Defense News editorial, 16 May 2011
One of the natural laws of government is that many of the numbers cited as totems of progress are less than they appear. Take the Pentagon's claim that it's already cut defense spending by some $400 billion over the coming years. Of that, according to a Defense News analysis, some $330 billion reportedly was from the termination of key, high-profile programs announced by Defense Secretary Robert Gates in April 2009. The rest is from an aggressive effort to slash overhead spending to the tune of $178 billion, $78 billion of which went to the Treasury and the rest staying in the services' budgets for "reinvestment."
President Obama lauded Gates for the cuts and called for another $400 billion to be slashed from broader national security spending through 2023. Gates did it once, Obama said, and - pending a roles and missions review - he can do it again.
That rang alarm bells in the Pentagon, where officials recognized that their "we saved $400 billion" bumper sticker was based largely on plans not to spend funds in out-year budgets.
And some of the programs that were canceled - such as a new Air Force bomber - were resurrected in other, similar programs.
In fairness to the outgoing defense secretary, the follow-on bomber program that came back may be less ambitious and cheaper than the one that was canceled. And analysts say the Transformational Communications Satellite System needed to be ended after it consumed $3 billion in research and development spending without showing much actual technology development. But in any true accounting, replacement programs and their costs must be netted against the claimed savings.
There is an old Washington saying that no money is less real than out-year money. This means that anything that is beyond the immediate spending bill is purely notional. The problem is, the Pentagon apparently hasn't come to grips with the reality that defense spending, at best, will remain flat as manpower, medical, materials, energy and maintenance costs continue to soar, forcing cuts in investment accounts.
The timing could hardly be worse as the nation needs to modernize its fighter jets, bombers, aerial tankers and warships and fund recapitalization programs for the Army, which has gained much new gear through robust supplemental spending.
cuts are coming, and DoD must make its own before having to make forced cuts. Requirement control is a popular method of limiting the costs of new weapons, but it's equally important to control the growing number of missions.
The first step should be to ensure the roles-and-missions review ordered by Obama slashes unnecessary and costly redundancies in capabilities. Unmanned aircraft programs, for example, have proliferated to the point that each service will build a fleet of aircraft, each with differing mission equipment, training and logistics streams.
Second, the Pentagon must avoid doing what it did - portraying soft numbers as hard ones that do little other than expose it to criticism.
Lastly, to make wise cuts, the Pentagon must improve its internal financial management processes to pinpoint what it's spending and how. Without hard data, it's hard to come up with hard savings.
Citation: Defense News editorial, 16 May 2011. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=6508896&c=FEA&s=COM (16 May 2011)