A Conversation with Air Force Secretary James G. Roche
Washington, D.C.: National Guard Association of the United States, August 2001.
Air Force Secretary James G. Roche was not on board a month when he found himself in the middle of a controversy.
The Air Force initiative to eliminate the Air National Guard B-lB bomber fleet stunned the affected units and angered some in Congress. It also raised concerns about the new administration's commitment to citizen-airmen in the aerospace force of the future.
Roche sat down with NATIoNAL GuARD magazine last month to discuss the B-lB decision and his vision for the Air Guard. His words and tone reflect a man undaunted by the controversy and determined to apply the analytical approach he learned in business to managing Air Force operations.
The retired Navy officer who spent the last 17 years as an executive with Northrop Grumman admits he has much to learn about the Guard. But he is asking a lot of questions. The answers may determine the Air Guard's future roles and missions.
(Below are highlights from the conversation. The entire interview is available on the NGAUS Web site at www.ngaus.org.)
Q: You come to this job after many years as an executive with a successful corporation. Are there any business principles that you would like to apply to the operation of the Total Air Force in general and the Air National Guard in particular?
A: We have a Total Force so let me answer the question from back to front for context. We have something like two-thirds of our lift and tankers in the Air National Guard. About a third of our attack aircraft are in the Air National Guard. In fact, the Air National Guard has a flying-hour budget that is two-anda-half times the size of the Reserves'. So it's very clear that the active force and the Air National Guard have to be intertwined very closely. Now, a lot of that is because the denominator has gotten smaller over the years. The active force has gotten smaller and the Guard has stayed about the same size, therefore the proportions [in the Guard] are greater.
What that means is that it's such a deep relationship that the basic things you ask in business are appropriate. Good business people will stop every couple of years and ask themselves, Would I buy my business? Is it a business I want to be in? Does it have a good future? Two, if I bought this business, would I run it the same way? Would I organize it the same way? When I come here, clearly I would buy the business. But the issue is, do we have the right combinations of things for the era we're going towards?
We talk about three major systems that we have to deal with. One is our human system, which has to do with resources in the active force and the reserve force, what's contracted out, what's not contracted out. We also have [equipment] and doctrine. We need to make each of these systems interface correctly. The first one makes use of the assets of the second to contribute to the third. So asking questions across the board is what I'm doing, which is what any good businessperson would do.
The second point that comes from business, especially in the last decade or two, is the dramatic realization of how much more expensive it is to recruit someone than it is to retain someone. Once you've invested in someone, being able to tap that investment is unbelievably valuable. One of the neat things about the Guard is we capture experienced people.
The third thing that I think that comes from business is a process of continuous improvement. You can't get lazy or think the future should be like the past only more so. You should be looking to improve yourself all the time. In our business where you only get tested when people go in harm's way, it's especially important that you think things through before. Are you the way you ought to be? Are you doing things right? Are you attuned to a future situation as compared to be being able to replicate a past situation?
Q: The Air National Guard has participated in every U.S. conflict since the otganization's creation in 1947. What is your knowledge of the Air Guard's historical role within the Air Force?
A: You have to understand that I am a former Naval person so you have to take into context the denominator What's my knowledge of the Air Force as compared to what's my knowledge of the Air National Guard? My knowledge of the Air Force frankly comes mainly from technology and from systems as compared to Air Force organization and operations.
For the last 17 years, I've spent most of my time devoted to systems that contribute to the Air Force. So, for instance, in the case of a [precision-guided missile] system called Lightning II, the Air National Guard has been very enlightened to be able to take a system that they thought could make a great contribution, They, in fact, purchased it and tested it out to see how effective it-might be for the rest of the force. So, I've seen the advantages of that. I've not spent a lot of time with the history of the Guard other than to realize the point you've just made-that they've been present in every conflict.
You can ask questions directly and sometimes people will give you limited answers. Or you can postulate something and people will come back and correct you which is another way of getting answers. For instance, I will say, "If I were a governor, I would only want the Guard to have things that could be useful in emergencies in my state-lift or tankers, which have room for lift. That would be important to me." Then I wait for something to come back and I'll have a general come baek and say, "That misses the point. When I was the 'CO' in Operation Northern Watch, 46 percent of the attacks were made by Guard attack aircraft that were deployed." I say, OK, and now I've started to build a database. I'm frankly learning a lot about the Air Force and I'm also learning about the different components of the Air Force.
Q: What roles do you foresee the Air National Guard performing in the national military strategy currently being devised?
A: This is at the heart of the question. It's not just the Air Guard; it's the whole Air Force. What's our role? We believe we're in the business of global reconnaissance and strike. The reconnaissance complexes and the strike complexes are more than just the platform where a guy pulls a lanyard and a weapon drops. It's a much richer thing. So I'm asking questions along the lines of why is the Guard not involved in Joint [Surveillance Target Attack Radar System]? Why is the Guard not involved in [Airborne Warning and Control System] more? Why aren't we looking at this across the board? What's the strategy for the active force and the Guard force over the long run?
