By M. Ehsan Ahrari
Global Beat, October 1998
The People's Republic of China (PRC) has already assigned its Navy a prime role ahead of its Army and Air Force. The rationale underlying this decision is quite sound. Since the overall modernization of all three services of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will take two or possibly more decades, concentration on enhancing the offensive and defensive capabilities of one service is quite cost-effective.
The culmination of the Cold War and the implosion of the former Soviet Union have brought about an end to a long-standing Chinese fear of a potential major war with that superpower. Now the Chinese strategic doctrine of local wars has become more concerned with possible limited wars, which would necessitate limited military responses. As long as a limited war is fought on the periphery of the Chinese homeland, the PRC could rely on its Navy to contain such a conflict. Consequently, in the 1990s and beyond, the PLA Navy (PLAN) has brought about a very important change in its strategic doctrine. Traditionally, its primary focus was the defense of territorial and coastal waters. However, it has now adopted the Mahanian concepts of power projection and sea control. Thus, the reliance on the submarine force emerges as an important aspect of China's naval modernization.
Since Soviet strategic culture played an important role in the evolution of Chinese strategic culture from the 1950s onward, one also has to examine certain features of Russian naval doctrines in the 1990s to make some informed judgments about Chinese Naval doctrine as it is being evolved between now (i.e., the end of the 1990s) and for the next two or three decades. "Historically," as one study notes, "the submarine force has been a key element of Russian military power." The current Russian military establishment continues to assign an important status to submarines as "a practical option for ensuring strategic deterrence and rebuffing an enemy naval force." Even with its considerably diminished military status in the post-Cold War years, the submarine force serves as an important element of Russia's military power. To maintain its strategic deterrence, Russia has been allocating a higher percentage of its remaining warheads to ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). "Hence, SSBNs, along with the attack submarines which protect them, are increasingly important to Russia's nuclear deterrent posture."1
The Russian Navy not only considers the attack and cruise missile submarines (SSNs and SSGNs) "as the first line of defense against enemy aircraft carriers and warships capable of launching land-attack cruise missiles," but regards the submarines "as a cost-effective combination of other key military capabilities, including the ability to destroy Western SSBNs, covertly mine enemy sea lanes, conduct covert surveillance and intelligence, and launch land-attack cruise missiles."2 This Russian reliance on submarines and submarine warfare stems from the financial crunch that country has been experiencing throughout the 1990s. This financial crunch has kept Russia from bankrolling its overall military buildup a la the days of the former Soviet Union. The Russian example of relying on their Navy for strategic defense has been adopted by the Chinese for a variety of reasons. First, aside from the previously noted similarities between the Chinese and Russian strategic cultures, an emulation of Russia's strategic doctrine is an option that is both cost-effective and complementary to Chinese strategic objectives. Naval power has always been neglected in the land-oriented strategic thinking of Mao Zedong. During the Korean war, Chinese forces were pounded by the lethality of the U.S. naval and air power. This and subsequent conflicts persuaded Mao and his successors never to allow China's enemy forces such a decisive advantage over Chinese forces in the naval and air power. Nuclear power was also an important ingredient of this thinking since the United States threatened to use nuclear weapons against China during the Korean war.3
Second, the indigenous technological capabilities of the PRC's scientific community remains too low for China to develop ambitious modernization plans affecting all three services. Thus, the PRC has to rely on a number of policy measures to pursue a modest strategy of modernizing its armed forces. These include developing weapon systems by using indigenous talents; developing various military projects; negotiating co-production agreements, off-the-shelf purchases, and contract agreements for purchase of a variety of high tech-based systems; and relying equally heavily on the development of weapon systems through reverse engineering-a process that takes about fifteen year per system, according to one study.4
Third, China's historical experience with foreign powers has made it highly suspicious and distrustful of dependence on international organizations and alliances. Its rulers are of the view that only economic wealth and power (fu qiang) will enable them to fend off foreign manipulation. Consequently, the Chinese leader continue to view a strong defense as an outgrowth of a strong economy, and assign a very high priority to the economic development of their country. 5 The implosion of the Soviet Union serves as an unhappy reminder of what a gross and systematic neglect of economic affairs at the expense of acute military buildup can do even to a military superpower. The Chinese leaders are poised to avoid the Soviet example at all costs.
