The hardest question that President Obama faces is political sustainability here, not military strategy there.
Saturday, Oct. 31, 2009
by Jonathan Rauch, NAtional Journal
In 1833, President Jackson, no slouch when it came to firm leadership, advised, "Always take all the time to reflect that circumstances permit, but when the time for action has come, stop thinking." Conservatives who deplore what they see as President Obama's indecision about Afghanistan overlook the first clause. Obama is right to think, and think hard, before acting.
While pondering advice from his military and diplomatic teams, he could do worse than consult two recent books from way off the military and foreign-policy grids. Neither is about Afghanistan; in fact, neither more than briefly mentions it. What the books have in common are intriguing insights into the problems of state building. By implication, both suggest that the path to a stable Afghanistan -- to a benign central government that can defend itself and control its territory -- is longer than most Americans realize.
"We're certainly talking years, and probably decades," Douglass North says. "It's a daunting process, and it's troubling, because I don't think most people appreciate that you'd be getting into something very costly. You've got to be willing to devote an enormous amount of time and resources."
North, a Nobel Prize-winning economist at Washington University in St. Louis, is one of three authors of Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, an immodestly titled and immoderately stimulating book published earlier this year by Cambridge University Press. His co-authors are John Joseph Wallis, an economic historian at the University of Maryland, and Barry Weingast, a political scientist and development expert at the Hoover Institution.
"All societies face the problem of violence," they begin. In particular, all societies must find a way to cope with the fighting that arises as factions compete for resources or supremacy: what Thomas Hobbes once called the war of all against all. Social orders emerge in order to contain and control this violence.
Two recent books suggest that the path to a stable Afghanistan is longer than most Americans realize.
"All of human history has had but three social orders," the authors write. The first, which characterized most of prehistory, was the foraging order. In hunter-gatherer societies, small social groups managed violence by means of kinship and face-to-face contact. In time, between 10 and five millennia ago, what the authors call the limited-access order emerged. This is a much larger social order -- it could be as large as the Roman Empire -- that is governed by a dominant elite or coalition that stays on top by controlling and distributing patronage and privilege. How you fare, in a limited-access order, depends on who you are and whom you know.
So predominant is the limited-access order in human affairs that the authors refer to it as the "natural state." Only in the last few hundred years has an alternative emerged: the open-access order. It allows political participation and economic access on equal terms according to impersonal rules. Broad, government-enforced rights replace selective, government-distributed privileges.
Open-access orders are more politically stable and economically successful than their precursors; in fact, today they dominate the world. But developing a culture based on rule of law under which dominant elites willingly surrender their monopoly on power can take centuries, if it ever happens at all. Only a mature natural state -- one with durable institutions, a military under firm political control, and elites who are acclimated to the rule of law -- can make the transition to an open order.
Alas, Afghanistan is not even close to maturity. It is an example of a fragile natural state, one that "can barely sustain itself in the face of internal and external violence." In such a state (Haiti, Iraq, and Somalia are other examples) political or economic shocks lead easily to mayhem, coalitions shift rapidly, and "all politics is real politics: People risk death when they make political mistakes."
Violence and Social Orders is much more textured than I can convey here. Suffice it to say that if North and his co-authors are right, the United States should not even hope to build a modern liberal state in Afghanistan. The only plausible mission, rather, is to push the fragile social order toward maturity, a process that must begin by creating security. "That, in Afghanistan, is an immense problem," North says.
A book by James C. Scott arrives in much the same place, but by way of a very different path. Scott is a political scientist and anthropologist at Yale University who has spent his career studying peasants and pastoralists. In September, Yale brought out his fascinating work The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia. Scott's subjects are what he calls "barbarians by design," hill peoples of Southeast Asia who have managed to stay largely ungoverned by modern states.
If Douglass North and his co-authors are right, the United States should not even hope to build a modern liberal state in Afghanistan.
Today, Scott writes, "virtually the entire globe is 'administered space,' and the periphery is not much more than a folkloric remnant." For most of history, however, states were islands in an ocean of statelessness. Typically, state control established itself in lowland country where agricultural plots were fixed -- thus taxable -- and subjects were accessible and settled. Only recently, with the development of such "distance-demolishing technologies" as paved roads and high-speed communications, has state control become ubiquitous.
Even so, some regions have remained resistant. By hovering on the edges of civilization, mountain peoples can enjoy many of the products of modern economies without paying the price in taxes and cultural assimilation.
We in the West like to think of such peoples as precivilized, waiting for Americans to come along with the gift of good government. Wrong, Scott writes. "Hill peoples are not pre-anything." Rather, they are deliberate holdouts whose social structures "are constituted as if they were intended to be a state-maker's or colonial official's worst nightmare. And indeed, they are largely so." Rugged mountain redoubts discourage intruders; mobile populations and portable crops evade tax collectors; fluid, nonhierarchical political structures frustrate diplo-mats; guerrilla tactics enervate invading armies.
Though Scott's book focuses on Southeast Asia, the mountain territories around the Afghanistan-Pakistan border answer well to his description. No wonder that governments in Kabul and Islamabad have barely tried to govern those areas directly -- until they became havens for the latest holdouts against civilization, Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
Can stateless hill peoples be pacified and brought under central control? "It's do-able," Scott says, "but it takes a lot of money, a lot of technology, a lot of troops, a lot of roads." For the Thai central government to extend its writ to mountain redoubts took two or three decades, even with modern technology's prodigious road-building and jungle-clearing prowess.
And Afghanistan? Every attempt at centralization in 100 years has failed, says Thomas Barfield, a Boston University anthropologist who has studied the nomadic cultures of Afghanistan since the early 1970s, and whose book Afghanistan: Power and Politics will be published in June. "We [Americans] come in with the model of one country, one government, one law," he says. "Historically, areas like Afghanistan have not been governed that way."
What has worked and could again work, he says, is to consolidate and improve governance in the 10 percent or so of Afghanistan's land area (cities, irrigated lowlands, and the like) where most of the people live; then make deals with local power brokers in the mountain regions. Over time, the attractions of the cash economy and stable governance will bring the peripheral areas into the state's ambit, but "the process often takes generations. The first generation says, 'We're proud and free.' The second generation says, 'We're poor and there's nothing to do.' "
Success in Afghanistan, Barfield says, thus requires patience and, especially, commitment. "In Afghanistan, the perception that you're either a winner or a loser turns into reality."
Five scholars, two disciplines (economics and anthropology), one conclusion: Richard Holbrooke was right when he wrote in 2008, before taking on the job of special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan in the Obama administration: "The conflict in Afghanistan will be far more costly and much, much longer than Americans realize."
For Americans, the hard part is not surging, it's staying. The hardest question that Obama faces as he decides whether to double down in Afghanistan concerns political sustainability over here, not military strategy over there.
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31 October 2009
28 October 2009
DOD To Field New Airborne Sensor for Tracking Afghan Insurgents
Inside Defense
Oct. 27, 2009 -- Defense Department officials will soon deploy a new type of sensor to Afghanistan that is capable of tracking insurgent foot traffic over a wide swath of land, a military official said today.
The moves comes as the number of coalition troops killed and wounded by improvised explosive devices is on the rise. Data provided by the Joint IED Defeat Organization shows a sharp spike in IED attacks this summer. In September, 37 coalition personnel were killed and 285 wounded by makeshift bombs, according to a JIEDDO briefing. The numbers were 21 and 66 respectively in September 2008. The year before, nine personnel died and 37 were wounded during that month, the briefing states.
News services reported that eight U.S. troops were killed earlier today from IED attacks.
JIEDDO Director Army Lt. Gen. Thomas Metz said insurgents in Afghanistan use cruder bombs than those found in Iraq. And they move through the mountainous terrain on foot to plant them, he added.
“The enemy rode to work in Iraq; the enemy walks to work in Afghanistan,” Metz said at a briefing with reporters today.
His organization's new sensor is capable of spotting “dismounts” -- individuals traveling on foot -- over a large area of land and instruct or cue other sensors to take a closer look. Metz said he plans to have the technology fielded by the winter or early spring.
Northrop Grumman makes the Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VADER) sensor. On its Web site, the company says the technology provides Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) data and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery to ground commanders.
SAR technology is used to significantly widen the aperture of sensors, enlarging their field of view.
Officials have yet to decide on which platform the VADER sensor would be mounted. “That is still in debate,” Metz said. “We may very well deploy it on a fixed-wing” aircraft, he added. -- Sebastian Sprenger
10272009_oct27d
Oct. 27, 2009 -- Defense Department officials will soon deploy a new type of sensor to Afghanistan that is capable of tracking insurgent foot traffic over a wide swath of land, a military official said today.
The moves comes as the number of coalition troops killed and wounded by improvised explosive devices is on the rise. Data provided by the Joint IED Defeat Organization shows a sharp spike in IED attacks this summer. In September, 37 coalition personnel were killed and 285 wounded by makeshift bombs, according to a JIEDDO briefing. The numbers were 21 and 66 respectively in September 2008. The year before, nine personnel died and 37 were wounded during that month, the briefing states.
News services reported that eight U.S. troops were killed earlier today from IED attacks.
JIEDDO Director Army Lt. Gen. Thomas Metz said insurgents in Afghanistan use cruder bombs than those found in Iraq. And they move through the mountainous terrain on foot to plant them, he added.
“The enemy rode to work in Iraq; the enemy walks to work in Afghanistan,” Metz said at a briefing with reporters today.
His organization's new sensor is capable of spotting “dismounts” -- individuals traveling on foot -- over a large area of land and instruct or cue other sensors to take a closer look. Metz said he plans to have the technology fielded by the winter or early spring.
Northrop Grumman makes the Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VADER) sensor. On its Web site, the company says the technology provides Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) data and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery to ground commanders.
SAR technology is used to significantly widen the aperture of sensors, enlarging their field of view.
Officials have yet to decide on which platform the VADER sensor would be mounted. “That is still in debate,” Metz said. “We may very well deploy it on a fixed-wing” aircraft, he added. -- Sebastian Sprenger
10272009_oct27d
ARMY MODERNIZATION IN-PROCESS REVIEW RESULTS IN NO FORMAL DECISIONS
Inside the Army
The Defense Acquisition Board’s in-process review of the Army’s brigade combat team modernization effort, held Oct. 16, did not produce clear decisions but was a “constructive conversation,” according to a service spokesman.
The two-hour meeting brought together senior Army officials, including Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Chiarelli, with the members of the Defense Acquisition Board, including Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter, an Army official told Inside the Army last week.
The source said items discussed at the meeting included the Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team equipment originally developed under the Future Combat Systems program; follow-on capabilities packages; the ground combat vehicle strategy, including an overview of its proposed time line; network integration; and the transition to a program executive office.
“It was a good conversation, it was a constructive conversation,” Paul Mehney, spokesman for program executive office integration, told ITA. “And the Army is currently awaiting an acquisition memorandum that will help guide and outline the strategy for BCT modernization.”
Rickey Smith, director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center-Forward, said during an Oct. 19 teleconference with reporters that he attended last week’s review. Though he declined to speak extensively about the meeting -- instead deferring to the Army’s acquisition office -- Smith said the direction out of the meeting on operational requirements was “continue to march in the approach we’re taking.”
Mehney stressed during the teleconference that the meeting was simply an in-process review, meaning “no formal, hard decisions” were made.
Pentagon spokeswoman Cheryl Irwin told ITA the “review took place, but there was no documentation planned at this time.
“It was basically just a briefing of how the Army would like to proceed,” she said in an Oct. 20 e-mail.
The review, originally scheduled for Oct. 7, was postponed after issues arose between the service and the Office of the Secretary of Defense about the five- to seven-year time line for the ground combat vehicle effort and the future role of the Future Combat Systems prime contractor team.
Though select Army and OSD officials met that day, sources said the discussion was not considered a DAB review.
Meanwhile, the service earlier this month completed a critical design review of its E-IBCT capabilities, a required step before a December production decision.
The first set of E-IBCT equipment, recently renamed Increment 1, includes the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System, Tactical and Urban Unattended Ground Sensors, the Class 1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle and the Network Integration Kit.
The review, conducted Oct. 14 and 15 in St. Louis, MO, included representatives from the Army, the Pentagon, the Government Accountability Office and prime contractors Boeing and Science Applications International Corp.
The review incorporated feedback from the Army Evaluation Task Force and the Future Force Integration Directorate and finalized the production design specifications as the E-IBCT effort moves toward a low-rate initial production decision later this year, Mehney said in an Oct. 16 e-mail.
“Completing the Critical Design Review is an important step toward the milestone C decision in December so we can enter low-rate initial production early in 2010,” said Derek McLuckey, Boeing Increment 1 program manager, in a company statement.
According to the Boeing statement, the CDR reviewed more than 120 criteria “to ensure that system designs are mature, meet soldier requirements and are ready for low-rate initial production.” -- Marjorie Censer and Kate Brannen
ARMY-21-42-1
The Defense Acquisition Board’s in-process review of the Army’s brigade combat team modernization effort, held Oct. 16, did not produce clear decisions but was a “constructive conversation,” according to a service spokesman.
The two-hour meeting brought together senior Army officials, including Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Chiarelli, with the members of the Defense Acquisition Board, including Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter, an Army official told Inside the Army last week.
The source said items discussed at the meeting included the Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team equipment originally developed under the Future Combat Systems program; follow-on capabilities packages; the ground combat vehicle strategy, including an overview of its proposed time line; network integration; and the transition to a program executive office.
“It was a good conversation, it was a constructive conversation,” Paul Mehney, spokesman for program executive office integration, told ITA. “And the Army is currently awaiting an acquisition memorandum that will help guide and outline the strategy for BCT modernization.”
Rickey Smith, director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center-Forward, said during an Oct. 19 teleconference with reporters that he attended last week’s review. Though he declined to speak extensively about the meeting -- instead deferring to the Army’s acquisition office -- Smith said the direction out of the meeting on operational requirements was “continue to march in the approach we’re taking.”
Mehney stressed during the teleconference that the meeting was simply an in-process review, meaning “no formal, hard decisions” were made.
Pentagon spokeswoman Cheryl Irwin told ITA the “review took place, but there was no documentation planned at this time.
“It was basically just a briefing of how the Army would like to proceed,” she said in an Oct. 20 e-mail.
The review, originally scheduled for Oct. 7, was postponed after issues arose between the service and the Office of the Secretary of Defense about the five- to seven-year time line for the ground combat vehicle effort and the future role of the Future Combat Systems prime contractor team.
Though select Army and OSD officials met that day, sources said the discussion was not considered a DAB review.
Meanwhile, the service earlier this month completed a critical design review of its E-IBCT capabilities, a required step before a December production decision.
The first set of E-IBCT equipment, recently renamed Increment 1, includes the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System, Tactical and Urban Unattended Ground Sensors, the Class 1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle and the Network Integration Kit.
The review, conducted Oct. 14 and 15 in St. Louis, MO, included representatives from the Army, the Pentagon, the Government Accountability Office and prime contractors Boeing and Science Applications International Corp.
The review incorporated feedback from the Army Evaluation Task Force and the Future Force Integration Directorate and finalized the production design specifications as the E-IBCT effort moves toward a low-rate initial production decision later this year, Mehney said in an Oct. 16 e-mail.
“Completing the Critical Design Review is an important step toward the milestone C decision in December so we can enter low-rate initial production early in 2010,” said Derek McLuckey, Boeing Increment 1 program manager, in a company statement.
According to the Boeing statement, the CDR reviewed more than 120 criteria “to ensure that system designs are mature, meet soldier requirements and are ready for low-rate initial production.” -- Marjorie Censer and Kate Brannen
ARMY-21-42-1
Helicopters in America’s post-9/11 wars
Carl Conetta, September 2008
Chapter 6 from Lutz Unterseher, et. al., Military Intervention and Common Sense: Focus on Land Forces (Berlin: Ryckschau, June 2009)
1 New missions, old dilemma
Recent military experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has prompted a significant change in American ideas about the combat use of helicopters, implying a greater emphasis in the future on small-unit combat support roles. These have significantly supplanted ideas of deep attack and large-scale helicopter assaults. These changes have not really surmounted the dilemmas associated with rotary-wing aircraft, however. Indeed, recent experience starkly illustrates these dilemmas. And nothing is more telling than the high attrition rate for helicopters in operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.
Since 2001, the US military has kept an average of approximately 550 helicopters of all types in the “Central Command” area, which encompasses both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. (As of August 2008, there are more than 600 involved in these conflicts.) All told, in seven years, the United States has lost about 25 percent of the average number of deployed helicopters, that is: 136 helicopters lost – at least one-third of these to enemy action. {1} Moreover, the Army estimates that 3 percent of its entire fleet of 3,150 helicopters will be “washed out” due to recent military operations and require replacement. This, despite spending an average of $500 million per year to “reset” those craft returning from service in Afghanistan and Iraq.
To restate the dilemma that frames our analysis:
• Helicopters are prized for their unique combination of mobility, flexibility, and agility as well as their putative capacity to work closely with ground forces and provide them with persisting support. But these promises and capabilities are offset by issues of cost and vulnerability.
• Once deployed, helicopters prove acutely sensitive to environmental conditions, are relatively fragile, and can be engaged throughout their performance envelope by multiple, relatively-inexpensive weapon systems. These vulnerabilities can be mitigated, partially – but only in ways that substantially increase costs while narrowing the scope of the crafts’ usability.
More than ever before, fielding military helicopters is a high-cost proposition. In 2008, the value of an Apache AH-64D ranged between $34 million and $48 million, depending on the level of upgrades. To keep them flying requires a complement of 30 support personnel each. And, due to maintenance scheduling, it takes a fleet of 30 Apaches to keep eight available in the field.
Any nation hoping to frequently deploy and use combat helicopters in operationally significant numbers must have very deep pockets and a certain insensitivity to cost and cost-effectiveness – as though it has money to burn. Even then, higher command and political authorities may, at the last moment, prove unwilling to risk these costly assets in the types of missions for which they were supposedly procured. Thus, the crash of two US Army helicopters at the outset of the 1999 Kosovo war contributed to keeping Apaches out of that conflict entirely (although 24 had deployed to fight).
