The governor of Iraq's once-violent Anbar province talks about recovery and foreign investment.
Saturday, Oct. 31, 2009
by James Kitfield, The National Journal
When twin suicide truck bombs rocked Baghdad on October 25, killing more than 150 people in the worst terrorist strike there in two years, the attacks provided a grim reminder that Iraq's security remains fragile in the face of a still-deadly insurgency. By contrast, Anbar province, the former hotbed of terrorist and insurgent activity, has remained relatively quiet. Indeed, when the history of the Iraq war is written, the turnabout of Anbar will feature prominently.
Once the focal point for Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Sunni insurgency, Anbar's main towns of Falluja and Ramadi are synonymous with some of the war's worst fighting. But Anbar today is one of the quietest regions in the country. That transformation is the result of a 2006 decision by tribal leaders to form the "Awakening Councils," striking an alliance with U.S. forces and sending local "Sons of Iraq" to fight Al Qaeda.
Recently, National Journal Staff Correspondent James Kitfield spoke with Anbar's governor, Qasim Abed al-Fahadawi, who was in Washington for a conference. The interview touched on the pending withdrawal of U.S. combat troops, Iraq's difficult transition to normalcy, and the lessons that the "Anbar model" holds for the war in Afghanistan. Edited excerpts follow.
NJ: Recent months have seen renewed terrorist attacks in Iraq. How concerned are you that Al Qaeda in Iraq and associated Sunni insurgent groups may be making a comeback?
Fahadawi: I will tell you, for my region this is not really a big issue. It's well known that Anbar at one time was the most violent area in Iraq, because at that time many people were acting as incubators to the violence. Now the opposite is true. Almost everyone in Anbar is now convinced that violence works against their interests and in favor of outside agitators. In my opinion, the violence works against the interests of all Iraqis and serves mainly the interests of Iran.
NJ: How strong is Al Qaeda in Anbar province?
Fahadawi: I think it is weak, because they have very little support. Anyone known to support Al Qaeda is rejected by the community. That was the main success behind the Sons of Iraq in Anbar. Al Qaeda could not have been defeated by the American Army or the Iraqi army. It could only survive with the support of the people, and the tribes and the people have turned against Al Qaeda. Of course, we had the help of the American and Iraqi armies, but the main element in the defeat of Al Qaeda in Anbar was the rejection of the group by normal people. If you mention Al Qaeda to our citizens today, everyone feels nervous. So I don't think Al Qaeda will ever be able to find a base in Anbar again.
NJ: How important are the national elections in Iraq scheduled for January?
Fahadawi: We all hope the January elections will provide solutions to many problems, because the last elections were dominated by sectarian forces. Iraq is too diverse a nation to be based on a sectarian foundation. We have Arabs and Kurds, Christians and Muslims, Sunni and Shiite. We all have to find a way to live together as we did in our past, because this sectarian fighting is largely new to the Iraqi people.
As an example of how the elections can help, right now there are delegations from [Shiite majority] Nasiriya and [Sunni majority] Anbar forming a secular coalition and political party based on its opposition to sectarianism or religion. We believe that Iraq cannot be led on the basis of religion, because that will lead directly to sectarianism.
NJ: How concerned are you that the Iraqi parliament has been unable to pass an election law that will determine whether voters choose between "closed lists" of political parties or "open lists" of individual politicians?
Fahadawi: For sure we need open-list elections to be successful, because the 2005 elections were based on closed lists and the whole country lost as a result. We paid a very heavy price for those elections and the subsequent rise to power of sectarian politicians. There are people in parliament today as a result who are not only unqualified to hold their positions, but some are not even Iraqis! There is one parliament member who has Iranian citizenship and is not an Iraqi at all! Why? Because with closed lists people don't know who they are really voting for. The party behind the closed list puts whoever it wants into power.
NJ: So are you worried that Iranian influence will increase as a result of the upcoming elections?
Fahadawi: I actually think the political parties most associated with Iran will lose in this election. They gained influence from past elections, but there is a growing feeling inside Iraq that we need to pursue our own national interests separate from Iran, or Syria, or any of our neighbors. We hope to have good relations with all neighbors, but we can't follow their lead because they are looking after their own interests, and Iraqis need to do the same. After all of the blood and treasure we Iraqis have expended, and all the destruction we have seen, more and more people are concluding that we have to live together as Iraqis.
NJ: Do you think that Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, a Shiite Muslim, is now perceived as such a secular leader?
Fahadawi: Yes. No one believed a few years ago that he could take on the Iranian-backed special groups in Basra, but he led Iraqi security forces there and that was a very dangerous move. He took a big risk. And because he prevailed, it is now working in his favor. We all appreciate what he did. Personally, I don't care if the next leader of Iraq is a Shiite, or a Kurd, or a Muslim, or a Christian. It means a lot, however, that he is not motivated by sectarian feelings. Maliki proved that he is a leader of all Iraqis, and I think that will help him in upcoming elections.
NJ: Earlier there was talk of holding a referendum on pushing up the date for the withdrawal of U.S. troops by a year, with all combat forces out by the end of 2010 instead of 2011. Would you support such a referendum?
Fahadawi: Personally, I am opposed to the idea of a quicker withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. Of course, I will have to live with whatever the federal government decides, but personally I oppose the idea and not primarily for security reasons. We in Anbar are already managing our own security without much help from the Americans. But we still need the Americans for aid and reconstruction.
Working with local tribal leaders, my team has made great progress in terms of investment and reconstruction in Anbar province, and we have developed a foreign investment master plan. But for decades we were isolated from the rest of the world. We lack experience and contacts. The American officers have been helping us with their administrative skills and international contacts, and therefore it is my wish that they stay longer to help us solidify these gains.
NJ: There is a heated debate in Washington about whether the "Anbar model" can be exported to Afghanistan, in terms of persuading local tribal leaders there to turn against the Taliban. Do you think there are lessons from Anbar that might apply to Afghanistan?
Fahadawi: Well, there are obvious differences between Iraq and Afghanistan, so you will not be able to replicate the Anbar model exactly. It's like a mathematical formula: You can use similar concepts and formulas to find a solution, but you have to factor in the elements unique to each situation.
NJ: Can you give an example?
Fahadawi: If you compare Anbar and Afghanistan, for instance, you'll find that many people in Anbar are highly educated, with university degrees and experiences traveling and training abroad. So you can approach them based on a certain logic.
In Afghanistan, you will find less educated and worldly people, so you have to adjust the formula for that difference. They may be more like the Iraqis in Najaf and Karbala, where the religious leaders are the key. If a religious leader issues an edict, the people there will follow.
NJ: What other differences stand out between Anbar and Afghanistan?
Fahadawi: In Anbar the standard of living is pretty high. Most families have their own villas. I have my own house and farm in Ramadi, for instance, and my business and children. That means I have something that I don't want damaged, something to defend, something to fight for.
Afghanistan is a much poorer country, and because they don't have so much to lose it's easier to want to destroy things. I would say you have to provide the people there something of value that they don't want to lose. You have to give them something that they are willing to defend, to fight for. That kind of heavy investment will take time. I think it will take you even longer than in Iraq. In the end, however, I think the problems in Afghanistan can be solved in a similar way to Anbar.