By June Teufel Dryer
Global Beat, 22 June 1998
Although the People's Liberation Army would be no match for U.S. forces in a major war, it is feared by neighboring powers and could conceivably do considerable damage to American forces in an Asian regional scenario. China's aim may be to build a military that is perceived as so powerful that neighboring states with whom it has territorial disputes will capitulate rather than contest their claims.
This primer assesses China's military capabilities in five categories: defense posture, strategic forces, ground forces, naval forces, and air and air defense.
I. Defense posture
Although China's military - the People's Liberation Army - would be no match for U.S. forces in a major war, it is feared by neighboring powers and could conceivably do considerable damage to American forces in an Asian regional scenario. The military modernization of the PLA is expected to focus on three areas: small high-tech forces for use in regional scenarios; large low-to-medium tech forces for internal security purposes; and a strategic nuclear force sufficiently potent to provide a deterrent to other powers. China's aim may be to build a military that is perceived as so powerful that neighboring states with whom it has territorial disputes will capitulate rather than contest their claims.
Deployment
Ground and air forces are divided into seven military regions each covering several provinces apiece; The navy into three fleets (North, East, and South) on China's eastern coast. Ground troops (approximately half of total) are heavily concentrated in the north and northeast around Beijing and near the border with Russia. The bulk of marines are attached to South Sea Fleet, reflecting territorial disputes with neighbors involving sovereignty over Taiwan, the Spratlys, Paracels, and Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands.
Readiness
Varies widely, with elite rapid reaction units at the high end. Readiness levels are not available on unclassified basis. Despite recent improvements, training methods continue to be deficient. Officers are better educated but the poor educational levels of rank-and-file troops remains a limitation. Time in-air and at-sea for air force and the navy remain well below NATO standards.
Defense spending
The published defense budget has been rising by approximately 10 percent annually since 1988. China defends this by pointing out that these increases barely keep pace with inflation. But actual defense spending is estimated to be three to four times the published budget. Moreover, this year's increase to the published defense budget, 12.8 percent or about $11 billion, occurs as inflation rate is estimated to be under three percent.
Doctrine
The expectation is that the PLA must be prepared to fight local, limited, high-tech wars on China's periphery, presumably including ethnic conflict within China's borders. China has accused unspecified foreign forces of instigating these ethnic conflicts. The country does not fear attack on Chinese territory but has defined all disputed territorial claims as strictly domestic (see Deployment). China does fear a U.S.-Japan alliance to "contain" China which may impede recovery of these "lost territories."
Political aspects
There has been no PLA presence in the powerful Standing Committee of the Political Bureau since the 15th Party Congress in the fall 1997. However, all top generals have been appointed by President Jiang Zemin and are believed loyal to him. Some analysts believe that the military leadership has been urging a harder foreign policy line on Jiang but hard evidence is lacking.
II. Strategic Forces
China's strategic force constitutes a credible deterrent but is not regarded by military experts as a force with a first strike posture. China has world's third-largest nuclear weapons arsenal and is expected to field ICBMs with multiple independently targeted warheads (MIRVs) by 2010.
Nuclear warheads
At least 100; some estimates say as high as 1,000. U.S. Air Force sources estimate 17-20 are targeted at U.S.; it is likely some can reach east coast cities.
Rocket forces and bombers
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles: 17 or more, 7 being fitted with multiple (MIRVed) independently targeted warheads; 10 plus or more older types. Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles: About 46. Long-range bombers: None known.
Ballistic missile submarines:
One Xia-class SSBM carrying 12 intermediate ranged ballistic missiles.
III. Ground forces
A total of 2,090,000 personnel are under arms in China. But ground forces have received lowest priority for modernization after naval, air, and strategic forces. Consequently, the infantry will probably absorb the bulk of a planned reduction of 500,000 in the size of the PLA. Apart from a small number of rapid reaction units, the ground forces lack firepower and mobility. Modernization efforts include upgrading logistics capabilities and firepower of ground forces in general and increasing the number of rapid reaction units.
Main armor
Overall vastly inferior to comparable Western main battle tanks. China operates 8, 500 large tanks, primarily severely outdated indigenously-produced copies of Soviet T-54s. These are being phased out as more modern Chinese-made Type 85 IIMs, equipped with Israeli technology, come on line.
Other armor
China maintains about 1200 Type 63 amphibious light tanks and 800 Type 62 light tanks.
Artillery
Except for the HJ-8 anti-tank weapons, these are Soviet - or Chinese versions of Soviet - designs which have been around since the 1950s or earlier. However, some are still effective weapons.
Towed artillery
About 14,500 total barrels, though numbers are not certain. They break down as follows:
* Multiple rocket launchers: 122 mm/130 mm/273 mm
* Mortars: 82 mm/100 mm/120 mm/160 mm.
* Anti-tank guided weapons: HJ-73 (similar to Soviet Sagger); HJ-8 anti-tank weapons.
