By Andy Chan
10 February 2001
Note: WarZone Campaign (WZC) in Chinese is (Zhanqu Zhanyi�Ͼԧ�) and it can also translate as theaters of operation. Please do not confuse the WZC with the old Soviet era military term Operational Art of War in which generally used to describe the areas between strategy and tactics.
Chapter One:
Introduction:
WarZone Campaing (WZC) doctrine a team very frequently used by PLA officers in recent years. It is a doctrine, which PLA developed for its future wars. It is generally describes a strategic region where military operation is conducted during a limited war. Is similar to the NATO notion of theatre of operation:
Limited war with had the following characters:
? The opponent will not be a superpower.
? The war will be near China's border.
? The war will not be a deep invasion.
? China will seek a quick military decision.
? Rapid reaction and deployment forces will enough to defeat the local forces of Vietnam, India, Central Asia, Philippines, Malaysia, or Indonesia.
Limited war is identified by the by PLA call for military to prepare not for a protracted People's War with national mobilization, but for a quick, smaller scale "limited war under high-tech conditions," or simply Limited War (jubu zhanzheng). Chinese military writers frequently cite a speech by Deng Xiaoping to the Central Military Commission in 1985 to explain the origins of the concept. Deng's speech flatly decreed that the world would not be seeing a global war or a major nuclear war for "a long time to come." In the decade since that speech, Chinese analysts have spelled out more than 30 conflict scenarios in articles, from this school of thought, as well as in interviews by the author with Chinese military officers.
The traditional PLA Military Region (MR) is land force, geographic and regional political based, and the WZC is a clear departure of that concept. WZC is an operational based doctrine and involves all services of the PLA.
WZC is the doctrine for conducting a limited war under high-tech condition, it started as the realization by the PLA planners in which they are technologically inferior if compared with its potential adversaries, the goal of WZC is to use PLA's selective Packet Of Excellence (POE), to offer set adversary's technologic edge. At the currently PRC's economic structure, the PLA cannot afford to modernized all this armed force.
China's past impractical and insular approach to military modernization gave way to a new effect at examining and selectively incorporating advanced foreign military technologies while attempting to indigenize those qualities through licensed co-production of complete or subcomponents of a system . At the same time, large effect has been place on R&D areas instead fielding largest already outdated systems.
The PLA will use this selectively systems and technologies to build its WZC military operation upon.
Belief History:
This WZC concept is first recorded in 1979, an ad hoc operational area commands (zhanqu) was form during the first Sino-VN war, when it engaged in military operations. The Southern Command as it was known was actually directed the attack on Vietnam. In addition, there was a Northern Command, formed out of three northern Military Regions (Shenyang, Beijing, and Lanzhou) facing toward the Soviet Union. This concept was further develop in the 80s to meeting China's strategy and tactics needs, in spring of 1996 when the PLA was engaging in large-scale exercises and firing rockets across the Taiwan Strait, they formed the Fujian Front, rather than have the normal Nanjing Military Region.
The WZC concept was first advocated by the late Deng Xiaoping, instead of shifting priority resources from civil infrastructure and economic reform programs to an across-the board PLA modernization. He intends to focus on programs that will give China the most effective mean for exploiting critical vulnerabilities in defense.
It was clear in the early 80s, PLA will not and does not have the funding, nor technologies, know-how and the professionalism to change this trend if the currently military doctrine and deployment continues. Although the PLA advanced all its strategic goals in its short war with Vietnam, the performance of the PLA was poor. The Allied victory in the dessert war of 1991 only to push the PLA to adopted a new doctrine in a much faster pace by shift more resource into the military. Limited war under hi-tech condition calls for modernization priorities within the PLA are focused on the missile, air, and naval arms, the rapid reaction and deployment formations of the army as well. By created pockets of excellence within the PLA, and follow the WZC doctrine, the PLA hope to enable China to be a address most if not all its security issues. It is an impressive undertaking; consider the scale of the reform, which involved millions of men, and a time honored military tradition that all member of the PLA leadership trained under.
PLA Trend:
In order to understand the concept of WZC, it is helpful to examine the trends of the PLA forces structure.
In recent years, the PLA leadership lay out the PLA forces structure and directions in number of speech, news report and research publications, and the recent China Defense White paper. To give a few examples: Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang's China's Security, Michael Pillsbury's Chinese Views of Future Warfare, You Ji's The Armed Force of China and included the Annual Report to the US congress. .
The trend can be summarized in the following points:
1. Active duty PLA forces will become quantitatively smaller, with an emphasis on technological quality and training.
2. Reserves and the People's Armed Police will increase in size; they will replace the role of the people's militia.
3. People? war concept of the organization the militia appears to weigh close to zero as a factor in PRC strategic planning.
4. The PLA will retain many existing weapons and attempt to develop new tactics and techniques to defeat a high-technology enemy. PLA can only afford to supply limited elite formations with latest equipments and weapons
5. Only limited amounts of foreign weapons and equipment will be introduced into the forces; the indigenous Chinese defense industry will continue to be the source of the majority of modern weapons. And most the funding will be focus on Weapon R&D.
6. Capabilities will emphasize rapid response and joint operations, focusing on precision attack, join air, naval, special and, information warfare.
7. Command and control organizations will be reorganized to streamline the C3I process.
8. The military region will pay less and less in the role of War fighting, and move toward more of a support role.
9. More force will be cut from the Currently PLA order of battle (orbat). It is important to note that PLA includes 500,000 civilian employees in its active duty forces. And many other services is continue to outsource. According to South China Morning Post (June 30, 1998) PLA is going to cut 100,000 personnel per year through much of next decade. By 2010, the total members of the PLA in all services will be less then 2 million. Voluntaries will make up bulk if not all of the forces.
10. Number of Political commissars will be cut in lower echo of the PLA formations. The large number of reserve and PAP will replace the PLA in disaster relief and community service missions.
11. And most important of all, the war PLA will be facing is a limited war.
The WZC Doctrine is the PLA attempt to bring the above 11 points together, to form a comprehensive defense doctrine for future limited wars.
Since the early 1980s periodic rumors have gone around Beijing about the Military Regions (MRs) being completely abolished. Some report suggested
A new five new local headquarters will be form out of the old ones, again the term WarZones,? was used.
The early report by Dennis J. Blasko in his a new PLA Force Structure? suggested a new five local HQ strategic based fronts:
? The Northeast, oriented toward Russia, Korea, and Japan.
? The Northwest, oriented toward Central Asia and Russia.
? The East, oriented toward Taiwan and Japan.
? The South, oriented toward the South China Sea, Indochina and India.
? The Central Reserve and Capital Region, primarily used as a holding area from which additional troops can be dispatched to China's four corners, as well as protection of Beijing.
But more recently, a number of good articles and books stated the otherwise.
