for the future.”
The smaller USC-60A 8-foot-diameter antenna achieved stable data rates in excess of 75 megabits per second using less than 21 percent of satellite transponder power and 370 watts of terminal power. “From our perspective, the XTAR tests were a success,” Evanchik asserts. “Minimal antenna upgrade was required to access the XTAR left-hand circular polarization; minimal hardware upgrade was necessary with the modem and a multiplexer; and the cost per bit is significantly lower than commercial leases with Ku-band. As demonstrated, data rates with X-band exceed current Ku-band capability, and we are no longer power-limited.”
The final report for the Ramstein demonstration was still being prepared at press time. However, according to Rick Dunnegan, the test director, overall, the XTAR-EUR satellite performed well using tactical military terminals. “The satellite is technically suitable where X-band may be required for inter-theater applications using two transponders,” he reports. Dunnegan is a test engineer at the Joint Satellite Communications Engineering Center, Fort Monmouth. “Gateway access and control aspects worked well overall using military terminals with a few exceptions.”
At Ramstein and Croughton both Army and Air Force terminals and antennas were employed. In Germany, two USC-60A terminals were used. This highly transportable 2.4-meter-diameter terminal is primarily in use for joint deployable intelligence support systems, operating in C-, X-, and Ku-bands. In England the LHGXA with its 16-foot-diameter antenna was used. “Overall, XTAR-EUR worked as advertised as a very high-power satellite using military assets. It doubles the capacity of DSCS,” Dunnegan maintains. “However, some inexpensive terminals did not have the proper isolation required for XTAR, while other existing terminals in the inventory for years provided very good isolation.”
The State Department successfully conducted XTAR tests at a separate Croughton location using an SC-6 Enterprise terminal and a 66-foot-diameter dish antenna. U.S. Air Force terminals at the Croughton standard tactical entry point are focused on DSCS and were connected for the test to the SC-6 via fiber optic cable.
The Air Force will make a decision on whether to participate with XTAR-EUR based on the demonstration results in the final report, Col. Christopher L. Moore, USAF, says. He is deputy director of the Global Communications and Information Directorate, Air Force Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (AFC2ISRC), Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. The reason, Col. Moore explains, is the left-hand circular polarization requirement with military terminals. “They are not set up to handle both right- and left-hand polarization. Without knowing the technical results of the test, there could be interference issues with the opposite transponder that may reduce efficiencies or gains in bandwidth.
“But let me be clear; I’m very happy with what we have heard thus far, with respect to the test. XTAR gives us some increased flexibility in an extremely bandwidth-constrained environment that we work and fight our wars in today. However, I’m hesitant to say we had a fully successful demonstration without final test results, which could cause us not to pursue XTAR,” the colonel says. Adding that funding is tight, “the bill we may have to pay to make our legacy terminals compatible with this capability could be too high,” he continues.
Master Sgt. Tobey T. Sizemore, USAF, was the Ramstein demonstration point of contact for AFC2ISRC. He adds, “XTAR was tested in an unprecedented way.” The sergeant is the satellite communications programs superintendent for AFC2ISRC. “Without a doubt, there is increased capacity due to the improved power available on this commercial satellite. Still, there are some concerns with legacy terminals but not with all of them. The increases in power, whether on XTAR or the follow-on UHF wideband gap filler military satellites, will provide increased capacity to disadvantaged tactical terminals. And we successfully demonstrated that with some caveats. We wholeheartedly think that XTAR could provide an interim capability until the UHF comes along in a couple of years.”
------------------------
Citation: Clarence A. Robinson Jr. "Robust Satellite Capacity Grows," Signal Magazine, December 2005.
Original URL: http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/anmviewer.asp?a=1057&z=169
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