Modalities of Recent Modernizing Endeavors
Given these realities, what does the PLA Navy look like toward the end of the 1990s? To start with, aircraft carriers, the main symbol of a blue water navy, are absent from the inventory of naval vessels of the PLAN. However, the PRC's fascination with owning aircraft carriers-and, indeed, with emerging as a world class naval power in the coming years-is far from absent. On the contrary, the debate within China over whether it should acquire aircraft carriers may best be described as off-again, on-again. Each carrier is a multibillion-dollar system, "pegged around a host of supporting ships-air defense escorts, anti-submarine escorts, tankers and replenishment vessels." Destroyers and cruisers, on the contrary, are "cheaper and less vulnerable ships that can be sent into troubled water unassisted." Various naval specialists are examining the option of owning surface ships armed with cruise missiles and ATBM systems. Long-range cruise missiles launched from surface ships promise to supplement or even replace conventional air attacks, "with satellite imagery providing both targeting data and most of the post-attack damage assessment."6
Toward the end of 1997, it was reported that China under the leadership of President Jiang Zemin has resolved to launch an ambitious carrier plan in the year 2000. As ambitious as the plan sounded, the PLA Navy was bound to encounter a number of highly technical problems. Realistically speaking, the PRC did not have the kind of technological sophistication that was required to build a true conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) carrier. Besides, a vital necessity for such a carrier is the availability of VTOL aircraft. And Britain was not about to sell its Harriers to Beijing. The only other country that has short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft technology, Russia, has discontinued the production of YAK-141 program. A pragmatic option for China was to develop a helicopter carrier as an interim measure. This was, indeed, reported to be what the Chinese leaders were considering, with the eventual development of true aircraft carrier being a live option over the long run.7
As shown in Table 1, under the category of strategic missile submarines, the PLAN has 1 Golf-class and 1 Xia-class submarines.8 Under the category of patrol or attack submarines, it has 5 Han (or Fleet)-class submarines (type 091), and 1 more is planned; 4 Song-class submarines (type 039), and 2 more are in reserve; 3 Kilo-class submarines (type 877 and 636, and 1 more is under order; 1 modified Romeo-class (SSG); and 36 Romeo-class (Type 033) submarines. An additional 32 of these submarines are in reserve. The PLAN also has a total of 18 destroyers, one more planned; and 35 frigates, and 2 more under construction.
The Golf-class submarine was refitted in 1995 with JL-2, two-staged solid fuel missile, with inertial guidance up to 8,000 km or 4,320 n-miles. It also contains three or four 90 kt nuclear MIRV or a single nuclear 250 MIRV kt. The Xia-class SSBN is fitted with 12-JL-2 two-stage solid fuel missiles, with inertial guidance up to 8,000 km. Its refitting process, started in 1995, is expected to be completed in 1998. The Han-class attack submarines are armed with C-801 cruise missiles, with a range of 42 km or 22 n-miles. Their original basic Russian electronic support measures (ESM or intercept) was replaced by a modern French design, possibly for long-range targeting. The Song-class submarines, "the first Chinese submarine equipped with a submerged-launched anti-ship cruise missile,"9 are still undergoing a trial period. These submarines contain an integrated bow sonar, are armed with C-801 SSMs, and their diesel engines are reported to be reverse engineered.