The definition of the WarZone Doctrine became clearer and more forward-looking. Chapter two addresses the concept of WZC.
The Concept of the WZC:
WZc's major features is it is an intermediate campaign mode between a major or total war involving partial or total national mobilization, or of very limited scale critical Hit Warfare? of special force actions.
WZC can be divided into three phases:
Elite forces and sharp arms (Jingbing Liqi):
To use Special Operation Force (SOF) and gain first hand information of the battle, disrupt enemy's build up, in addition to build up a presents with elite forces and make a political statement to the adversary to back off. The WZC is aiming at the political victory, not territorial gain. If the adversary backs off, the WZC is consider successful.
Gaining initiative by striking first (Xianji Zhidi):
Conducting preemptive strikes against the enemy's most critical targets, often referred to as winning victory with one strike? to convince an enemy to desist without having to defeat his military forces, to make political decisions in line with the Chinese objective.
Fighting a quick battle to forces a quick resolutions (Suzhan Sujue)
Send in the mobile formations such as the armor and mechanized infantry divisions for a quick kill, and force the final political resolution. If the two elements were successful, victory will belong to PLA when the last elements are to carry out.
The WZC doctrine helps to transform the absolute PLA inferiority into local and temporary superiority by using its pockets of excellence? particularly in naval, air, conventional, strategic missile, rapid reaction, and special operations capabilities.
The NATO operation in Kosovo, and the Gulf War only reinforce the PLA strategists notions that passivity army will not survive in the modern battle field, more and more, modern battle field increasingly a contest of �|o contact? in which, air power and long range fire will effective soft the passive armies? defense and limit its freedom of action to a point when the land force attacks, the contest phase of the war is over.
WZC is does not address total war. The scale of a total nation-state war will overwhelm and diminish the relevance of these PLA pockets of excellence,? because of the technologically superior superpower(s) is likely to employ its most advanced weapons simultaneously on all fronts and throughout the war process.
WZC is more limited and shorter than a total war, because the PLA is more likely to deal with an adversary that is much less powerful than a superpower and in a shorter time frame. The goal of such limited wars is political rather then territorial, Sino-India war of 1962 and Sino-Vietnam war of 1979 are examples.
Command:
Command it the most important component of any wars, The traditional MR commanding organs are ground-force-dominated, since they reflect the ground force nature of PLA. Such domination will cause inter-service friction since PLAN and PLAAF is not under direct PLA command but equal partners in CMC
Also, the lack of professional and technical experience of some MR commanding officers in non-ground force services may not contribute to an optimal combination of various service components, the basic condition for achieving local and temporary superiority.
The WZC address the above issues by creating a central control command structure in time of need.
A WZC command is to be created, with a CMC representative system will be established at the top command level in the war zone, a practice similar to that of USSR during World War II . The representative is directly responsible to the supreme command in Bejing, commands and coordinates all PLA units in war zone and can issue direct orders to the civilian government in the region.
The purpose of creating such a leadership structure is to bring all regional military units and civilian supporting resources under more integrated command and control. Coordinating fairly independent large-scale united campaigns by all four services is a key aspect of the war zone concept. As a profound reform of the Chinese military system this entails a long-term plan to establish joint command HQ redeploys the four services under a united system
1. To bridge the gap in C3I currently existing between the four services in the PLA.
2. To remove the existing logistical barriers between the different services so as to facilitate a unified supply system (sanjun lianqin).
3. To lay down groundwork for joint exercises of all services, for the purpose of launching united campaigns.
4. To place the regional units under tighter central control.
The WZC calls for non-ground force service forces stationed in an MR not to answer the MR commanding officers, but rather to service headquarters in Beijing. The new air force order of battle for example, after disbanding MR based air armies, five PLAAF command center (air corps) were created . The job of those command centers is to cooperate and coordinate with the PLA and PLAN. The main different between the air corps and the old air army is that most of the administrative functions have been moved up to the MRAF headquarters.
All this means that the new WZC headquarters will have operational commanding power (zuozhan zhihui quan) over service forces, a complex procedure such as war zone command supreme command service command war zone service command war zone the service forces? . The WZC will use the existing MR command department as the foundation; the joint command may consist of intelligence, decision control, communications and electronic warfare, and fire control and coordination components. Also, rather than the ground force domination as in the old MR headquarters, this command will be truly joint, with a higher proportion of both commanding and staff officers from non-ground force services. It is even possible that the joint forces commander and chief of staff come from services other than the ground forces. under usual circumstances, however, the commanders of WZC Air Force, Navy, and Second Artillery forces serve as the deputy commanding officers of the joint command. Moreover, the decision control component may be composed of staff teams headed by a deputy chief of staff from all service commands. But most important, this command may be relegated the operational commanding power over all service commands and forces within the war zone.? Stated by Major General Liu ChaoMing in his in Reforming the Command Department work in Campaign under High-tech conditions? by expanding representation of services in the joint command proportional to their role in the joint campaign, it may alleviate inter service friction. This expansion also provides the necessary expertise that may optimize assembling of joint forces. Also, as the joint command gains complete operational control of service commands and forces within the war zone, swiftly organizing the joint forces.?
The centralized command in WZC is crucial in determining and deciding the general goal, and operation of the campaign. In addition to define the objectives, tasks, timing, and space of operations for each service force. Yet at the same time, decentralized command and service autonomy are desirable, particularly in intra-service matters regarding manner of deployment and specific methods for implementing sub-campaigns.? In timing, centralized command is absolutely necessary in the planning and preparation phase prior to the campaign. Central intervention is also necessary for strategic direction and the use of key arms and forces that may have imminent and important impact on the campaign outcome. �co avoid loss of opportunities and ensure rapid response at key moments, it is even necessary to conduct Bypassing-level command? (Yueji zhihui?�V�ū� allowing the campaign commander to be squad leader.?
Chapter Three: WZC Order of Battle:
Phase one: Elite forces and Sharp Arms
The PLA has three kinds of special force? that can fulfill or call up on to perform the role. Each MR has a battalion plus strength special operation force, the 1st Marine brigade, and the 15 AB Corp.
The 15 Airborne Corp (Total strength 35,000)
Including 43, 44, and 45 Parachute Division.
Each Parachute Division includes three airborne regiments and one light artillery regiment.
Weapons include 50-100 BMD-3 and 2S9 self-propelled mortars, large numbers of BJ212 jeeps with 105mm recoilless rifles or HJ8E ATGM, and Type 89 120mm SP anti-tank guns. These last are air transportable. Additional weapons include Type 84 82mm mortars, Type 85 60mm hand-held mortars, and Type 85 107mm MRL. In 1997, a new lightweight jeep entered service: a Y-7H reportedly carries up to 10 of these jeeps. Paratroopers have portable GPS systems, night-vision goggles, radios, and other high-technology equipment. By many accounts, they are the best the PLA can offer.
