Inside Defense
Nov. 2, 2009 -- An insufficient number of contract oversight personnel and a lack of visibility over the inventory of some equipment are just two of the challenges that may impede the Defense Department’s ability to meet drawdown deadlines agreed upon by the United States and Iraq, the Government Accountability Office said today.
In a statement released today, William Solis, director of defense capabilities and management for GAO, provides initial observations on the Pentagon's planning for the drawdown of forces in Iraq and warns of challenges that need to be addressed. Solis appeared today before the congressional Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The current drawdown time line calls for a reduction of U.S. troops in Iraq to 50,000 by Aug. 31, 2010, and a complete withdrawal is supposed to take place by the end of 2011, according to GAO. The scale of the drawdown is enormous: 128,700 U.S. troops, more than 115,000 contractor personnel, 295 bases and more than 3.3 million pieces of equipment.
To meet the established targets for August 2010, Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) "must draw down 32 percent of its contractor personnel workforce, retrograde over 50 percent of its tracked and wheeled vehicles, and close 67 percent of its bases in Iraq," Solis states.
Adding to the complexity of the effort, the drawdown of equipment and personnel is "one of several tasks U.S. forces in Iraq are conducting concurrently in a continuously evolving environment during a period of Iraqi political uncertainty," according to Solis.
By the Pentagon's own estimates, efforts to reduce personnel and return equipment have so far exceeded targets, he notes. However, much remains to be done and serious challenges threaten to complicate the Pentagon's plans, states Solis.
First, DOD has not fully determined what kind of contractor support it will need to complete the drawdown, said Solis in his statement.
"In planning for the contractor presence needed during the final phase of the drawdown, MNF-I has made assumptions in the absence of defined requirements or full visibility over contracted services that may contribute to wasted resources and may hinder the timely execution of drawdown," he states.
Contracts for services in Iraq and Kuwait, which will soon reach their expiration date, are also presenting challenges to drawdown plans, according to Solis. Contracts for base and life support, convoy support and equipment maintenance are scheduled to be re-competed and re-awarded at the height of the drawdown, he notes.
"To prevent similar service interruptions when other key contracts transition, it will be critical that DOD ensures that the outgoing contractor release personnel to the incoming contractor as anticipated," he states.
The lack of sufficient contract oversight personnel, a problem that GAO has been documenting since 2004, also must be addressed, says Solis.
In addition, key decisions about what is going to happen to certain equipment have yet to be made, according to Solis. The complexity surrounding decisions about what can and cannot be transferred to the Government of Iraq is contributing to planning uncertainty.
So far, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq has prepared a list of equipment it believes the Iraqi government will need to provide security after U.S. forces leave. According to Solis, this list includes about 1.5 percent of the estimated 3.3 million pieces of equipment in Iraq, with a projected value of about $600 million.
The list is being reviewed by the Pentagon, according to Solis. "Until this list is approved, and an appropriate transfer mechanism determined, the equipment that will be transferred to the Government of Iraq remains uncertain," he states.
The future of the fleet of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles is one area that poses significant challenges, according to Solis.
"According to Army officials, the Army, which manages most of the MRAP fleet, has issued preliminary disposition instructions for MRAPs to be retrograded from Iraq, but service-wide requirements for MRAPs have not yet been finalized," Solis writes.
"To remove MRAPs from Iraq according to the timeline set by the Security Agreement, the pace of their retrograde will need to significantly increase as the drawdown progresses, which heightens the potential for bottlenecks," he continues.
Finally, Solis highlights the longstanding weaknesses of information technology systems and the Pentagon's lack of visibility of inventory of some equipment and shipping containers as further challenges that have to be addressed if drawdown time lines are to be met.
"While much has been done to facilitate the drawdown effort, the efficient execution of the drawdown will depend on DOD’s ability to mitigate these challenges," Solis says. -- Kate Brannen
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