By Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor
The New York Times, 13 March 2006
As the Bush administration's envoy for Iraqi politics, Zalmay Khalilzad had considerable experience dealing with Iraqi opponents of Saddam Hussein.
Before the war, Mr. Khalilzad was the White House's point man in meetings with Iraqi exile leaders in London and Kurdistan. After the shooting started, he was a key figure at political gatherings in Baghdad and at Tallil air base to begin assembling a new Iraqi leadership.
So when the White House prepared to announce the appointment of L. Paul Bremer III as the chief civilian administrator in Iraq in May 2003, Mr. Khalilzad had every expectation that he would continue in his political role. But just before the announcement, he learned he was not going to Iraq with Mr. Bremer after all.
In fact, his Iraqi political portfolio was gone. The decision surprised not just Mr. Khalilzad, but also Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, according to former State Department officials who asked to remain anonymous because they were talking about private discussions. Why, Mr. Powell wondered, was the Bush administration excluding the one man who knew all the players and was trusted by them?
Mr. Powell phoned Condoleezza Rice, President Bush's national security adviser, for an explanation. Ms. Rice replied she had had nothing to do with the decision. In a White House meeting with Mr. Bush, Mr. Bremer had insisted on sole control of the occupation authority as well as efforts to engineer a new government, Mr. Bremer notes in his book.
Gen. Jay Garner, who had served as the chief civilian administrator in Iraq before Mr. Bremer's appointment, said the decision to exclude Mr. Khalilzad was a mistake. "I thought it was absolutely tragic when Zal got edged out," General Garner said in an interview. "He was damn good as a diplomat and my sense was that the Iraqis trusted him."
While Mr. Bremer had experience on terrorism issues and was energetic, he had never served in the Middle East and had no nation-building experience. In Baghdad, he made several decisions that he vigorously defends, but which critics say proved fateful in slowing the rebuilding of the country and allowing violence to mount. He dissolved the Iraq Army and backed the White House policy of purging many Baath Party members from government positions.
Military officials complained he was not committed to local elections. When the United States Marines organized voting in Najaf, Mr. Bremer ordered the military to cancel it after concluding that a candidate he did not favor would win, according to senior Marine commanders. "When we denied Iraqis the opportunity to elect local officials," said Lt. Gen. James Conway, "we were increasingly seen as occupiers."
After Mr. Bremer went to Baghdad, Mr. Khalilzad, who grew up in Afghanistan, was appointed ambassador to his native country. After Mr. Bremer left Iraq, and after a short tour by John D. Negroponte, Mr. Khalilzad was appointed the United States ambassador in Baghdad. As a conservative strategist, Mr. Khalilzad was among those who pushed for tough action on Iraq.
In his current role, he has drawn criticism from Shiites and Sunnis in recent weeks as sectarian violence has heightened the threat of civil war. But both sides also praise his negotiating skills and say he is essential to bring the factions together to form a new government. "He was very flexible," General Garner said. "If something did not work out, he would try another path."
For Mr. Powell and his aides, the decision to exclude Mr. Khalilzad demonstrated the administration's tendency to make important decisions without consulting key officials. Neither he nor Ms. Rice were told in advance of the decision to dissolve the Iraqi military, according to State Department officials.
As he was preparing to leave office, Mr. Powell told Mr. Bush that the national security process was broken, according to former officials who did not want to comment on the record about a private conversation.
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Citation: Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. "After Invasion, Point Man for Iraq Was Shunted Aside," The New York Times, 13 March 2006.
Original URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/13/international/middleeast/13zalmay.html
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