The 15 Airborne Corp normally? control by the PLAAF, since it is a strategic force, in any of operations, the order always comes be either the CMC or the WZC.
In 1985, most of the soldiers were ordinary paratroopers trained for general supporting duties in a combined army campaign. Only 17 percent were specialized paratroopers. Due to the requirement of the WZC, this percentage has now risen to 43 percent, and ordinary paratroopers have dropped from 53 percent to 23 percent. The purpose of increasing the percentage of specialized paratroopers was to make the corps into a combined arms force rather than just a mobile infantry force, making it more capable of conducting independent operations in a limited, high technology war.
More and more focus will be placed on helicopter assaults as opposed to traditional airdrops. In times of war, 15 Airborne Corps can also utilize civilian aircraft such as C-130s, HU-1s, AS332s, Chinooks, and a very large number of Y-5 (700+) utility transports. During number of exercises, 15 Airborne Corps has demonstrated it can move a regiment plus of paratroopers with light armored vehicles to anywhere within China in less then 24 hours. These exercises also show that a large number of Para-gliders are in use.
In addition to the 15 Airborne Corp, each Military Regions has its SOF (Special Operation Force). In peacetime, it is directly under MR HQ, The commanding officers of an SOF, including the commander, Political commissar and chief of stuff are full Colonels. Officers above the platoon level are required to be university graduates and received further education in the Army Command Academy.
Officers and men of this ASF are selected under the recon and technical units of every formations in the MR. According the TW article PLA critical-hit warfare? and TW research paper the PLA rapid reaction forces? by Col Wen-Chung Liao, the wash out rate is about 50 percent after receiving further tests and training. In addition, every MR has established special training facilities for their RRF units. And instructors are directly report to the CMC. Special skills, such as martial arts, are also including in the training.
1st Marine brigade stated Yulin Base is under the command of the South Sea Fleet. The name 1st Marine could be misleading. The PLAN marine is unlike the US marine who are consider to be elite infantries in amphibious warfare, the PLAN marine is the Navy commando unit similar to the Old Soviet Union's Spetsnaz units. The PLA amphibious warfare are the task of the army 10th armored division, 3rd motorized brigade, and 1st mechanized division of the first group army of the Najing MR, those formation's armor and transport are all amphibious such as the new type 99 amphibious tank, and type 77 amphibious APC,
Phase Two: Gaining Initiative by Striking First:
The six designated mechanized RDF Divisions and brigades, terrain based special formation, and the 11 PLAAF fist divisions can call upon to conduct this phase of the WZC. The tactical operation formation form those div/bgd must be able to deploy with in days of notices.
The six mechanized RDF Divisions and brigade might come from the following MR:
2 formations from Beijing MR
1 formation from Shanyang MR
1 formation from Jinan MR
1 formation from Lanzhou MR
Those formations could be the following units.
91 motorized Division of 31 GA
121 motorized Division of 41 GA
160 Mechanized Infantry Brigade of 54 GA
3rd Mechanized Infantry Brigade of 1st GA (Amphibious)
149 Special Mechanized Mountain Division of 13 GA
40 Special Forrest Infantry Division of 14 GA
One of the most important strategic changes for the PLAAF took place in the late 1980s when the PLA began forming a rapid-reaction force consisting of 揻ist? (quantou) units. The rapid-reaction strategy is based on the premise that China will only be engaged in local wars for the foreseeable future, that the PLA must strike to end the war quickly and meet the political objectives, and that cost is a big factor as equipment becomes more expensive to use and replace. It wasn̿ until the early 1990s, however, that the PLAAF formally established any rapid-reaction units.
According to PLAdaily, the official newspaper of the PLA, In order to be a PLAAF fist division, one must demonstrate the capabilities to move 90% of its aircraft on air to any suitable airports with in 48 hours when notice.
The PLAAF fist air divisions are:
3rd Fighter of Nanjing MR
1st Fighter of Shangyang MR
15 Fighter of Beijing MR
12 Fighter of Jinan MR
18 Fighter of Guangzhou MR
8 Bomber of Lanzhou MR
10 Bomber of Nanjing MR
23 Bomber of Beijing MR
5 Attack of Jinan MR
22 Attack of Beijing MR
28 Attack of Nanjing MR
Terrain Based Formation:
If needed, the WZC can draw the terrain-based formation into its operation. Those are special formations in Div/Bgd size, their command and control are designed to be able quick transfer to WZC command in crisis situations. They were form in the late 1980s and entrusted around flash points within the war zone and therefore can reach the front? in a relatively short period of time. For instance, special terrain divisions were setup for both tropical jungle warfare and freezing high plateau warfare have been formed in the Chengdu MR in order to respond quickly to difficult situations along the Sino-Vietnam and Sino-India boarder.
The known Terrain divisions are the following and some can be use in both the RDF and terrain base role.
54 GA's 127 Special Light Mobile Division for urban warfare
21 GA's 61 Highland Motorized Division for highland warfare
13 GA's 149 Special Mechanized Mountain Division RDF in the Mountain warfare
14 GA's 40 Specialized Forest Infantry Division for Forest and Jungle warfare
Tibet Area Field Combat Formations? 52 and 53 brigade for Mountain warfare
Xinjiang Area Field Combat Formations? 11 Highland Motorized Division for highland warfare.
Phase Three: Fighting a Quick Battle to Forces a Quick Resolution:
In this Phase, the PLA heavies such as tank brigade and mechanized infantry division will be reinforce the 15 AB, SOF, and the RDF already engaged in combat. An entire tank brigade is believed to be able to move to any part of China via rail (except Tibet) to any part of China less then two weeks. A new railroad and freeways are under construction to enhance logistical mobility. In addition to the tank divisions, the PLA also raise 6 tank brigades in the late 80s, one per MR, except the Guangzhou MR,
The independent tank brigade are to control by the War Zone command, the first tank brigade was form by the 13 GA. It has the following TOE
? 4 tank battalions (31 tanks each)
? 1 mechanized infantry battalion (40 APC)
? 1 artillery battalion (18 SP guns)
? 1 AA battalion (18 SP AA guns)
The Tank Brigades are to be supported by the newly reformed local mechanical motorized infantry brigade in the Cat A GA. In an unconfirmed report, after the half million-troop cut of 1998 the PLA converted a total 22 infantry divisions into brigades. They are 3, 34, 48, 55, 56, 58, 60, 57, 68, 79, 80, 82, 92, 118, 119, 160, 179, 191, 196, 205, 207 brigade.
The main different between the old-field army based infantry division and the new WZC based infantry brigade is the downsizing of three fighting regiment to two regiments. In additionally cancel all regiment level political departments, and functionaries. The support regiment such as tank, arty, AA changes to Battalion with 5 companies, 3 such Battalion became a special regiment control directly by the Brigade.
