In a bid to ensure hybrid, complex threats like those tied to Afghanistan inform the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Pentagon has injected a second set of defense planning scenarios into the mix -- but with the fast-tracked QDR slated to climax this summer, some officials see little time to refine the new “red team” scenarios.
At a House Armed Services Committee hearing yesterday, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he created the red team to review not only the defense planning scenarios but also the QDR as a whole.
“I not only think that having a red team for the QDR is a good idea, I’ve already moved in that direction,” said Gates. “And the person who will lead the red team is the same person who led the red team for the last QDR and that’s Dr. Andy Marshall.”
Marshall, the head of the Pentagon’s net assessment office, will be assisted by Gen. James Mattis, head of U.S. Joint Forces Command, who Gates described as one of the military’s most “creative and thoughtful” minds. The team will also include outside experts, Gates said.
“I’ve actually got them red teaming both the scenarios and the QDR itself so that we’re not prisoners of bureaucratic group-think of people who have done this work forever,” said Gates.
Mattis called for the outside review of the classified, country-specific defense planning scenarios (DPS) in a March 11 memo to Gates that proposed “anchor points” for institutionalizing irregular warfare. Gates has cited “complex hybrid warfare” in the context of rebalancing the Pentagon’s budget to address the full spectrum of threats. At the Army War College last month, he noted this will be the first QDR to fully incorporate many lessons learned on the battlefield these last few years “about what mix of hybrid tactics future adversaries, both state and non-state actors, are likely to pursue.” But how QDR officials will grapple with hybrid warfare while planning for future missions is still being determined; the scenarios will be key.
The external “red team” review would ensure the “refinement” of defense planning scenarios if they are “too simplistic, or lacking in IW or hybrid aspects, or otherwise insufficient,” according to Mattis’ memo, a copy of which was reviewed by Inside the Pentagon. He suggested the outside team report directly to Gates or Pentagon policy chief Michèle Flournoy. The red team, he wrote, should be “directed to consider adding the Afghan Campaign as a stand-alone DPS -- it appears we will fight it for years, why not discipline the Department to include it in our DPS?”
The Joint Staff defines a DPS as a depiction of a threat to international security, a corresponding mission for U.S. military forces and a strategic-level concept of operation for carrying out that mission. Typically, a single set of scenarios approved by the defense secretary serves as a standard by which senior defense officials can measure the sufficiency of the defense program. That set of scenarios is supposed to ensure consistency for DOD studies, war games and experiments. But the dawn of the red team effort has left some Pentagon officials wondering which scenarios will inform the QDR.
It could be the QDR would draw on both sets of scenarios, which might “tell you different things,” one service official speculated. Without question the first set will be more detailed, but the second set could provide some insights, the official added. A defense official noted the alternative scenarios might not be given as much weight as the other set of more detailed scenarios, which could be a source of tension down the road.
The service official added there is some general concern in the Pentagon about the red team scenarios, not the least of which is practicality. How much work can be done on the new scenarios in the next month and a half or so, before the QDR starts producing recommendations in August, is unclear, the official said. Given the “tremendous” investment of time and manpower required to develop scenarios and the finite amount of time available, the official said, one concern is mistakes could be made, while another is that some might ask, “Why not my idea?” Still, there is not active angst over the red team effort, the official added.
Mattis was the instigator for the red team effort, the defense official said, and the Joint Staff jumped on board because the QDR team did not want to use the joint capability areas contained in the 2008 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review. The Army then jumped on board because there was a concern that the current scenarios did not include a major combat operation option, the official said, noting Iraq and Afghanistan are part of the assessment, but the Army wanted another scenario for a large-scale ground invasion of another country.
Two things are going on, the official said: A desire to use the joint operational concepts and conceptual work developed through JFCOM and a desire to use alternative scenarios to justify sizing for a major combat operation.
Army spokesman Lt. Col. Martin Downie declined to comment on whether the Army had voiced concerns to the Office of the Secretary of Defense about the original DPS set being light on ground scenarios.
InsideDefense.com reported earlier this year that the QDR would mull missions like U.S.-led stability and reconstruction operations, steady-state demands, major conflicts against state adversaries and defense of the homeland and civil support. U.S.-led stability and reconstruction operations mulled would include Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as North Korea in the event of regime collapse and Pakistan in the event the Pakistani government lost control of its nuclear weapons. Potential major conflicts eyed would involve China (a crisis over Taiwan), Russia (coercion of Baltic states) and Iran (with nuclear weapons).
But these are potential missions, not the classified scenarios, another service official said. The Army prefers a North Korea-, Iran-, Nigeria- or Pakistan-type scenario that could be non-warlike but would require boots on the ground, the official added.
In his memo to Gates, Mattis outlined several other steps to institutionalize irregular warfare in DOD, including establishing a national center for small unit excellence to ensure IW superiority; directing the Defense Intelligence Agency to produce an annual, unclassified update on the IW/hybrid threat; offering to run an IW/hyrbid war game for the State Department and other agencies, using the professional military education program as a strategic asset; directing officials to fix shortfalls with high-demand, low-density forces identified by JFCOM; and directing a fully resourced effort to immediately develop first-class simulators for IW training. -- Christopher J. Castelli