Table 1 - Strength of the Fleet of the PRC
Type Active (Reserve) Building (Planned)
Aircraft Carrier 0 1
SSBN 1 (1)
SSB 1 -
Fleet Submarines (SSN) 5 1
Cruise Missile Submarine (SSG) 1 -
Patrol Submarines 54 (32) 3 (2)
Destroyers 18 (1)
Frigates 35 2
Fast Attack Craft (Missile) 129 (56) 3
Fast Attack Craft (Gun) 105 (182) 65 (30)
Fast Attack Craft (Torpedo) 65 (30) -
Fast Attack Craft (Patrol) 113 6
Patrol Craft 14 2
Minesweepers (Ocean) 27 (7) -
Minesweepers (Coastal) 1 (50) -
Mine Warfare Drones 4 (42) -
Minelayer 1 -
Hovercraft 1 -
LSTs 21 (2) 2
LSMs 41 (3) 3
LCMs(LCUs 44 (230) -
Troop Transports (AP/AH) 6 -
Submarine Support Ships 5 1
Salvage and Repair Ships 3 2
Supply Ships 23+ 3
Tankers 88 -
Icebreakers 4 -
Degaussing Ships 3 -
Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1996-1997
The Kilo-class submarines are type 877 EKM and 636 SSKs (diesel electric), with most advanced torpedoes, both originally built for the Russian Navy. The 636 is the latest design "with quieter propulsion and an automated combat information system capable of providing simultaneous fire control on two targets."10 This last mentioned capability is just one of the many new evolving features in submarine warfare that the United States Navy is likely to be keenly observing in the coming years. As one U.S. Naval publication notes:
Modern submarine combat systems combine sensors, fire control, and data management functions to reduce operator workload. This trend has been driven by the need to keep pace with the reduced manning complements on newer submarines. These systems feature multi-function consoles, standardized data buses, and modular architecture. The integrated combat system provides automated assistance to the operator in every phase of a combat mission: mission planning, contact detection, target classification, target tracking, and weapons launch.11
The Ming class submarines are armed with YU-4 (SAET60) torpedoes, with hull-mounted sonars that have active as well passive search and attack capabilities. The Modified Romeo class submarine is armed with 6 YJ-1 (Eagle Strike) and C-801 SSMs. Regarding 36 Romeo class submarines, Jane's Fighting Ships 1996-1997 notes that it is difficult to assess the exact number of operational vessels since these submarines spend "more than a few days at sea each year because there are insufficient trained men."12
Among the destroyers owned by the PLAN, the two most advanced are Russian-built Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers. This surface strike combatant is comparable to the U.S. Navy's Arleigh Burke-class and Japan's Kongo-class guided missile destroyers. The Sovremenny was described by U.S. defense specialists in 1987 as "one of the most technologically advanced naval warships ever produced by the [Former] Soviet Union." It is armed with "eight supersonic active homing, medium-ranged SS-N-22 sunburn anti-ship missiles (mach 2.5 range 90km-120 km)," and has performance characteristics that "will increase China's ability to threaten U.S. carriers . . . "13 The PLAN's Luda-class destroyers are armed with a ballistic trajectory ASW weapon CY-1, and 8 YJ-1 missiles. The Luhu-class destroyers are also armed with 8 YJ-1 missiles. The production of these destroyers was delayed "because of problems obtaining more gas turbines and the reallocation of funds to the Sovremennys."14
The PLAN has three categories of frigates-Jiangwei-class, Jianghu III- and IV-class, and Jianghu I-class. All of these are armed either with surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) YJ-1 (Eagle Strike) or Hy-2 (C-201-also a SSM). All these frigates are expected to undergo extensive upgrading and modifications in the coming years. The PLA Navy also owns a very large number of fast attack crafts, and quite a few minesweepers, both of which are defensive in nature. It also has a large number of drone minesweepers, which are unmanned remote control vessels used for sweeping acoustic and magnetic mines. Because they can be controlled from a distance of 5 kilometers, they can be used only for sweeping home waters.15
Reinvention of One's Great Power Status or a New Hegemonism?