Brigade has its command and functions departments, each Battalion 's logical support, finance, and management would come directly from Brigade HQ. The brigade will have combine-abilities then the traditional div, but as the same time, the Brigade can still fight like a reinforced regiment and therefore streamline the operation. The first step is from Div to Brigade take place mostly in the regiment level, the second step will be Brigade-Btn-izatrion. In addition to remove one regiment, combine battalion, and brigade HQ directly control of Battalion, This idea first started in mid 80s after the reinstate of ranks. After 97, the speed of reform increases after the Kosovo war.
The 34 reminding motorized infantry divisions remind are the 1, 4, 6, 8, 11, 31, 36, 37, 40, 46, 61, 69, 70, 72, 86, 91, 112, 113, 115, 116, 121, 123, 124, 127, 132, 138, 139, 149, 162, 163, 188, 190, 193, 199 divisions.
Those motorized infantry divisions are to play a support role only. Their task is static defense and flank security.
Chapter Four: Deployment of WZC:
Deployment in the battle levels is crucial to whether local and temporary superiority can be achieved. Deployment of RRF and RDF or the concept of trans-regional support operations, which means deploying the best force and arms from other MRs to reinforces the WZC when local/limited may occur.
WZC deployment doctrine calls for a joint service campaign where each service conducts relatively independent sub-campaigns (Zhi Zhanyi). The local MR HQ will act as ad hoc WZC HQ and it will have jurisdiction over the all services involve. It can select forces and arms in a flexible component assembly (Bankuai Goujian zhuhe) to form a comprehensive strike effects, this including infrastructure and assists in the civilian sectors. According the Nan Li, in the high-tech battlefield, annihilating enemy vital forces and arms can no longer be achieved by simply adding numbers of forces, planes, tanks and artily pieces.? In addition, the new WZC calls for a dispersed deployment in tactical strike zones, (sushan bushu) instead of the traditional practice of concentrating forces and arms in a pointed area. When the window of vulnerability? opens, optimal force will be use in multi-points at a selected target. The object is to use sufficient munitions, arms and force neither too little nor too much, are used to destroy select the target at the shortest possible time? Li (page 153)
Coordination between those strike zone will be establish and strike its adjacent area: a tactical depth zone where firepower can be coordinated among ground forces artillery, attack helicopters, and air force attack aircraft, as well as a campaign depth zone where coordination is conducted among ground forces campaign/tactical missiles, air force fighter-bombers and attack aircraft, and Second Artillery conventional missiles. Target-based coordination means that firepower is coordinated around two types of targets. Air firepower, for instance, may be responsible for targets that are mobile and easier to detect, and have weaker air defense, while ground firepower deals with targets that are hidden and fixed, and have stronger air defense. Timing-based coordination refers to ordering the sequence of strikes. Between ground and air, for instance, ground strikes will go first. Among mobile targets of varying speed, the most mobile and threatening targets will be dealt with first? Senior Colonel Cui Changqi a Preliminary Investigation of the Question of Joint Fire Power Support in Ground Mobile Campaign? P>The local motorized infantry division will act as flank support even at their own turf.
Using RDF and RRF has two side positive effects, by maintaining a moderate level of forwardly deployed force; this in turn reduces tension in the disputed area. On the other hand, the highly mobile and effective RDF and RRF constitute an indirect forward presence. This itself may contribute to local and temporary superiority in psychological teams.
Chapter Five: WZC Operation:
Gaining initiative by striking first, is important in any warfare, take the momentum away from the enemy. In a short WZC, causing substantial losses to enemy forces and arms thought a first strike is half the battle. In order for a successful first striking, an element of surprise is a must. First strikes may not lead to local and temporary initiative and superiority if the enemy is well prepared and anticipated the strike. A rapid built up and movement must be concealed. While faster, RDF and mobile elements of the PLA are more dependent on good roads, rails, airports; it is noisier; and it offers more visible profiles to the enemy. Reconnaissance can go both ways. The WZC calls for real-time surveillance for location of the windows of opportunity? and effective communications between all services. To gain information superiority, the concept of counter-reconnaissance is suggested. Intend to neutralize enemy's recon survivability and C3I capabilities, with ECM, ECCM, AEW, ELINT, stealth and other high techs tools. Also mobility corridors, and local security umbrella for C3I and logistic, is necessary to establish with air cover, SAM cover, and ECM support.
In order to understand the role of EW in WZC context, it is helpful to view the modernization of PLA over all C3I capabilities:
The PLA has been putting much effect in creating a modern C3I infrastructure. It is clear that EW and C3I is the weakest link within the PLA.
The first stage of modernization was launched in the early 1970s, and was basically completed at the beginning of the 1980s. Its main purpose was to construct a national strategic C3I system that could connect all PLA commands at the corps level. A total length of 53000 KM of underground defense electric cable network was constructed. 86 underground telecommunications command centers were created throughout the country. Additional 10000 KM of cable were connected to every defense outpost in China. In time of war, a WZC command HQ can be setup in a effective manor because all the necessary infrastructure are there.
The PLA C3I modernization program moved to the second stage in the 1980s. China launched its first Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) satellite in 1976, with a few addition satellite launched in the 80s, the PLA was able to deploy mobile ELINT capabilities to all its armies, together with SATCOM SIGINT capabilities, and the PLA was able to intercept signals transmitted via the US and the Russian Communications satellite systems since the late 1980s.
While the national and regional level have witness a great deal of improvement on C3I, such as satellite communication channels for the group armies and digital link to divisional HQ, but the control command has effective coverage of the PLA ground forces only to the divisional level, and this coverage is heavily dependent on radio and security telephones, facsimile and email. The C3I system of the basic units is mainly carried by semi-conductor radio of extra short wave modulation, provide range of 2.5 to 10 KM, and can easily disrupted though electronic warfare (EW)
This vulnerable is the urgent task for the PLA, if it is to adopt its C3I system to the requirements of a high tech future war. Structurally, the PLA has made it a top priority to create war-zone-based integrated C3I system under the direct control of the CMC. The key reform concerns enhancement of horizontal link across the service and units. In the early 1990s the PLA began a baheng bazong(�K��K��)? program, namely to setup an optical fiber communication network composed of eight truck lines covering the country. By end of 1995, a total of 10000 KM had been completed. And it has been announced that by the year 2000, China will be able to develop 120,000 KM line fiber cables and produce one million KM of fiber cable a year.
At the tactical level, the PLA has made concentrated efforts to develop satellite-based communication networks, digital communication equipment and field C3I systems. By middle of the 1980s PLA had established over 2000 stations to receive satellite signals. Each of them was equipped with an antenna 6-7.5 meters in diameters. In 1998, mobile satellite communication truck was developed with the launch of two the third generation of telecommunication nick named DongfanHong-3 in 1997 and 98. The goal is any tactical unit within a war zone should have duplicated network connections via both the extra short wave and satellite links.