Nations with fewer helicopters to spare than does the United States will be even more cautious about putting them in harm’s way. Thus, peace operations in Chad and Darfur have had a difficult time attracting sufficient numbers of even transport types. The problem is not that the world has too few military helicopters on hand, however. All told, UN operations employ about 150 helicopters worldwide – out of total member military holdings that exceed 12,000.
2 Pivotal experiences in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars
The most important factor influencing post-9/11 US helicopter operations was the general shift in US security concerns from conventional warfare to counter-insurgency efforts. Counter-insurgency scenarios typically involve too few forces attempting to secure too much space. In this context, helicopters promise a capacity to rapidly concentrate troops and firepower across large expanses of territory despite poor ground transportation nets. This is something of a return to origins for military helicopters, calling to mind their early use in the Vietnam and Algerian conflicts.
Also important in shaping recent US practice were a host of negative experiences in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The net result of these has been to undermine command enthusiasm for large-scale “deep operations” by armed helicopters and to raise a caution flag on “air assault” operations as well. (The latter involve using helicopters to insert infantry units deep in enemy territory with attack helicopters providing support).
2.1 Operation Anaconda and the challenge of air assault
Depositing lightly armed troops deep in enemy territory is a high risk gambit. Success depends on luck, good intelligence, and close coordination among different arms. The vulnerability of the troops leaves little room for mishaps, while the vulnerability of the helicopters and their sensitivity to environmental conditions raises the likelihood that mishaps will occur. Operating in mountains or other challenging environments adds to the risks and uncertainties. Operation Anaconda illustrates how easily things can come apart.
In March 2002, three months after the fall of the Taliban regime, US forces led an effort to kill or capture Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters still holed up in the Shahi-Kot Valley. The plan was to have pro-government militia (stiffened by US air power and special operations units) engage the anti-government forces, while other US forces stemmed their retreat – a hammer and anvil operation. Helicopters were to deliver US troops – the “anvil” -- into blocking or observation positions and provide them with fire support. However, upon being inserted, the first wave of about 200 US personnel unexpectedly found their landing areas to be swarming with Taliban fighters. Due to environmental conditions, difficult terrain, and the density of enemy fire, Apache gunships were unable to provide sufficient fire support.
All of the seven Apaches involved sustained significant damage – and five were compelled to return to base (although three of these returned to the fight within 24 hours). Deployment of a second wave of US “anvil” troops was postponed and half of the first wave was evacuated that night. Given heavy support by fixed-wing aircraft, deployment re-commenced the next day. Under a revised plan, fixed-wing bombardment continued for nearly a week before US and pro-government forces secured the valley. Central Command claimed that between 500 and 770 anti-government forces had been killed, although only dozens of bodies were found.
In a related incident, an attempt to land a US SEAL reconnaissance team near a peak (Takur Ghar) overlooking the Shahi-Kot valley also ran into unexpected heavy fire. One of the two Chinook transport helicopters carrying the team was hit by an RPG and both were forced to fly off – but not before a team member fell out and into the hands of the Taliban. The damaged Chinook made a controlled crash-landing seven kilometers away and its crew was rescued. A subsequent attempt to land a rescue team for the SEAL who had fallen from the chopper near Takur Ghar also came under heavy fire, but successfully inserted the team before flying off, damaged. Finally, an effort to reinforce this team similarly met heavy fire. Another Chinook was hit by an RPG and crashed, killing four on board.
The challenge of helicopter operations under fire in difficult mountain terrain was illustrated again more than three years later (28 June 2005) when a MH-47 Chinook sent to rescue another trapped SEAL team was hit by an RPG. Badly damaged, it was nonetheless able to land on a high ledge. Unfortunately, the ledge gave way and the helicopter toppled down the mountainside. All 16 service people on board were killed. Due to high altitudes, the Apaches that had been escorting the Chinook could not keep pace, so it had to fly into the hot zone without fire support. (Russian heliborne troops faced a similar tragedy in Chechnya on 27 April 2007 when the rotor of their Mi-8 helicopter struck a mountain side while trying to land special operations troops. It tilted over, slid down the mountain side, and burst into flames, killing all 20 on board.)
The troubles encountered in Operation Anaconda also call to mind the October 1993 “Black Hawk Down” incident in Mogadishu, Somalia. There, an air assault raid into a militia-controlled area of the city was stalled when RPGs brought down two MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. A blizzard of small-arms fire and RPGs held support helicopters and relief convoys at bay for 14 hours. Nineteen Americans were killed and 73 wounded.
2.2 Karbala, Iraq – deep attack undone
On 23 March 2003, three days after the onset of the Iraq war, 31 Apache helicopters of the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment (some organic, some attached) set out to deplete the armor and air defenses of the Iraqi Medina Division near Karbala. As was doctrine, they flew low in packs toward their objective. However, en route they became ensnared in “flak traps” – storms of small arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades, and man-portable missiles, originating from roof tops. This ad hoc air defense effort, which was reminiscent of Somali tactics ten years earlier, had probably been triggered by Iraqi pickets equipped with either cell phones or low-power radios. The fire brought down one of the Apaches and damaged all the others sufficiently to compel their return to base. The experience dampened command interest in attempting helicopter deep attack thereafter.
Following the Karbala incident, attack aviation focused mostly on reconnaissance efforts, flank security operations, and the provision of fire support (Close Combat Attacks or CCAs) for advancing ground units – especially in built-up areas. According to one observer, this “signaled the rebirth of aviation in a close fires role and represented a paradigm shift from a decade-long infatuation with deep attacks.” {2}
One partial exception – a denouement, actually – was a 28 March helicopter attack on the 14th Mechanized Brigade of the Medina Division conducted by the aviation units of the 101st Airborne. This was a more deliberate effort than the 23 March attack by the 11th AHR, with the units carefully reconnoitering and clearing zones as they proceeded, and pulling back when they faced heavy ground fire (so that artillery and fixed-wing aircraft might suppress it). As a result, no helicopters were lost to enemy action (although two succumbed to accidents). On the downside, the attack claimed only a handful of Iraqi armored vehicles, artillery, and air defense systems. Caution has its price as well as its benefit.
3 Recent counter-insurgency operations – a helicopter renaissance?
Despite the experience of Operation Anaconda and the failed Karbala mission, helicopters have come to play a central role in recent counter-insurgency efforts. Today, they are key providers of transport, with armed types acting as escorts. Gunships also serve to provide security to ground convoys. And they serve in reconnaissance, surveillance, and “close combat attack” roles, providing ground units with “over the shoulder” firepower. Sometimes they act independently in smaller-scale “counter-insurgent strike” efforts. In urban cordon and search operations, they have acted to block and interdict insurgents attempting escape. During the 2008 operations in Sadr City, at least a half-dozen Apaches were kept in the air at all times, employing hundreds of Hellfire missiles over a few weeks.
The fact that helicopters are serving broadly does not mean they are the optimal choice for all the tasks they have been assigned, however. They are an asset that America held in abundance before the onset of the current wars. Despite America’s unique investment in them, they have not escaped the dilemma associated with their vulnerability. This can be appreciated by analyzing the types of threats they have faced in recent wars and the ways these threats have been managed.
3.1 Environmental challenges and maintenance overload
As noted earlier, helicopters seem to offer a ready-made solution to the force-to-space problems that often plague counter-insurgency efforts. It is just as important to note, however, that insurgencies are most likely to flourish in physical environments that helicopters will find challenging.
As we have seen above, jagged terrain and cityscapes make landings difficult and they offer insurgents occluded firing positions. Telephone and electrical wires in and around cities have claimed at least four helicopters. Thin, cold mountain air saps lift and power, degrading performance and shortening helicopter “on station” time. High ambient temperatures also stresses engines and limits lift. Snow storms in Afghanistan, sandstorms in Iraq, and wind and rain storms in both limit visibility and make controlled maneuver difficult.
Environmental conditions too frequently require that helicopter use be curtailed, which can disrupt joint operations. Such problems effected the conduct of Operation Anaconda, delayed planned helicopter attacks at the start of Iraqi Freedom, and limited helicopter use to daylight hours for 10 crucial days during the first phase of the war.
Sand and dust pose persistent problems. Most of the helicopter accidents in Iraq and Afghanistan are due to “brownout conditions” in which the downwash of rotors kicks up an envelope of blinding dust. To compensate, pilots execute “no hover” landings, touching down while their aircraft are still moving forward – a practice that stresses the rotor gears and airframe. Sand and dust continuously coat, clog, and erode mechanical and electronic gear (notably including infrared missile warning systems). Despite regular maintenance in the field, one helicopter was found to harbor 230 pounds of sand when it rotated home, according to the commander of the Army Aviation Center. {3}
Helicopters fly between 30- and 50-hours per month, on average, in Afghanistan and Iraq, which is considered a high operational tempo. The Army has been able to sustain a 77 percent readiness rate for its deployed helicopters by substantially boosting its field maintenance efforts, routinely rotating helicopters into and out of the theater – only 17 percent of the total inventory is deployed at any one time -- and mounting an ambitious $4 billion helicopter “reset” program at home. Today, maintenance crews make up 85 percent of the Army aviation force. By contrast, British forces, unable to match American resources, have seen their helicopter readiness levels in theater drop to 50 percent.
3.3 The insurgent threat
Modern attack helicopters and the doctrine for their use developed with reference to Soviet armored forces in Europe. There, the expected main threat to helicopters was radar guided missile and anti-aircraft cannon (notably the ZSU-23-4, an armored self-propelled system with four 23-mm guns). Helicopter attack scenarios envisaged fixed-wing aircraft neutralizing these weapons. Helicopters were supposed to approach their objective flying nap-of-the-earth (to lessen their exposure) and then pop-up on arrival to deliver anti-tank missiles at standoff ranges. Presumably, most of their flying would occur over threatened, but not enemy-controlled territory. Clearly, such scenarios have little relevance to America’s post-9/11 wars.
The insurgent threat to helicopters in Iraq and Afghanistan includes small arms fire, anti-aircraft machine guns (notably the 12.7 mm DshK), rocket-propelled grenades (notably the RPG-7), and portable surface-to-air missiles (principally the SA-7, but also the SA-14 and SA-16). While small-arms fire is often spontaneous, the use of RPGs, portable missiles, and heavy machine guns is not. Insurgents often fight in “air defense” teams that combine weapons, spotters, and communications personnel. Favored sites in Iraq are roof tops, court-yards, alleys, and groves. Small open-bed trucks carrying weapons covered with a tarp offer a means to rapidly concentrate weapons – especially heavy machine guns – and then disperse. Favored targets include helicopters flying predictable transit routes or conducting routine reconnaissance. Any coalition effort that concentrates helicopters over a period of days, or any area that regularly attracts helicopter surveillance, also offer insurgents an opportunity to concentrate their air defense efforts.
The contest between insurgent tactics and helicopter counter-moves is evident in the 20 January 2007 downing of a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter in which 12 died. In this case, the second helicopter in a team of two took fire, tried to land, and was hit again by an RPG round. The lead aircraft immediately returned fire and then landed in an effort to assist the downed crew. Soon, another set of Black Hawks joined the fray as did two attack helicopters. These destroyed a truck mounting a heavy machine gun as well as three houses near some trees where a second anti-aircraft gun was hidden. Shortly afterward, a rapid reaction team of seven armored jeeps (HMMWVs or “Humvees”) arrived. One was hit by an improvised explosive device, however, which killed another soldier. After securing the area, they additionally found missile launchers and a mortar tube.
There are technological counter-measures available that are usually effective for dealing with those anti-aircraft missiles currently in insurgent hands -- as long as helicopters fly high enough to allow for reaction time (minimally, above 2,000 meters). However, as noted below, the best counter-measure systems have not always been installed – nor will be. And there are no counter-measures yet available for the small arms, machine gun, and RPG threats.
RPGs are very effective up to 200 meters, but also have scored hits as far out as 700. Small arms are out-ranged beginning at 1000 meters. Heavy machine guns in skilled hands can be quite effective up to 1,500 meters. So, taken together, these weapons can make flying below 2,000 meters quite perilous. Unfortunately, given the nature of these conflicts, there are no or few truly secure zones.
In providing fire support or striking insurgent targets, pilots would prefer to engage from standoff ranges – at least three kilometers using missiles. Cannons require closer shots, however: 1,500 meters or less. Indeed, in order to distinguish individual combatants, helicopters often must fly closer. And, of course, insurgents will choose to engage at close ranges. Thus, most engagements occur at distances of less than 1,000 meters, which puts helicopters within range of an array of weapons.
3.4 Technological Countermeasures
Ideally, helicopters in harms way – which includes all types in Iraq and Afghanistan – would have infrared heat suppressors as well as rugged, advanced missile warning systems, flare dispensers, and active jammers. At the start of the Iraq war, however, only special operations types met this standard. Most conventional scout and attack helicopters had older warning and jamming systems and no flare dispensers. Some lacked infrared suppressors. Transport types were worse off. As the war progressed (and helicopters fell from the sky), warning and jamming systems received upgrades, and these began to spread from attack models to transport types. Yet, as of August 2008, coverage was still not complete. And existing upgrade programs have not kept pace with the threat. Losses to enemy fire in Iraq during 2006 and 2007 – before many Sunni and Shia militia stood down – were greater than those during the preceding two-year period.
Losses not withstanding, there is no likelihood that even the attack helicopter fleet will be upgraded to the standard of special operations craft. Upgrades to the latter cost about $19 million per airframe in 2004, while upgrades to conventional helicopters were in the range of $3 million each. Cancellation of the Comanche program has made possible a more thorough upgrade program for the conventional fleet. But the savings cannot close the gap because they are also supposed to help the Army generally modernize its helicopter fleet.
Equipping the Apache AH-64D with “best protection” would probably drive the per unit to cost into the $45 million to $55 million range. The RAH-66 Comanche faced cancellation in 2004 when its unit cost rose to nearly $59 million. Helping to motivate that decision was the realization that, despite the Comanche’s many advanced features and high cost, it was not well protected against the insurgent threat. Additional upgrades would have had to be made.
3.5 Tactical countermeasures
No foreseeable technology will cure the vulnerability of these fragile machines as they operate over and within complex terrain, ridden with adversaries. Indeed, the principal means of alleviating helicopter attrition in Iraq and Afghanistan have been tactical and operational, not technological. But these have imposed their own limits and costs.
Helicopters have taken to flying in small teams – usually two -- rather then alone or in large groups. Team members keep 500 meters between them, so that one might cover the other and both might divide the labor of identifying and engaging targets. More generally, the importance of working together with other arms has been emphasized. Thus, for instance, fixed-wing aircraft might escort helicopters in especially dangerous areas.
Crashes are most common at night, but day time is when insurgents have their greatest success in downing helicopters. Night-time dangers can be mitigated by flying above terrain obstacles and landing only on landing strips in secure bases, however. Unlike early in the war, by 2007 plenty of these bases existed. So night flying increased. Still, most close combat support operations require daytime flight. And reconnaissance and transport tasks cannot be restricted to night.
When conducting operations, nap-of-the-earth flying is no longer attempted. Shooting “on the run” or while diving has largely replaced stationary fire techniques or “hovering fires” (except sometimes at night). This, of course, complicates the task of acquiring and accurately engaging targets.
Helicopters have also taken to flying faster and higher when transiting “hot spots”. Predictable transit corridors – such as those that might follow surface lines of communication – are avoided. And numerous “no fly zones” have been designated. Complementing these are shifting “danger zones” over which pilots must exercise greater caution.
4 Seeking alternatives
The measures outlined above probably have helped prevent a debilitating rise in the numbers of helicopters claimed by insurgent action. But they succeed by narrowing the utility of helicopters – that is, by revoking the promise of a “go anywhere, do anything” flying machine. (Similarly, the wider adoption of advanced countermeasures systems help drive the cost of helicopters toward prohibitive heights).
These factors, and the inherent vulnerability of helicopters, make a search for alternatives worthwhile. One approach is to avoid using helicopters for tasks that other arms -- artillery or fixed-wing aircraft, for instance – might accomplish just as well and more safely (as the US Marine Corps’ Cobra Survivability Plan concluded early in the war). {4} In many situations, the armed reconnaissance role is better fulfilled by more heavily armored ground forces, with helicopters relegated to standoff surveillance and fire support. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) might substitute for helicopters in performing many surveillance and reconnaissance tasks – and they increasing are. Especially in cities and other complex environments, UAVs are substituting for scout helicopters (such as the OH-58 Kiowa Warrior).
5 A tilt-rotor alternative to helicopters?
One alternative not worthy of consideration is increased reliance on tilt-rotor aircraft, such as the US Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey. The Osprey’s one sure advantage is its capacity to fly 40% to 60% percent faster than helicopters when it operates in “airplane” mode. Thus, it is presumed less vulnerable when in flight. But its cost – $75 million per unit (2009) – is much higher and its transport efficiency is much less than that of comparable helicopters. Helicopters equal in power and empty weight to the V-22 can carry much more payload to any distance. The CH-53E Super Stallion, for instance, costs approximately $40 million, but it can carry twice as much payload to 400 nautical miles. And the difference between helicopters and tilt rotors in terms of transport efficiency increases with altitude, which is relevant to operations in mountainous terrain.
The MV-22 figures centrally in the Marine Corps’ plans for “rapid maneuver from the sea,” thus they are loathe to surrender it. Actually, comparable helicopters could do the job faster whenever several round trips are required. This, due to their “transport efficiency” advantage. But the MV-22 speed advantage holds true if only one or two waves are planned. What happens on arrival is another matter, however.
In “hover mode,” the MV-22 is considerably less stable than helicopters and must descend slowly and carefully, which increases its exposure precisely when insurgents might be closest. Maneuverability in hover mode also is compromised. These limits reflect efforts to address persistent aerodynamic problems (“vortex ring state”), which also make the craft likely to kick-up especially disruptive dust clouds when landing.
In 2007-2008, 12 MV-22s deployed to Iraq, but these were not used in high-threat missions or areas. During 2,500 sorties, pilots reported being fired on twice. Given substantial manufacturer support, the Osprey’s in Iraq where able to achieve a 68 percent average readiness rating – which is still below that achieved by older helicopters in theater. The aircraft also has faced persistent engine problems. These compelled at least one emergency landing in Iraq, while a series of engine fires have plagued the craft back home. (All told, 30 personnel have been killed in crashes during Osprey test flights between 1991 and 2000.)