* Air Defense guns: 23 mm/37 mm/57 mm/85 mm/100 mm.
Armored personnel carriers
5,500, comparable to older Soviet wheeled BTR series.
Regular army
2,090,000 organized into 24 group armies of 60,000-90,000 each. Group armies composed of three infantry divisions plus tank, artillery, air defense, and support units. Composition and readiness vary from group army to group army; figures not available on an unclassified basis.
Elite units
Fifteen to twenty percent of ground forces belong to commando units with superior training and weapons and capable of rapid deployment.
Marines
One brigade plus special reconnaissance units, about 5,000 men, under naval command.
Airlift capability
Insufficient to transport all airborne units at once.
IV. Naval forces
The PLA's Navy - the PLAN - operates approximately 970 ships, most of which are small and obsolete. Naval modernization is underway, including construction and deployment of Luhu-class destroyers and Jiangwei-class frigates capable of carrying helicopters. Ships are being retrofitted with new types of missiles; Kilo-class submarines and advanced radar systems have been purchased from Russia. However, these improvements will not address PLAN's fundamental problem: its inability to mount sustained, coordinated operations and protect itself while doing so.
Ballistic missile submarines
One Xia, with 12 intermediate ranged ballistic missiles.
Attack submarines
There are 59 or 60 attack submarines
* Nuclear powered submarines: 5 Han-class with 533 mm torpedo tubes;
* Cruise missile submarines: 1 ex-Soviet Romeo-class with with 6 C-801 (similar to French Exocet) SSM and 533 mm torpedo tubes;
* Diesel submarines: 53-54, mostly older ex-Soviet Romeos, but including 3-to-4 more modern Russian-purchased Kilo-class with advanced radar systems.
Destroyers
There are 18 mostly obsolete destroyers.
Frigates
There are approximately 36 frigates, mostly Jiangwei-class. A few Jiangwei carry one French Dauphin helicopter each, but most are equipped with guns and anti-submarine weapons from the '70s and '80s.
Patrol boats
About 830 missile boats, torpedo boats and patrol boats, plus about 120 mine-countermeasure craft. Some of these have been assigned to paramilitary forces, including the People's Armed Police, the border guards; the militia and Customs Services. While it is difficult to be certain of their numbers, overall combat effectiveness is low.
Amphibious warfare
There are 71 LST/LSM types plus 140 smaller craft; can be supplemented by civilian craft. Lift for 1 or two 2 divisions, but limited capacity for assault landings or large-scale amphibious operations. Sufficient sealift for marines but little evidence that other ground forces have amphibious training.
V. Air and air defenses forces
The People's Liberation Army Air Force - the PLAAF - has a large number of combat aircraft, about 5,150. But most of its mainstays are modeled after first and second-generation fighters of the former Soviet Union. In recent years, China has developed and deployed new-type fighters such as the J-8 II (F-8 II) and purchased Sukhoi Su-27 fighters plus permission to produce Su-27s domestically under license from Russia. Modernization plans center on developing strategic airlift, aerial refueling, ground attack capabilities and a new generation of air-superiority fighters. A total of about 470,000 personnel fall under the air and air defense category.
Bombers
The U.S. National Defense University 1997 report says "180 nuclear capable bombers," but that includes some planes which might not prove very useful in wartime. For instance, the authoritative Institute for International Strategic Studies 1997-98 Military Balance says that of 100 H-6 medium bombers, "some may be nuclear-capable." H-6s are copies of Russian Badgers, lumbering Tupolov planes which first flew in 1952.China also operates about 200 H-5 medium bombers, copies of Soviet-built Beagles, Ilyushin planes which first flew in 1948.
Fighters
Forty Su-27; Eight Su-27 B; Two-thousand J-6; Five hundred J-7; Two hundred J-8.
Ground attack
More than 400 Q-5 attack jets, comparable to old American A-4.
Transports
Ten Soviet Il-76, with 12 more rumored to have been purchased; 18 British BAe Trident; about 400 older aircraft, again copies of Soviet types. Some are configured as tankers, but China has no real air-to-air refueling capability.
Command and control capabilities
China maintains tracking stations in Xinjiang and Shanxi that are phased-array radar complex for ballistic missile early warning.
Air defense
Sixteen divisions under the air force, plus navy and ground force units. Guns and older Surface-to-air missiles (SAM) systems.
Naval Air Force
535 land-based aircraft of the same types as the air force are under the command of the navy.
June Teufel Dreyer is professor of political science at the University of Miami Department of Political Science.
She wrote this primer for "The Challenge of China," a project of MSNBC and the New York University Center for War, Peace, and the News Media.
---------------------------
Citation: June Teufel Dryer. "China's Rusting Sword Despite Nuclear Status and Large Army, China has Little Offensive Capability," Global Beat, 22 June 1998.
Original URL: http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/china/06221998dryer.html
---------------------------