The Army has compiled a comprehensive list of lessons learned from more than seven years of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq that will inform the development of a new ground combat vehicle, according to an Army official.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced the cancellation of the Future Combat Systems vehicle component in April, contending the effort had not adequately incorporated the lessons learned from war. At the same time, he announced the launch of a new vehicle modernization effort.
In an interview with Inside the Army last week, Rickey Smith, director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center-Forward, described the preliminary work being done to produce a concept proposal for the ground combat vehicle effort.
Smith, who is leading the Training and Doctrine Command task force on Army modernization, has nicknamed the effort “Task Force 120,” in reference to the 120 days they have before their Labor Day deadline. The group oversees the many modernization efforts under way brought about by the changes made to the FCS program.
While the service is waiting on an acquisition decision memorandum from the Pentagon acquisition executive that will serve as guidance for restructuring the old FCS program, Smith said TRADOC has been able to move forward with its work.
“We aren’t to the point yet where we have to stop,” said Smith. “We’re waiting for it as well, but at the same time, we’re not sitting down.”
In the meantime, Smith and his colleagues are working on assessments of future threats and operational environments, as well an evaluation of science and technology.
“You’ve got to do all that work before you move forward,” he said.
Key to the preliminary work behind the ground combat vehicle is a thorough analysis of lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, said Smith.
The Army has drafted such a list and will use it to guide the work it does going forward, he said.
“What we’re putting together there is -- after seven years, what are the fact-based, key lessons we’ve learned across [doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities] or the strategic, operational or tactical level,” said Smith. “There’s a wealth of information out there.”
The list is not yet ready for public release, he said.
To create the list, TRADOC had to sort through assertions, myths and anecdotal evidence to create lessons learned that can be applied to the future force, he said.
Smith cited the belief that the current vehicle armor is not adequate as an example.
“That’s an assertion,” he said. “Now what are the facts that back it up? We go to the National Ground Intelligence Center and they tell us how vehicles have been lost in the battle. We go to the scientists and they tell us how certain armor reacts to certain threats. Then you can pretty well prove, or there’s enough factual basis that, yes, that is the lesson learned.”
Task force officials also have encountered the misperception that logistical units were suffering the highest rate of casualties from improvised explosive devices. Smith said this turned out not to be true.
“And mainly that’s because our maneuver forces out there are going into those kind of places to a much greater extent. So, you’ve got to move past people’s emotional perceptions,” he said.
The list of lessons learned is just one piece of a much larger puzzle, according to Smith. He described a number of simultaneous efforts under way that will feed into the ground combat vehicle concept proposal and the Army’s other modernization efforts.
For example, the Army has decided the timing is right to revise its capstone operational concept for the future force, said Smith (see related story).
Smith said these efforts fit the guidance given to TRADOC to carry out this work in an integrated fashion, looking at many interlocking and interdependent issues at once.
“So, we’ve actually taken the view to integrate and synchronize, to the greatest extent we can, all of our force design work, all of our work on protected mobility with our [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles] and up-armored humvees and how those are going to be dealt with over the long haul, both in terms of where they fit in the organization and how their life cycle is managed,” he said.
In addition to analyzing force design and vehicle mix issues, the task force is also doing a comprehensive review of the current network architecture, said Smith.
“They’ve already mapped the existing integrated architectures” being used by troops deploying in 2009 and 2010, said Smith. By understanding where the network is today, the Army can decide where it wants to shift or enhance capabilities, he said. An initial draft of the “integrated architecture view” for 2011 and 2010 has also been completed, he added.
“And then that drives you into a trades discussion, because there’s never enough funding and there’s always more demand and you can always be better,” said Smith. “Do I give everyone an equal thing, even though that lowers the capability on a given type of unit? Or do I make it more robust here and less there? Or do I try to realign funding? All three of those are in play right now.”
A formal assessment of trades that will address those questions will take place in June, he said.
In addition to working in an integrated way, TRADOC has been directed to be inclusive, said Smith. This means working across “schools, centers, proponents and the acquisition community,” he said.
TRADOC is also working to leverage the information available and the work that’s been done, but is not bound by it, Smith said. This means that if something works, there’s no need to change it, he added.
“But at the same time, there are areas where we see that we’ve got to make these shifts -- and the SecDef was clear on some protection items and things -- so we see this as an opportunity to get back into it and give it a good, hard scrub,” he said.
Smith pointed to the progress made through the FCS program in sensors, the network, hybrid electric technologies and advanced armor.
“Now, I’m not saying those will be the answers, but there’s really no reason to say we’ve got a blank sheet of paper. Because we don’t,” he said. “Those are the kinds of things we will leverage.”
The technology also has to be mature enough to be deployed in five to seven years, said Smith. Some people spend too much time determining which technology readiness level will be appropriate, he added. The important question, he said, is, “Can I take it to war tomorrow?”
Because technology readiness levels advance with varying speeds, it is more useful to look at what technologies have been proven, both by contractors and through independent assessments, he said.
It will also be important to deliver a vehicle that is not at the end of its size, weight and power, he said, calling this attribute “expandability.”
At this stage, Smith said he did not see the need for participation from industry just yet. The Army is still determining operational requirements. The Maneuver Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate, spread out between Ft. Benning, GA, and Ft. Knox, KY, is responsible for developing the vehicle operational requirements, according to Smith.
Smith said they are the lead, but they are not alone.
“We have all of the proponents at the table with them,” he said. “The areas that you consider will look very much like the key performance parameters of FCS, not because we’re writing them the same, but things like training, reliability, sustainment, protection, survivability, network -- those are really the areas.
“The question then is, how far do you change? What do you adjust? Do you increase protection or lower transportability? Those are things we have to work our way through and we haven’t come to those conclusions yet.” -- Kate Brannen
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