The rationale underlying the growth of military power of any country may be analyzed by studying its declared strategic objectives. In the context of this essay, these objectives may best be studied by asking the following question: what is the mission assigned to a navy by its political masters? Even if one were to refuse to categorize the escalating pace of Chinese activism in the South China Sea as a manifestation of hegemonic tendencies, the following examples will leave little doubt that China, to say the least, is in the process of reinventing itself as a great power. The PRC has reiterated its intentions to reunify Taiwan even with the use of force. It has announced a tenfold increase in the area of its strategic maritime interests from 200 km off its coast (first chain islands or diyi daolian-the Japanese home islands, the Rikuyi Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo) to 2000 km off its coast (second chain island or dier daolian-which includes the Marianas, Guam, and the Carolines). This change from a coastal defense to an off-shore defense (which could be described as brown water defense, as a starting point, then development of blue water defense) strategy, according to Lewis and Xue, "reflects the resolution of a long-standing debate on whether greater importance should be attached to fighting the enemy at sea or repulsing his landing operations."16
As one author notes, "Within Southeast Asia there is the belief that China regards the region as an area of influence with which relations should be structured hierarchically." The religious and cultural heterogeneity of the Southeast Asian nations and their relatively weaker military and economic status vis-à-vis the PRC means that the former must "negotiate the terms and conditions of an acceptable relationship with China over the many issues that concern the region."17 China has contested the ownership of Spratly Islands by five other countries-Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Taiwan. The Paracel Islands-known in China as Xish Islands-are claimed by both the PRC and Vietnam. In addition, there remains a historical dispute with Japan over the ownership of the Senkakus Islands.
In 1992, the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress passed a law that asserted China's sovereignty over water around the Paracels and Spratlys. The PRC made clear its intentions "to prevent the harmful passage of vessels through its territorial waters" (Article 8), stated that its navy "can order the eviction of foreign naval vessels" (Article 10), and gave its navy "the right to chase foreign vessels violating its regulations to the high seas." Foreign naval vessels, under this law, "must obtain China's permission before proceeding through the South China Sea and foreign submarines must surface and fly their country's flag."18
China's growing ties with Burma are a source of concern to India, for the latter envisions these ties as precursor to a Chinese presence in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea-areas India considers falling within its own sphere of influence. The Chinese military presence in the Mergui Island, near the Strait of Malacca, caused consternation among the Japanese. It is through these strait that Middle Eastern oil shipments pass to Japan. In summary, as one author writes, "A common regional view is that China has visions of being Number 1 in East and Southeast Asia and its growing navy is an overt manifestation of this power."19
The PRC must be able to back the preceding foreign policy assertiveness with a highly proficient naval force. At the present time, the technological preparedness of the PLAN only identifies a few pockets of excellence, however. Its acquisition of Sovremenny-class destroyer and Kilo-class submarines certainly falls in this category. For instance, it has recreated its Marine Corps and deployed it on Hainan Island, closer to the Spratlys. It has acquired the Ilyushin 76 heavy transport aircraft and enhanced its airborne forces from brigades to divisions.20 Its strategic submarines, once fully developed, promise to enhance the defensive as well as the offensive capabilities of the PLAN. But for now it is "largely a defensive fleet," and is likely to be effective "only against an amphibious attack." 21 However, since the capabilities of even the brown water navies are so dependent on their air power, the PLAN is, indeed, faced with the challenging task of building a highly capable air force supporting the naval missions. The absence of aircraft carriers will appear more of a strategic gap in the next decade or so than it does toward the end of the 1990s. The absence of a degree of indigenous technological know-how, the acute underdevelopment of technological infrastructures within China, and a bare presence of integrated systems-that are the life-blood of even a moderately sophisticated navy-are likely to be some of the main obstacles in the way of the PLAN's attempts to develop as a brown water navy.