According to the James Mulvenon, the PLA leadership was very impress by the performance of the US forces in Desert Storm. Form many of their writings; it seems clear that PLA theorists believe the IW played a significant role in the U.S victory. The Chinese did not seek the information dominance as stated in Field manual 100-6 Information operations Aug 1996, but rather to enhanced their own C3I and defense themselves against enemy EW attacks.
While some Chinese literature used the term information dominance (zhixinxiquen) as in Field manual 100-6 defined as the ability to defend one's own information while exploiting and assaulting opponent's information infrastructure. At currently level, the PLA do not possess the capabilities to conduct a comprehensive offensive EW attack, and more over, some Chinese commentators assert that information superiority is not determined by the technological superiority, but by new tactics and the independent creativity of commanders in the field, placing much more emphasis on personnel and organization-related components of the conflict.
WZC on attack:
For the PLA, the concept of Active Defense is the central principle that guides its initiation of military operation. Gaining Initiative by striking first is the extension is that principle. For local initiative and superiority to be realized through preemption at the WZC level, the elements of surprise, optimal timing, and proportion of forces devoted to the initial battle must be the central focus of attention.
For the PLA, the window of opportunity, or the optimal timing for a first strike, is the brief period between the failure of political and diplomatic initiatives, and it force are ready and before enemy's military links? with its political counterpart.
揑n the circumstance of enemy loss at the strategic level campaign commanders should grasp the favorable opportunity when the enemy's campaign deployment is still incomplete, launch a preemptive offensive within the scope permitted by the strategic objective, throw enemy campaign deployment into confusion, and force the enemy to fight us under the conditions of insufficient preparation and unfavorable posture.?
Once the campaign is initiated, the outcome of the first battle is deemed crucial in determining whether local initiative is realized. Therefore, it is necessary to throw a powerful and superior initial strike force (shoutu bingli) into the initial battle.? For the air force, for instance, as high as 80% of the campaign air force should be used in the initial battle in coordination with surface-surface missiles, ship artillery, ground force aviation, electronic warfare, and special operations capabilities.? The objective is temporary suppression of enemy capabilities? by striking key targets that are relatively vulnerable but crucial in constituting enemy comprehensive operational capabilities.? P>Mobility Attack:
To assist the PLA's first strike, mobility is the key, with only the Packet of excellence involve in a limited war, the PLA can ensure transports and know how are available. Successful mobility operation is the key to local superiority for several reasons. It may reduce inferiority through swiftly deploying superior forces and arms at crucial times and places. It may reduce one's own vulnerability by denying the enemy fixed targets. It also generates initiative and momentum through shifting and separating enemy forces, confusing the enemy about intentions, and thus creating opportunities to annihilate separated enemy forces by taking advantage of a favorable time and place of one's choosing. Mobile warfare is more dependent on good road, rails and sometimes complex and cumbersome logistic supports. The PLA must be able to master real time reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance and communication in all level in order to carry out such a mobile operations.
Threats to mobility are mainly the air at this phase, the traditional close air raids from bombers will be likely to be replaced by the over-the-horizon (chao shiju) surface-to-surface and air-launched missiles and smart bombs as the dominant threat, and the launching platforms may stand off beyond the scope and reach of the PLA campaign air defense network. Due this threat, it is necessary to establish one or several inter-connected 搈obility corridors? (jidong zoulang) or a local security umbrella? (diyu anquan shan) at the locality and time when campaign forces are to move. Such an umbrella is sustained by several major measures. One is using surface-to-surface missiles, fighter-bombers such as the Su-30, and other long-range arms to strike and destroy as many enemy standoff platforms as possible in early operations. Air Force interceptors, as well as mobile, then supplement this and fixed long-range SAMs such as the S-300, and close in AA missile suck as DK-9, KS-1 and HQ 61 deployed adjacent to the mobility zone. In the meantime, mobile air defense units equipped with portable SAMs and mobile small-caliber AAA batteries deal with attack helicopters and other close-in flying targets. Such an umbrella may be connected with the strategic air defense for early warning and early interception. In addition, the umbrella could be reinforced by continuous electronic measures to reduce or confuse the enemy's awareness and enhance its transparency to the PLA. The survivability of the air defense forces themselves needs to be enhanced through mobility and concealment. Finally, mobile elements must not be conduct movements under daylight conditions without surveillance and air superiority.
Starting in 1996, Chinese leaders, including CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin and PLAAF commander Liu Shunyao, began to re-emphasize publicly the PLAAF's capability to fight offensive battles.
�che Chinese Air Force plans to build up state-of-the-art weapons systems by early next century, including early warning planes, electronic warfare warplanes, and surface-to-air missiles. The PLA Air Force is now able to fight both defensive and offensive battles under high-tech conditions. The Air Force is now capable of waging high-level long-distance combat, rapid maneuverability, and air defense, and is able to provide assistance to navy and ground forces. The Air Force now sources most of its equipment domestically, fielding a large number of Chinese-designed and produced high-quality fighters, attackers, bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, and special purpose planes. Over the next few years, the Chinese Air Force will enhance its deterrent force in the air, its ability to impose air blockades, and its ability to launch air strikes, as well as its ability to conduct joint operations with the ground forces and navy.?
The following are based Senior Colonel Huang Bin's shenhua zhanqu zhanyi yanjiu de jidian sikao? (Several Reflections on Deepening Research on War Zone Campaign) in NDU scientific research department, (research on the theory of campaign) National Defense University, 1997.
Major General Yu Chenghai's �kui zhanqu lianhe zuozhan zhihui konzhi wenti di jidian renshi? (Several Understanding Regarding the Question of Command and Control Concerning War Zone Joint Operation) Beijing National Defense University, 1997.
Yu Shusheng Sun Lianhe Zhanyi? (On Joint Campaign) National Defense University, 1997
Xu Guoxin �Whanqu zhanyi houqin baozhang? (Logistic Support for War Zone Compaign) National Defense University 1997
Mobility has two sub actions:
Leap-forward mobility (neixian jidong) and Inferior-line mobility (yuejinshi jidong)
Leap-forward calls for mobility outside but close to the exterior flank of the enemy's deployment. It is usually conducted when enemy deployment is relatively concentrated, the battlefield is large in scope, and time is sufficient. Since the purpose of ELM is to create momentum (zhaoshi) that may shift enemy forces and create favorable fighting opportunities (zhanji) and vulnerable targets, it may not have to be always concealed. Small-scale mobility may divert attention from large-scale mobility (xiaodong yan dadong), or a posture of encircling and capturing key targets or positions may intend to trigger enemy reinforcement, thus creating opportunities for annihilating enemy vital forces through mobility.