Despite its troubles, the Osprey has gained popularity as a VIP taxi in Iraq – a favorite of top brass and visiting dignitaries and celebrities. Notably, on 22 July 2008, a flight of four transported Senator Barack Obama from Al-Anbar province to an airport in Amman, Jordan. Without question, images of the four odd-looking craft landing together were impressive. But even as showman, the Osprey is unlikely to supplant the helicopter – at least, not until some footage of it deftly maneuvering in battle supplants the ubiquitous videos of its spectacular test crashes.
Notes
1. “General says US Army has lost 130 helicopters in Iraq and Afghanistan,” International Herald Tribune, Associated Press, 23 March 2007.
2. R. M. Cassidy, “Renaissance of the attack helicopter in the close fight,” Military Review (July-August 2003)
3. P. Hess, “Army Needs $1.2b for Chopper Replacement," United Press International, 2 January 2006.
4. R. Wall and D. A. Fulghum, “Coming Under Fire,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 12 May 2003.
Bibliography
Blandy, C.W.: North Caucasus: Problems of Helicopter Support in Mountains (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, August 2007).
Cassidy, R.M.: “Renaissance of the attack helicopter in the close fight,” Military Review, July-August 2003.
Chandler, J.G.: “Reset: Army Aviation's Change of Mindset,” Overhaul and Maintenance, Vol. 13, No. 7, July 2007.
Chavanne, B.: Marines May Seek New V-22 Engines. Aviation Week, 18 March 2008
Colucci, F.: “Army's War-Weary Choppers Get Repairs,” National Defense, February 2005.
Colucci, F.: “Finding Ways To Stay In The Fight,” Rotor and Wing Magazine, 1 May 2005.
Coniglio, S.: “Combat Helicopter Survivability,” Military Technology, March 2005.
Cordesman, A.H.: The Air War Lessons of Afghanistan: Change and Continuity (Washington D.C.: Center for Science and International Security, December 2002.)
Erwin, S. I.: “Army Aviation Must Change To Stay Relevant, Says Panel,” National Defense, March 2004.
Eshel, D.: “The Insurgency Anti-Helicopter Threat,” Military Technology, March 2005.
Gaillard, L.: V-22 Osprey—Wonder Weapon or Widow Maker? (Washington DC: Center for Defense Information, 2006).
Johnson, D.E.: Learning large lessons: the evolving roles of ground power and air power in the post-Cold War era (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2006.)
Lambeth, B.S.: Air Power Against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom (Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2005).
Magnuson, S.: “Army helos can thwart missiles, but remain vulnerable,” National Defense, August 2007.
McLaughlin, G.A.: “Army Aviation's Evolution To Sustained Operations,” Army Magazine, June 2004.
Puttre, M.: “Rethinking Combat Helicopter Doctrine,” Journal of Electronic Defense, Dec. 2003.
Slife, Col. J.: “Shootdown solution,” Armed Forces Journal International, June 2007.
Taylor, D.: “V-22 Ospreys Saw Little Enemy Fire During First Deployment,” Inside the Navy, Vol. 21, No. 18, 5 May 2008.
Thompson, M.: “V-22 Osprey: A Flying Shame,” Time Magazine, 26 September 2007.
U.S. Air Force: Operation Anaconda: An Air Power Perspective (Washington D.C.: February 2005)
U.S. Congressional Budget Office: Modernizing the Army’s Rotary-Wing Aviation Fleet (Washington DC: November 2007).
U.S. Congressional Budget Office: Replacing and Repairing Equipment Used in Iraq and Afghanistan: The Army’s Reset Program. (Washington DC: September 2007).
Wall, R.: “Cobras in Urban Combat,” Aviation Week, Vol. 158, Issue 15, 14 April 2003.
Wall, R. and Fulghum, D.A.: “Coming Under Fire,” Aviation Week, 12 May 2003.
Withington, T.: “Helicopters: Operational Mobility,” ISN Security Watch, 2 May 2008.
Chapter 6 from Lutz Unterseher, et. al., Military Intervention and Common Sense: Focus on Land Forces (Berlin: Ryckschau, June 2009)
1 New missions, old dilemma
Recent military experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has prompted a significant change in American ideas about the combat use of helicopters, implying a greater emphasis in the future on small-unit combat support roles. These have significantly supplanted ideas of deep attack and large-scale helicopter assaults. These changes have not really surmounted the dilemmas associated with rotary-wing aircraft, however. Indeed, recent experience starkly illustrates these dilemmas. And nothing is more telling than the high attrition rate for helicopters in operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.
Since 2001, the US military has kept an average of approximately 550 helicopters of all types in the “Central Command” area, which encompasses both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. (As of August 2008, there are more than 600 involved in these conflicts.) All told, in seven years, the United States has lost about 25 percent of the average number of deployed helicopters, that is: 136 helicopters lost – at least one-third of these to enemy action. {1} Moreover, the Army estimates that 3 percent of its entire fleet of 3,150 helicopters will be “washed out” due to recent military operations and require replacement. This, despite spending an average of $500 million per year to “reset” those craft returning from service in Afghanistan and Iraq.
To restate the dilemma that frames our analysis:
• Helicopters are prized for their unique combination of mobility, flexibility, and agility as well as their putative capacity to work closely with ground forces and provide them with persisting support. But these promises and capabilities are offset by issues of cost and vulnerability.
• Once deployed, helicopters prove acutely sensitive to environmental conditions, are relatively fragile, and can be engaged throughout their performance envelope by multiple, relatively-inexpensive weapon systems. These vulnerabilities can be mitigated, partially – but only in ways that substantially increase costs while narrowing the scope of the crafts’ usability.
More than ever before, fielding military helicopters is a high-cost proposition. In 2008, the value of an Apache AH-64D ranged between $34 million and $48 million, depending on the level of upgrades. To keep them flying requires a complement of 30 support personnel each. And, due to maintenance scheduling, it takes a fleet of 30 Apaches to keep eight available in the field.
Any nation hoping to frequently deploy and use combat helicopters in operationally significant numbers must have very deep pockets and a certain insensitivity to cost and cost-effectiveness – as though it has money to burn. Even then, higher command and political authorities may, at the last moment, prove unwilling to risk these costly assets in the types of missions for which they were supposedly procured. Thus, the crash of two US Army helicopters at the outset of the 1999 Kosovo war contributed to keeping Apaches out of that conflict entirely (although 24 had deployed to fight).
Nations with fewer helicopters to spare than does the United States will be even more cautious about putting them in harm’s way. Thus, peace operations in Chad and Darfur have had a difficult time attracting sufficient numbers of even transport types. The problem is not that the world has too few military helicopters on hand, however. All told, UN operations employ about 150 helicopters worldwide – out of total member military holdings that exceed 12,000.
2 Pivotal experiences in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars
The most important factor influencing post-9/11 US helicopter operations was the general shift in US security concerns from conventional warfare to counter-insurgency efforts. Counter-insurgency scenarios typically involve too few forces attempting to secure too much space. In this context, helicopters promise a capacity to rapidly concentrate troops and firepower across large expanses of territory despite poor ground transportation nets. This is something of a return to origins for military helicopters, calling to mind their early use in the Vietnam and Algerian conflicts.
Also important in shaping recent US practice were a host of negative experiences in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The net result of these has been to undermine command enthusiasm for large-scale “deep operations” by armed helicopters and to raise a caution flag on “air assault” operations as well. (The latter involve using helicopters to insert infantry units deep in enemy territory with attack helicopters providing support).
2.1 Operation Anaconda and the challenge of air assault
Depositing lightly armed troops deep in enemy territory is a high risk gambit. Success depends on luck, good intelligence, and close coordination among different arms. The vulnerability of the troops leaves little room for mishaps, while the vulnerability of the helicopters and their sensitivity to environmental conditions raises the likelihood that mishaps will occur. Operating in mountains or other challenging environments adds to the risks and uncertainties. Operation Anaconda illustrates how easily things can come apart.
In March 2002, three months after the fall of the Taliban regime, US forces led an effort to kill or capture Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters still holed up in the Shahi-Kot Valley. The plan was to have pro-government militia (stiffened by US air power and special operations units) engage the anti-government forces, while other US forces stemmed their retreat – a hammer and anvil operation. Helicopters were to deliver US troops – the “anvil” -- into blocking or observation positions and provide them with fire support. However, upon being inserted, the first wave of about 200 US personnel unexpectedly found their landing areas to be swarming with Taliban fighters. Due to environmental conditions, difficult terrain, and the density of enemy fire, Apache gunships were unable to provide sufficient fire support.
All of the seven Apaches involved sustained significant damage – and five were compelled to return to base (although three of these returned to the fight within 24 hours). Deployment of a second wave of US “anvil” troops was postponed and half of the first wave was evacuated that night. Given heavy support by fixed-wing aircraft, deployment re-commenced the next day. Under a revised plan, fixed-wing bombardment continued for nearly a week before US and pro-government forces secured the valley. Central Command claimed that between 500 and 770 anti-government forces had been killed, although only dozens of bodies were found.
In a related incident, an attempt to land a US SEAL reconnaissance team near a peak (Takur Ghar) overlooking the Shahi-Kot valley also ran into unexpected heavy fire. One of the two Chinook transport helicopters carrying the team was hit by an RPG and both were forced to fly off – but not before a team member fell out and into the hands of the Taliban. The damaged Chinook made a controlled crash-landing seven kilometers away and its crew was rescued. A subsequent attempt to land a rescue team for the SEAL who had fallen from the chopper near Takur Ghar also came under heavy fire, but successfully inserted the team before flying off, damaged. Finally, an effort to reinforce this team similarly met heavy fire. Another Chinook was hit by an RPG and crashed, killing four on board.
The challenge of helicopter operations under fire in difficult mountain terrain was illustrated again more than three years later (28 June 2005) when a MH-47 Chinook sent to rescue another trapped SEAL team was hit by an RPG. Badly damaged, it was nonetheless able to land on a high ledge. Unfortunately, the ledge gave way and the helicopter toppled down the mountainside. All 16 service people on board were killed. Due to high altitudes, the Apaches that had been escorting the Chinook could not keep pace, so it had to fly into the hot zone without fire support. (Russian heliborne troops faced a similar tragedy in Chechnya on 27 April 2007 when the rotor of their Mi-8 helicopter struck a mountain side while trying to land special operations troops. It tilted over, slid down the mountain side, and burst into flames, killing all 20 on board.)
The troubles encountered in Operation Anaconda also call to mind the October 1993 “Black Hawk Down” incident in Mogadishu, Somalia. There, an air assault raid into a militia-controlled area of the city was stalled when RPGs brought down two MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. A blizzard of small-arms fire and RPGs held support helicopters and relief convoys at bay for 14 hours. Nineteen Americans were killed and 73 wounded.
2.2 Karbala, Iraq – deep attack undone
On 23 March 2003, three days after the onset of the Iraq war, 31 Apache helicopters of the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment (some organic, some attached) set out to deplete the armor and air defenses of the Iraqi Medina Division near Karbala. As was doctrine, they flew low in packs toward their objective. However, en route they became ensnared in “flak traps” – storms of small arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades, and man-portable missiles, originating from roof tops. This ad hoc air defense effort, which was reminiscent of Somali tactics ten years earlier, had probably been triggered by Iraqi pickets equipped with either cell phones or low-power radios. The fire brought down one of the Apaches and damaged all the others sufficiently to compel their return to base. The experience dampened command interest in attempting helicopter deep attack thereafter.
Following the Karbala incident, attack aviation focused mostly on reconnaissance efforts, flank security operations, and the provision of fire support (Close Combat Attacks or CCAs) for advancing ground units – especially in built-up areas. According to one observer, this “signaled the rebirth of aviation in a close fires role and represented a paradigm shift from a decade-long infatuation with deep attacks.” {2}
One partial exception – a denouement, actually – was a 28 March helicopter attack on the 14th Mechanized Brigade of the Medina Division conducted by the aviation units of the 101st Airborne. This was a more deliberate effort than the 23 March attack by the 11th AHR, with the units carefully reconnoitering and clearing zones as they proceeded, and pulling back when they faced heavy ground fire (so that artillery and fixed-wing aircraft might suppress it). As a result, no helicopters were lost to enemy action (although two succumbed to accidents). On the downside, the attack claimed only a handful of Iraqi armored vehicles, artillery, and air defense systems. Caution has its price as well as its benefit.
3 Recent counter-insurgency operations – a helicopter renaissance?
Despite the experience of Operation Anaconda and the failed Karbala mission, helicopters have come to play a central role in recent counter-insurgency efforts. Today, they are key providers of transport, with armed types acting as escorts. Gunships also serve to provide security to ground convoys. And they serve in reconnaissance, surveillance, and “close combat attack” roles, providing ground units with “over the shoulder” firepower. Sometimes they act independently in smaller-scale “counter-insurgent strike” efforts. In urban cordon and search operations, they have acted to block and interdict insurgents attempting escape. During the 2008 operations in Sadr City, at least a half-dozen Apaches were kept in the air at all times, employing hundreds of Hellfire missiles over a few weeks.
The fact that helicopters are serving broadly does not mean they are the optimal choice for all the tasks they have been assigned, however. They are an asset that America held in abundance before the onset of the current wars. Despite America’s unique investment in them, they have not escaped the dilemma associated with their vulnerability. This can be appreciated by analyzing the types of threats they have faced in recent wars and the ways these threats have been managed.
3.1 Environmental challenges and maintenance overload
As noted earlier, helicopters seem to offer a ready-made solution to the force-to-space problems that often plague counter-insurgency efforts. It is just as important to note, however, that insurgencies are most likely to flourish in physical environments that helicopters will find challenging.
As we have seen above, jagged terrain and cityscapes make landings difficult and they offer insurgents occluded firing positions. Telephone and electrical wires in and around cities have claimed at least four helicopters. Thin, cold mountain air saps lift and power, degrading performance and shortening helicopter “on station” time. High ambient temperatures also stresses engines and limits lift. Snow storms in Afghanistan, sandstorms in Iraq, and wind and rain storms in both limit visibility and make controlled maneuver difficult.
Environmental conditions too frequently require that helicopter use be curtailed, which can disrupt joint operations. Such problems effected the conduct of Operation Anaconda, delayed planned helicopter attacks at the start of Iraqi Freedom, and limited helicopter use to daylight hours for 10 crucial days during the first phase of the war.
Sand and dust pose persistent problems. Most of the helicopter accidents in Iraq and Afghanistan are due to “brownout conditions” in which the downwash of rotors kicks up an envelope of blinding dust. To compensate, pilots execute “no hover” landings, touching down while their aircraft are still moving forward – a practice that stresses the rotor gears and airframe. Sand and dust continuously coat, clog, and erode mechanical and electronic gear (notably including infrared missile warning systems). Despite regular maintenance in the field, one helicopter was found to harbor 230 pounds of sand when it rotated home, according to the commander of the Army Aviation Center. {3}
Helicopters fly between 30- and 50-hours per month, on average, in Afghanistan and Iraq, which is considered a high operational tempo. The Army has been able to sustain a 77 percent readiness rate for its deployed helicopters by substantially boosting its field maintenance efforts, routinely rotating helicopters into and out of the theater – only 17 percent of the total inventory is deployed at any one time -- and mounting an ambitious $4 billion helicopter “reset” program at home. Today, maintenance crews make up 85 percent of the Army aviation force. By contrast, British forces, unable to match American resources, have seen their helicopter readiness levels in theater drop to 50 percent.
3.3 The insurgent threat
Modern attack helicopters and the doctrine for their use developed with reference to Soviet armored forces in Europe. There, the expected main threat to helicopters was radar guided missile and anti-aircraft cannon (notably the ZSU-23-4, an armored self-propelled system with four 23-mm guns). Helicopter attack scenarios envisaged fixed-wing aircraft neutralizing these weapons. Helicopters were supposed to approach their objective flying nap-of-the-earth (to lessen their exposure) and then pop-up on arrival to deliver anti-tank missiles at standoff ranges. Presumably, most of their flying would occur over threatened, but not enemy-controlled territory. Clearly, such scenarios have little relevance to America’s post-9/11 wars.
The insurgent threat to helicopters in Iraq and Afghanistan includes small arms fire, anti-aircraft machine guns (notably the 12.7 mm DshK), rocket-propelled grenades (notably the RPG-7), and portable surface-to-air missiles (principally the SA-7, but also the SA-14 and SA-16). While small-arms fire is often spontaneous, the use of RPGs, portable missiles, and heavy machine guns is not. Insurgents often fight in “air defense” teams that combine weapons, spotters, and communications personnel. Favored sites in Iraq are roof tops, court-yards, alleys, and groves. Small open-bed trucks carrying weapons covered with a tarp offer a means to rapidly concentrate weapons – especially heavy machine guns – and then disperse. Favored targets include helicopters flying predictable transit routes or conducting routine reconnaissance. Any coalition effort that concentrates helicopters over a period of days, or any area that regularly attracts helicopter surveillance, also offer insurgents an opportunity to concentrate their air defense efforts.
The contest between insurgent tactics and helicopter counter-moves is evident in the 20 January 2007 downing of a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter in which 12 died. In this case, the second helicopter in a team of two took fire, tried to land, and was hit again by an RPG round. The lead aircraft immediately returned fire and then landed in an effort to assist the downed crew. Soon, another set of Black Hawks joined the fray as did two attack helicopters. These destroyed a truck mounting a heavy machine gun as well as three houses near some trees where a second anti-aircraft gun was hidden. Shortly afterward, a rapid reaction team of seven armored jeeps (HMMWVs or “Humvees”) arrived. One was hit by an improvised explosive device, however, which killed another soldier. After securing the area, they additionally found missile launchers and a mortar tube.
There are technological counter-measures available that are usually effective for dealing with those anti-aircraft missiles currently in insurgent hands -- as long as helicopters fly high enough to allow for reaction time (minimally, above 2,000 meters). However, as noted below, the best counter-measure systems have not always been installed – nor will be. And there are no counter-measures yet available for the small arms, machine gun, and RPG threats.
