By Lt. Col. Robert G. Fausti
Army, February 2005
The war in Iraq is one of our main concerns and in the words of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, “There are more unknowns than knowns.” One thing is clear, however. The consequences of losing are immense and unacceptable. There are many elements to fighting a counterinsurgency. There must be a coordinated and determined integration to fulfill the social and economic expectations and needs of the populace and security to enforce peace. Recent history has not been kind to us in the last year.
I am a soldier. I think along military lines, but let no one be fooled. Military victory will not equal total victory. It may only delay defeat. The French experience in Algeria and our political loss in Vietnam are a warning to us all.
The Army is now a member of a multistrategic effort to stabilize Iraq. Security is our main effort in this task, and current history does not bode well for the home team. Observations:
* Last year U.S. forces were engaged in the first battle of Fallujah. U.S.-trained Iraqi forces were sent to assist in this battle. En route to their operational area, they mutinied and the battalions were deemed combat ineffective.
* Six months to a year later, U.S. commanders sent another U.S.-trained unit into Fallujah under the command of an Iraqi general. This brigade, through desertions, mutinies and defections to the terrorist side, also became combat ineffective.
* In late December, a series of heavily fortified Iraqi police stations were overrun.
The above events cast doubt on the training methodology and training systems being used. I suggest that the U.S. Army consider forming a study group of Middle Eastern military and cultural experts to determine:
* What are the best armies in the Arab world?
* What methods and procedures do these armies use at the soldier and junior leader level to train and enforce discipline?
* Are there other methods that we need to look at other than the U.S. model of training?
* What are we doing wrong and what do we need to do to train an effective Iraqi fighting force?
Based on my experience as a student of history, as an infantry officer who has served in Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and as a former foreign area officer, I have serious doubts about applying TRADOC training and disciplinary standards to the Iraqi soldier. The U.S. citizen and the Iraqi citizen respond to very different cultural stimuli on a sociological and psychological level. Training a young Iraqi man the same way you train a young American man is like trying to train a bronco in the same manner you train a dolphin. Yes, you can do it, but you will not get the desired result.
The key to our efforts lies in the findings of the study group that 1 suggested. If the study group finds that U.S. methodology will not work, then we need to use the methods that will work. Some of these methods may violate TRADOC regulation 350-6. If the recommended training methodology is repugnant to us or considered too harsh, then we have a problem. If this is the case, then I suggest that the Army consider private contractors or a foreign army, such as the Turks, South Koreans or Chileans be given this mission.
Iraq is too large and the security situation demands that we keep the current indigenous force in place. Given the current situation, I do not see us turning the ship we have created. The totality of what we have done so far cannot be scrapped, but there needs to be an improvement and redirection of troop training. We need to apply this training across the board, but in order for it to be successful, small units such as battalions and companies need to be the point of concentration.
Training must be inherently tough. Deprivation and hardship, both on the intellectual and physical level, must be a part of this process. We need to train these first units like we trained the U.S. airborne units of World War II. In both officer and enlisted training, dropouts must be expected and, more important, a percentage must be desired. These units should have the following characteristics:
* Elite status attached to them.
* Double or quadruple the pay of any other government service.
* Dress uniforms that are tailor-made.
* Equipment that is new.
* The best facilities in the country for garrisons.
* Garrisons that have family housing.
* Retention under American advisors and control to avoid misuse and corruption.
There are two reasons for doing this. One, we need to send a signal and a perception to these soldiers and the Iraqi nation that they are the best. These first units can then be sent into action. After approximately two to three months of proving themselves, some of those who have shown themselves to be the best leaders could be sent to a training command to train the new cohorts in place of foreign nationals. Two, these people will need the full support of the government.
They and their families need to be protected from the corruption and insecurity that permeates the nation. Only high pay, prestige and secure facilities will do this.
These new units will be the core from which an elite army will be built. Has this been done before? Yes, numerous historical examples are available in which a small, well-trained force became the basis of a larger one. These small forces instilled and inculcated their values into the larger forces, therefore improving them and making them nearly unbeatable.
I understand political sensitivities are involved, but winning is paramount.
Every day American soldiers are dying in Iraq. The lives of the sons and daughters of our country demand maximum effort, and half measures to a father or mother are unacceptable.
Until the Iraqi armed forces are fully trained and competent, there can be no workable exit strategy envisioned for Iraq.
LT. COL. ROBERT G. FAUSTI received a commission as a second lieutenant of Infantry in the U.S. Army in 1987 and has served with Training and Doctrine Command, conventional infantry and special operations units, and as a foreign area officer. Before serving in the Army, Col. Fausti was in the Marines. He was honorably discharged from the Marines in 1984. Col. Fausti holds a master’s degree from Vanderbilt University.
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Citation: Lt. Col. Robert G. Fausti. “Fixing Iraqi Combat Effectiveness,” Army, February 2005.
Original URL: http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3723/is_200502/ai_n9521474
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