Inferior-line mobility is mobility through gaps between forces within the enemy's deployment. It is conducted when favorable opportunities have been created with concrete targets. It also means that forces are dispersed and organized into smaller, more agile tactical units that take many routes (xiaoqun duolu), and move swiftly from one point to the next simultaneously and in darkness. Inferior-line may lead to lower force density, less exposure time, and shortened length of mobile columns, which in turn may enhance both survivability and speed of mobility. All these modes may be employed in a combined way or separately, depending on how they contribute to local and temporary initiatives under specific circumstances. The central objective of mobility is to create favorable conditions for offensive operations.
Continuous Assault:
Continuous assault is meant to be directed against temporarily stationed enemy forces. The central premise is that since the enemy forces and arms are precise, lethal, fast, and responsive, PLA forces may exploit the brief opportunity when the temporarily stationed enemy forces are unprepared or not fully prepared. In this circumstance, PLA forces may launch a multi-direction, multi-route, multi-echelon, continuous assault on key enemy positions at both the front and in the depth of enemy deployment. First, several frontal and deep operational groupings (zhengmian zuozhan qun and zhongshen zuozhan qun) may be organized. Each grouping is capable of air-land operations, and consists of several echelons (tidui) that may conduct continuous assault alternately. Continuous assault may begin with sudden, heavy, and brief firepower assault? on key targets, such the enemy C4I, and against missile, plane, and artillery platforms to reduce enemy coordination and fire power.? This is to be immediately followed by simultaneous assault by all operational groupings to cut apart (fenge) enemy forces; to prevent coordination between enemy firepower support, counter-attack forces, and divided enemy forces; and to encircle (baowei) each slice of enemy forces. At the same time, deep operational groupings may strive to intertwine with (jiaozhi) enemy depth forces to reduce enemy superiority in long-range firepower support and mobile reinforcing forces, and to give full play to PLA's advantages in close combat. To prevent the divided enemy forces from either being diverted (zhuanyi, the PLA euphemism for relief from encirclement) or being consolidated, thus running the risks of fighting a battle of routing (jikuizhan) or a battle of attrition (xiaohaozhan) rather than an ideal battle of annihilation (jianmiezhan), all groupings must conduct assault continuously to preclude breathing space for the enemy and to achieve a favorilabe position for the PLA in one stroke.
Deep Strike
Deep Strike is directed mainly against fortified enemy defenses. Its underlying premise is that since enemy defenses are more likely to be mobile than fixed in order to reduce losses caused by the adversary's preemption, its firepower support system, main counter-attack forces, and reserve forces (yubeidui, referring to regular backup forces but not the reserves) are likely to be deployed in the close depth (qianzongshen) of defense. They are also likely to be connected with C4I that coordinates firepower, force mobility, and counter-attack, which are likely to be deployed in the deep depth (quan zongshen) of defense. They generally constitute the �aelly? that is crucial to successful defense. On the other hand, this �aelly? may be soft since various components may be loosely connected and secured. As a result, it may provide a window of vulnerability for deep strike. Still, It is not realistic for our army to conduct the kind of simultaneous deep strike as conducted by Western armies, since in overall terms, we will remain inferior in high technology for a long time.? On the other hand, It is absolutely necessary to conduct deep strike. The focus of our deep strike, however, is on decomposing enemy defense, restricting enemy mobility in firepower support, forces, and electronic capabilities, weakening and sabotaging enemy comprehensive defense capabilities, and creating conditions for annihilating enemy forces separately.? Specifically, deep strike forces may be composed of a carefully selected armor-based assault component, a raid and sabotage component, and sometimes an airborne and heli-borne component. Each component is to be capable of ground and air defense and well armed with instruments and techniques of destroying or sabotaging various types of enemy targets. While taking into consideration alternative plans in the face of possible enemy interception, blocking, or delay through air-land firepower strike, mobile obstacles, and charges (chongji) by enemy counter-deep strike forces, PLA deep strike forces may either force their entry into the enemy's defense perimeter with the firepower support of air, missile, artillery and frontal attacking forces, or infiltrate through darkness, bad weather, and favorable terrain. Once reaching their targets, a swift, fierce, and coordinated attack is to be launched, aimed at destroying
the crucial parts of the enemy's C4I system, weapons platforms, and backup forces in the shortest time possible. Depending on circumstances, strikes can be concentrated on one target system after another, or dispersed against several separate systems simultaneously. The central objective is to weaken and paralyze the enemy's comprehensive defense capabilities,
Vertical Strike:
Vertical strike may be applied in both continuous assault and deep strike, or conducted independently. Its basic premise is that since enemy defenses have become more effective, the traditional PLA practice of using the ground to control the air? may also be supplemented by vertical strike, making offensive operations more effective. But since the PLA aviation elements are still rather limited in both quantity and quality, it is not possible to wage vertical strike throughout the whole process of offensive operations.? Therefore, vertical strike is to be applied to key directions, at key times, and against key targets in order to enhance local and temporary superiority. The basic elements of vertical strike include:
? dropping paratroopers into the enemy campaign and tactical depth to attack enemy forces;
? using transportation planes and helicopters to ship deep strike forces into the enemy's defensive depth for striking predetermined targets, and for outflanking (yuhui), encircling, and cutting apart enemy forces;
? landing forces in the enemy's rear to surround (hewei) and encircle enemy forces;
? using helicopters to transport forces to favorable positions, to block and fight incoming enemy reinforcing units, thus ensuring complete annihilation of encircled enemy forces;
? using attack helicopters to provide support for outflanking, encircling, penetrating, and cutting up enemy forces;
? using concealed helicopter shipments of special forces to raid vital enemy targets;
? using fighters to deny airspace over encircled enemy forces, and using attack planes and bombers to provide airborne fire support for attacking ground forces.
Application of vertical strike may be concealed and sudden, though only under local air superiority. Vertical strike may be assembled in such a way that it is highly streamlined, capable of independent operations, and well equipped with anti-air/anti-tank capabilities and electronic warfare capabilities that can sabotage and suppress enemy communications and fire control systems. Furthermore, it may be used in such a way that it coordinates well with ground fire support and attacking forces. Finally, technical and operational maintenance needs to be strictly organized.
Firepower attack:
Firepower attack is a new kind of attack for the PLA, it define as a concentrated effects of tactical missiles, air attacks, tactical artillery in a sudden, brief, or continuous within a limited period of time. The advantage of firepower attack is that it is less restricted by distance, easy to organize and command, and easy to control. It is limited since it cannot capture territories, positions, and materials. It may be primarily conducted at the strategic and campaign levels for objectives such as battlefield denial, cutting off sea and air transportation, striking political and economic targets, and destroying military targets. For similar reasons, it is more desirable to use missiles than aircraft to avoid the complex preparation for gaining conditional air superiority, and more desirable to be sudden, concentrated, and brief than continuous to achieve the first strike shock.