RPGs are very effective up to 200 meters, but also have scored hits as far out as 700. Small arms are out-ranged beginning at 1000 meters. Heavy machine guns in skilled hands can be quite effective up to 1,500 meters. So, taken together, these weapons can make flying below 2,000 meters quite perilous. Unfortunately, given the nature of these conflicts, there are no or few truly secure zones.
In providing fire support or striking insurgent targets, pilots would prefer to engage from standoff ranges – at least three kilometers using missiles. Cannons require closer shots, however: 1,500 meters or less. Indeed, in order to distinguish individual combatants, helicopters often must fly closer. And, of course, insurgents will choose to engage at close ranges. Thus, most engagements occur at distances of less than 1,000 meters, which puts helicopters within range of an array of weapons.
3.4 Technological Countermeasures
Ideally, helicopters in harms way – which includes all types in Iraq and Afghanistan – would have infrared heat suppressors as well as rugged, advanced missile warning systems, flare dispensers, and active jammers. At the start of the Iraq war, however, only special operations types met this standard. Most conventional scout and attack helicopters had older warning and jamming systems and no flare dispensers. Some lacked infrared suppressors. Transport types were worse off. As the war progressed (and helicopters fell from the sky), warning and jamming systems received upgrades, and these began to spread from attack models to transport types. Yet, as of August 2008, coverage was still not complete. And existing upgrade programs have not kept pace with the threat. Losses to enemy fire in Iraq during 2006 and 2007 – before many Sunni and Shia militia stood down – were greater than those during the preceding two-year period.
Losses not withstanding, there is no likelihood that even the attack helicopter fleet will be upgraded to the standard of special operations craft. Upgrades to the latter cost about $19 million per airframe in 2004, while upgrades to conventional helicopters were in the range of $3 million each. Cancellation of the Comanche program has made possible a more thorough upgrade program for the conventional fleet. But the savings cannot close the gap because they are also supposed to help the Army generally modernize its helicopter fleet.
Equipping the Apache AH-64D with “best protection” would probably drive the per unit to cost into the $45 million to $55 million range. The RAH-66 Comanche faced cancellation in 2004 when its unit cost rose to nearly $59 million. Helping to motivate that decision was the realization that, despite the Comanche’s many advanced features and high cost, it was not well protected against the insurgent threat. Additional upgrades would have had to be made.
3.5 Tactical countermeasures
No foreseeable technology will cure the vulnerability of these fragile machines as they operate over and within complex terrain, ridden with adversaries. Indeed, the principal means of alleviating helicopter attrition in Iraq and Afghanistan have been tactical and operational, not technological. But these have imposed their own limits and costs.
Helicopters have taken to flying in small teams – usually two -- rather then alone or in large groups. Team members keep 500 meters between them, so that one might cover the other and both might divide the labor of identifying and engaging targets. More generally, the importance of working together with other arms has been emphasized. Thus, for instance, fixed-wing aircraft might escort helicopters in especially dangerous areas.
Crashes are most common at night, but day time is when insurgents have their greatest success in downing helicopters. Night-time dangers can be mitigated by flying above terrain obstacles and landing only on landing strips in secure bases, however. Unlike early in the war, by 2007 plenty of these bases existed. So night flying increased. Still, most close combat support operations require daytime flight. And reconnaissance and transport tasks cannot be restricted to night.
When conducting operations, nap-of-the-earth flying is no longer attempted. Shooting “on the run” or while diving has largely replaced stationary fire techniques or “hovering fires” (except sometimes at night). This, of course, complicates the task of acquiring and accurately engaging targets.
Helicopters have also taken to flying faster and higher when transiting “hot spots”. Predictable transit corridors – such as those that might follow surface lines of communication – are avoided. And numerous “no fly zones” have been designated. Complementing these are shifting “danger zones” over which pilots must exercise greater caution.
4 Seeking alternatives
The measures outlined above probably have helped prevent a debilitating rise in the numbers of helicopters claimed by insurgent action. But they succeed by narrowing the utility of helicopters – that is, by revoking the promise of a “go anywhere, do anything” flying machine. (Similarly, the wider adoption of advanced countermeasures systems help drive the cost of helicopters toward prohibitive heights).
These factors, and the inherent vulnerability of helicopters, make a search for alternatives worthwhile. One approach is to avoid using helicopters for tasks that other arms -- artillery or fixed-wing aircraft, for instance – might accomplish just as well and more safely (as the US Marine Corps’ Cobra Survivability Plan concluded early in the war). {4} In many situations, the armed reconnaissance role is better fulfilled by more heavily armored ground forces, with helicopters relegated to standoff surveillance and fire support. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) might substitute for helicopters in performing many surveillance and reconnaissance tasks – and they increasing are. Especially in cities and other complex environments, UAVs are substituting for scout helicopters (such as the OH-58 Kiowa Warrior).
5 A tilt-rotor alternative to helicopters?
One alternative not worthy of consideration is increased reliance on tilt-rotor aircraft, such as the US Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey. The Osprey’s one sure advantage is its capacity to fly 40% to 60% percent faster than helicopters when it operates in “airplane” mode. Thus, it is presumed less vulnerable when in flight. But its cost – $75 million per unit (2009) – is much higher and its transport efficiency is much less than that of comparable helicopters. Helicopters equal in power and empty weight to the V-22 can carry much more payload to any distance. The CH-53E Super Stallion, for instance, costs approximately $40 million, but it can carry twice as much payload to 400 nautical miles. And the difference between helicopters and tilt rotors in terms of transport efficiency increases with altitude, which is relevant to operations in mountainous terrain.
The MV-22 figures centrally in the Marine Corps’ plans for “rapid maneuver from the sea,” thus they are loathe to surrender it. Actually, comparable helicopters could do the job faster whenever several round trips are required. This, due to their “transport efficiency” advantage. But the MV-22 speed advantage holds true if only one or two waves are planned. What happens on arrival is another matter, however.
In “hover mode,” the MV-22 is considerably less stable than helicopters and must descend slowly and carefully, which increases its exposure precisely when insurgents might be closest. Maneuverability in hover mode also is compromised. These limits reflect efforts to address persistent aerodynamic problems (“vortex ring state”), which also make the craft likely to kick-up especially disruptive dust clouds when landing.
In 2007-2008, 12 MV-22s deployed to Iraq, but these were not used in high-threat missions or areas. During 2,500 sorties, pilots reported being fired on twice. Given substantial manufacturer support, the Osprey’s in Iraq where able to achieve a 68 percent average readiness rating – which is still below that achieved by older helicopters in theater. The aircraft also has faced persistent engine problems. These compelled at least one emergency landing in Iraq, while a series of engine fires have plagued the craft back home. (All told, 30 personnel have been killed in crashes during Osprey test flights between 1991 and 2000.)
Despite its troubles, the Osprey has gained popularity as a VIP taxi in Iraq – a favorite of top brass and visiting dignitaries and celebrities. Notably, on 22 July 2008, a flight of four transported Senator Barack Obama from Al-Anbar province to an airport in Amman, Jordan. Without question, images of the four odd-looking craft landing together were impressive. But even as showman, the Osprey is unlikely to supplant the helicopter – at least, not until some footage of it deftly maneuvering in battle supplants the ubiquitous videos of its spectacular test crashes.
Notes
1. “General says US Army has lost 130 helicopters in Iraq and Afghanistan,” International Herald Tribune, Associated Press, 23 March 2007.
2. R. M. Cassidy, “Renaissance of the attack helicopter in the close fight,” Military Review (July-August 2003)
3. P. Hess, “Army Needs $1.2b for Chopper Replacement," United Press International, 2 January 2006.
4. R. Wall and D. A. Fulghum, “Coming Under Fire,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 12 May 2003.
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26 October 2009
In Afghanistan, Training Up Is Hard To Do
If the U.S. wants Afghans to defend themselves, in the short run it will require more American troops, not fewer.
Saturday, Oct. 24, 2009
by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. National Journal
Oral History Of Iraq & Afghanistan Project
• The Oral History Project
Brian Drinkwine has been in Afghanistan for a little more than a month, and he still can't quite get his phone to work. "I'm down here at Forward Operating Base Kandahar," the Army colonel explains apologetically over the static at the start of a mid-October interview. "Because of the introduction of more brigades down in the south, we've maxed out some of the technology," including that for making international calls.
A veteran of the 1989 invasion of Panama, two tours in Iraq, and a 2004 deployment to Afghanistan, Drinkwine commands the 4th Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division. His soldiers make up about 4,000 of the 21,000 reinforcements President Obama authorized for Afghanistan in March, almost all of whom are now in place, even as Obama agonizes over whether to send some 40,000 more. Drinkwine's brigade has a different mission from the others: Rather than taking command of a specific territory, or "battle space," to patrol and pacify, his soldiers are dispersed across southern Afghanistan in small groups of seven to 50 as advisers to the Afghan army and police force.
"We live with our Afghan brothers and teach them counterinsurgency," Drinkwine said. "It's about deeds, not words. We can't sit there and run a training class.... The Afghan security forces watch us. And I think, in many cases, after the first firefight or after the first tough mission, you become brothers when you bleed with each other."
The arrival of Drinkwine's soldiers in September doubled the number of U.S. military advisers in Afghanistan. For the first time since the war began, the Pentagon considers the mission to train and mentor the Afghan security forces fully manned. Or, to be precise, the number of advisers in Afghanistan finally matches -- almost -- the military's official requirement. A report from the Defense Department's inspector general released on September 30 estimated that even with the new brigade, training teams for the police will still be 200 advisers short. If Washington policy makers decide to double the Afghan army and police force -- either to replace U.S. troops withdrawn or to supplement a further surge of American forces -- the current number of military advisers in Afghanistan will need to double too.
Small teams of trainers cannot fill the need alone. Full-sized combat units are also part of the mission. "You would see a U.S. company living on a [forward operating base] with an Afghan army company or an Afghan platoon," Lt. Col. Daniel Morgan explained. His brigade of the 101st Airborne served in Afghanistan from March 2008 to March 2009 as a combat unit, not as advisers, but his soldiers fought alongside the Afghans -- to teach them by example and to keep them alive long enough to learn on the job.
"When the Afghans who just came out of training see a U.S. platoon [of 18 or more soldiers] scrambling up a mountain and taking fire and taking care of each other, those Afghans will go up that mountain," Morgan said. "It's much harder for a three-man adviser team" to do that.
Here is the paradox facing the president. In the long run, it is true that "as the Afghans stand up, we will stand down," to adapt the cliche that is, after many years, finally coming true in Iraq. But that equation is true only over the long run. In the next few years, at least, getting more Afghans ready to fight requires deploying more, not fewer, Americans to train them in boot camp, to advise them in the field, and above all, to fight alongside them. In the near term, training more Afghans is not an alternative to sending more Americans: Achieving the goal requires more Americans.
The Iraq Experience
We know that training the Afghans to defend themselves will require more Americans, not fewer, because we have tried it the other way. In 2003 and 2004, the United States attempted to build Iraqi forces on the cheap and to hand over security to them prematurely while drawing down American troops. When fighting in Falluja triggered uprisings across the country, the undertrained and undersupported Iraqi units mostly dissolved -- with some significant exceptions.
"When we had U.S. forces, for example in An Najaf, the police stood there and fought," recalled Brig. Gen. David Quantock, who in 2004 commanded a military police brigade tasked with training Iraqi cops -- on top of patrolling the highways and reforming Abu Ghraib prison. "In those stations where there was no [U.S.] presence, like in Kufa, those stations were lost."
As the Iraqi debacle of 2004 showed, advising cannot be neatly divorced from fighting. Before drawing down, U.S. forces had to not only build up their local allies but also grind down the threat to a level low enough that the nascent indigenous units could tackle it on their own.
Americans naturally prefer to focus on the handoff, not the fight. Even the names of the commands overseeing training for Iraqis and Afghans optimistically signal that goal: "Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq" and "Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan." But "you never get to that level if you don't improve security," said retired Lt. Gen. James Dubik, who led the transition command in Iraq at the height of the violence. "That was part of our discussion in 2007," he recalled: "We've got to get out of the 'transition' business, because if we don't win the war, there'll be nothing to transition to."
In 2007, the surge of 30,000 U.S. troops to Iraq and the wooing of Sunni Arabs away from the insurgency brought the threat down as the capacity of Iraqi security forces rose. In Afghanistan, threat and capacity are far from that happy meeting place.
Part of the problem is that the Bush administration, rightly or wrongly, switched its focus from Afghanistan to Iraq in 2002, a priority only recently reversed. But a contributing factor has been the U.S. Army's institutional disdain, outside the relatively small Special Forces, for working with untrained foreign rabble, a bias that has taken thousands of U.S. casualties to turn around. Afghanistan was an afterthought to Iraq, and so was mentoring indigenous forces in either country, which meant that training Afghan soldiers was an afterthought to an afterthought. Training Afghan police officers, who take more than twice as many casualties as the better-supported army, was an afterthought to an afterthought to an afterthought. Drinkwine's brigade of advisers is just a down payment on reversing eight years of underinvestment in Afghanistan. And the Afghans start off deeper in the hole than the Iraqis ever were.
The Afghans Can Fight
"There's a difference between Afghans and Iraqis," said Morgan, who has served in both countries. "The Afghans have been fighting for a long time, and you can see it in their eyes. They are not afraid to fight."
For the Americans who are mentoring Afghan fighters, the good news is that Afghanistan has been at war for 30 years. The bad news is that Afghanistan has been at war for 30 years. When the United States intervened in that conflict in October 2001, the military found plenty of hardened warriors eager to fight the Taliban, but precious few soldiers with the discipline, technical skills, or the institutional infrastructure -- from boot camps to supply lines to payroll systems -- to stabilize the country. After 9/11, a relative handful of Special Operations troops and CIA operatives needed just two months to mobilize the Northern Alliance warlords to take Kabul. Eight years later, mobilizing a force to keep Kabul is proving harder.
"I worked with one of their battalion commanders. He looked just like Sean Connery, only he was about 5 feet tall," said Spencer Kohlheim, a senior sergeant in the Indiana National Guard who trained Afghan army scouts in 2004-05, when the three-year-old army was less than 30,000 strong. That 5-foot Afghan commander had two decades' experience fighting the Soviets and then the Taliban.
By contrast, "your lower enlisted, your privates, they were right off the farm," Kohlheim said. "I gave them all notebooks and pens and paper; by lunchtime the notebooks were all filled up with pictures they were drawing."
Once Kohlheim adapted his training techniques to the Afghans, however, he found them to be fast learners, illiterate or not. "If they do something hands-on, they start picking it up real quick," he said. "That was probably one of the most rewarding things I think I've ever done as a soldier. When you can teach someone with no education whatsoever to call and adjust [artillery] fire, it makes you feel pretty good."
Such hands-on learning has made the Afghan national army an effective infantry force, one small unit of foot soldiers at a time. Of the 90 battalions, or kandaks, fielded to date, the U.S. military considers only three unready for combat -- one of those is fresh from basic training -- and 28, a third of the total, are rated capable of operating without U.S. support.
At levels of complexity beyond the individual infantry battalion of 600 men, however, the picture darkens. Just 43 percent of Afghan men can read, compared with 84 percent in Iraq. Afghan officers are officially required to be literate, but so many are not that American advisers often have to fill out supply request forms, according to the September report from the Pentagon inspector general.
"They don't make the logistics system work," said Maj. Gen. Richard Formica, the outgoing chief of Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, which oversees Afghan army and police force development. "What you're seeing is the coalition guys coming to the rescue and providing the stuff" through U.S. or NATO supply lines.
When shipments do move through the Afghan system, corruption takes bites along the way. Police units, in particular, sometimes end up short of weapons and short of gasoline to fuel patrols. "Fuel is money, and fuel has a way of disappearing over there," said Maj. Andrew Ashley, who advised the Afghan police in late 2008 and early 2009. Winter clothing, pickup trucks, and even military equipment are known to go missing, as well. In 2005, Kohlheim's Afghan soldiers even sold their spare uniforms. In a cash economy, payrolls are particularly vulnerable. "Theoretically, the goal is to get them set up for electronic payment," Ashley said, "but that assumes someone is able to access a bank."
The Troubled Afghan Police
All of the institutional problems hit the Afghan police force even harder than the army. Dispersed in 365 districts across the country, the so-called Afghan national police are in fact mostly a patchwork of locally based forces, recruited from the communities they serve. Less well trained, paid, and equipped than the army, the district police operate far from Kabul's support or oversight but dangerously close to local potentates, criminals, and insurgents. From January 2007 to October 2008, the Defense IG reported, while U.S. and NATO forces suffered 464 troops killed in action and the Afghan army lost 505, the Afghan national police lost 1,215.
"The army is, I'd say, five to six years further along in development than the police," Formica said. "Every army unit we have has been mentored [by U.S. or NATO advisers]. With the police, we haven't had that luxury. We've got about 20 percent of the 365 police districts that have embedded mentor teams."
To bring cops up to a national standard, a reform program called "Focused District Development" pulls them out of their home districts and sends them to national training centers for an intensive eight-week course. (Elite units called the Civil Order Police, or Afghan Gendarmerie, fill in while the local cops are gone.) So far, however, only 66 of the 365 districts nationwide have completed the training, all of them in relatively accessible places along Afghanistan's major national highway, the so-called ring road.
Formica's command still rates those 66 police districts significantly lower than the Afghan army. (See graphic, p. 26.) Yet, other important measures of success are evident. When the retrained police return to their districts, their death rates drop, on average, by 60 percent -- and casualties among local civilians decrease by 66 percent.
Outside help can indeed make a difference, but only if it is there. So far, U.S. or NATO advisers have worked with just one-fifth of Afghanistan's police districts. Another variable is whether the advisers find adequate leadership once they get to a district.
In a country without strong institutions, personalities matter above all. So the true story of Afghan security forces is not one of a uniformly excellent army and a universally inept police force. It is about dramatic variation from one army battalion or police district to the next, and sometimes even within the same unit at different times, depending on who is in charge.