We're in the business of global reconnaissance and strike. We have assets that we bring to the table-active force, Reserve and Guard. And for each of those components, what is the appropriate division of labor? What makes sense? In fact, I've asked and I'm going to continue to ask the folks in the Air Guard to help answer those questions. Can we have associate squadrons of aircraft, some owned by the Guard, where the active people are the associates? Can some be owned by the active force where Guard folks are the associates? The things that are information-based on the reconnaissance part and the strike complex part are so stressing that we need people with experience, with good judgment, with brains and somehow we're excluding the Guard from that. I don't understand that. And meanwhile, we also have a bunch of aging aircraft. And if these aircraft are not going to be suitable to go into harm's way, they should be retired. We should be able to change and rearrange. But I'm looking for an overall strategy.
Q: The president addressed the NGAUS General Conference last September. While he did not promise the National Guard any specific roles and missions, he did pledge that "the views of the Guard must be fully represented as we prepare the military of tomorrow." How is the Air Guard participating in the shaping of its future?
A: The interesting thing about folks who are in the Guard is that I don't know who is and who isn't. I see Air Force officers. No one says to me, "Psst, he's a member of the Guard." [Air National Guard Director Major] General Paul Weaver is a member of the Guard. He's the head of the Guard. But I have no idea if the officers who walk in are Reservists or Guard or active duty. There's no way I can tell, nor would I want to. So, hopefully, Paul and his folks are being kept abreast. I've had conversations with him. He understands I'm asking all these questions so that when we finish with the Quadrennial Defense Review and the large strategy we will know what steps we have to take.
We get multiplier effect from the Air Guard in terms of the experience, judgment and in continuity of people on the airplane. We don't have crew turnover as much as we have elsewhere. Where can they help us? We have folks who are very willing to give up their weekends. We have reservists that do the same thing. I came upon a C-17 in Paris manned by a reserve crew at that time. One of the officers, I think it was the pilot, gave up his anniversary with his wife to do that for us. So we have dedicated people who are clearly very experienced and they need to be part of this. Now, to the degree to which the Guard participates in the QDR, I think that's through the Air Force.
Q: Many in the Air National Guard community believe that cutting the B-1 was the first step in removing the Air Guard from the strike arena. What role will the Air National Guard play in the Air Force's strike capability?
A: I define strike as a strike complex. So therefore F-15s, F-16s are a part of strike but so are joint Stars. So are air operations centers. In other words, I believe the Guard has more to offer than just flying the plane. I think they can also be part of the battle management field.
We also want to be able to rotate between Guard and active-duty people on these planes that are in very high demand. We should look at everything, see what makes sense and do it together.
Q: The B-1 decision generated a great deal controversy in Congress as well as within the Guard community. What are your lessons learned from this experience?
A: Yes. (Laughing) Yes. Get more people confirmed earlier so these things don't pop out before you want them to. What we had wanted was a decision from the president and then we would have gone to everybody and told them this was coming so that it did not appear that is was a blind shot. Paul Weaver found out 12 hours before I did. I'll take full responsibility for that; I'm the head of the Air Force. We should've notified people about a week or two ahead of time.
In terms of the inherent issue, I'm glad the issue is joined. I'm glad it has raised this whole relationship of the Guard, the Reserve and the active force for the long run. Why not deal with it? Why not use this as the precipitating event? Use this to start talking about the long-range plan? We are deficient at longrange plans. We need good long-range plans for our people, for our systems, for where we base things and where we repair things. We'll do it together.
Q: There are currently no plans to field the F-22 or the Joint Strike Fighter to the Air National Guard. Do you envision the Air National Guard flying fighters and bomber aircraft in the aerospace force of the future?
A: In terms of bomber aircraft, I don't know. I really don't know because there are so few bombers and because one of the things we are worried about is how do you position the aircraft when hostilities haven't yet started but could start and you want to deploy. We tend to hold bombers back in the United States and so that we can quickly forward deploy them. Whether the Guard should be part of that or not, I don't know. They're not a part of the B-52 world right now and they're not part of the B-2 world right now. In 20 years should that be the case, I don't know. I really don't know.
In terms of the B-Is, it turns out [the Guard] had the smaller units. In terms of the strike complex, they should be part of it. In terms of what I'll call medium-range strike and air superiority, there's absolutely no reason the Guard should not be a part of thatF-15s, etc. But in the long run, clearly, I would want the Guard to be a part of Joint Strike Fighter and F-22.
Q: Does that also include flying them?
A: Is Why not? In the long run. We're talking about timing. Remember if the Guard is one-third of the force, a strategy for them has to take everything. We can't say they're half Air Force people [because they serve part-time]. They're full Air Force people. They have a great comparative advantage in experience and the fact that half have been vetted twice. The disadvantage is that a lot of folks have other jobs.
Therefore, deployments have to be planned more ahead of time. People have to rotate more and equipment stays someplace where the active force doesn't have that problem. They have advantages and they have disadvantages, but you can exploit the advantages and minimize the disadvantages. I'm open broadly to a strategy for the long run.
Copyright National Guard Association of the United States Aug 2001
Citation: 'We should be able to change and rearrange.' A Conversation with Air Force Secretary James G. Roche, Washington, D.C.: National Guard Association of the United States, August 2001.
Original URL: http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3731/is_200108/ai_n8973584