The cost of adding 10 more DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyers to the fleet would be less than adding a seven-ship class of next-generation DDG-1000s modified for equal capability in ballistic missile defense, anti-air warfare and anti-submarine warfare, according to a letter from the Navy’s top officer to Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA).
The May 11 letter, obtained by Inside the Navy and authored by Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead, compares the acquisition costs for the DDG-51 destroyer and a modified DDG-1000 destroyer based on a multi-hull procurement in constant fiscal year 2010 dollars.
The cost of procuring a modified DDG-1000, including research, development, test and evaluation, as well as ship construction, would be $2.87 billion in FY-10, while the cost of a DDG-51 would be $2.25 billion, according to the letter. Additionally, the average follow-on cost for ship construction, from FY-11 to FY-16 for a modified DDG-1000 would be $2.25 billion, while the average follow-on cost for a DDG-51 would be $1.9 billion.
For the purposes of the calculations, the modified DDG-1000 would have the Advanced Gun System and associated magazines removed and additional missile-launch tubes installed in their place. The ship would employ Standard Missile-2, SM-3 and SM-6 missiles and otherwise engage in ballistic missile defense and area defense anti-air warfare at least equivalent to that of the Flight IIA DDG-51, which is equipped with the Advanced Capability Build 12 Aegis combat system. No modifications would be done for the two ships to be equal in anti-submarine warfare.
Still, the letter notes that the “technical risk and acquisition costs” associated with the DDG-1000 are not as well-defined as those for the DDG-51 hull and combat system, which has been procured for decades.
“Therefore, the additional capacity and capability gained through continuation of DDG-51s with lower technical risk and defined cost, coupled with the risks associated with the DDG-1000, make the restart of the DDG-51 line the preferred choice for affordable warfighting capability and capacity,” Roughead’s letter states.
Last summer, the Navy announced its intentions to truncate the multibillion-dollar DDG-1000 program at three ships, contending that anti-ship cruise missile, ballistic missile and submarine threats are of new and growing significance and that the vessel does not have the right capabilities to counter them. Instead, the Navy wants to revert to building more of the proven DDG-51s.
In an Oct. 24, 2008 letter from Kennedy to Roughead, the senator, who chairs the Senate Armed Services seapower subcommittee, requested an “apples-to-apples” comparison of the the DDG-51 and DDG-1000, expressing concern that the Navy had not sufficiently justified the truncation decision.
“I believe this would entail providing complete cost data on a DDG-51, as envisioned by the Navy after restart of the production line, and on a DDG-1000 that has modifications the Navy believes are critical to perform the ballistic missile defense, area defense anti-air warfare and blue-water anti-submarine warfare missions driving the Navy’s desire to shift between platforms,” Kennedy wrote in his request.
The Navy’s FY-10 budget request reflects the change, as it seeks the remainder of funds for the third DDG-1000 and to purchase a DDG-51. House authorizers have been supportive of the move, but there has been some resistance from Senate authorizers, including Kennedy. Massachusetts is home to Raytheon, which makes the DDG-1000 combat system and stands to lose billions in potential revenue from the DDG-1000 curtailment.
The letter additionally compares the annual operation and support costs for a DDG-51 and a modified DDG-1000 in constant FY-10 dollars. The total costs of maintenance, manpower and operations, assuming a crude oil price of $50 per barrel, would be $63.8 million for the DDG-51 and $59.1 million for the DDG-1000. At $100 per barrel, it would be $69.9 million for the DDG-51 and $67.6 million for the DDG-1000, and at $150 per barrel it would be nearly equivalent at $75.9 million for the DDG-51 and $76 million for the DDG-1000.
The difference rests largely in manpower costs, which are $37.3 million annually for a DDG-51 but estimated to be just $17.3 million for a DDG-1000. A DDG-51 has 254 enlisted and 24 officers on its crew, while a DDG-1000 would have just 108 enlisted and 15 officers on its crew due to increased automation and by growing shore support to complete activities traditionally performed aboard.
However, the report notes that the numbers do not account for the increased ashore maintenance costs associated with DDG-1000’s decreased crew size, and therefore “comparing the individual element of manning costs between the two ships can be misleading.”
“Navy is committed to increasing the shore infrastructure to perform this maintenance; however, those added maintenance costs generally negate the savings generated by the smaller crew size,” Roughead writes.
The figures are calculated on a 35-year service life basis, including periodic depot maintenance and upgrades, and assume an annual fuel usage rate of 87,373 barrels for DDG-51 and 121,233 barrels for DDG-1000.
The letter also reveals more details about the comparative anti-submarine warfare capabilities of each ship. The main differences, it states, are the bow-mounted sonars, periscope detection radar planned for the DDG-1000, and the DDG-1000’s lower ship noise characteristics to evade detection.
“There is a known performance difference at the sensor level between the hull-mounted sonars on the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 ships due to physical size and source-level differences between the ships,” Roughead writes, noting that the DDG-51 has greater detection capability in blue-water environments.
But when factoring in the periscope detection radar and stealthiness, “the DDG-1000 could be expected to perform as well as, or possibly better than, the DDG-51 under certain scenarios and acoustic conditions.”
However, at the campaign level, he continues, when the DDG-1000 is utilized in fleet anti-submarine warfare activities in conjunction with other ships and aircraft, “the magnitude of the performance difference is unclear.”
As such, Roughead notes that there is a “probability that the difference in performance levels at the campaign level would be low” and assesses the two ships as equal in this area, with no modification necessary to the DDG-1000 for the purposes of the analysis. -- Rebekah Gordon
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