In the six months that U.S. Army Capt. Christian Mitchell spent with an Afghan national army company in 2007 and 2008, it had two very different commanders. The first was a veteran Northern Alliance fighter named Atullah. "He cared about the guys in his company, he cared about training them, and he wanted to learn," Mitchell said. "I stayed by his side, but we got to the point where he was running things." Then Atullah got a better posting and was succeeded by a defector from the Taliban named Baqi. "He took all the pride out of the company," Mitchell lamented. "He didn't respect the soldiers. When pay came in, large chunks of money would come up missing." And on combat patrols, time and again, Mitchell had to shove Baqi aside and take over before the Afghan commander got people killed. "It was like starting from scratch."
Later in his tour, Mitchell moved to an Afghan army brigade headquarters where the change was from bad to good. "When I went over there, they actually had just removed the old operations officer for being corrupt, and they had moved over a new guy who was formerly the intelligence officer. He was a great guy, a really smart guy.... We made a lot of headway."
Drinkwine said, "Where there are good Afghan leaders, really good Afghan leaders, it's infectious in their unit. And the best way to develop Afghan leaders is to surround them with good leaders." That is where the U.S. forces come in.
Teaching By Fighting
"Adviser" is a low-key job title. But when the country being advised is in the middle of a war, advisers do not spend most of their time giving advice.
"We'd go out and get in a fight; we'd fight for a couple of hours until we started to run out of ammo for the Afghans; and then we'd fall back to the hilltop and call in air strikes for the rest of the evening," Maj. Robert Gully said. "We'd do that almost every day."
Now an instructor at the Army's school for advisers at Fort Polk in Louisiana, Gully is an Army Special Forces officer with two tours in Afghanistan and one in Iraq, as well as pre-9/11 training missions in Bosnia and the Baltics. He spent nine months in 2006-07 commanding an "A-team" of 12 Americans advising about 80 Afghan national army soldiers. One of his men died -- "it broke my heart because he was a really good friend" -- as did five of the Afghans.
The unit had originally been stationed in a quiet area around the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif, where Gully could not get the Afghans to take his training program seriously. "A lot of times the attitude was, 'Why do we need to train? We don't need to train -- we are soldiers.' " Then Gully's unit moved to the Taliban-controlled Panjaway Valley south of Kandahar, where it was in constant combat. "That was much more effective than trying to convince them back in Mazar-i-Sharif why they should lay on the ground and shoot their gun at a target," Gully said dryly. Once the Afghans deployed to the Panjaway Valley, "they would really listen, but they were also so fearful at times that they didn't want to move." To get them to act, much of Gully's "adviser" job boiled down to teaching by example.
"Most of the guys on my team had been to Iraq and Afghanistan multiple times" and "enjoyed being in action," Gully said. "That was the inspirational part for the Afghan guys, because when we get in a fight, my guys are making jokes and smiling. [The Afghans'] apprehension about engaging the enemy, some of that started to go away."
Ashley, the police adviser, said, "I don't think 'training' is the right word for this mission. We took a lot of casualties."
In a combat zone, part of advising is simply surviving. And survival depends on having backup that the still-developing local forces cannot provide. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the training focus has been on raising units of light infantry. That means foot soldiers with AK-47 or M-16 rifles, a few portable heavy weapons such as machine guns or mortars, basic body armor, and some form of transportation: A few Afghan units have up-armored Humvees but most ride in the open beds of pickup trucks. The Afghan air corps has, at last count, 30 Russian-made aircraft -- 14 cargo helicopters, nine helicopter gunships, two jet trainers, and five transport planes -- but its growth is slow. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, recently postponed adding artillery, engineer, and other support units to free up resources for more foot soldiers. Afghan units originally organized as supply battalions have been converted to infantry.
The emphasis on infantry means that U.S. or NATO forces have to provide everything else, from artillery and air strikes to medical care and supplies. That is why the standard 12-person U.S. advisory team, although much deviated from in practice, includes one artillery officer to call for fire support, two logisticians, and a communications specialist with a long-range radio. For the ill-equipped Afghan forces, advisers are not just teachers. They are a lifeline to the enormous resources of the U.S. military.
"It gave them a big boost because they knew that if they got into difficulties they couldn't extract themselves from, we had artillery, we had aircraft. They didn't have that stuff," Mitchell said. He estimated that he could get his Afghans an air strike within 10 minutes of calling and artillery shells within four. "They loved it," he said. The Afghans would ask him, "We want to go do this patrol; do we have the plane with no pilot flying above us?" -- a reference to U.S. spy drones used to scout ahead.
Above all, the Afghans appreciated the American helicopters that could rapidly evacuate their wounded. "If they know they have helicopters or airplanes above them," Morgan said, "those soldiers will fight."
Of course, a 12-man adviser team cannot operate helicopters, fighter-bombers, or even a convoy of supply trucks: It can only call for them from other, larger units. In a shooting war where a weak indigenous force faces a threat beyond its capabilities, a training effort can complement a larger U.S. military presence but not substitute for one.
An Orphan Mission
A central obstacle to training and developing Iraqi and Afghan forces has been, frankly, the attitudes of U.S. commanders who have resisted taking on the mission.
A month after the U.S. occupied Iraq, on Mother's Day 2003, Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton got the call to rebuild the Iraqi army. "My wife said, 'You know, I thought that person would already have been there,' " Eaton recalled. Two weeks later, he hitched a ride on an Army helicopter north from Kuwait -- no transportation had been provided -- and arrived at Baghdad International Airport only to find that the phone number for his new organization didn't work. The next day, he finally met his workforce: "five guys who were on loan from a series of staffs," Eaton said. "They had been there about a week."
With borrowed officers and private contractors, he began to put Iraqis through basic training, but no system existed to advise Iraqi units in the field. Some U.S. commanders, such as then-Maj. Gen. David Petraeus, went out of their way to work with the new Iraqi units. Others tried to ignore the Iraqis altogether.
"There was a U.S. infantry battalion we had to work with, and it was almost as much of a challenge to be an ambassador to them as to be an ambassador to the Iraqis," recalled Gully, the Special Forces officer, who before his Afghan advisory tour spent six months with Iraqi forces in Mosul in 2005-06. One junior Ameri -- can officer, a platoon leader, made a point of working with Gully's Special Forces team and its Iraqi advisees, "but he was kind of seen as a renegade."
Only in 2006 did the Army finally create a formal course to train non-Special Forces soldiers to be advisers. But it did so by stripping a tank brigade at Fort Riley, Kan., of its combat elements and turning the remaining support troops and command staff into instructors, whether or not they had ever been to Iraq or Afghanistan. "We had not served as advisers ourselves, so we were training people to do something we had not done ourselves, without rule books on how to do it," said retired Lt. Col. John Nagl, who commanded one of the repurposed tank battalions. "We essentially made it up as we went along." But, he said, "We adapted and overcame, and by the time I left in June of '08, we were getting pretty good."
Much of the Fort Riley course focused on how to survive in a war zone: small-arms training, first aid, radio communications, and the like. It was a useful refresher for the many advisers-to-be who had never deployed but not for the combat veterans, whose numbers increased steadily over time. "It was very redundant for me," Mitchell said, "stuff I had lived and breathed for years and could do with a blindfold on." He had spent a year in Iraq before going to Fort Riley in 2008 to prepare for his tour advising the Afghan army. Mitchell acknowledged, however, that the "language and the cultural piece... was pretty good. They had a lot of cultural awareness classes with Afghanis, [and] they had scenarios where we worked with the Afghan interpreter, worked with other Afghans who were supposed to be [Afghan national army] soldiers."
Today, the Army recognizes that training foreign forces is one of its core missions. The adviser-training program and most of its experienced instructors have moved from Fort Riley to Fort Polk, where the Pentagon has created a brigade specifically to train advisers both on-site and, through mobile training teams, across the force. The Army-Marine Corps's Counterinsurgency Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., created in 2006, took formal responsibility for developing an adviser doctrine and earlier this year issued the Army's first manual on foreign security force assistance. The Army Chief of Staff, Gen. George Casey, has ordered promotion boards to consider service as an adviser to be a qualification equal to serving on the staff of an American combat unit. And instead of pulling adviser teams together from across the force and deploying them as independent units with little coordination or support, the Army is starting to build adviser capability into full-sized units, such as Drinkwine's 4th Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division.
Rough edges persist, however. Drinkwine's soldiers were originally scheduled for a combat mission in Iraq and had to retrain themselves to serve as advisers in Afghanistan, using Afghans on contract and mobile training teams dispatched from Fort Polk. Amid all the other demands of practicing combat skills and preparing to deploy, Drinkwine estimates, the brigade "had a good six weeks over a three-month period" to focus specifically on advising. (That at least compares favorably with the old eight-week course at Riley, most of which was devoted to combat training.)
And although most of Drinkwine's officers and sergeants have deployed before, they are, on average, lower-ranking than the old-style adviser teams and the Afghans they are going to deal with. "I very clearly can't expect a company commander with maybe eight or nine years in the Army, with one deployment under his belt, maybe two, to walk up to a kandak commander who fought against the Soviets and say, 'I'm here to mentor you,' " Drinkwine said. Future adviser brigades will be augmented with 48 extra midgrade officers, but Drinkwine received only five.
The U.S. military and the Afghan forces it mentors have come a long way since 2001. There is still a long way to go. "If we are going to depart Afghanistan," Nagl said, "the only way to do so and be secure is to have a reliable Afghan security force appropriately sized, working for a reasonably well-respected, well-supported Afghan government. That's a work of three to five years and more resources than we have yet put into Afghanistan." He added, "The alternative is truly to fight a forever war."
Saturday, Oct. 24, 2009
by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. National Journal
Oral History Of Iraq & Afghanistan Project
• The Oral History Project
Brian Drinkwine has been in Afghanistan for a little more than a month, and he still can't quite get his phone to work. "I'm down here at Forward Operating Base Kandahar," the Army colonel explains apologetically over the static at the start of a mid-October interview. "Because of the introduction of more brigades down in the south, we've maxed out some of the technology," including that for making international calls.
A veteran of the 1989 invasion of Panama, two tours in Iraq, and a 2004 deployment to Afghanistan, Drinkwine commands the 4th Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division. His soldiers make up about 4,000 of the 21,000 reinforcements President Obama authorized for Afghanistan in March, almost all of whom are now in place, even as Obama agonizes over whether to send some 40,000 more. Drinkwine's brigade has a different mission from the others: Rather than taking command of a specific territory, or "battle space," to patrol and pacify, his soldiers are dispersed across southern Afghanistan in small groups of seven to 50 as advisers to the Afghan army and police force.
"We live with our Afghan brothers and teach them counterinsurgency," Drinkwine said. "It's about deeds, not words. We can't sit there and run a training class.... The Afghan security forces watch us. And I think, in many cases, after the first firefight or after the first tough mission, you become brothers when you bleed with each other."
The arrival of Drinkwine's soldiers in September doubled the number of U.S. military advisers in Afghanistan. For the first time since the war began, the Pentagon considers the mission to train and mentor the Afghan security forces fully manned. Or, to be precise, the number of advisers in Afghanistan finally matches -- almost -- the military's official requirement. A report from the Defense Department's inspector general released on September 30 estimated that even with the new brigade, training teams for the police will still be 200 advisers short. If Washington policy makers decide to double the Afghan army and police force -- either to replace U.S. troops withdrawn or to supplement a further surge of American forces -- the current number of military advisers in Afghanistan will need to double too.
Small teams of trainers cannot fill the need alone. Full-sized combat units are also part of the mission. "You would see a U.S. company living on a [forward operating base] with an Afghan army company or an Afghan platoon," Lt. Col. Daniel Morgan explained. His brigade of the 101st Airborne served in Afghanistan from March 2008 to March 2009 as a combat unit, not as advisers, but his soldiers fought alongside the Afghans -- to teach them by example and to keep them alive long enough to learn on the job.
"When the Afghans who just came out of training see a U.S. platoon [of 18 or more soldiers] scrambling up a mountain and taking fire and taking care of each other, those Afghans will go up that mountain," Morgan said. "It's much harder for a three-man adviser team" to do that.
Here is the paradox facing the president. In the long run, it is true that "as the Afghans stand up, we will stand down," to adapt the cliche that is, after many years, finally coming true in Iraq. But that equation is true only over the long run. In the next few years, at least, getting more Afghans ready to fight requires deploying more, not fewer, Americans to train them in boot camp, to advise them in the field, and above all, to fight alongside them. In the near term, training more Afghans is not an alternative to sending more Americans: Achieving the goal requires more Americans.
The Iraq Experience
We know that training the Afghans to defend themselves will require more Americans, not fewer, because we have tried it the other way. In 2003 and 2004, the United States attempted to build Iraqi forces on the cheap and to hand over security to them prematurely while drawing down American troops. When fighting in Falluja triggered uprisings across the country, the undertrained and undersupported Iraqi units mostly dissolved -- with some significant exceptions.
"When we had U.S. forces, for example in An Najaf, the police stood there and fought," recalled Brig. Gen. David Quantock, who in 2004 commanded a military police brigade tasked with training Iraqi cops -- on top of patrolling the highways and reforming Abu Ghraib prison. "In those stations where there was no [U.S.] presence, like in Kufa, those stations were lost."
As the Iraqi debacle of 2004 showed, advising cannot be neatly divorced from fighting. Before drawing down, U.S. forces had to not only build up their local allies but also grind down the threat to a level low enough that the nascent indigenous units could tackle it on their own.
Americans naturally prefer to focus on the handoff, not the fight. Even the names of the commands overseeing training for Iraqis and Afghans optimistically signal that goal: "Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq" and "Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan." But "you never get to that level if you don't improve security," said retired Lt. Gen. James Dubik, who led the transition command in Iraq at the height of the violence. "That was part of our discussion in 2007," he recalled: "We've got to get out of the 'transition' business, because if we don't win the war, there'll be nothing to transition to."
In 2007, the surge of 30,000 U.S. troops to Iraq and the wooing of Sunni Arabs away from the insurgency brought the threat down as the capacity of Iraqi security forces rose. In Afghanistan, threat and capacity are far from that happy meeting place.
Part of the problem is that the Bush administration, rightly or wrongly, switched its focus from Afghanistan to Iraq in 2002, a priority only recently reversed. But a contributing factor has been the U.S. Army's institutional disdain, outside the relatively small Special Forces, for working with untrained foreign rabble, a bias that has taken thousands of U.S. casualties to turn around. Afghanistan was an afterthought to Iraq, and so was mentoring indigenous forces in either country, which meant that training Afghan soldiers was an afterthought to an afterthought. Training Afghan police officers, who take more than twice as many casualties as the better-supported army, was an afterthought to an afterthought to an afterthought. Drinkwine's brigade of advisers is just a down payment on reversing eight years of underinvestment in Afghanistan. And the Afghans start off deeper in the hole than the Iraqis ever were.
The Afghans Can Fight
"There's a difference between Afghans and Iraqis," said Morgan, who has served in both countries. "The Afghans have been fighting for a long time, and you can see it in their eyes. They are not afraid to fight."
For the Americans who are mentoring Afghan fighters, the good news is that Afghanistan has been at war for 30 years. The bad news is that Afghanistan has been at war for 30 years. When the United States intervened in that conflict in October 2001, the military found plenty of hardened warriors eager to fight the Taliban, but precious few soldiers with the discipline, technical skills, or the institutional infrastructure -- from boot camps to supply lines to payroll systems -- to stabilize the country. After 9/11, a relative handful of Special Operations troops and CIA operatives needed just two months to mobilize the Northern Alliance warlords to take Kabul. Eight years later, mobilizing a force to keep Kabul is proving harder.
"I worked with one of their battalion commanders. He looked just like Sean Connery, only he was about 5 feet tall," said Spencer Kohlheim, a senior sergeant in the Indiana National Guard who trained Afghan army scouts in 2004-05, when the three-year-old army was less than 30,000 strong. That 5-foot Afghan commander had two decades' experience fighting the Soviets and then the Taliban.
By contrast, "your lower enlisted, your privates, they were right off the farm," Kohlheim said. "I gave them all notebooks and pens and paper; by lunchtime the notebooks were all filled up with pictures they were drawing."
Once Kohlheim adapted his training techniques to the Afghans, however, he found them to be fast learners, illiterate or not. "If they do something hands-on, they start picking it up real quick," he said. "That was probably one of the most rewarding things I think I've ever done as a soldier. When you can teach someone with no education whatsoever to call and adjust [artillery] fire, it makes you feel pretty good."
Such hands-on learning has made the Afghan national army an effective infantry force, one small unit of foot soldiers at a time. Of the 90 battalions, or kandaks, fielded to date, the U.S. military considers only three unready for combat -- one of those is fresh from basic training -- and 28, a third of the total, are rated capable of operating without U.S. support.
At levels of complexity beyond the individual infantry battalion of 600 men, however, the picture darkens. Just 43 percent of Afghan men can read, compared with 84 percent in Iraq. Afghan officers are officially required to be literate, but so many are not that American advisers often have to fill out supply request forms, according to the September report from the Pentagon inspector general.
"They don't make the logistics system work," said Maj. Gen. Richard Formica, the outgoing chief of Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, which oversees Afghan army and police force development. "What you're seeing is the coalition guys coming to the rescue and providing the stuff" through U.S. or NATO supply lines.
When shipments do move through the Afghan system, corruption takes bites along the way. Police units, in particular, sometimes end up short of weapons and short of gasoline to fuel patrols. "Fuel is money, and fuel has a way of disappearing over there," said Maj. Andrew Ashley, who advised the Afghan police in late 2008 and early 2009. Winter clothing, pickup trucks, and even military equipment are known to go missing, as well. In 2005, Kohlheim's Afghan soldiers even sold their spare uniforms. In a cash economy, payrolls are particularly vulnerable. "Theoretically, the goal is to get them set up for electronic payment," Ashley said, "but that assumes someone is able to access a bank."
