Inside Defense
(Clarification: The original version of this story, citing comments from James Miller, the principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy, stated that the Defense Department would not consider cuts to its operational strategic nuclear delivery systems during negotiations with Russia on a follow-on Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Lt. Col. Jonathan Withington, a Pentagon spokesman, said on Aug. 6 that analysis now being conducted as part of the Nuclear Posture Review -- which is examining changes in force structure -- could influence the U.S. position in the START follow-on negotiations. The story has been updated accordingly.)
Aug. 5, 2009 -- A Pentagon analysis underpinning the United States' opening position in strategic arms talks with Moscow calls for retaining all operational strategic nuclear delivery systems, leaving decisions about force structure changes that might require cuts to nuclear-armed bombers, submarines or missiles until completion of the Nuclear Posture Review later this year.
James Miller, principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy, said in an exclusive interview with InsideDefense.com that while Pentagon officials are exploring a wide range of changes to U.S. nuclear posture -- including how to further reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the national defense strategy -- the U.S. military intends for now to hold steady the size of the missile, submarine and bomber force.
On July 6, President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a framework for a follow-on to the 1991 arms treaty, set to expire in December, that would set the number of strategic nuclear delivery systems between 500 -- Russia's objective -- and 1,100, Washington's target. The two sides also agreed the follow-on treaty would reduce the number of operationally deployed warheads maintained by each nation to between 1,500 and 1,675.
The U.S. position that Obama carried into that agreement in Moscow was the result of analysis led by the Defense Department as part of early work on the Nuclear Posture Review, said Miller.
“The Nuclear Posture Review has proceeded and driven positions taken in the START-follow on negotiations,” he said. “It has been a DOD-led review, with interagency involvement. And our senior leaders, including our secretary and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have been involved and have approved the recommendations that have gone forward.”
The 1,100 strategic delivery vehicles the United States advanced as a target in the negotiations includes hundreds of systems that are no longer used for nuclear missions, including many that the Defense Department has no plans to ever operate again.
However, the START treaty lays out highly technical rules for counting launchers: Each deployed intercontinental ballistic missile and associated launcher, each deployed submarine-launched ICBM and its associated launcher, and each deployed heavy bomber is counted as a single delivery vehicle -- no matter whether they are outfitted with nuclear or conventional warheads.
“Under those counting rules, a number of systems that we've used in the past and don't currently use or intend to use are counted,” Miller said in an interview at the Pentagon on July 24. “All told, there are several hundred of those phantom vehicles.”
Among these are 50 empty MX missile silos and 50 Minuteman silos that have been decommissioned. Under the treaty, 96 launch tubes on four Trident-class submarines which have been converted to fire conventional cruise missiles are still counted.
The Air Force has parked a number of bombers at the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, AZ, boneyard, including 51 B-52Gs, 13 B-52Hs and 16 B-1Bs, according to Theresa Pittman, a spokeswoman for the Air Force unit that maintains the facility. The Pentagon has dismantled 46 B-52s in accordance with the START treaty, she said.
The Air Force's entire operational B-1 bomber force -- 66 aircraft as of May, none of which are configured to carry nuclear warheads -- is counted under the START treaty.
“To the extent these phantom delivery vehicles can be taken off the books, that allows us to go down and preserve the flexibility of our force mix,” Miller said.
The number of operational strategic nuclear delivery systems is classified, he said, adding, “What I'll say is, it is a couple- to several-hundred less than the countable number.”
Miller said the NPR analysis that informed the U.S. position in the START follow-on discussions would allow the Defense Department to retain enough nuclear warheads and delivery systems to preserve the nuclear triad.
The analysis examined a range of options to reduce warhead numbers below caps set in 2001 by Russia and the United States under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, which aims to reduce the number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200.
“We looked at a range of several different specific numbers below that level; we looked at them in the context of some very stressing scenarios involving potential nuclear conflict, involving challenges to each of the systems, each of the legs of the triad,” Miller said.
He declined to say whether the U.S. position on the number of nuclear warheads in the agreement Obama and Medvedev signed was the higher or lower objective, only that it was the result of a thorough vetting by the Defense Department which provided for the retention of a “robust triad” capability.
“The resulting analysis was provided to the senior leadership and the position that we ended up with and recommended to the negotiators was the one supported by the [defense] secretary and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” he added, noting it was a “very extensive analysis of the possibilities for the future across a wide range of scenarios.”
Miller said one option being considered would involve reducing the number of warheads loaded on each Minuteman missile.
“It is something we're definitely looking at,” he said.
He also signaled that the Nuclear Posture Review likely would call for retaining all three legs of the nuclear triad.
“As the NPR continues we will look at a full range of options,” Miller said. “There is a very good case for retaining diversity in our nuclear-delivery systems. And the details of that will depend in part on the overall strategy and guidance that we're making adjustments to. I wouldn't preclude any outcome. But, I guess, as a hint of where we're heading, we recognize that diversity in delivery systems is important.”
Ted Warner, a Pentagon veteran who was assistant secretary of defense for strategy and threat reduction from 1997 to 2000, has returned to the Defense Department to be the military's point man in START follow-on negotiations, which are led by the State Department.
Miller said the Pentagon is looking for the START follow-on treaty “to allow both sides to mix their forces as they see fit,” marking a change from START, which puts specific limitations on different types of forces.
“What we'd like to do is establish a basis with the Russians that allows us to continue the most important verification provisions of START,” Miller said. “We're both looking for ways to reduce costs associated with that. But the transparency allowed by the treaty and inspections and exchange of data has been very helpful and helps reduce the chances that either side engages in worst-case analysis of the other.”
In addition, hammering out a new treaty with Russia is an important dimension in efforts to burnish the U.S. government's leadership credentials, he said.
“The fact that we're working together is important,” Miller said. “Given that we [the United States and Russia] account for 90 percent plus of the nuclear weapons in the world today, we want to encourage others to reduce their nuclear weapons. We want to strength the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime. And taking action in reducing our own numbers is part of our obligation under the NPT and part of what it will take to make progress.” -- Jason Sherman
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