In order to enhance its power projection capabilities, China has to take a number of measures. First, it has to increase its logistic supply ships. Second, it has to modernize and increase the number of its current nuclear submarines and equip them with modern offensive platforms. Its attack submarines, destroyers, and frigates have to be similarly modernized. Third, it has to acquire state-of-the art command and control systems. However, on this issue, as on the issue of modernization at large, it is not sufficient to purchase state-of-the-art weapons; developing indigenous capabilities to maintain these imported platforms, and, more important, nurturing a corps of highly competent technicians to build these platforms are the sine qua non of a great power. Fourth, China may have to reexamine its nuclear deterrent option in order to redirect its capital investments to other military programs. The strategic realities of its neighborhood are starkly different in the 1990s than they were in the previous decades. The potential of nuclear attack has substantially subsided since the implosion of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Japan has constitutional limits regarding its development of an offensive force. India, another fledgling naval power of the region, appears to be limiting itself in the Indian Ocean. That leaves only U.S. naval forces as a potential challenge to a mounting Chinese naval presence in East Asia. However, all indicators are pointing toward a continued force drawdown of the U.S. armed forces. This means that the U.S. Navy will continue to reduce its footprints in East Asia. Thus, the Chinese military establishment is under no pressure to maintain a high level of nuclear deterrence, and will be free to focus on enhancing the conventional side of the PLAN's power projection capabilities in the coming years. Fifth, the two areas the PLAN is seriously deficient-logistics and naval air power-are likely to take several years, if not decades, to develop indigenously. The Chinese authorities are not running against any urgent deadlines to acquire these capabilities, their only challenge being the present low level of technological knowledge that prevails in the PRC.
Despite the fact that the PLAN has not yet acquired impressive technological capabilities, one should not underestimate the status of the PRC. China is an emerging great power of the 1990s, whose political and military status in the coming decades appears promising, especially if it continues its impressive economic growth without a political implosion a la the former Soviet Union. The mere acquisition of technological sophistication and conversion of this type of knowledge into military prowess is not sufficient for a country to be considered a great power, however. As Edward Luttwak notes, there are a number of equally important "tacit" preconditions to be a great power. These include a readiness to use force whenever it is advantageous to do so, and an acceptance of the resulting combat casualties with equanimity, as long as the number was not disproportionate.22 China has, indeed, fulfilled these preconditions through its willingness to get involved in military conflicts in the past decades: the Korean War of the 1950s, military action against India in 1962, military action against Vietnam in 1979, and the PRC's refusal to be intimidated by the nuclear armed former Soviet Union. That might have been one reason why the United States took seriously China's missile firing into commercial shipping and transportation lanes near Taiwan in March 1996-an action that was clearly aimed at intimidating the Taiwanese government-and sent its Second Carrier Battle Group into the waters off Taiwan.
If one follows Luttwak's argument, given the reputation of the PRC for getting involved in military conflicts even when the military odds are against it and in view of the very low level of tolerance of the American public to get involved in distant conflicts that are likely to produce high American casualties, the United States should not have risked a conflict with the PRC. However, given the reputation of U.S. military power in the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1991, it is prudent to argue that Washington made a rational calculation that the PRC would not risk a military confrontation with the United States when its ships showed up in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait.
But by not responding in kind to the United States' show of naval power, China has not necessarily backed away from a military conflict. Quite the contrary, one can argue that given the past record of China's lack of timidity about getting embroiled in a military conflict, Beijing demonstrated its willingness to take military action, if necessary, to solve this issue. And China fired missiles toward Taiwan. Similarly, the United States went to the brink of manifesting its resolve to use military power to keep China from seeking a military solution. Both sides also demonstrated how far they can go to register their resolve and when to stop after they have registered it. Taking military action was not worth the cost at this time. The economic stakes for both sides are much too high in the 1990s to be jeopardized by impetuous military actions. Besides, while the Gulf War of 1991 has clearly demonstrated the high-tech capabilities of the U.S. armed forces, it did not prove anything about the political will of the United States to absorb human losses and continue fighting. The Chinese know that this issue continues to be the Achilles heel of the United States.