The Troubled Afghan Police
All of the institutional problems hit the Afghan police force even harder than the army. Dispersed in 365 districts across the country, the so-called Afghan national police are in fact mostly a patchwork of locally based forces, recruited from the communities they serve. Less well trained, paid, and equipped than the army, the district police operate far from Kabul's support or oversight but dangerously close to local potentates, criminals, and insurgents. From January 2007 to October 2008, the Defense IG reported, while U.S. and NATO forces suffered 464 troops killed in action and the Afghan army lost 505, the Afghan national police lost 1,215.
"The army is, I'd say, five to six years further along in development than the police," Formica said. "Every army unit we have has been mentored [by U.S. or NATO advisers]. With the police, we haven't had that luxury. We've got about 20 percent of the 365 police districts that have embedded mentor teams."
To bring cops up to a national standard, a reform program called "Focused District Development" pulls them out of their home districts and sends them to national training centers for an intensive eight-week course. (Elite units called the Civil Order Police, or Afghan Gendarmerie, fill in while the local cops are gone.) So far, however, only 66 of the 365 districts nationwide have completed the training, all of them in relatively accessible places along Afghanistan's major national highway, the so-called ring road.
Formica's command still rates those 66 police districts significantly lower than the Afghan army. (See graphic, p. 26.) Yet, other important measures of success are evident. When the retrained police return to their districts, their death rates drop, on average, by 60 percent -- and casualties among local civilians decrease by 66 percent.
Outside help can indeed make a difference, but only if it is there. So far, U.S. or NATO advisers have worked with just one-fifth of Afghanistan's police districts. Another variable is whether the advisers find adequate leadership once they get to a district.
In a country without strong institutions, personalities matter above all. So the true story of Afghan security forces is not one of a uniformly excellent army and a universally inept police force. It is about dramatic variation from one army battalion or police district to the next, and sometimes even within the same unit at different times, depending on who is in charge.
In the six months that U.S. Army Capt. Christian Mitchell spent with an Afghan national army company in 2007 and 2008, it had two very different commanders. The first was a veteran Northern Alliance fighter named Atullah. "He cared about the guys in his company, he cared about training them, and he wanted to learn," Mitchell said. "I stayed by his side, but we got to the point where he was running things." Then Atullah got a better posting and was succeeded by a defector from the Taliban named Baqi. "He took all the pride out of the company," Mitchell lamented. "He didn't respect the soldiers. When pay came in, large chunks of money would come up missing." And on combat patrols, time and again, Mitchell had to shove Baqi aside and take over before the Afghan commander got people killed. "It was like starting from scratch."
Later in his tour, Mitchell moved to an Afghan army brigade headquarters where the change was from bad to good. "When I went over there, they actually had just removed the old operations officer for being corrupt, and they had moved over a new guy who was formerly the intelligence officer. He was a great guy, a really smart guy.... We made a lot of headway."
Drinkwine said, "Where there are good Afghan leaders, really good Afghan leaders, it's infectious in their unit. And the best way to develop Afghan leaders is to surround them with good leaders." That is where the U.S. forces come in.
Teaching By Fighting
"Adviser" is a low-key job title. But when the country being advised is in the middle of a war, advisers do not spend most of their time giving advice.
"We'd go out and get in a fight; we'd fight for a couple of hours until we started to run out of ammo for the Afghans; and then we'd fall back to the hilltop and call in air strikes for the rest of the evening," Maj. Robert Gully said. "We'd do that almost every day."
Now an instructor at the Army's school for advisers at Fort Polk in Louisiana, Gully is an Army Special Forces officer with two tours in Afghanistan and one in Iraq, as well as pre-9/11 training missions in Bosnia and the Baltics. He spent nine months in 2006-07 commanding an "A-team" of 12 Americans advising about 80 Afghan national army soldiers. One of his men died -- "it broke my heart because he was a really good friend" -- as did five of the Afghans.
The unit had originally been stationed in a quiet area around the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif, where Gully could not get the Afghans to take his training program seriously. "A lot of times the attitude was, 'Why do we need to train? We don't need to train -- we are soldiers.' " Then Gully's unit moved to the Taliban-controlled Panjaway Valley south of Kandahar, where it was in constant combat. "That was much more effective than trying to convince them back in Mazar-i-Sharif why they should lay on the ground and shoot their gun at a target," Gully said dryly. Once the Afghans deployed to the Panjaway Valley, "they would really listen, but they were also so fearful at times that they didn't want to move." To get them to act, much of Gully's "adviser" job boiled down to teaching by example.
"Most of the guys on my team had been to Iraq and Afghanistan multiple times" and "enjoyed being in action," Gully said. "That was the inspirational part for the Afghan guys, because when we get in a fight, my guys are making jokes and smiling. [The Afghans'] apprehension about engaging the enemy, some of that started to go away."
Ashley, the police adviser, said, "I don't think 'training' is the right word for this mission. We took a lot of casualties."
In a combat zone, part of advising is simply surviving. And survival depends on having backup that the still-developing local forces cannot provide. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the training focus has been on raising units of light infantry. That means foot soldiers with AK-47 or M-16 rifles, a few portable heavy weapons such as machine guns or mortars, basic body armor, and some form of transportation: A few Afghan units have up-armored Humvees but most ride in the open beds of pickup trucks. The Afghan air corps has, at last count, 30 Russian-made aircraft -- 14 cargo helicopters, nine helicopter gunships, two jet trainers, and five transport planes -- but its growth is slow. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, recently postponed adding artillery, engineer, and other support units to free up resources for more foot soldiers. Afghan units originally organized as supply battalions have been converted to infantry.
The emphasis on infantry means that U.S. or NATO forces have to provide everything else, from artillery and air strikes to medical care and supplies. That is why the standard 12-person U.S. advisory team, although much deviated from in practice, includes one artillery officer to call for fire support, two logisticians, and a communications specialist with a long-range radio. For the ill-equipped Afghan forces, advisers are not just teachers. They are a lifeline to the enormous resources of the U.S. military.
"It gave them a big boost because they knew that if they got into difficulties they couldn't extract themselves from, we had artillery, we had aircraft. They didn't have that stuff," Mitchell said. He estimated that he could get his Afghans an air strike within 10 minutes of calling and artillery shells within four. "They loved it," he said. The Afghans would ask him, "We want to go do this patrol; do we have the plane with no pilot flying above us?" -- a reference to U.S. spy drones used to scout ahead.
Above all, the Afghans appreciated the American helicopters that could rapidly evacuate their wounded. "If they know they have helicopters or airplanes above them," Morgan said, "those soldiers will fight."
Of course, a 12-man adviser team cannot operate helicopters, fighter-bombers, or even a convoy of supply trucks: It can only call for them from other, larger units. In a shooting war where a weak indigenous force faces a threat beyond its capabilities, a training effort can complement a larger U.S. military presence but not substitute for one.
An Orphan Mission
A central obstacle to training and developing Iraqi and Afghan forces has been, frankly, the attitudes of U.S. commanders who have resisted taking on the mission.
A month after the U.S. occupied Iraq, on Mother's Day 2003, Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton got the call to rebuild the Iraqi army. "My wife said, 'You know, I thought that person would already have been there,' " Eaton recalled. Two weeks later, he hitched a ride on an Army helicopter north from Kuwait -- no transportation had been provided -- and arrived at Baghdad International Airport only to find that the phone number for his new organization didn't work. The next day, he finally met his workforce: "five guys who were on loan from a series of staffs," Eaton said. "They had been there about a week."
With borrowed officers and private contractors, he began to put Iraqis through basic training, but no system existed to advise Iraqi units in the field. Some U.S. commanders, such as then-Maj. Gen. David Petraeus, went out of their way to work with the new Iraqi units. Others tried to ignore the Iraqis altogether.
"There was a U.S. infantry battalion we had to work with, and it was almost as much of a challenge to be an ambassador to them as to be an ambassador to the Iraqis," recalled Gully, the Special Forces officer, who before his Afghan advisory tour spent six months with Iraqi forces in Mosul in 2005-06. One junior Ameri -- can officer, a platoon leader, made a point of working with Gully's Special Forces team and its Iraqi advisees, "but he was kind of seen as a renegade."
Only in 2006 did the Army finally create a formal course to train non-Special Forces soldiers to be advisers. But it did so by stripping a tank brigade at Fort Riley, Kan., of its combat elements and turning the remaining support troops and command staff into instructors, whether or not they had ever been to Iraq or Afghanistan. "We had not served as advisers ourselves, so we were training people to do something we had not done ourselves, without rule books on how to do it," said retired Lt. Col. John Nagl, who commanded one of the repurposed tank battalions. "We essentially made it up as we went along." But, he said, "We adapted and overcame, and by the time I left in June of '08, we were getting pretty good."
Much of the Fort Riley course focused on how to survive in a war zone: small-arms training, first aid, radio communications, and the like. It was a useful refresher for the many advisers-to-be who had never deployed but not for the combat veterans, whose numbers increased steadily over time. "It was very redundant for me," Mitchell said, "stuff I had lived and breathed for years and could do with a blindfold on." He had spent a year in Iraq before going to Fort Riley in 2008 to prepare for his tour advising the Afghan army. Mitchell acknowledged, however, that the "language and the cultural piece... was pretty good. They had a lot of cultural awareness classes with Afghanis, [and] they had scenarios where we worked with the Afghan interpreter, worked with other Afghans who were supposed to be [Afghan national army] soldiers."
Today, the Army recognizes that training foreign forces is one of its core missions. The adviser-training program and most of its experienced instructors have moved from Fort Riley to Fort Polk, where the Pentagon has created a brigade specifically to train advisers both on-site and, through mobile training teams, across the force. The Army-Marine Corps's Counterinsurgency Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., created in 2006, took formal responsibility for developing an adviser doctrine and earlier this year issued the Army's first manual on foreign security force assistance. The Army Chief of Staff, Gen. George Casey, has ordered promotion boards to consider service as an adviser to be a qualification equal to serving on the staff of an American combat unit. And instead of pulling adviser teams together from across the force and deploying them as independent units with little coordination or support, the Army is starting to build adviser capability into full-sized units, such as Drinkwine's 4th Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division.
Rough edges persist, however. Drinkwine's soldiers were originally scheduled for a combat mission in Iraq and had to retrain themselves to serve as advisers in Afghanistan, using Afghans on contract and mobile training teams dispatched from Fort Polk. Amid all the other demands of practicing combat skills and preparing to deploy, Drinkwine estimates, the brigade "had a good six weeks over a three-month period" to focus specifically on advising. (That at least compares favorably with the old eight-week course at Riley, most of which was devoted to combat training.)
And although most of Drinkwine's officers and sergeants have deployed before, they are, on average, lower-ranking than the old-style adviser teams and the Afghans they are going to deal with. "I very clearly can't expect a company commander with maybe eight or nine years in the Army, with one deployment under his belt, maybe two, to walk up to a kandak commander who fought against the Soviets and say, 'I'm here to mentor you,' " Drinkwine said. Future adviser brigades will be augmented with 48 extra midgrade officers, but Drinkwine received only five.
The U.S. military and the Afghan forces it mentors have come a long way since 2001. There is still a long way to go. "If we are going to depart Afghanistan," Nagl said, "the only way to do so and be secure is to have a reliable Afghan security force appropriately sized, working for a reasonably well-respected, well-supported Afghan government. That's a work of three to five years and more resources than we have yet put into Afghanistan." He added, "The alternative is truly to fight a forever war."
Awaiting New Pentagon Orders for Way Ahead on C2 Program
Inside Defense
Oct 19, 2009 -- Defense Department leaders are pondering how to breathe new life into a command-and-control program -- once set to expire -- now that its intended successor is progressing too slowly, according to defense officials.
The recently unveiled conference agreement on the fiscal year 2010 defense authorization bill requires defense officials to craft a report detailing how they see the marriage of the existing Global Command and Control System-Joint with the troubled Net-Enabled Command Capability effort. Citing significant schedule slips and department infighting, lawmakers directed DOD to stop development on the NECC and use the project's results so far to modernize the GCCS program.
“The department is in the process of re-evaluating the way ahead for modernizing the Global Command and Control System - Family of Systems,” Defense Information Systems Agency acquisition chief Anthony Montemarano wrote in a statement, forwarded by a spokesman. “The approach taken in the Net Enabled Command Capability (NECC) program has not been responsive enough to meet the needs of our joint warfighters,” the statement said.
DOD's original plan was to migrate service-specific versions of the Global Command and Control System to NECC in 2012.
A significant novelty of the new system was to be its service-oriented architecture, which enables Web-based operation. DISA officials said over the summer they want to keep the SOA approach, regardless of NECC's fate.
“As for how specifically this program will progress, the department is discussing the details for the way ahead, and [Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter] will make the final determination,” Montemarano's statement reads.
In their conference language, lawmakers indicated what questions they want to see answered. The required report on the modernized GCCS program must spell out how much the effort would cost and what technical problems must first be solved, according to the conference agreement. -- Sebastian Sprenger
10192009_oct19b
Oct 19, 2009 -- Defense Department leaders are pondering how to breathe new life into a command-and-control program -- once set to expire -- now that its intended successor is progressing too slowly, according to defense officials.
The recently unveiled conference agreement on the fiscal year 2010 defense authorization bill requires defense officials to craft a report detailing how they see the marriage of the existing Global Command and Control System-Joint with the troubled Net-Enabled Command Capability effort. Citing significant schedule slips and department infighting, lawmakers directed DOD to stop development on the NECC and use the project's results so far to modernize the GCCS program.
“The department is in the process of re-evaluating the way ahead for modernizing the Global Command and Control System - Family of Systems,” Defense Information Systems Agency acquisition chief Anthony Montemarano wrote in a statement, forwarded by a spokesman. “The approach taken in the Net Enabled Command Capability (NECC) program has not been responsive enough to meet the needs of our joint warfighters,” the statement said.
DOD's original plan was to migrate service-specific versions of the Global Command and Control System to NECC in 2012.
A significant novelty of the new system was to be its service-oriented architecture, which enables Web-based operation. DISA officials said over the summer they want to keep the SOA approach, regardless of NECC's fate.
“As for how specifically this program will progress, the department is discussing the details for the way ahead, and [Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter] will make the final determination,” Montemarano's statement reads.
In their conference language, lawmakers indicated what questions they want to see answered. The required report on the modernized GCCS program must spell out how much the effort would cost and what technical problems must first be solved, according to the conference agreement. -- Sebastian Sprenger
10192009_oct19b
The Pentagon's New Africa Push
Counter-terrorism is now a major focus of the year-old U.S. Africa Command.
Saturday, Oct. 24, 2009
by Sean J. Miller National Journal
Once the forgotten continent, Africa has growing strategic importance in America's fight against terrorism. A recent commando operation that killed a top organizer for Al Qaeda in Somalia is one part of the U.S. military's new multifaceted approach to regional security, which includes deepening ties between the Pentagon and African armies and putting American soldiers in the role of nation builders.
The absence of stable governments has led to the Horn of Africa becoming a haven for Qaeda operatives. It's here that U.S. intelligence recently tracked Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a Kenyan wanted by the FBI for his involvement in attacks against a hotel in Mombasa in 2002 and in the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. On September 14, U.S. Special Forces troops ambushed and killed Nabhan as his convoy stopped for breakfast in southern Somalia.
U.S. officials didn't waste any time trumpeting the strike. In a speech to the Center for American Progress in Washington the next day, Johnnie Carson, assistant secretary of State for African affairs, hailed Nabhan's death as a blow to Al Qaeda and its Somali ally Al Shabab. "We think that his departure from the scene probably makes us all who work in and around East Africa a little bit safer, a little bit more secure," he said. But two days later, Al Shabab offered its own reply. It launched a successful suicide attack against U.S.-backed African Union peacekeepers in Mogadishu. The twin suicide bombing killed some 15 soldiers, including Maj. Gen. Juvenal Niyoyunguruza, the Burun-dian deputy commander of the A.U. force. It was the deadliest attack to date against the multinational peacekeepers -- Al Shabab called it revenge for Nabhan's killing.
Counter-terrorism is now a major focus of the nascent U.S. Africa Command -- AFRICOM for short. But the command, which is celebrating its one-year anniversary this month, won't always rely on American troops to neutralize the threat posed by extremist groups, at least not directly.
Rather than hunting and killing terrorists, AFRICOM focuses on "professionalizing" African militaries so that they can better confront local security challenges on their own, U.S. commanders say, while at the same time teaching soldiers to respect human rights and civilian rule. These efforts, however, have possible downsides. In an area of the world still scarred by colonialism, the U.S. military risks being associated with a rogues' gallery of African military leaders, and it remains to be seen whether an indirect approach can improve the security situation in a country such as Somalia, where the U.S.-backed Transitional Federal Government is almost powerless.
At its most basic level, AFRICOM represents a bureaucratic reshuffling: The U.S. Central, European, and Pacific commands had divided responsibility for the continent. Building relationships with America's African partners, commanders said, was difficult when they didn't know whether to call Honolulu or Tampa, Fla., to get a desk officer on the phone. "We were not nearly as responsive as we needed to be to the priorities, perspectives, and needs of our African partners," said Navy Vice Adm. Robert Moeller, in a phone interview from the command's headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. Creating AFRICOM was "a clear recognition on the [Pentagon's] part that we need to be organized in a way to much more effectively deal with those things that matter to our African partners."
The U.S. military had been conducting a variety of exchange programs and training exercises with African militaries. AFRICOM simply placed these programs under one roof. It also put a new focus on partnering with civilian agencies and African militaries on aid projects, such as, say, funding the construction of Ugandan schools.
Moeller maintains that AFRICOM's goal is to ward off conflict "by not only better preparing their security forces but, through our support for other government agencies that work with these nations, to create the overall conditions" that would make violent extremism a less attractive option. Still, Moeller added, this mission doesn't mean that the U.S. military has forsaken the use of force. "If we are directed to take some action as a result of a U.S. policy decision, we're obviously prepared to do that." Moeller and others stress that AFRICOM hasn't superseded State's role in U.S.-African relations. "None of these types of training activities or programs or exchanges are done without the full concurrence of the chief of mission in that parti-cular country," said Louis Mazel, State's director of regional and security affairs for Africa.
But many observers still have reservations about the new command. "In Africa, uniforms are feared, even hated," says Berouk Mesfin, an Ethiopian-based researcher with the Institute for Security Studies. "When you have other armies trying to come in, telling people they are coming to help them build schools, clinics, etc. -- people are obviously suspicious."
