03 July 2007

Brown's Wars Part 2: Meltdown on the frontline in Basra

The only people venturing out are British troops, and three died on the PM's first day. Will Miliband persuade his boss to pull them out?

By Raymond Whitaker
The Independent, 01 July 2007

The blast that killed Private James Kerr and Private Scott Kennedy, both 20, and Corporal Paul Joszko, 28, would have been heard across half of Basra. It happened at 1am on Thursday in the deserted streets of al-Antahiya, on the southern outskirts of the city.

The men would have known their mission was dangerous. They had left the relative security of Basra air station - Britain's main base in Iraq, which is spread across a wide expanse of desert bordering the city's airport - to resupply the only British contingent still within the city limits, at Basra Palace. There are only a few possible routes between the two bases, as local insurgents well know, and most journeys are undertaken by helicopter.

To minimise the risk of travelling by road, the convoy had gone to Basra Palace in darkness, when ordinary residents of the city remain indoors, behind high walls. The only people to venture out are British troops - and those they are fighting. The soldiers had delivered their supplies, and were on the way back when they left their Warrior armoured vehicles to check their surroundings. At this point, it appears, a hidden watcher triggered the bomb that killed the three men and seriously wounded a fourth.

The loss of three soldiers in one attack, the second worst in Iraq so far this year, brought the British toll since the 2003 invasion to 156. Not only did it come on Gordon Brown's first full day as Prime Minister, but one of the victims, Pte Kerr, was from Cowdenbeath, in his constituency. In significant contrast to his predecessor, Tony Blair, who never had contact with relatives of British soldiers lost in Iraq or Afghanistan, Mr Brown telephoned Pte Kerr's mother to express his condolences. Some wonder if that signals a change of approach on Iraq.

The new Prime Minister was never expected to continue Mr Blair's symbiotic relationship with George Bush, but Mr Brown's government appointments removed any doubt. David Miliband, his Foreign Secretary, privately doubted the wisdom of invading Iraq. Sir Mark Malloch Brown, now a Foreign Office minister, made no secret of his view that the Iraq war was almost certainly illegal. And John Denham, who quit the Government in 2003 in protest at the war, is back.

The fact that Des Browne, the Secretary of State for Defence, was the only minister to remain in the same post after Mr Brown's extensive reshuffle may indicate that the new incumbent in No 10 saw the need for some continuity in Britain's wars. This weekend Mr Miliband is closeted with briefers, acquainting himself with all the complexities of his portfolio. But the situation in southern Iraq carries its own momentum, one that appears to point to an early exit for British troops.

In one of the most detailed independent reports on Basra since the invasion, the authoritative International Crisis Group (ICG) last week painted a devastating portrait of life in the city. It said Operation Sinbad, Britain's attempt between September 2006 and March this year to root out militias, restore security and kick-start economic reconstruction, appeared at first to be a qualified success. Criminality, political assassinations and sectarian killings receded somewhat, and relative calm prevailed.

"Yet this reality was both superficial and fleeting," says the ICG report. "By March-April 2007, renewed political tensions once more threatened to destabilise the city, and relentless attacks on British forces in effect had driven them off the streets into increasingly secluded compounds. Basra's residents and militiamen view this not as an orderly withdrawal, but rather as an ignominious defeat. Today the city is controlled by militias."

The ICG blames Britain for "the most glaring failing of all": the inability to establish a strong provincial administration capable of enforcing its will. Instead of the political parties responsible for the violence being confronted, they were treated as partners - an object lesson, it says, of what the Americans should not do as they carry out their security "surge" in Baghdad.

While others might disagree with the group's belief that British forces could ever have achieved such a transformation in Basra, they probably would not quarrel with its conclusion that "in Basra the British appear to have given up on the idea of establishing a functioning state, capable of equitably redistributing wealth and resources, establishing respect for the rule of law and instituting a genuine and accountable democracy". The report adds: "In any event, time is running out. Four years after the fall of Saddam's regime, they are facing increasingly frequent and bloody attacks, and it is hard to imagine them remaining for long." Even if the coalition wanted to re-engage, says the ICG "it already may well be too late".

That was clear the minute Mr Blair, for once going against American wishes, announced early this year that British forces would be reduced from just over 7,000 to their present 5,500. The bitter irony of last week's attack is that the resupply convoy on which the three soldiers died may well have been the last to Basra Palace, which is due to be handed over to Iraqi forces any day now. That will leave the airport as the only British base in Iraq.

Military sources believe another 500 troops may come home soon, but that would be the last partial withdrawal: 5,000 is considered the minimum to ensure that the remaining force can protect itself. But what would be the point, many ask, of keeping them in one location, unable to achieve much beyond acting as a magnet for insurgent attacks?

Critics argue that a precipitate British withdrawal would make the violence in Basra even worse. The diminished British presence has created worsening friction with American commanders, who are concerned about the security of the supply route from Kuwait. If the British left, they say, American troops would have to be sent south to fill the void.

It was impossible to contemplate the end of the British mission in Iraq while Tony Blair was PM. Nor is his successor likely to make any dramatic announcement of a withdrawal soon. The most likely outcome, possibly before the end of the year, is a quiet handover to the local administration and the Iraqi army.

With the Afghan mission demanding all the personnel available, most British troops would leave as soon as possible. Perhaps 1,500 would remain to carry out training duties away from Basra. The timing may be subject to uncertainty, but this weekend, for the first time since 2003, it seems possible to pose the uncomfortable question: who will be the last British soldier to die in Iraq?

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Citation: Raymond Whitaker. "Brown's Wars Part 2: Meltdown on the frontline in Basra," The Independent, 01 July 2007.
Original URL: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2725713.ece
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