Undoubtedly, despite the considerable high-tech superiority enjoyed by the U.S. armed forces, neither side loses sight of the fact that both these countries also possess nuclear arms. Even when one stays within the range of a potential conventional military conflict between the United States and PRC, the Western military establishments need to keep in mind that the Chinese military leaders are likely to make the best of the PRC's current technological inferiority-a condition they clearly envision as transitory. Thus, they are cognizant of the fact that they must develop strategies to minimize the high-tech edge of the enemy-presumably the United States, since it epitomizes the high-tech warfare, as was clearly demonstrated in the Gulf War of 1991.
In a thoughtful essay, Su Zian, writing in Xianai Bingoi (Modern Weaponry) makes numerous observations that the Western armed forces, especially the U.S. Navy, must keep in mind for future reference. Before summarizing his observations, I should note that the focus of Su Zian's writing is on a country that is most likely to fight a largely high tech-based war. The other noteworthy characteristics of such a war are that there will be a heavy use of weapons that have an over-the-horizon potency and high precision; there is likely to be a large distance between two (or more) belligerents; and one of the belligerents' armed forces are likely to rely heavily on low-tech weapons. The following are some of Su Zian's suggestions for the benefit of a low-tech country that are relevant to this essay.
First, he suggests that the low-tech country should develop long-range precision interception weapons (e.g., the conventional cruise missiles and super guns) that should target the transport ships of the high tech enemy. He specifically mentions cruise missiles and super guns. Second, Su recommends the use of saturation tactical ballistic missile strikes on an enemy's fleet of aircraft carriers and its high-priced air defense missile systems and other large-scale equipment. "For a [low-tech] country on the defense," he writes, "surface-to-surface tactical ballistic missiles are a fine offensive weapon in that they present a major threat to the enemy and could pin it down."23
Interestingly enough, the PRC has accumulated an impressive array of cruise missiles. These include SY-1/HY-1, HY-2, HY-3/C-301, HY-4/C-201, FL-1, FL-2/SY-2, C-101, C-601, andYJ-2/C-802. All of these are anti-ship cruise missiles; the C-802 is both a land attack and an anti-ship cruise missile. The PRC has also made noteworthy advances in ballistic missile production. Its inventory of these missiles includes CSS-2 and CSS-3 (intermediate-range ballistic missiles-IRBMs); CSS-4, DF-31 and DF-41 (all short-range ballistic missiles-SRBMs); CSS-N3 and JL-2 (submarine-launched ballistic missiles-SLBMs). Of these, China has exported CSS-2 to Saudi Arabia, CSS-8 to Iran, and DF-11, also known as M-11, to Pakistan. Despite an impressive array of anti-ship missiles, the PLA Navy has "fallen short in protecting its ships from anti-ship cruise missiles . . ." and it " has no missile defense."24
Closing Observations
In summary, the best advantage the PRC enjoys in the 1990s is that its economy is performing well. Despite the recent turbulence experienced by its neighbors-Malaysia, Thailand, Korea, and even Japan-the Chinese economy has not yet suffered from the deleterious spillover effects from these economies. What China should remember is that it can go only so far in being assertive before its neighbors will construe its behavior as a manifestation of hegemonic tendencies. East Asia is already regarded as an area with the second highest military expenditures after the Persian Gulf region. The presence of China and the past dark example of Japanese militarism, along with economies that have been booming until they suffered the aforementioned turbulences, have made more than their fair share of contributions to the high military expenditures of that area.
China is also reaping the benefits of a threat-free environment of the post-Cold War years. Now Russia, aside from not being a threat, has emerged as a major supplier of sophisticated military weapons to the PRC. The United States is also eager to sell its weapons-related technologies to China, Beijing's record on human rights and its intimidation of Taiwan notwithstanding.