Having AFRICOM's chief, Army Gen. William Ward, appear publicly with African leaders is also problematic, Mesfin warned. "There's a feeling that ... the roots of the problem in Africa are [actually] the governments in place, the rulers who never want to relinquish power [or] not even to share power," he said. "Whenever you are dealing with those guys, that creates a negative impression among the populace. There is no middle ground in Africa."
State's Mazel recognizes that AFRICOM's profile can influence public perception of the U.S. "Do we have a concern about a perception? Yes," he said, "but do we have a concern that there will be a militarization of American foreign policy? No. Foreign-policy formation, foreign-policy implementation on the African continent will be led by civilian elements."
Somalia poses a different policy challenge. "The problem in Somalia is, you don't have a partner. You have a Transitional Federal Government, which isn't a government -- there is no indirect method," said J. Peter Pham, a fellow at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy who studies the Horn of Africa.
There's also the risk that the U.S. military is training, and in some cases equipping, African armies for their next war. This summer, the State Department said, it was providing "arms and munitions and training" to the TFG's modest forces. Meanwhile, in Ethiopia next door, AFRICOM maintains a relationship with that country's National Defense Forces, providing some "limited equipment support." And AFRICOM helps train that country's noncommissioned officer corps, said Rear Adm. Anthony Kurta, who commands Camp Lemonier, the U.S. military base in Djibouti. Ethiopia recently occupied parts of Somalia at the "invitation" of the country's transitional government, reigniting old tensions between the neighbors.
Policy makers are aware of the risks, Mazel said. "By making a military more proficient, are we creating a more professional army that will pose a risk either to its neighbors or to people in the region? Or are we creating a sort of praetorian guard for the leadership of the country? That's certainly not the hope that we have."
While AFRICOM is expanding its military-to-military cooperation, the State Department is also maintaining a program for training African militaries, albeit with a focus on peacekeeping. "Most, if not virtually all, of the African peacekeepers' training is being done through the State Department," Mazel said. In West Africa, for instance, "we've trained, through State Department-funded programs, the new armed forces" in Liberia, he said. "But we've also had mentors and trainers come from the military to support what we've been doing. Yes, there's been an overlap there, but it's continuous. It's not as if our civilian trainers are teaching one thing and the AFRICOM [trainers] are teaching another."
The indirect approach being touted by AFRICOM is punctuated with demonstrations of U.S. force, such as the precision strike against Nabhan. Some analysts, however, worry that such attacks may be counterproductive. In the Horn of Africa, Mesfin said, "what people see is actually who had the last laugh."
Still, Mesfin said that countries in the region are nervous after Al Shabab demonstrated its ability to carry out an organized attack. The suicide bombing in Mogadishu seemed to embolden the group, Mesfin said. Al Shabab warned Djibouti not to send troops to help the A.U. mission, and it even threatened Nairobi-based Ugandan and Burundian diplomats. The ambassadors "actually received text messages on their mobiles saying that their embassies in Nairobi will be attacked," Mesfin said. "People are nervous in Nairobi."
American observers warn against giving Al Shabab too much credit. "Even if Nabhan hadn't been terminated, [the suicide attack] probably would have happened anyways," Pham said. "It was attempted earlier in the summer and they failed." One thing is clear: U.S. policy in Africa will have to be quick to adapt to a fluid situation. "When you get involved in the Horn, you're either supporting one of the parties or changing the balance of power," Mesfin said. "Acting as a neutral observer doesn't work."
Saturday, Oct. 24, 2009
by Sean J. Miller National Journal
Once the forgotten continent, Africa has growing strategic importance in America's fight against terrorism. A recent commando operation that killed a top organizer for Al Qaeda in Somalia is one part of the U.S. military's new multifaceted approach to regional security, which includes deepening ties between the Pentagon and African armies and putting American soldiers in the role of nation builders.
The absence of stable governments has led to the Horn of Africa becoming a haven for Qaeda operatives. It's here that U.S. intelligence recently tracked Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a Kenyan wanted by the FBI for his involvement in attacks against a hotel in Mombasa in 2002 and in the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. On September 14, U.S. Special Forces troops ambushed and killed Nabhan as his convoy stopped for breakfast in southern Somalia.
U.S. officials didn't waste any time trumpeting the strike. In a speech to the Center for American Progress in Washington the next day, Johnnie Carson, assistant secretary of State for African affairs, hailed Nabhan's death as a blow to Al Qaeda and its Somali ally Al Shabab. "We think that his departure from the scene probably makes us all who work in and around East Africa a little bit safer, a little bit more secure," he said. But two days later, Al Shabab offered its own reply. It launched a successful suicide attack against U.S.-backed African Union peacekeepers in Mogadishu. The twin suicide bombing killed some 15 soldiers, including Maj. Gen. Juvenal Niyoyunguruza, the Burun-dian deputy commander of the A.U. force. It was the deadliest attack to date against the multinational peacekeepers -- Al Shabab called it revenge for Nabhan's killing.
Counter-terrorism is now a major focus of the nascent U.S. Africa Command -- AFRICOM for short. But the command, which is celebrating its one-year anniversary this month, won't always rely on American troops to neutralize the threat posed by extremist groups, at least not directly.
Rather than hunting and killing terrorists, AFRICOM focuses on "professionalizing" African militaries so that they can better confront local security challenges on their own, U.S. commanders say, while at the same time teaching soldiers to respect human rights and civilian rule. These efforts, however, have possible downsides. In an area of the world still scarred by colonialism, the U.S. military risks being associated with a rogues' gallery of African military leaders, and it remains to be seen whether an indirect approach can improve the security situation in a country such as Somalia, where the U.S.-backed Transitional Federal Government is almost powerless.
At its most basic level, AFRICOM represents a bureaucratic reshuffling: The U.S. Central, European, and Pacific commands had divided responsibility for the continent. Building relationships with America's African partners, commanders said, was difficult when they didn't know whether to call Honolulu or Tampa, Fla., to get a desk officer on the phone. "We were not nearly as responsive as we needed to be to the priorities, perspectives, and needs of our African partners," said Navy Vice Adm. Robert Moeller, in a phone interview from the command's headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. Creating AFRICOM was "a clear recognition on the [Pentagon's] part that we need to be organized in a way to much more effectively deal with those things that matter to our African partners."
The U.S. military had been conducting a variety of exchange programs and training exercises with African militaries. AFRICOM simply placed these programs under one roof. It also put a new focus on partnering with civilian agencies and African militaries on aid projects, such as, say, funding the construction of Ugandan schools.
Moeller maintains that AFRICOM's goal is to ward off conflict "by not only better preparing their security forces but, through our support for other government agencies that work with these nations, to create the overall conditions" that would make violent extremism a less attractive option. Still, Moeller added, this mission doesn't mean that the U.S. military has forsaken the use of force. "If we are directed to take some action as a result of a U.S. policy decision, we're obviously prepared to do that." Moeller and others stress that AFRICOM hasn't superseded State's role in U.S.-African relations. "None of these types of training activities or programs or exchanges are done without the full concurrence of the chief of mission in that parti-cular country," said Louis Mazel, State's director of regional and security affairs for Africa.
But many observers still have reservations about the new command. "In Africa, uniforms are feared, even hated," says Berouk Mesfin, an Ethiopian-based researcher with the Institute for Security Studies. "When you have other armies trying to come in, telling people they are coming to help them build schools, clinics, etc. -- people are obviously suspicious."
Having AFRICOM's chief, Army Gen. William Ward, appear publicly with African leaders is also problematic, Mesfin warned. "There's a feeling that ... the roots of the problem in Africa are [actually] the governments in place, the rulers who never want to relinquish power [or] not even to share power," he said. "Whenever you are dealing with those guys, that creates a negative impression among the populace. There is no middle ground in Africa."
State's Mazel recognizes that AFRICOM's profile can influence public perception of the U.S. "Do we have a concern about a perception? Yes," he said, "but do we have a concern that there will be a militarization of American foreign policy? No. Foreign-policy formation, foreign-policy implementation on the African continent will be led by civilian elements."
Somalia poses a different policy challenge. "The problem in Somalia is, you don't have a partner. You have a Transitional Federal Government, which isn't a government -- there is no indirect method," said J. Peter Pham, a fellow at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy who studies the Horn of Africa.
There's also the risk that the U.S. military is training, and in some cases equipping, African armies for their next war. This summer, the State Department said, it was providing "arms and munitions and training" to the TFG's modest forces. Meanwhile, in Ethiopia next door, AFRICOM maintains a relationship with that country's National Defense Forces, providing some "limited equipment support." And AFRICOM helps train that country's noncommissioned officer corps, said Rear Adm. Anthony Kurta, who commands Camp Lemonier, the U.S. military base in Djibouti. Ethiopia recently occupied parts of Somalia at the "invitation" of the country's transitional government, reigniting old tensions between the neighbors.
Policy makers are aware of the risks, Mazel said. "By making a military more proficient, are we creating a more professional army that will pose a risk either to its neighbors or to people in the region? Or are we creating a sort of praetorian guard for the leadership of the country? That's certainly not the hope that we have."
While AFRICOM is expanding its military-to-military cooperation, the State Department is also maintaining a program for training African militaries, albeit with a focus on peacekeeping. "Most, if not virtually all, of the African peacekeepers' training is being done through the State Department," Mazel said. In West Africa, for instance, "we've trained, through State Department-funded programs, the new armed forces" in Liberia, he said. "But we've also had mentors and trainers come from the military to support what we've been doing. Yes, there's been an overlap there, but it's continuous. It's not as if our civilian trainers are teaching one thing and the AFRICOM [trainers] are teaching another."
The indirect approach being touted by AFRICOM is punctuated with demonstrations of U.S. force, such as the precision strike against Nabhan. Some analysts, however, worry that such attacks may be counterproductive. In the Horn of Africa, Mesfin said, "what people see is actually who had the last laugh."
Still, Mesfin said that countries in the region are nervous after Al Shabab demonstrated its ability to carry out an organized attack. The suicide bombing in Mogadishu seemed to embolden the group, Mesfin said. Al Shabab warned Djibouti not to send troops to help the A.U. mission, and it even threatened Nairobi-based Ugandan and Burundian diplomats. The ambassadors "actually received text messages on their mobiles saying that their embassies in Nairobi will be attacked," Mesfin said. "People are nervous in Nairobi."
American observers warn against giving Al Shabab too much credit. "Even if Nabhan hadn't been terminated, [the suicide attack] probably would have happened anyways," Pham said. "It was attempted earlier in the summer and they failed." One thing is clear: U.S. policy in Africa will have to be quick to adapt to a fluid situation. "When you get involved in the Horn, you're either supporting one of the parties or changing the balance of power," Mesfin said. "Acting as a neutral observer doesn't work."
23 October 2009
‘NETWAR’ PIONEER CAUTIONS AGAINST SURGE FOR AFGHANISTAN
Inside the Pentagon
Instead of sending more troops to Afghanistan, the administration should adopt a policy that allows the military to use small outposts across the country to coordinate attacks against Taliban and al Qaeda fighters with the help of local tribes, a counterterrorism scholar argues in a new study sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The report, titled “Aspects of Netwar and the Conflict with al Qaeda” and delivered to OSD last month, was penned by Naval Postgraduate School professor John Arquilla. His “Netwar” concept posits that terrorist networks cannot be defeated by traditional military might.
News of the study comes as the debate in Washington about America’s course in Afghanistan grows more heated. Some Republican lawmakers have urged President Obama to immediately approve a request for tens of thousands of troops from Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the commander of U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan.
In a confidential assessment for Defense Secretary Robert Gates that was made public last month, McChrystal argued a manpower-intensive counterinsurgency strategy was needed to quell the resurgence of violent extremists.
But Arquilla disagrees.
“Whether the principal focus is al Qaeda terrorists or Taliban insurgents, there is no need for more troops,” he told InsideDefense.com in an e-mail. While the fight against al Qaeda cells worldwide has gone “reasonably well,” he argued, the situation in Afghanistan has worsened because DOD has abandoned the “Netwar” tactics -- the use of small, highly mobile groups of special operations forces, connected through information sharing platforms and with access to air support -- that helped topple the Taliban government eight years ago.
“We have done less well in countering the Taliban insurgent networks -- largely because of the increasing focus on and preference for waging a ‘big unit war,’” Arquilla wrote in the e-mail. “This has been our principal error in Afghanistan, a mistake that will only be compounded by sending more troops.”
DOD has about 65,000 troops deployed in Afghanistan.
“We have always had enough troops to move away from big, Bagram-sized basing to outposts,” Arquilla said, referring to the air field north of Kabul where some 20,000 troops are based.
In his study, Arquilla argues the 2007 surge of troops to Iraq is ill-suited to serve as a model for Afghanistan. The move was credited with bringing about marked security improvements in that country. But according to Arquilla, it was a focus on platoon-sized outposts, combined with the formation of local militias who began fighting insurgents, that brought down the level of violence.
The idea of “Netwar” leans heavily on the use of small, mobile units because they can “swarm” their targets with multiple attacks on multiple fronts. These units also are better suited to forge “social networks” with local populations -- even those that are initially hostile, Arquilla’s report states.
The document also calls for a change in the war’s “narrative.”
“[A]t the narrative and social levels, the implication is that Afghanistan is probably not a country where much effort should be given to trying to form and sustain a strong central government,” the report reads. “Instead, something looser -- cantonal, like Switzerland, or confederated, like [then-Sen.] Joseph Biden’s early (and misplaced) plan for Iraq -- seems far more appropriate in Afghanistan,” it adds. -- Sebastian Sprenger
PENTAGON-25-42-20
Instead of sending more troops to Afghanistan, the administration should adopt a policy that allows the military to use small outposts across the country to coordinate attacks against Taliban and al Qaeda fighters with the help of local tribes, a counterterrorism scholar argues in a new study sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The report, titled “Aspects of Netwar and the Conflict with al Qaeda” and delivered to OSD last month, was penned by Naval Postgraduate School professor John Arquilla. His “Netwar” concept posits that terrorist networks cannot be defeated by traditional military might.
News of the study comes as the debate in Washington about America’s course in Afghanistan grows more heated. Some Republican lawmakers have urged President Obama to immediately approve a request for tens of thousands of troops from Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the commander of U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan.
In a confidential assessment for Defense Secretary Robert Gates that was made public last month, McChrystal argued a manpower-intensive counterinsurgency strategy was needed to quell the resurgence of violent extremists.
But Arquilla disagrees.
“Whether the principal focus is al Qaeda terrorists or Taliban insurgents, there is no need for more troops,” he told InsideDefense.com in an e-mail. While the fight against al Qaeda cells worldwide has gone “reasonably well,” he argued, the situation in Afghanistan has worsened because DOD has abandoned the “Netwar” tactics -- the use of small, highly mobile groups of special operations forces, connected through information sharing platforms and with access to air support -- that helped topple the Taliban government eight years ago.
“We have done less well in countering the Taliban insurgent networks -- largely because of the increasing focus on and preference for waging a ‘big unit war,’” Arquilla wrote in the e-mail. “This has been our principal error in Afghanistan, a mistake that will only be compounded by sending more troops.”
DOD has about 65,000 troops deployed in Afghanistan.
“We have always had enough troops to move away from big, Bagram-sized basing to outposts,” Arquilla said, referring to the air field north of Kabul where some 20,000 troops are based.
In his study, Arquilla argues the 2007 surge of troops to Iraq is ill-suited to serve as a model for Afghanistan. The move was credited with bringing about marked security improvements in that country. But according to Arquilla, it was a focus on platoon-sized outposts, combined with the formation of local militias who began fighting insurgents, that brought down the level of violence.
The idea of “Netwar” leans heavily on the use of small, mobile units because they can “swarm” their targets with multiple attacks on multiple fronts. These units also are better suited to forge “social networks” with local populations -- even those that are initially hostile, Arquilla’s report states.
The document also calls for a change in the war’s “narrative.”
“[A]t the narrative and social levels, the implication is that Afghanistan is probably not a country where much effort should be given to trying to form and sustain a strong central government,” the report reads. “Instead, something looser -- cantonal, like Switzerland, or confederated, like [then-Sen.] Joseph Biden’s early (and misplaced) plan for Iraq -- seems far more appropriate in Afghanistan,” it adds. -- Sebastian Sprenger
PENTAGON-25-42-20
FLURRY OF NEW PENTAGON REPORTS TO ACCOMPANY QDR IN EARLY 2010
Inside Defense
The Pentagon must send Congress a flurry of new reports on force structure issues, basing plans and the global defense posture when it delivers the Quadrennial Defense Review report to lawmakers early next year, according to the fiscal year 2010 defense authorization conference agreement unveiled last week.
The legislation also tasks the Government Accountability Office with conducting a follow-up study of the QDR to ensure the review covered the required topics.
One legislative provision (section 1052), proposed earlier this year by House authorizers and approved recently by conferees, would require the Defense Department to prepare a report on the force structure findings of the ongoing QDR.
The report, which would have a classified annex, would include the analyses used to determine and support the findings on force structure and a description of any changes from the previous QDR to the minimum military requirements for major military capabilities. The force structure report would be due to Congress with the submission of the QDR report.
Another provision (section 1063), which originated with House authorizers, calls for a separate report on basing plans for combatant commands. This report would also be due to Congress with the QDR.
The report on basing plans would describe how the plans support the U.S. national security strategy; how the plan supports the security commitments undertaken by the United States pursuant to any international security treaty; how the plan addresses the current security environment in each geographic combatant command’s area of responsibility, including U.S. participation in theater security cooperation activities and bilateral partnership, exchanges, and training exercises; and the impact that a permanent change in the basing of a unit currently stationed outside the United States would have on such matters.
The same report would also cover the impact the plan will have on the status of overseas base closure and realignment actions undertaken as part of a global defense posture realignment strategy and the status of development and execution of comprehensive master plans for overseas military main operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations of the global defense posture of the United States; any recommendations for additional closures or realignments of military installations outside of the United States; and any comments resulting from an interagency review of the plan that includes the Department of State and other relevant federal departments and agencies.