Ambush attack:
Ambush attack is to deal with mobile enemy forces. Through concealed predeployment of forces close to the zone where possible enemy operations may be conducted, counter-reconnaissance will play an important role. The success of the ambush attack will be based upon the comprehensive capabilities of the air-land firepower, force mobility and assault are applied suddenly to enemy forces entering the zone. While ambush has always been a PLA fighting method, there are several major differences between the new and the old. First, since enemy mobility may be swift using multiple routes and many tactical groupings, the new ambush zone will be reasonably large so that ambush forces may have sufficient space to move and choose favorable positions while having better chances of avoiding detection. Also, unlike the old ambush where forces are deployed very close to the strike zone, the mobile ambush forces will maintain an optimal distance from the strike zone to conceal intentions, and close in swiftly through a sudden, fierce? assault on the enemy forces that enter the strike zone. Moreover, unlike the old single-service-based ambush, the new ambush combines air-land firepower with ground forces assault. Finally, to ensure local superiority, rigorous preventive measures will be implemented against enemy mobility, air raid, and other counter-ambush measures.
Chapter Six: Training:
The PLA training has been focused on creating elite forces and sharp arms.
The training of the those forces can be summarized in the following points
By Andrew N. D. Yang and Col. Milton Wen-Chung Liao
a. Identifying possible targets and intensively assessing conditions of the war zone (zhanqu)
b. Applying imported technology to store, assess, and revise every operational plan and implementing these plans in training and exercises so as to adjust combat capability in different war scenarios.
c. Deploying motorized vehicles, electronic warfare equipment, and modernized logistic support to RRF units to enhance force mobility, long-range deployment, electronic countermeasure and electronic counter-countermeasure capabilities.
d. Reducing the timeframe for transforming levels of operational readiness, such as transforming operational readiness from level 4 to level 1 in a time period not exceeding three days.
As for individual soldiers in RRF have to undertake special training, such as swimming, skiing, and mountain climbing. Apart from basic training, infantry soldiers with service above two years will acquire proficiency with every weapon system assigned to the company, advance training in the consolidate three attacks and five defenses? (san da wu fang�T������) Three attacks? refers to attacks on helicopters, tanks, and airborne troops. five defenses? means to defend against nuclear/biological/chemical attacks, electronic countermeasures, and precision-guided weapon systems. three real trainings? refers to deploying real troops, conducting real operations, and using live ammunition in training.
Officers and men of this army special force are selected under the recon and technical units of every formations in the MR. According the TW article PLA critical-hit warfare? and TW research paper the PLA rapid reaction forces? by Col Wen-Chung Liao, the wash out rate is about 50 percent after receiving further tests and training. In addition, every MR has established special training facilities for their RRF units. And instructors are directly report to the CMC. Special skills, such as martial arts, are also including in the training.
More information can be found at Zhou Mon-Wu, elevation of PLA special force? in military Digest. Oct 1997, pp2-3
Large scale RRF and RDF Exercises Since 1996
Nanjing MR
a. Nanjing MR conducted three-phased exercises from March 8 to 21, 1996 in the Taiwan Strait:
Phase I: 2nd Artillery fired Dongfeng-15 (M-9) missiles off Keelung and
Kaohsiung harbors.
Phase II: Air Force and Navy conducted air attack and missile firing exercises, electronic warfare, low-level penetration air attacks, blockade, and air-sea combined exercises.
Phase III: Air-sea-land forces conducted amphibious landing exercises on
Pingtan Island. AAU helicopters, Su-27 fighters, and airborne troops were also deployed.
b. In September 1996, the East Sea Fleet conducted combined exercises off the Zhejiang coast, including air-sea combined exercises and anti-submarine warfare.
c. In October 1996, another air-sea combined exercise was conducted with emphasis on air superiority and sea control capability.
d. In November 1996, an air-land combined exercise was conducted in Anhui. A simulated blue force? was attacked by a �fed tank regiment. The Air Force deployed Su-27 and J-8II jet fighters to attack the blue? force. All land forces were rapidly transported by railways and vehicles to the exercise region.
Jinan MR
a. From late October to early November 1996, an air-land combined exercise was conducted in the Anyang and Tongbao mountain regions of Henan Province. Artillery, communication, anti-air, Army Aviation, and Air Force units all took.54 part. �fed? troops attacked a simulated Republic of China (ROC) army company that was occupying strategic points.
b. From 19 to 31 October 1996, an air-sea combined exercise was held in the Yellow Sea. Submarines, destroyers, and Navy fighters and bombers simulated �fed? vs. blue? war games.
Guangzhou MR
a. In September 1996, an electronic warfare exercise was held in the Yangquan and Yangjiang area of Guangdong Province. Electronic countermeasure (ECM) and counter-countermeasure (ECCM) courses were practiced.
b. In mid-October 1996, an amphibious landing exercise was held in Zhanjiang, Yangjiang (Guangdong Province) and the Wutong region of Guangxi Province. Forces included an infantry division, communication, ECM, and logistic support units, two landing ships (LSTs) and an aviation unit of the South Sea Fleet, including 10 H-6 bombers, F-7s, and Su-27s of the Southern Air Force regiment. Troops were deployed to the exercise region by motorized transport. The exercise also included �fed? vs. blue? war games.
c. March 12? 0, 1996, a missile and artillery live-fire exercise was held in Nanao (Guangdong Province). Nuclear submarines, destroyers, and conventional submarines from North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet were deployed to the exercise zone. Naval aviation collaborated with naval ships in conducting missile attacks, ECM, and anti-submarine warfare drills.
Beijing MR
a. A large combined exercise was held in Hebei Province and Inner Mongolia in late August 1996. Forces included a tactical missile unit, an infantry division, a logistics unit, and Army aviation helicopters, as well as A-5, J-7, H-5, H-6, and ECM aircraft of Northern Air Force regiment. The main drills of this exercise sought to enhance long-distance rapid-deployment capability, air-land counter-attack capability, and logistics support capability.
a. In the Jan 4 of 2000, a mech bgd from the 65 GA of the Beijing MR move 2000 KM in 10 days to support operations in the boarder area.
Shenyang MR
a. In mid-September 1996, an amphibious landing combined exercise was held on Changshan Island of Bohai Bay. Forces included a mechanized infantry division, LSTs, landing craft (LCMs), and Air Force aircraft.
b. In late October 1996, an air-land combined exercise was held near Harbin. Forces included a mechanized division, artillery and tank brigades, and communication units. The exercise emphasized long-distance rapid-deployment capability and force coordination.
c. Between late October and early November of 1996, an exercise was held in Liaoning and Jilin. Forces included an artillery brigade, an anti-aircraft brigade, a tank division, a helicopter unit, and a logistics support unit. Exercise drills included long-distance rapid deployment, counter-attack, live firing, and logistics efficiency.