However, these positive developments, which have a potential of tremendously facilitating the PLAN's modernization endeavors, might come to an abrupt end if the rulers of China were to find no end to their foreign policy assertiveness. They must realize that the mere size of their country is intimidating enough for their smaller and militarily weaker neighbors. In addition, the absence of transparency in their military expenditures creates ample fears in East Asia. China can reinvent itself as a great power by continuing its march on the road to economic development. Naval modernization, indeed, the modernization of the entire PLA, is not likely to create a paranoia about its intentions among its neighbors if the PRC tones down its sustained foreign policy assertiveness, and, instead of issuing unilateral declarations of sovereignty over its territorial claims, if Beijing demonstrates its willingness to seek political solutions to these issues. Otherwise, coupled with its heightened military modernization, its foreign policy assertiveness is likely to escalate the spirals of military preparedness, whose implications are likely to be deleterious for all of East Asia.
End Notes
1 Worldwide Submarine Challenges (Office of Naval Intelligence, 1996), p. 22.
2 Ibid.
3 For a detailed discussion of this point see, John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), especially chapter Nine. For a discussion of the nuclear issue, see Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988).
4 Christopher D. Yung, People's War at Sea (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, March 1996).
5 David Shambaugh, "China's Military: Real or Paper Tiger?," The Washington Quarterly, 1996, pp. 19-36. Also Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," Survival, Summer 1994, pp. 43-59.
6 Steven Ryan, "Asia's 21st Century Navies: Time for the Renaissance of the Surface Ship," Asian Defense Journal, October 1995, pp. 24-26.
7 John Downing, "China's Aircraft Carrier Program," Asia Pacific Defense Reporter, November 1997, pp. 6-7.
8 This discussion is based on Jane's Fighting Ships 1996-1997 (Jane's Information Group, 1997), pp. 113-125.
9 "Worldwide Submarine Challenges, 1997, Statement of Rear Admiral Michael W. Cramer, Director of Naval Intelligence, Before the Subcommittee on Seapower of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 8 April 1997.
10 Ibid., p. 558.
11 Worldwide Submarine Challenges (Office of Naval Intelligence, 1996), p. 558.
12 Jane's Fighting Ships 1996-1997, op. Cit., p. 116.
13 Gary Klintworth, "The Chinese Navy to get some big guns, at last," Asia Pacific Defense Reporter, April-May 1997, p. 6-7.
14 Jane's Fighting Ships 1996-1997, op. Cit., p. 118.
15 Joseph R. Morgan, Porpoises Among Whales: Small Navies in Asia and the Pacific (Hawaii: East West Center, March 1994), p. 34.
16 Lewis and Xue, China's Strategic Sea Power , op. Cit., p. 323.
17 Lesez Bszynski, "Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: Regionalism and Security," Asian Survey, September 1992, pp. 830-847.
18.Ibid., p. 836.
19 David Winterford, "Chinese Naval Planning and Maritime Interests in South China Sea: Implication for U.S. and Regional Security Policies," The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol. 2, Winter 1993, pp. 369-398.
20 Yung, op. Cit., p. 15.
21 Morgan, op. Cit., p. 34.
22 Edward N. Luttwak, "Where are the Great Powers?" Foreign Affairs, July/August 1994, pp. 23-28.
23 Su Zian, "Strategies to Minimize High-tech Edge of Enemy," originally published in Chinese on August 8, 1995, translation from Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-CHI96-036, pp. 1-4.
24 Eric McVadon, "PRC's Exercises: Doctrine and Tactics Toward Taiwan: The Naval Dimension," in James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs (Editors), Crisis in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1997), pp. 249-276.
M. Ehsan Ahrari is a Professor of National Security & Strategy at the Joint & Combined Warfighting School of Armed Forces Staff College
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Citation: M. Ehsan Ahrari. "Strategic Implications of China's Naval Modernization," Global Beat, October 1998.
Original URL: http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/ahrari1098.html
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