This section also requires Defense Secretary Robert Gates to notify Congress at least 30 days prior to permanently relocating a unit stationed outside the United States.
Yet another provision (section 2822), which originated with Senate authorizers, calls for a new annual Pentagon report on global defense posture realignment and an update on an interagency review.
The first annual report would be due to Congress early next year with the submission of the FY-11 budget request. It would discuss the status of overseas base closure and realignment actions undertaken as part of a global defense posture realignment strategy as well as the status of development and execution of comprehensive
master plans for overseas military main operating bases, forward operating sites and cooperative security locations.
The report -- which overlaps somewhat with the study called for in section 1063 -- would address how the master plans would support the security commitments undertaken by the United States pursuant to any international security treaty; the impact of such plans on the current security environments in the combatant commands, including U.S. participation in theater security cooperation activities and bilateral partnership, exchanges and training exercises; and comments from Gates resulting from an interagency review that includes the State Department and other federal departments and agencies.
This provision also says that within 90 days of submitting the QDR to Congress, the Pentagon must submit an interagency overseas basing report detailing how the results of the assessment conducted as part of such review will impact the status of overseas base closure and realignment actions undertaken as part of a global defense posture realignment strategy and the status of development and execution of comprehensive master plans for overseas military main operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations of the U.S. global defense posture. This report is supposed to include any recommendations for additional closures or realignments of military
installations outside of the United States and any comments resulting from the interagency review.
In addition, the legislation directs the Government Accountability Office to review the QDR report to mull how well the Pentagon complied with the law requiring the report to address certain topics. The GAO report would be completed within 90 days of the issuance of the QDR. If the GAO determines the QDR report fails to directly address any required topics, the conference agreement would require Gates to submit another report addressing the items in question. This DOD report would be due 30 days after the GAO study is completed. -- Christopher J. Castelli
PENTAGON-25-41-8
The Pentagon must send Congress a flurry of new reports on force structure issues, basing plans and the global defense posture when it delivers the Quadrennial Defense Review report to lawmakers early next year, according to the fiscal year 2010 defense authorization conference agreement unveiled last week.
The legislation also tasks the Government Accountability Office with conducting a follow-up study of the QDR to ensure the review covered the required topics.
One legislative provision (section 1052), proposed earlier this year by House authorizers and approved recently by conferees, would require the Defense Department to prepare a report on the force structure findings of the ongoing QDR.
The report, which would have a classified annex, would include the analyses used to determine and support the findings on force structure and a description of any changes from the previous QDR to the minimum military requirements for major military capabilities. The force structure report would be due to Congress with the submission of the QDR report.
Another provision (section 1063), which originated with House authorizers, calls for a separate report on basing plans for combatant commands. This report would also be due to Congress with the QDR.
The report on basing plans would describe how the plans support the U.S. national security strategy; how the plan supports the security commitments undertaken by the United States pursuant to any international security treaty; how the plan addresses the current security environment in each geographic combatant command’s area of responsibility, including U.S. participation in theater security cooperation activities and bilateral partnership, exchanges, and training exercises; and the impact that a permanent change in the basing of a unit currently stationed outside the United States would have on such matters.
The same report would also cover the impact the plan will have on the status of overseas base closure and realignment actions undertaken as part of a global defense posture realignment strategy and the status of development and execution of comprehensive master plans for overseas military main operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations of the global defense posture of the United States; any recommendations for additional closures or realignments of military installations outside of the United States; and any comments resulting from an interagency review of the plan that includes the Department of State and other relevant federal departments and agencies.
This section also requires Defense Secretary Robert Gates to notify Congress at least 30 days prior to permanently relocating a unit stationed outside the United States.
Yet another provision (section 2822), which originated with Senate authorizers, calls for a new annual Pentagon report on global defense posture realignment and an update on an interagency review.
The first annual report would be due to Congress early next year with the submission of the FY-11 budget request. It would discuss the status of overseas base closure and realignment actions undertaken as part of a global defense posture realignment strategy as well as the status of development and execution of comprehensive
master plans for overseas military main operating bases, forward operating sites and cooperative security locations.
The report -- which overlaps somewhat with the study called for in section 1063 -- would address how the master plans would support the security commitments undertaken by the United States pursuant to any international security treaty; the impact of such plans on the current security environments in the combatant commands, including U.S. participation in theater security cooperation activities and bilateral partnership, exchanges and training exercises; and comments from Gates resulting from an interagency review that includes the State Department and other federal departments and agencies.
This provision also says that within 90 days of submitting the QDR to Congress, the Pentagon must submit an interagency overseas basing report detailing how the results of the assessment conducted as part of such review will impact the status of overseas base closure and realignment actions undertaken as part of a global defense posture realignment strategy and the status of development and execution of comprehensive master plans for overseas military main operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations of the U.S. global defense posture. This report is supposed to include any recommendations for additional closures or realignments of military
installations outside of the United States and any comments resulting from the interagency review.
In addition, the legislation directs the Government Accountability Office to review the QDR report to mull how well the Pentagon complied with the law requiring the report to address certain topics. The GAO report would be completed within 90 days of the issuance of the QDR. If the GAO determines the QDR report fails to directly address any required topics, the conference agreement would require Gates to submit another report addressing the items in question. This DOD report would be due 30 days after the GAO study is completed. -- Christopher J. Castelli
PENTAGON-25-41-8
Secret War Game Report Alerted QDR Leaders to Raft of Vulnerabilities
Inside Defense
Oct. 9, 2009 -- U.S. Joint Forces Command officials over the summer alerted Defense Department leaders to a raft of recently identified vulnerabilities and capability gaps so significant that command officials decided the information must be kept secret, a JFCOM official said today.
In keeping the findings of an early summer war game in Northern Virginia classified, command officials reversed an earlier decision to publish a public report on the outcome of the drill by late July. The war game set out to test the tenets of the January 2009 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, a key document whose ideas are now making their way into emerging Marine Corps and Army warfighting doctrine.
The assumptions of the CCJO “held up very well” in the war game, JFCOM's Rear Adm. Dan Davenport asserted in a telephone call with reporters today. But he also spoke of a “depth” and quantity of vulnerabilities exposed through the war game that seemed unexpected.
In particular, the information U.S. adversaries could derive from the “combination” of vulnerabilities outlined in the war game report spurred the decision to restrict its distribution to cleared individuals with a need to know, Davenport said.
Davenport leads JFCOM's directorate for joint concept development and experimentation (J-9).
In late June, command officials forwarded an initial batch of findings and recommendations to defense officials conducting the Quadrennial Defense Review, according to Davenport. They sent the complete report when it was finished about a month later, he added.
“There is definitely a sense of urgency” at JFCOM and among DOD leaders to address the vulnerabilities outlined in the report, Davenport said. “The leaders who participated in the war game certainly had a sense of urgency that was expressed throughout the war game and since the war game,” he added.
The war game pitted friendly, or blue, forces against teams of red forces, simulated adversaries, composed of “regional subject-matter experts with broad experience in national security,” according to Davenport.
While JFCOM officials have declined to describe the three war game scenarios in detail, they have said the drill involved dealing with a state competitor, a state slipping into lawlessness, and some form of a stateless global terrorist organization.
During the drill, blue forces had to conduct missions without the flood of crucial situational awareness data normally piped via cables and satellites to the most remote places on Earth. The result was a “real impact” on blue forces, but not enough to keep them from reaching their objective, Davenport said.
The game showed communication systems must be made more “resilient and redundant” in the face of potential cyber attacks, according to Davenport. In addition, troops must receive the proper training so they can function without data networks at their constant disposal, he added.
The area of information operations also showed much need for improvement during the war game, officials have said. “We saw in the game that our forces will often be operating in areas with multiple competing narratives at play,” Davenport said today. “In the war game, red was often able to maintain the initiative in the battle of the narrative, forcing blue to be largely reactive,” he added.
Adversaries' capabilities to block U.S. forces from entering future battlefields also played a big role in the drill. “We have a fairly robust collection of recommendations and insights that we are forwarding in that area,” Davenport said.
One way of ensuring U.S. forces can access distant battlefields in the future is through “relations and agreements” with key countries worldwide, according to Davenport. But DOD also must have countermeasures for defeating anti-access capabilities when U.S. forces need to “take access,” he added.
Since the war game, J-9 officials have begun writing a series of concept papers to explain in more detail the implications of grouping major military activities into the categories "combat," "security," "engagement" and "relief and reconstruction," as is done in the CCJO, Davenport said. -- Sebastian Sprenger
1092009_oct9b
Oct. 9, 2009 -- U.S. Joint Forces Command officials over the summer alerted Defense Department leaders to a raft of recently identified vulnerabilities and capability gaps so significant that command officials decided the information must be kept secret, a JFCOM official said today.
In keeping the findings of an early summer war game in Northern Virginia classified, command officials reversed an earlier decision to publish a public report on the outcome of the drill by late July. The war game set out to test the tenets of the January 2009 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, a key document whose ideas are now making their way into emerging Marine Corps and Army warfighting doctrine.
The assumptions of the CCJO “held up very well” in the war game, JFCOM's Rear Adm. Dan Davenport asserted in a telephone call with reporters today. But he also spoke of a “depth” and quantity of vulnerabilities exposed through the war game that seemed unexpected.
In particular, the information U.S. adversaries could derive from the “combination” of vulnerabilities outlined in the war game report spurred the decision to restrict its distribution to cleared individuals with a need to know, Davenport said.
Davenport leads JFCOM's directorate for joint concept development and experimentation (J-9).
In late June, command officials forwarded an initial batch of findings and recommendations to defense officials conducting the Quadrennial Defense Review, according to Davenport. They sent the complete report when it was finished about a month later, he added.
“There is definitely a sense of urgency” at JFCOM and among DOD leaders to address the vulnerabilities outlined in the report, Davenport said. “The leaders who participated in the war game certainly had a sense of urgency that was expressed throughout the war game and since the war game,” he added.
The war game pitted friendly, or blue, forces against teams of red forces, simulated adversaries, composed of “regional subject-matter experts with broad experience in national security,” according to Davenport.
While JFCOM officials have declined to describe the three war game scenarios in detail, they have said the drill involved dealing with a state competitor, a state slipping into lawlessness, and some form of a stateless global terrorist organization.
During the drill, blue forces had to conduct missions without the flood of crucial situational awareness data normally piped via cables and satellites to the most remote places on Earth. The result was a “real impact” on blue forces, but not enough to keep them from reaching their objective, Davenport said.
The game showed communication systems must be made more “resilient and redundant” in the face of potential cyber attacks, according to Davenport. In addition, troops must receive the proper training so they can function without data networks at their constant disposal, he added.
The area of information operations also showed much need for improvement during the war game, officials have said. “We saw in the game that our forces will often be operating in areas with multiple competing narratives at play,” Davenport said today. “In the war game, red was often able to maintain the initiative in the battle of the narrative, forcing blue to be largely reactive,” he added.
Adversaries' capabilities to block U.S. forces from entering future battlefields also played a big role in the drill. “We have a fairly robust collection of recommendations and insights that we are forwarding in that area,” Davenport said.
One way of ensuring U.S. forces can access distant battlefields in the future is through “relations and agreements” with key countries worldwide, according to Davenport. But DOD also must have countermeasures for defeating anti-access capabilities when U.S. forces need to “take access,” he added.
Since the war game, J-9 officials have begun writing a series of concept papers to explain in more detail the implications of grouping major military activities into the categories "combat," "security," "engagement" and "relief and reconstruction," as is done in the CCJO, Davenport said. -- Sebastian Sprenger
1092009_oct9b
PENTAGON LOOKS TO ALTER MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE CONSTRUCT
Inside Defense
The Pentagon is heading back to the drawing board to redefine a key element of the seabasing concept, a move that will delay plans to deliver a new logistics ship to the fleet that is intended to be a centerpiece of the Navy’s Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) group of vessels, according to Defense Department officials.
The move is part of a wider review of amphibious capabilities Defense Secretary Robert Gates ordered in the spring that is set to be briefed to senior Pentagon leaders this week.
“We’re reconceptualizing that program,” said a senior Pentagon official, referring to MPF(F).
MPF(F) is intended to be a collection of ships meant to support more permanent sea bases in the future.
The program of record -- which Navy and Marine officials have said may change -- calls for a squadron of: two LHA-R large-deck amphibious ships, one LHD large-deck amphibious ship, three Mobile Landing Platform transport ships, three Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off vessels, three T-AKE cargo ships and two TAK legacy ships. The goal has been to buy the ships in increments.
The integral element of MPF(F) is the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP), a pier ship that will serve as the interface between other ships for the transfer of vehicles and other equipment. In April, Gates announced plans to scrutinize the requirement for MLP and other amphibious capabilities such as the 11th LPD-17 dock ship, to “assess costs and analyze the amount of these capabilities the nation needs” over the summer in preparing the fiscal year 2011 budget request.
That assessment is nearing completion, according to Pentagon sources.
Sources said it is likely the Pentagon will opt for an existing alternative to building the MLP.
In February, the Navy awarded San Diego-based General Dynamics’ National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) a $3.5 million initial design contract for MLP with an option for a second phase. Delivery of the first MLP is slated for 2015, the Navy said at the time of the award.
“At sea functionality remains an imperative [for the Defense Department],” a source noted. “But it may not be an MLP, it may be an MLP-like capability.”
In its version of the fiscal year 2010 defense authorization bill, the Senate Armed Services Committee cut one of the two requested T-AKE auxiliary vessels in the department’s budget request. The House opted to fund the request.
The $400 million cut by Senate authorizers was appealed by the Defense Department in a recent package of appeals sent to Capitol Hill.
“The Navy has awarded a contract for $100 million of long-lead time material in December 2008 with funding authorized and appropriated in FY-08,” the Pentagon writes. “Removing the T-AKE-14 would result in excess material to the government, although some of the material could be delivered to Military Sealift Command as spares. Also, the T-AKE program is in full-rate production and the president’s budget request to fund T-AKEs-13-14 detail design and construction in FY-10 will yield the most efficient build plan for this class. Delaying award of the T-AKE-14 will result in production inefficiencies, and an increased risk of exceeding target costs for T-AKE-14 as well as other ships under construction.”
The difference between the House and Senate versions of the bill will be resolved in the conference process this fall.
Sources said last week the Navy and Marine Corps would make use of the additional T-AKE ships regardless of the fate of MPF(F).
The Senate Appropriations Committee supported the authorizers’ cut in its version of the FY-10 defense spending bill.
“The committee supports the recommendation of the Senate Armed Services Committee to reduce the request by $400,000,000 [for T-AKE] to delay exercising the option for the second of the two ships until after the department completes the QDR reviews of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) concept,” the lawmakers write in the report accompanying the bill.
House appropriators supported the two T-AKE vessels requested by the Pentagon. The difference will be resolved in the conference process. -- Zachary M. Peterson with additional reporting by Jason Sherman
NAVY-22-37-1
The Pentagon is heading back to the drawing board to redefine a key element of the seabasing concept, a move that will delay plans to deliver a new logistics ship to the fleet that is intended to be a centerpiece of the Navy’s Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) group of vessels, according to Defense Department officials.
The move is part of a wider review of amphibious capabilities Defense Secretary Robert Gates ordered in the spring that is set to be briefed to senior Pentagon leaders this week.
“We’re reconceptualizing that program,” said a senior Pentagon official, referring to MPF(F).
MPF(F) is intended to be a collection of ships meant to support more permanent sea bases in the future.
The program of record -- which Navy and Marine officials have said may change -- calls for a squadron of: two LHA-R large-deck amphibious ships, one LHD large-deck amphibious ship, three Mobile Landing Platform transport ships, three Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off vessels, three T-AKE cargo ships and two TAK legacy ships. The goal has been to buy the ships in increments.
The integral element of MPF(F) is the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP), a pier ship that will serve as the interface between other ships for the transfer of vehicles and other equipment. In April, Gates announced plans to scrutinize the requirement for MLP and other amphibious capabilities such as the 11th LPD-17 dock ship, to “assess costs and analyze the amount of these capabilities the nation needs” over the summer in preparing the fiscal year 2011 budget request.
That assessment is nearing completion, according to Pentagon sources.
Sources said it is likely the Pentagon will opt for an existing alternative to building the MLP.
In February, the Navy awarded San Diego-based General Dynamics’ National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) a $3.5 million initial design contract for MLP with an option for a second phase. Delivery of the first MLP is slated for 2015, the Navy said at the time of the award.
“At sea functionality remains an imperative [for the Defense Department],” a source noted. “But it may not be an MLP, it may be an MLP-like capability.”
In its version of the fiscal year 2010 defense authorization bill, the Senate Armed Services Committee cut one of the two requested T-AKE auxiliary vessels in the department’s budget request. The House opted to fund the request.
The $400 million cut by Senate authorizers was appealed by the Defense Department in a recent package of appeals sent to Capitol Hill.
“The Navy has awarded a contract for $100 million of long-lead time material in December 2008 with funding authorized and appropriated in FY-08,” the Pentagon writes. “Removing the T-AKE-14 would result in excess material to the government, although some of the material could be delivered to Military Sealift Command as spares. Also, the T-AKE program is in full-rate production and the president’s budget request to fund T-AKEs-13-14 detail design and construction in FY-10 will yield the most efficient build plan for this class. Delaying award of the T-AKE-14 will result in production inefficiencies, and an increased risk of exceeding target costs for T-AKE-14 as well as other ships under construction.”
The difference between the House and Senate versions of the bill will be resolved in the conference process this fall.
Sources said last week the Navy and Marine Corps would make use of the additional T-AKE ships regardless of the fate of MPF(F).
The Senate Appropriations Committee supported the authorizers’ cut in its version of the FY-10 defense spending bill.
“The committee supports the recommendation of the Senate Armed Services Committee to reduce the request by $400,000,000 [for T-AKE] to delay exercising the option for the second of the two ships until after the department completes the QDR reviews of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) concept,” the lawmakers write in the report accompanying the bill.
House appropriators supported the two T-AKE vessels requested by the Pentagon. The difference will be resolved in the conference process. -- Zachary M. Peterson with additional reporting by Jason Sherman
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