Lanzhou MR
a. A 1000-mile railway transport rapid-deployment exercise was held in Lanzhou MR in August 1996. The purpose was to enhance mobile deployment capability.
b. In late August 1996, a Northern Air Force bomber and fighter regiment (including Su-27s) from various MRs were assembled in Gansu Province and conducted an air attack exercise, targeting a simulated ROC Ching Chuan Kan airbase that was built in Dingxin. The exercise included air combat, air-to-ground attack, and the firing of a new type of surface-to-air missile
c. From late September to early October of 1996, a �fed? vs. blue? combined exercise was held in Shanxi Province. The exercise simulated a counter attack against an invading Russian army.
Chengdu MR
b. The 13 GA spend a number of years fight the blue army? is focus on counter attack, mobile and combine warfare with elements of different GA. Its job is to support the front line when it is needed. It is a very mobile GA, special attention were pay to ensure all transport works properly.
c. One excise in year 2000 included the 37 motor inf div, 149 mech inf div, arty bgd and number of other troops, a total of 30000 troops.
The number of exercises conducted from 1995 to 1996 far exceeded the number of exercises conducted between 1992 and 1994. The focus of the exercises shifted from anti-airborne, anti-amphibious landing to amphibious landing and airborne offensive operations. In particular, the 1997 exercises emphasized amphibious
landing capabilities and urban combat tactics. New types of equipment, such as
Ro/Ro cargo ships, imported Russian BMPs, and newly developmental AFVs.
The following are copied directly from Ken Allen's china's Aviation Capabilities?
Over the past fifteen years, the PLA has placed a great emphasis on training at several levels, including professional military education (PME) for officers at different levels, and initial training within training units for enlisted soldiers. PME for officers includes basic training at a two- or four-year academy, education at the PLAAF Command College for mid-level and senior level commanders and staff officers. Some senior officers receive training at the National Defense University. At the operational unit level, training includes unit training, intra-service exercises, and greater emphasis now on joint service exercises.
Since the late 1980s, the PLAAF and Naval Aviation have been involved in several complementary organizational changes that have resulted in more realistic flight training. Historically, fighter and ground attack pilot training was a three-phase process: basic flight school (20 months), flying academy (28 months), and operational unit training (4 to 5 years). Beginning in 1986, however, the PLAAF began to experiment with an additional fourth phase. For graduates of fighter and ground attack flying programs, phase three became a one-year aircraft conversion program at newly organized transition training bases. Phase four, or proficiency development, became a slightly truncated version of the old operational training in units (now three to four years). The program was formalized in July 1988 when the Military Commission authorized each MRAF to establish a transition-training base.
Naval Aviation pilot training consists of three phases -- flying academy, training regiment, and operational regiment. Cadets at the Naval Aviation flying academies graduate after four years with a Bachelor of Flight degree. The goal is to have each cadet complete 300 flying hours. After graduation from the flying academy, pilots go directly to a training regiment. Following two to three years in a training regiment, the pilots can be awarded wings as a pilot third grade and are then assigned to an operational unit.
In 1987, the PLAAF established a Flight Test and Training Center at Cangzhou airfield near Tianjin. This center has three primary missions: to test new aircraft under development by the aviation ministry; to train the initial cadre of pilots in new type aircraft before the aircraft are deployed to an operational base for the first time; and to devise new air combat tactics.
The Training Center also established a blue Army? aggressor unit located nearby to simulate offensive and defensive operations against the �fed Army.? The aggressor aircraft, mostly F-7s and F-8s, engage in exercises with local units, employing dissimilar aircraft air intercepts utilizing evasive maneuvers. The tactics developed at the training base and through the blue Army? are now being moved to the unit-level, where several units have begun to turn these new combat theories and concepts into live-ammunition exercises.
Chapter Seven: Conclusion:
This essay is an attempt to outlined new campaign doctrine and strategies that may enhance the chances for the PLA. It is based on collections of articles, and it is by no mean publishable with out much refine works.
One thing for sure, the PLA is getting a long leg and longer arms by turning its absolute technological inferiority to local and temporary superiority. The newly discovered? notion of WZC, which may contribute to such superiority, since it may enable the PLA to fully exploit its new joint forces-based pockets of technological excellence.?
In the Mark Burles's Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings, the object of a limited war for the PLA is not necessary a pure military one.
By Gaining initiative by striking first not only confers a military advantage but also heightens the psychological or political shock value of any initial military success. The latter effect many have important payoffs: the adversary may became disheartened and defeatist as a result of the unexpected reverse he has suffered and maybe induced to reduce his war aims. The importance of achieving such as psychological-political shock is magnified in the case of a military force that has limited force projection and containment capabilities? The author used Sino-India and Sino-Vietnam wars as examples. In 79, although military speaking the PLA did not perform well, but once the shock is over for the Vietnamese, Deng safely stated: We estimate that the Soviet Union will not take too big an action? I think our action is limited, and it will not give rise to a very big event.
The high speed, precision, and lethality of high-tech Weapons may quicken the war process. But the high cost of high-tech weapons also means that war can be too costly if it is allowed to drag on or escalate. Also, prolonging the war may not only mean higher expense to sustain the war, but also severely damage the civilian infrastructure, thereby negatively affecting the national economy. Finally, simply because the PLA is inferior in technology, it is all the more necessary for it to fully exploit the local and temporary superiority it could achieve through preemption to resolve the war in its favor in the shortest possible time. If the war is allowed to become protracted, to the extent that the enemy regains its superiority, the PLA may face the prospect of being defeated, if PLA does not want to escalate the conflict to national level.
At any rate, even if WZC are wishful? thinking and PLA can not carry out every aspect of the WZC, it should used it as the foundation to streamline wartime joint forces command and operation structures. It is the blue print doctrine for PLA's future operations. The lesson of Vietnam is PLA will not threaten or fight wars unless the benefit is perceived to be high, the cost low and most important of all, the prospect of winning is good.
Some issues:
Please keep in mind, the WZC does not apply to the currently situation with Taiwan
In spite of all measures to increase the enemy's transparency to the PLA and to reduce the PLA's visibility to the enemy, successfully concealing a WZC-sized force for a preemptive strike that may catch the enemy by surprise is an immensely difficult deed to accomplish.
PLA writings on campaign doctrine and strategies do not contain alternative plans if or when the PLA cannot gain the initiative by striking first or if quick battle and quick resolution become difficult to obtain. One would argue that with IRBM and ICBM, to deter powerful? third party intervention or escalate the conflict by making the cost unacceptable high. How heavy is the face? factor in calling it off?
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Citation: Andy Chan. "PLA WarZone Campaign Doctrine: V 2.0," 10 February 2001.
Original URL: http://www.future-china.org.tw/fcn/mainland/secuity/20010210.htm
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